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From a theoretical point of view the experiences in which the feeling of self 
is temporarily or permanently altered, pose opportunities to apply, critically verify 
or even renew theories of the self. The altered self, from a human point of view, 
supposedly gains its most relevance when it is related to psychological sufferings, 
their comprehension, relief or treatment. However, not all altered self-experiences 
imply suffering or respective treatment. In eastern (and some western) 
philosophical traditions a „No-Self“ is considered. Techniques of a Self/ No- self 
include states of meditation, mindfulness or effortless attention. Moreover, for 
some, self-alterations are desired as in technically achieved, or drug induced 
suspensions of a “fixed”, „regular“, “normalized“ or “orthodox“ experience of 
oneself. If those normative approaches to the self in psychopathologic description 
actually help to elucidate the self or just risk affirming the concept of self-pathology 
instead of seeing the self as a vulnerable mode of self-preservation in its varieties of 
expressions, has to be considered. Different conceptual and clinical notions of the 
altered self and different modes of altered self-experience will be explored as for 
instance the general question of what a mental disorder could be as conceptual 
description of the altered self and how these different approaches to altered selves 
and altered self experiences help to clarify the notion of self. 
This book is the result of a selection of research papers of the project “Cognitive 
Foundation of the Self”1, with the generous support of the Portuguese foundation 
FCT2 and the IFILNOVA and with contributions of international scholars who 
mainly presented and discussed their work at the international conference called 
TheAltered Self and Altered Self-Experience3 held at the Universidade Nova de Lisboa 
(FCSH-UNL) at the institute of philosophy IFILNOVA on the 30th and 31st of May 
2013, and with a special contribution of one of the consultants of this project, Georg 
Northoff.   
If the self is a necessary condition for the possible constitution of experience and 
consciousness, how then does an altered self influence experience or consciousness? 
Is the self actually a stable or a mixed stable/changeable experience condition? How 
many different states of the self do we experience during our life? If we take the 
famous Portuguese writer Fernando Pessoa (1888-1935)- “I am an anthology”- and 
his 136 fictious characters (Pessoa 2013) under which fictious names he wrote, 
serious, we could even ask: How many (altered) selves are we? Does each one of us 
have only and exclusively one permanent and constantly identical (minimal) self or 
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do we have to deal with experiential variations, functional and formal development 
and dynamic modifications and change of self experiences, in which for instance 
the existential feeling of self is altered or in which we can take perspective of the 
other, instead of holding on to a clear unity and continuity of being a unique and 
unchangeable self over time? What affects our self temporarily and what changes it 
permanently? Do we have to struggle on the phenomenal level with a disunity of a 
multiplicity of phenomenal “aspects” and therefore as well with a multitude with 
epistemic conceptions of the self? Is the self “simply” a “complex” but problematic 
pattern (Gallagher 2013)? Can a self be altered voluntarily -and thus, can we 
experience altered states of selves? What do permanently altered selves tell us about 
the problem of normativity in relation to designating selves as “ill” or 
“disordered”? Is there an instituted “altered” self by the knowledge discipline of 
psychiatry? And can we speak of altered selves for example in self-impairments and 
disruption of the self as described in schizophrenia or autism?  
This book deals with the above mentioned questions from a decidedly 
interdisciplinary point of view including multiple and foremost divergent 
conceptual and empirically informed perspectives from philosophy, developmental 
psychology, mindfulness praxis, and different approaches to “neuro”-philosophies, 
philosophy of psychiatry, psychoanalysis, phenomenology as well as religious 
studies, cinema and literature studies.  
The first part of ASASE is on Altered Self-Experience and the second part deals with 





Emotional Aspects of Altered Self-Experience 
Recently in relation to neurobiological theories of the self Catarine Malabou (2013) 
outlined in her “Go Wonder: Subjectivity and affects in neurobiological times” in 
chapter 7 “On Neural Plasticity, trauma and the loss of affects” two meanings of 
brain plasticity, a positive one “in the formation process of neural connections and 
the fact that these connections may be transformed or altered during our lifetimes 
under the influence of experience and the kind of life we are leading” (Malabou 
2013, 56), while a second mode of brain plasticity lies in a negative plastic power as 
in brain damage and self disorders.  What altered affects for our Self mean, and the 
possibility of alteration of self-experience is given in “existential feelings of 
being”(Rattcliffe 2008) in which certain affect disappearance in the neurological 




operator of appearance and disappearance of affect and emotions. Even so that 
everything we used to be has drift away into infinity by time, forgetting, pain, the 
Self might only exists in a permanent auto-apparition or a resistance of 
disappearance into mere episodic occurrences of certain affects or emotions, 
therefore regaining a sometimes lost self-relation. How is the self then altered by 
basic or complex emotional patterns such as anger or guilt? 
 
1 Dina Mendonça - Emotions and Altered Self 
(New University of Lisbon, Portugal) 
Dina Mendonça´s paper examines how emotions alter the self in various ways and 
explores the importance of recognizing different types of deepness of emotions in 
order to establish different ways in which emotions alter the self. Besides looking at 
the double notion of emotion as episode and as disposition (Goldie 2007), 
Mendonça concentrates on the change and the mastering of the emotional control: 
What does it mean to master anger: how to avoid becoming angry in the first place, 
how to cease being angry, how to deal with anger in others (either in episodic 
occurrences as well as dispositional anger). She develops the hypothesis of “Being 
angry as a sonar device” and that from all emotions anger is the one best suited for 
this to test “boundaries” of the self’s social world and of the self’s ability and power 
to change the social world. Thus anger is seen as a socially important emotion and 
as an dynamic test-ground of the self in testing and reestablishing boundaries of the 
self on its own right and in relation to others. 
 
2 Amber Griffioen - Regaining the “Lost Self”: A Philosophical Analysis of 
Survivor’s Guilt  
(University of Konstanz, Germany)  
In "Regaining  the  “Lost  Self”:  A  Philosophical  Analysis  of  Survivor’s  Guilt" 
Amber L. Griffioen analyzes the feeling of guilt that survivors of traumatic events 
(war, rape etc.) feel. Traditionally this guilt is interpreted as resulting from a sense 
of guilt (identification with the causing agent of the trauma) or out of a sense of 
shame. The author believes that we should not focus on any of them separately but 
rather jointly. She characterizes these two kinds of guilt feelings concluding that the 
guilt lies more connected to the action while the focus of shame is the “self”. She 
also analyzes the known varieties of guilt: guilt by substitution (feeling that their 
survival involved the death of another), guilt for transgression (for having 
committed certain act or being to blame for a certain omission of acting right) and 
guilt for its involving role (feeling that the survivor somehow caused the trauma). 
What Griffioen puts into perspective is a “self” that feels hurt in a) its fundamental 
values, b)  in its autonomy as well as c) in its integrity. This self thus feels ashamed to 
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continue to exist in a world that is no longer what it had been before the trauma. 
The author’s assumption then is that the feeling of guilt rehabilitates the agency of the 
self, restoring its independence and regaining its integrity. If the subject thinks it 
had some guilt in the trauma, then is becomes an agent. In this sense Griffoen’s 
thesis is crystal clear: it is preferable to be an agent that is guilty, a self to be blamed, 
than not being an agent at all, and thus being lost or having lost oneself.  
 
Actor’s Self 
3 Sara F. Bizzaro - Acting and the Self 
(Instituto de Filosofia da Nova (IFLNOVA), FCSH-UNL, Portugal) 
With Douglas Hoffstaedter (2007) and his book “I am a strange loop” Bizzaro 
conceives the self in self rehearsals as a strange loop explaining how different types 
of acting and their respective theories work in changing the actor’s self for a 
performance.  In order to understand how an actor forms the character’s 
personality, Bizzaro analyses the acting techniques proposed by Strasberg, 
Stanislavski, Adler and Meisner. These authors’ present techniques of acting that 
go from a heavily internal emotion based acting to an external action based acting. 
Bizarro argues that the efficacy of all these acting methods can be understood within 
the framework created by Hofstadter to explain the way “selves” are represented 
in the brain. Analyzing how actors create other “selves” can be useful for our 
understanding of what the “self” is. Our abilities to play-act as children, to full 
fledge act as professional actors, or socially act in fulfilling our different social roles 
and our ability to view others as “selves”, all seem to indicate that the “self” is 
indeed less firm and stable than we like to think. Healthy “self” deviations can be 
just normal different uses of the same “self” mechanism and in the sense of Bizarro 
Hofstadter ‘s theory is adequate to easily explain how different types of “acting” 
work. 
 
Gender and Altered Self Experience 
4 Iwona Janicka  - Cutting the Cords - Rethinking Judith Butler’s Position on 
Transgender with René Girard’s Theory of Mimesis 
(University of Cambridge, UK)  
Situated aspects play some role in shaping who we are. They include the kind of 
family structure and environment where we grew up; cultural and normative 
practices and narratives define our way of living. The constitution of a wide or 
complex self is no exception in this. An extended self includes self-concepts and 
self-narratives as well as gender accounts to be looked at when referring to an 




intentional make-up of selves is in question. This chapter puts the extended self 
theoretically shaped by psychoanalytical gender theory to test. Psychoanalytical 
theories of the self often make use of cultural founding narratives to explain how 
selves are altered and may deviate towards “strange chambers of our soul”. Freud’s 
Oedipus is such an cultural founding narrative of the self and Butlers approach 
towards the Oedipus myth and the desiring self in Girard (1986) -in a dialogue with 
two psychiatrists (Jean-Michel Oughourlian and Guy Lefort)- in his mimesis account 
in “Things hidden since the foundation of the world”, explores the self as other. 
Janicka theorizes about gender identity in subjective alteration. For the author the 
alteration is relative to social normality, traditionally considered. Starting from the 
theory of Judith Butler (1990, 2004), she tries to show the limits of this theory that 
are visible, when it comes to interpreting transgender. The limits of Judith Butler, 
according to the author- result from Butler’s attachment to a too narrow 
psychoanalytic explanatory model. This critically viewed model gives an account 
of heterosexual and homosexual desire but not- according to Janicka- to 
transgender desire. The assumptions of Butler’s model that are due to a male/female 
dichotomy in which no other modalities are possible is based on the assumption that 
desire is primary and that gender identity is formed mainly from sexual desire and 
that consequently in this dual proposal of gender is seated in the prohibition of 
homosexuality, which becomes necessary for the formation of two orthodox poles 
of sexual identity (male/female). Janicka proposes the model of René Girard as an 
alternative instead. Girard allows to understand transgender desire because it does 
not necessarily link sexual desire to gender identity. Girard’s starting point is not 
sexual desire, but imitation: There are models that are to imitate and other to not 
imitate, i.e., they are rivals. By imitating a model, sexuality is also imitated, for 
example, the boy imitating his father desiring his mother as his father does. Janicka 
in the following analyzes several possible combinations of gender and sexuality, 
trying to demonstrate that Girard’s model solves the difficulties of psychoanalytic 
model best. 
Disembodiment of Self-experience: Out-of-Body Experience, 
Full-Body Illusion and Cinematic Experience 
When reflecting on the what the altered state of self in Out-of Body experience can 
actually tell us about the self we should distinguish different fields of research that 
should be considered in relation to a philosophical notion of the self: Important in 
researching the global aspects of the self when they are experienced as altered are:  
(a) embodiment and the bodily foundations of self-consciousness (b) perspective 
change and perspective-taking (2nd, 1st or 3rd PP) in altered selves and altered self 
experiences: biological and ecological aspects (Fuchs 2012) are important which 
allow the self to distinguish between self and what is not-self or other, including 
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aspects that define the egocentric (body-centered) spatial frame of reference-oposed 
to allocentric reference frames, considering a first-person perspective for possible 
actions in peri-personal space and its altered conditions as for instance in autoscopic 
experiences such as Out-of-Body experiences (Brugger, Blanke; Lenggenhagger 
etc.) (see: Gerner & Guerra, Zippel, Fonseca in this volume). Perspective taking can 
as well be seen as an essential component in the mechanisms that accounts for 
intersubjectivity and agency in relation to the self. 
According to Mohr&Blanke (2005) autoscopic phenomena (AP) are “rare”, illusory 
visual experiences during which the subject e.g. has the impression of seeing a 
second own body in extra-personal space. AP - in their view- consist in “out-of-
body experience, autoscopic hallucination, and heautoscopy”. For Brugger et al. 
(2006) Heautoscopy can be described as the encounter with one’s double (the 
reduplication of a single body and self and thus a breakdown of integrative 
multimodal processes that let me identify with my body), in the sense of a 
multimodal illusory reduplication of one’s own body and self. The phenomenon of 
polyopic Heautoscopy (a multiplication of body and self) according to Brugger et 
al (2006) “points to the multiple mappings of the body, whose disintegration may 
give rise to the illusory experience of multiple selves.“ Moreover, recent research 
has not only described phenomenologically these strange doubling, mirroring or 
shadowing phenomena of an altered or  “disrupted” self (Mishara 2010) but has 
shown as well that invasive technical manipulation of the brain can even induce an 
“illusory shadow person” (Arzy et al 2006) for example by artificial brain 
stimulation of the temporal parietal junction. How these strange autoscopic 
phenomena could be made fruitful in understanding not only pathologic or 
deviated self-experience but as well the working of the self in for example cinematic 
experience shall interest us here. How can the REM sleep state show itself as a 
proper state of conscious experience in which OBE could find a foundational 
explanation. Is it then possible to say that we have at least three different conscious 
states of self (unconscious, REM conscious and full conscious)? Is the self explained 
well by Northoff 2013b inside a triadic concept of consciousness that takes into 
consideration the brain´s intrinsic spatio-temporal activities in “resting states”, 
either slow loops (Northoff 2013b) in which the resting state’s slow wave 
fluctuations supposedly in the frequency ranges between 0.001 and 4 Hz are seen 
as central in consciousness (He et al 2008; He and Raichle, 2009; Raichle, 2009; 
Northoff 2013b), or in the distinction of resting states in REM sleep to fully 
conscious states (40Hz), in which the neural reactivity of the resting state to external 
stimuli distinguishes the awake state from the REM state (Llinás et al. 1998 and 
Llinás 2002). Accordingly, we could propose three alternating states of the self: the 




could be explained to fall into an in- between territory of overlapping fully awake Self 
and an REM self. 
 
5 Alexander Gerner & Michele Guerra - The Cinematic Self- Cinematic 
Experience, perspective taking and Out-of Body-Experience 
(CFCUL, University of Lisbon, Portugal & University of Parma, Italy) 
Theoretically and practically the self is something every one of us experiences and 
as such for Gerner & Guerra is subjected by alterations, mutations, and 
developments and in some cases even transformations. This chapter asks how can 
the experience of the self be altered temporarily (Altered Self-Experience) by 
immersion in cinematic experience including cinema, but as well VR. Gerner & 
Guerra focus on why the perspective (Petkova et al 2011) and its alteration matters 
as changes in the 1st PP realized by a) alienation (OBE) or b) appropriation (avatar 
identification) (see: Ganesh et al 2011) as well as the switch in between  2nd , 1st and 
3rd PP in relation to the full body image and full body hallucinations, in which issues 
of self-identification and bi-localization and other doubling phenomena become 
important to understand altered self-experience. The authors ask: Why OBE’ s 
could be interesting to be treated as cinematic experience in itself in the sense of 
"cinematic experience without a screen"? They recall as well more recent 
phenomenological theories of cinematic subjectivity in order to wonder how and 
whether the movie can be endowed with subjectivity, at least a simulated or enacted 
form of intersubjectivity assured by the degree of immersion and self-loss of the 
viewer into the movie and its “extended empathy” (Fuchs 2014) towards the 
characters represented on the screen (without their real bodies being present), 
looking at the definition of empathy towards the “virtual other” in Fuchs (2014). 
Altered self-experiences seem to show a switch of a) The ego-centered and the b) 
allo-centered reference frame or simply a possible dynamics of different 
“centeredness” perspectives of (somatic, exosomatic or I-You somatic) self 
experience. As cinematic experience the authors define switches in between the 
body centeredness to world-centeredness in relation to what happens on the screen 
in the moment of suspension of disbelief. But also the extension of the body image 
is made possible in cinematic experience as well as empathetic perspective taking with 
certain characters or actions on the screen. The question “What do I experience as 
my body?” (see: Blanke and Metzinger 2009) leads us as well to the problem of the 
proper body as a screen between sensed and projected body of (identity, body image 
etc) unfolding layers and repetitive projections of a film that is my “own” or my 
“entire” or my “narrative” body, besides or superimposed on my somatic body 
schemata. The authors follow the question in relation to immersive experience: How 
can we be distracted from our somatic body and immersed into a fictional or cinematic body- 
the body I feel and am affected by as long as the cinematic experience lasts?  
Alexander Gerner & Jorge Gonçalves  
 
16 
6  Niccola Zippel - The Altered Self in Dreaming State related to the Out-Of-Body 
Experiences. A Phenomenological Account interfacing with Neuroscience 
(Sapienza University of Rome, Italy) 
Zippel presents a neurophenomenological account of Out-of-Body experience related 
to sleep and dreaming states of consciousness. The author proposes a 
phenomenological reading of the alteration of the self in the out-of-body 
experiences during dreaming, which, based on the notion of the self as an embodied 
self, understands the self and the body as an indissoluble whole. The dream state 
represents a very peculiar condition of bodily experience: while during the NREM 
sleep one experiences a muscular-skeletal relaxation, in the REM sleep one lives the 
paralysis of her own body, to which a vivid mental process triggered by the ponto-
geniculo-occipital (PGO) waves corresponds. During this phase of the sleep, 
dreaming takes the shape of a bizarre narration that, despite its incongruity, 
uncertainty, and discontinuity, inserts itself in the network of neural connections 
already in place, and for this reason it is another way of performing personal 
emotions, thoughts, and associations. Precisely by the inability to move, the 
embodied self experiences such a rich mental performance as an alienating 
dimension of his/herself, since the body becomes an inactive though often invoked 
part of the dream (e.g. one tries to escape or to jump in dream without succeeding 
in doing it). On the other hand, being the motionless counterpart of the frantic 
activity of the dreaming mind, the body, as it were, is outside the dream events. 
This complex neurophysiologic situation is interesting from a phenomenological 
perspective, for it offers the opportunity to consider the condition of the embodied 
subject as regards the unaware mental process of dreaming. As a general goal, the 
paper aims at showing the basic features of the relationship between the dreaming 
self and his/her own body in the light of the most significant empirical dream’s 
researches findings.  
But still we have to understand what notion of the self we are talking about: For 
example Blanke and Metzinger propose a representationalist account of Minimal 
Phenomenal Self in which a minimal phenomenal self would be a necessary condition 
for a strong and cognitive 1PP (see: Blanke & Metzinger 2009, 7) In this part the 
dynamics of self-location (from where from do I perceive, speak, feel) become important 
as well as the question how  the relation between my experiential point of view of 
my self and the point of view of the somatic body expresses a dynamicity of the 
natural media of perspective and perspective-taking with my body (eye position, 
attentional gaze, attentional mode –focused; distracted; etc.), arms, legs, trunk, head 





7 João Fonseca – Full-Body Illusions, Out-of-Body Experiences and what they 
reveal about the Nature of the Self: some Functional, Computational and 
Neurological Considerations 
(New University of Lisbon, Portugal) 
In his neuro-computational approach João Fonseca uses autoscopic phenomena such 
as Full-Body-Illusions (FBIs) and Out-of-Body-Experiences (OBEs) to test his thesis 
for a taxonomical distinction between two kinds of Core-Self: Core-Self Simpliciter 
(CSS) and Cognitive Core-Self (CCS). He draws differences between a cortical 
proposal (Motor, Pre-Motor and Prefrontal areas) of a Core-Self and Björn Merker’s 
(2005, 2007) sub-cortical proposal (Upper-brainstem complex: superior culliculus – 
Pariequeductal Grey Area/hypothalamus - Substancia Nigra/Basal Ganglia) to develop 
the notion of Core-Self in this neurophilosophical model would correspond 
contrastively to the notion of a narrative or auto-biographical Self in the sense of 
Damasio. Fonseca suggests the fragmentation of the notion of Core-Self into two 
sub-concepts: CCS and CSS which would correspond to the most “basic sense of 
selfhood”, non-extended in time whereas CCS adds cognitive complexity and a 
short-time dimension to the former. Fonseca supports his distinction by invoking 
distinct neural and computational properties to each notion in which CCS would 
be build up in CSS’s neural structures and computational capacities.  
 
Altered Self-Experience in Religious Experience and Intimacy  
8 Gabriel Levy - The Implications of Anomalous Monism for Intimate Selves 
(Norwegian University of Science and Technology Trondheim, Norway) 
The religious study scholar Gabriel Levy looks at the intimate relation of man and 
woman as in the narrative model of Adam and Eve and brings this religious topic 
together with Donald Davidson’s concept of anomalous monism in 
interdependence of self and other (Davidson 1970; 2001). Levy’s paper focuses on 
the relationship between intimacy and the self.  By using one of the paradigmatic 
narratives about self-altering encounters of (sexual) intimacy, Adam and Eve, Levy 
explores the concept of intimacy in relation to intimate selves. Davidson’s anomalous 
monism argues that, although the first-person has a certain kind of authority in 
ascribing mental states to him or herself, the concept of the self is irreducible 
because it is grounded in intersubjectivity. Since intimacy requires a sense of 
ownership of the subjective self, this can lead to problems within a Davidsonian 
framework, in which the inter-subjective level is often prioritized. Taking the 
subjective level seriously from a Davidsonian perspective and from enacted mind 
(Kyselo & Di Paolo 2013) requires- according to Levy- a radical subjectivity that is 
exemplified by a personal experience of altered intimate self of the author that 
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happened at the proper Lisbon ASASE meeting in 2013 and that he reflects upon in 
an narrated interlude. In this way, this chapter pursues the subject of intimate selves 
not just from a scientific objective but as well from a subjective and intersubjective 
level in which the study methodologically switches perspective from a historical 
case study to self-observation and back.  
 
9 Bernardo Palmerim - Attention and Redemption of the Self in Weil and Sartre 
(University of Lisbon, Portugal) 
In his paper Bernardo Palmeirim addresses a classical issue of religious 
“conversion” (cf. greek metanoia) with Heidegger– which he names within the 
religious tradition with the term as “attention”. Conversion assumes a suffering, 
sick, divided self, and its supposed (re-) unification in religious or transcendental 
experience. The author compares two types of conversion. The first is given in the 
character Antoine Roquentin from the novel Nausea by Jean Paul Sartre and that can 
be seen as a model of "aesthetic conversion." The second is the “religious 
conversion" in Simone Weil. They have in common that the self in both conversion 
models turns its attention from itself to something outside by "loosing" its proper 
self in a religious or sublime “other” by contemplating “God” or an “artwork”. For 
Palmerim in religious conversion we are confronted with a moral transformation in 
which the world takes on a new meaning in God, while in aesthetic conversion there 
is no universal structure that explains its existence.  
 
Altered Self-Experience in Drug-Experiments and Mindfulness 
Meditation 
10 Michaela Hulstyn  - The Mutative Self and the Language of Insight in Henri 
Micheaux’s  Mescaline Experiments  
(University of Stanford, USA) 
Hulstyn examines the concept of a “mutative Self” in the texts of the Belgian-born 
poet Henri Micheaux that account for his Mescaline self-experiments in the 1950’s 
and 60’s.  
She asks: Can narratives on drug experimentation shed light on philosophic and 
psychological accounts of the self? The questionable status of the self during altered 
states of consciousness includes the moments of individual’s existence during 
which he oneself is not “in its right mind,” including the time one spends asleep, 
drunk, or on the drug mescaline, as in the case of Henri Michaux. While terms like 
“mind-altering” are commonplace in discussions of drug culture, especially as 
related to the psychedelic 1960s, few studies of altered states have considered a 




experimentation can tell us about the nature of the self during ordinary 
circumstances. In this paper Hulstyn examines Michaux’s take on the process of 
>unselfing< - a concept developed by Joshua Landy (2012) in How to Do Things with 
Fictions that covers both self-transcendence and self-rupture, as described during the 
self-induced drug experiments that began in 1956 and were carried out through the 
1960s. Michaux’s conception of the self during so-called normal states is considered 
using terminology from current research in psychology, philosophy and 
neuroscience to help understand the self-experience that Michaux describes in his 
work. Michaux’s take on altered states of selfhood in a synchronic sense, as 
described by himself in the experience of disunity in the moment, as well as the 
effect of the long-term experience, or diachronic sense of the self is analyzed. While 
doing so Hulstyn examines the implications of Michaux’s work on the development 
of a metaphysical vocabulary for otherworldly experience in the absence of faith in 
an omnipotent third party witness.  
 
11 Vera Pereira - Mindfulness and Self-Experience: No-Self Consciousness or 
Empty-Self Consciousness?  
(New University of Lisbon, Portugal) 
Mindfulness training has been used for centuries in eastern traditions such as 
Buddism (Albahari 2011) and Yoga with the goal of reaching altered states of 
consciousness capable of changing the experience and perception of self for 
spiritual purposes for instance by open monitoring techniques and focused 
attention (Travis & Shear 2010). Recently studies have shown that even traditional 
focused attention techniques also become effortless with practice (Lutz et al 2008). 
Thus in western cultures in recent years mindfulness psychotherapeutic programs 
have become popular. The developmental psychologist Vera Pereira explores in her 
chapter phenomenological and neurophysiological data on effects of these 
techniques. She reviews within the field of neuroscientific studies how mindfulness 
meditation affects self-referential processing and how meditation influences brain plasticity. 
She proposes that continuous regular practice of meditation techniques can lead to 
the progressive de-identification with the narrative self and an identification with 
the minimal-self, that is experienced as “empty” or a “non-personal psychological 
entity”, thus proposing a certain suspension of the narrative (Schechtman 2013) or 
egoic (Husserl) as well as extended autobiographic self (Damasio 2010) approaches 










The second part of ASASE is on Altered self in states of permanent self alteration in 
general and schizophrenia, depression and autism in specific. First we will ask with 
Gonçalves (12) how we can actually define a mental disorder. Problems then 
addressed are (13) embodied aspects of the self and the self-presenting character of 
abnormal conscious experience with López-Silva (14) the lack of unity of the self 
and self-recognition (Pio Abreu) (15) the neurological “midlinestructures” 
explanatory hypothesis of altered selves (Northoff) related to depression and 
schizophrenia (16) the interaction of self and other (autism and interaction theories 
of Cognition(Hipólito) and the enactive approach to self-other while asking (17) Is 
autism a relational self disorder? (Ciaunica) 
 
What is a Mental Illness?   
12  Jorge Gonçalves - How to define a Mental Disorder? 
(New University of Lisbon, Portugal) 
Gonçalves wonders why certain changes of the self are classified as mental illness. 
He is critically reviewing, not the search for causal explanations of mental illnesses, 
but the mere fact of epistemically knowing how to define these altered states of self as 
diseases and according to this definition how disorders come to exist objectively. His 
idea is that mental illness is defined based on a background of social, ethical and 
epistemic norms (Broome & Bortolloti, 2009). We may consider them as objective 
only if we assume that there is progress in human reason in the sense of overcoming 
cultural relativism in relation to mental illness. Gonçalves responds to possible 
alternatives to the idea that mental illness is defined as based on social, ethical and 
epistemic norms. Gonçalves refers to George Graham´s (2010) conventionalist thesis 
that causal-mechanist factors will be always present if there is a mental disorder. 
Graham argues that if it is true that mental disorders depend on social values, this 
is not a sufficient reason for us to reject them as “illnesses” in the realistic sense of 
the term. An alternative is that mental illness would be a malfunction of a natural 
function. The prevailing thought then would be that it is possible to determine 
certain natural functions of the brain and injuries that impair these functions. A 
further alternative is considered by Gonçalves to define mental illness as the 
subjective experience of suffering. The author, however, tries to show that these last 
two alternative perspectives are insufficient to define mental illness suggesting the 
aforementioned solution for reconciling the context dependency and the need for 




Altered Self in Schizophrenia and Depression 
13 Pablo López-Silva - Self Awareness and the Self-Presenting Character of 
Abnormal Conscious Experience  
(University of Manchester, UK) 
From a first-person perspective a self/non-self distinction is given in its various 
sensory-motor modalities, contributing to an embodied feelings of being (Ratcliffe 
2008) a self (a) sense of ownership and a (b) sense of agency for one’s actions (Gallagher 
2000, 2012; Rochat 2011). For Zahavi there is a “first personal givenness”(Zahavi 
2003) of experience in the sense of Nagel´s (1974) famous “what does it feel like” (to 
be a bat) to be a self or what it feels like. The feeling of being present and if a self 
can be directly given or presented, and how this idea of self “presence” is conceived 
is another field of controversy (c) “identification” with a body and its actions as a 
whole (phenomenally experienced as belonging to me thus also called ‘mineness’).  
The paper of López-Silva critically reviews phenomenological views- especially of 
Zahavi- that assume that minimal forms of self-awareness are an integral element 
inherent in all experiences. What is often called the sense of “mineness” of 
experience or sometimes is refered to in the debate on the “Immunity of Error to 
Misidentification” - IEM (Shoemaker 1984) - relative to the first person pronoun is 
called the self-presenting claim (SPC) of all experiences in Lopés-Silva’s  paper. The 
author uses arguments from a disrupted sense of mineness, such as in 
schizophrenia, that is specifically cases of “Thought Insertion” but as well reflects 
cases of somatoparaphrenic delusion and alien hand syndrome as arguments 
against Zahavi´s notion of mineness and the “I” as the subject of self-awareness in 
the sense of a necessary feature of givenness of all experience. 
 
Here the question arises how for example Zahavi explains (or fails this task) how 
the conceptual distinction between sensed and sensing grounds the distinction 
between the sense of agency and mineness. Altered self experiences such as 
autoscopic experiences, mindfulness or buddist no-self models pose general 
questions to a coherent concept of the self and deeply question the coherence of the 
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14  José Luís Pio Abreu - Schizophrenia is the Collapse of Self-Recognition. What 
Self? 
(CFCUL, Portugal) 
The professor of psychiatry Pio Abreu (Abreu 2012) addresses questions of the self 
in schizophrenia from a standpoint of an intentional self and the problem of self-
recognition. After introducing an account of neurobiology of schizophrenia, Abreu 
shows difficulties that patients with schizophrenia are confronted with as having 
problems on the neuronal level with brain connectivity by way of “long fibers” 
which link distant zones of the neo-telencephalon (Fornito et al., 2011). These 
difficulties for Abreu are due to several genetic variations and early environmental 
aggressions that disturb the development and organization of long fibers in the 
telencephalon, which are disrupted in pre-schizophrenic and schizophrenic 
subjects. He asks why we need such a large telencephalon. His thesis is that we need 
it (1) to handle signs – words, drawings and manufactured objects - which permits 
us to extend our territory, since signs are essential for all cognitive activities; (2) to 
recognize other people and ourselves, since human territory is composed of other 
people, (3) to evaluate reality while shifting between our intentions and the 
intentions of others. Schizophrenic patients have specific difficulties in every one of 
these three domains. Abreu defines the main problem of the schizophrenic self as 
the alternating between its and others' intentions, and assuming alternative 
meanings. All through life, there are situations where self-recognition and 
recognition of self-agency is decisive but laborious. These -for Abreu- are the 
situations that might precipitate a schizophrenic episode.  
The lack of unity of the self in schizophrenia is expressed by Abreu in the following 
way: In psychopathology, we usually say that schizophrenic symptoms disrupt the 
unity of the self as opposed to self identity which is disturbed in dissociative 
pathologies and is concerned with the temporal continuity of the autobiographical 
self. In his point of view we should look for the self, which is disturbed in 
schizophrenia in upper areas of the brain. His take on the intentional self is shown 
by the example of why we can’t tickle ourselves: if I have the intention of tickling 
myself, I do not feel ticklish because the efferent copy inhibits my sensorial 
perception. In this case, normal people feel ticklish, but schizophrenic patients have 
some difficulty in feeling the difference, perhaps because they cannot organize the 
efferent copies through long fibers in the telencephalon very well. In Pio Abreu’s 
concept of the unity of self-, which is challenged when schizophrenic symptoms are 
experienced- we have to consider an upper intentional self, constructed by learning, 
and processed in the more recent areas of the brain, above the autobiographical  (or 





15 Georg Northoff - How is our Self altered in Psychiatric Disorders – 
Neuropsychopathological Hypotheses  
(University of Ottawa, Canada) 
The Neurophilosopher and Neuroethicist Georg Northoff in his chapter and special 
issue of “Psychopathology of the Self in Psychiatric Disorders – 
Neuropsychopathological Hypotheses” conceives the self as central to our 
experience that has often been assumed to be necessary for any kind of 
consciousness in philosophy. For Northoff to understand the working and failures 
in the self we have to focus empirical attention on the midline structures in the 
brain. Recent investigations in neuroscience demonstrate- according to Northoff- a 
particular set of regions like the cortical midline regions to be associated with the 
processing of stimuli, specifically related to the self as distinguished from those 
remaining unrelated to the self. Furthermore, findings show close overlap between 
self-related activity and high levels of resting state activity in especially anterior 
midline regions. Recent findings in psychiatric disorders like depression and 
schizophrenia show both resting state abnormalities in exactly these regions that is, 
the cortical midline structures. Based on the psychopathology of the self and the 
recent neural findings of the resting state, Northoff develops a specific 
neuropsychopathological hypotheses about the self in depression and schizophrenia that are 
amenable to future experimental testing.      
 
Altered Social Selves? Autism and Intersubjectivity  
16 Inês Hipólito - On Autism and Interaction Theories of the Self 
(New University of Lisbon, Portugal) 
Hipólito reminds us that persons with Autistic Spectrum Disorder show various 
difficulties in social skills, cognitive processing and other co-occurring behavioral 
and physical problems. As people with autism demonstrate a lack of ability in dealing 
with others, the study of autism, with its specific constellation of behavioral and 
cognitive deficiencies this may highlight the structure, development and nature of 
social cognition in general and Self/Other awareness in particular. Hipólito 
challenges the failure in >Theory of Mind< in Autism view that characterizes social 
cognition as an individual achievement that happens within a particular person’s 
brain and body and treats social phenomena as external events that require 
interpretation, namely, mind-reading. Alternatively, she defends Gallagher’s 
“Interaction Theory” (Gallagher 2009) which proposes that the ability to “read” 
others is primarily a form of body reading rather than mind reading. Hereby the 
capability to comprehend other persons ultimately rests in a form of embodied 
practice that is emotional, sensory-motor, perceptual and nonconceptual.  
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Interaction Theory comprehends primary intersubjectivity and secondary 
intersubjectivity. Primary Intersubjectivity is seen hereby as the innate or early 
developing capacity to interact with others manifested at the level of perceptual 
experience— we see or more generally perceive in the other person’s bodily 
movements, facial gestures, eye direction, what they intend and what they feel. On 
this view, in second-person interactions, the mind of the other is not entirely hidden 
or private, but is given and manifest in the other person’s embodied behavior. 
Interaction theory- according to Hipólito- contends that these embodied practices 
constitute our primary access for understanding others, and continue to do so even 
after we attain theory of mind abilities, that in autism in this view is supposed to 
fail.  
 
17 Anna Ciaunica - Autism: a Relational Self Impairment? 
(University of Fribourg, Switzerland) 
Ciaunica treats the controversy over the basis for young children’s experience of 
themselves and others as separate yet related individuals, each with a mental 
perspective on the world – and over the nature of corresponding deficits in autism. 
On the dominant view, it has been argued that the human aptitude at inferring 
mental states is one of the crucial preconditions for the evolution of cooperative 
social structure in human societies. Consequently, limitations in psychological 
perspective-taking among autistic children have been regarded as signs of a 
“Mindblindness” deficit in having metarepresentational mental states (Baron-
Cohen et al 1985; Leslie 1994). Lombardo and Baron-Cohen (2010) recently 
acknowledged that Mindreading researches have left a gap in terms of devices that 
may be responsible not only for atypical self-referential processes in autistic 
children but also in their integration into the bigger picture of how individuals 
navigate and interact with the social world. This paper defends the idea that the 
intersubjective relatedness of the self is foundational for the development of higher order 
mentalizing skills and not the other way around. Hence, autistic individuals might 
suffer from a specific Relational-Self Impairment which triggers metarepresentational 
deficits.  
Ciaunica argues for a developmental account of the self in which the Self is build 
through Others by the centrality of what has come to be termed as “primary 
intersubjectivity” characterizes the mental experience of infants during infant–
caregiver interactions from the earliest phases of life. Given this attunement 
between a baby’s subjective experience of her own as well as of the caregiver’s 
experience during the organized patterns of mother–infant interactions from birth 
(Rochat and Striano, 1999), it has been hypothesized that there is a basic human-




Seeman 2011; Metcalfe & Terrace 2013) and joint intentionality (Tomasello et al 
2005, 2014). Moreover, attention has been paid to the intricate organization of the 
early bi-directional affective and imitative interaction sequences and their 
characteristic contingent ‘protoconversational’ turn-taking structure (Beebe et al 
1997; Jaffe et al 2001). Later, towards the end of the first year, infants relate to others’ 
actions and attitudes with reference to a shared world, for example by showing 
things to others and making requests, imitating others’ actions on objects, and 
engaging in social referencing (Bretherton 1992). A further stage that occurs 
between the middle and the end of the second year is when children show 
conceptual understanding of self and other, for example in adjusting their actions 
to the needs and feelings of others, referring to themselves as ‘I’ and addressing 
others as ‘you’, and talking about their own and others’ mental states. This latter 
stage has been typically taken to reflect a child’s ‘theory of mind’, but also the child’s 
increasingly sophisticated concept of ‘selves’, i.e., of individual persons who have 
distinctive psychological relations with the social and physical world. These 
findings according to Ciaunica suggest that infants’ capacity to understand other 
minds is rooted in their capacity to actively engage in intersubjective scenarios. The 
self in this view is not understandable without an irreducible embodied aspect to 
such interactions (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). The “interaction component” 
thesis stipulates that interaction constitutes, not just causally contributes, to 
intersubjective understanding.  
Ciaunica’ s chapter opens up towards a second part of the Lisbon research on the 
social (cognitive) foundations of self, an important follow up result of the Altered Self 
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The paper1 examines how emotions alter the self in various ways and explores the 
importance of recognizing different types of deepness of emotions in order to 
establish different ways in which emotions alter the self and proposing that anger 
works as a sonar device to find out information about the world and ourselves.  
Why should we begin with anger?2 In a very interesting article entitled “Anger, 
Present Injustice, and Future Revenge in Seneca’s De Ira” Katja Maria Vogt writes 
that Seneca said that anger was the most hideous and frenzied of all the emotions, 
and that the general assumption about anger was that understanding its nature was 
a way to avoid its occurrence. As Vogt writes, “[t]he idea that we should aim at 
getting rid of anger is tied to the theoretical discussion of anger: once we understand 
what we actively do when we experience anger, we can stop short of getting angry” 
(Vogt 2006, 57) further on pointing out that, for the most part, scholarly debate 
assumes that Seneca’s analysis of anger to be an exemplary analysis of an emotion 
and it can be expanded to a general theory of all emotions (Vogt 2006, 60). Vogt 
offer a thorough analysis of the definition and treatment of anger for Seneca raising 
several questions about its nature and the response given by the Stoic philosophical 
position. She explains how anger is, in spite of the particular attention that is 
devoted to it, particularly and surprisingly difficult to understand within the Stoic 
framework. One of the difficulties she indicates is the fact that emotions do not 
present a specific course of action (Vogt 2006, 61, 69, 73). The exemplary case of 
anger identified by the ancient tradition is perhaps due to the fact that anger is said 
to be one of the most frequently experienced emotions (Averill 1982), having 
consequences for health and illness for denying to feel anger, controlling its 
outbursts and general suppression of its experience is linked to a myriad of health 
problems such as asthma, ulcers, headaches, coronary heart disease and cancer 
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(Tucker and Friedman 1996; Siegman 1994; Tavris 1982: cited in Schieman 1999, 
274). 
In this paper I will begin by looking at the specific case of anger to unfold different 
levels of emotion’s deepness, and similarly to Seneca’s insight, think that some of 
the issues we observe with anger can be taken to be part of the overall conception 
of the emotions. One of the questions I want to keep in the background of the 
analysis is this questions about the connection of emotion to a course of action and 
the fact that no determinate course of action seems, at least at first, to be attached to 
emotions and return at the end to this pressing query.  
It seems that when a person gets angry one alters the self because it makes a person 
perceive the world through the lenses of anger. The tone of subjectivity introduced 
by the feeling of anger can be identified as showing that anger makes people think 
more optimistically because dangers seem smaller, actions seem less risky, ventures 
seem more likely to succeed, and unfortunate events seem less likely (Lerner & 
Keltner 2001, 150). Consequently, angry people are more likely to make risky 
decisions, and make more optimistic risk assessments because anger increases the 
perception of what is familiar and decreases the perception of what is risky 
(Gambetti & Giusberti 2009, 14). 
In addition, because emotions trigger certain changes in cognition, physiology and 
action the alterations caused by anger manifests itself in retrospective thinking as 
well, and therefore anger makes people less trusting, and slower to attribute good 
qualities to outsiders when they reflect upon events (Lerner & Keltner 2001, 151). 
An the list goes on as an angry person tends to anticipate other events that might 
cause anger, and tends to place more blame on another person for the misery, and 
anger can make a person more desiring of an object to which anger is tied, etc. The 
changes given by anger also seem to be sensitive to proximity of other people, that 
is, the status of anger changes with proximity and with the type of intimacy we have 
with people such that people who are close to us can offend us, wrong us, or deny 
us and overall make us more angry than distant people and thus anger is a far more 
difficult issue with those same close relationships.  
What the previous description tells us is that when we consider anger solely by the 
episodic moments of anger we get a very poor image of what anger is making it be 
bound to simply identify physical events that happen with anger, or specific types 
of injustice that may cause anger. It is within this critical position about the nature 
of anger that we can understand Nichola Dent article entitled “Anger is a Short 
Madness: dealing with Anger in Émile’s Education”. Dent writes that we clearly 
“misunderstand anger, its depth and pervasiveness, if we think of it principally in 
terms of episodes or bouts, rather than in terms of a mode of understanding or a 
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cluster of such modes, with accompanying estimates of value, imperatives for 
action, patterns of reaction and so on which can endure and shape an entire 
character or culture” (Dent 2000, 314). Dent’s paper indicates how we must 
conclude that, in order to understand emotion in all its complexity, it is necessary 
to think how anger modifies the person who feels it, how it modifies the persons’ 
relationships to others and to the overall reality (Dent 2000, 314).  
Thus, there are a wide variety of reasons why we can identify that people get angry 
and though we may be able to identify a specific episode for the manifestation of 
anger it is important to list all possible causes of anger to properly understand these 
episodes, as well as its consequences. First, people become angry when they think 
they, or those mattering to them, have been treated unjustly, contrary to their 
expectations of good treatment, when assumed social and interpersonal norms are 
violated. Secondly, people become angry when they are injured or insulted (hubris) 
by another such as when the person doing the action wants to show their 
superiority to the other person (bullying is a good example). Thirdly, people can get 
angry with another person not for what they in fact do or have done, but for what one 
assumes they are likely to or will do. Fourthly, people get angry when another person 
prevents, hinders, or even fails to help them with something they want and it feels 
to be due. As a consequence, even someone bothering a person in a state of 
unsatisfied desire can make them angry. Fifthly, people get angry when events go 
contrary to their expectations. And finally, we can say that people become angry 
when what they value, or what take very seriously, is denigrated or treated 
contemptuously by others3. To complexify matters even further the nature of anger 
its nature is also complemented by the cultural and literary inheritance of the 
meaning of anger with its manifold of meanings. In “A Brief History of Anger” 
Potegal and Novaco explain that thought when we look at scholarly work on anger 
there seems to be an overall suggestion that social tendencies work for moderating 
anger, there also seems to be the case that these tendencies are disturbed by the way 
in which anger plays an important role in maintaining the social hierarchy (Potegal 
& Novaco 2010, 19). So, thought there are several cultural restrictions on expression 
and experience of anger in many cultures around the world, as Potegal and Novaco 
identify, the human inheritance about anger must include both the prohibitions 
about anger as well as the images of sustenance of anger. That is, next to the fear of 
social and physical condemnation of anger, the belief that anger invites ill-health 
and misfortune and that expressing it is inappropriate for adults for it is amoral, 
bestial and childish, and finally that it is an emotion to be shameful of (Ibid, 12), we 
must also place the fact that in warrior type cultures, anger is cultivated as a way to 
produce indifference to wounds and pain and promote fearlessness in the battles 
(Ibid, 14). This is easily testified by the Viking fighter and also represented by 
Homer’s Illiad which starts with the phrase “wrath of Achilles” and can be 
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considered as to contain a complete and complex description of anger and its rise 
from various social causes and its various manifestations both facially and by verbal 
expression and its subsequent action (Ibid, 13). 
Since it has been shown that -“The capacity to control expression of emotion, particularly 
negative emotions, develops over the first years of life and has particular importance for the 
unfolding of appropriate and adaptive social behavior (Eisenberg et al., 1996; Eisenberg, 
1995; Thompson, 1994)” (Fox & Calkins 2003, 7)- it must be the case that we learn 
anger within this complex and mixed information cultural heritage and that looking 
into how we learn about emotions may be an interesting way to tackle the 
complexity of emotion.   
So we learn with others from birth how to feel, how to react to our feelings and 
emotions, how to integrate it into our emotional landscape. One of the strange 
outcomes of emotional education is that, unintentionally, the education of emotion 
aims to provide those growing up with a type of temporal neutrality, which can be 
stated as the general command:  
“Feel this way (that I am telling you or showing you) truly and you will not be 
feeling this other emotions which you do because you happen to be four and get 
easily frustrated”. (Brink 2003, 241) 
This temporal neutrality has several consequences: one is to assume that education 
of emotion is a domestication of emotion such as to produce the proper way to 
behave and feel; second, it leaves to chance the development of emotions for it 
assumes a mistaken simplicity; and third it maintains the current ambiguous stance 
to emotions, as is seen in the case of anger. This ambiguity about emotions 
impregnates the overall look upon emotions making them seem to both justify 
certain choices and attitudes while, at the same time, they are taken as ways that 
impair and block the best choices and attitudes. Consequently, we tend to look at 
our own emotional lives through these same incoherent lenses and we seldom take 
into account the complex surroundings of an episode of an emotion. For example, 
we are not educated to interpret ourselves (or others) to take seriously into account 
the amount of tiredness of lack of sleep impact of emotional experience. So, though 
it is reasonably to find oneself cranky and generally unsatisfied with everything on 
a Friday after a whole of week of resting only 5 hours at night, the maxim we allow 
ourselves is the lack of control on displaying crankiness. Instead we tend to take the 
issues that promote the crankiness seriously while, at the same time, we clearly 
know that being tired tends to change our perception of the world so as to make 
people more prone to being cranky. So we can use this information in many ways 
depending on how it suits us: sometimes to diminish the impact and importance of 
others people’s emotional reactions (if it so pleases us) by pointing out that a cranky 
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tired person does not deserve our attention because they are just exhausted; other 
times by validating his crankiness saying that though it is reasonable to be cranky 
due to tiredness it is also really unfortunate that this has happen to this person and 
she is right to be cranky.   
What is interesting about the previous description of the education of emotion is 
that it allows us to understand some of the underlying assumptions about emotion. 
First, we assume that emotions happen in a specific moment of time thus reinforcing 
the conclusion generally accepted in psychology, neuroscience and anthropology 
that emotions last for brief seconds, and consequently the reaction to them (either 
to dominate them or follow them) is also a matter of reaction within a short period 
of time. If I am angry and I think I shouldn’t be all I have to do is endure anger for 
a few seconds while it happens. Second, education of emotion assumes that there is 
a proper way to feel it (it should be clear independently of the fact of one following 
it or not). If I perceive an injustice towards me I should feel angry and if I don’t it is 
either because I do not interpret it properly as an injustice or I have some inability 
to defend myself. Thirdly, education of emotion assumes that the value of an 
emotion is set thus dividing emotional life into positive or negative valence. In a 
very thorough paper on emotional valence, entitled “Appraising Valence” by 
Colombetti this assumption is clearly identified and analyzed as in urgent need of 
revision. And finally, education of emotion worries much more about the 
properness of dealing with an emotion than about the insights of alteration it 
causes. That is, an angry person does not think: good this alteration will make me 
have a sharper eye about this situation, nor it will tell her ways to release anger so 
as to overcome the alteration of anger but mainly to not feel what she is feeling.  
There are many other consequences of the education of emotion regarding the 
nature of emotion such as to ignore the diversity of emotional processes within the 
same emotion-word and how details make the same emotional process slightly 
different and hold a different meaning, or how it leads us to take valence 
simplistically, or how it makes us overlook the importance of meta-emotions. In 
addition, it also gives us a misguided conception of the connection of time with 
emotional processes in general.  
In an article entitled “Emotion” Peter Goldie has made an effort to provide a 
summary of all the facts that a theory of emotion needs to accommodate in order to 
be acceptable. Among these fact we find the notion of diversity and that a theory of 
emotion must somehow make sense of the wide range of diverse dimensions of the 
diversity of emotions. The first of these dimensions is the diversity of duration. 
Goldie writes that “[i]n this dimension, emotions range from short termed 
emotional reactions such as surprise at the sudden and unexpected noise behind 
you, to longer-term emotions such as enduring love of your children or parents. The 
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former is best understood as an emotional episode or experience, and the later as 
an emotional disposition, but we typically use the term ‘emotion’ for both episode 
and disposition” (Goldie 2007, 928). 
The connection of time and emotion matters not just for a better understanding of 
how temporal dimensions are present in emotion but also for a deeper 
understanding of what emotion really is. In a article about the connection between 
time and agency, Flaherty states that time was a central issue for the intellectual 
agenda of George Herbert Mead because he understood that the way time is 
conceived determines the way in which human reality is understood. Accordingly, 
Flaherty writes, Mead begins his influential course Social Psychology with a 
critique of John B Watson behaviorism, among other things, because the 
behavioristic temporality (that a stimulus (i.e. cause) precedes a response (i.e. 
effect)) meant that the past determined the future, and “Mead recognized that this 
temporal framework excludes what he viewed as essential facets of human nature: 
choice, novelty, emergence, and improvisation” (Flaherty 2003, 17). Wierzbicka also 
testifies this in her book Emotions across Languages and Cultures (1999) when she 
points out that the idea that feelings have a very brief duration is the reflection of a 
strong behavioristic bias in the semantics of the English word emotion (Wierzbicka 
1999, 20). Thus, accordingly, we find Ekman writing that his proposal is  
“that emotions are typically a matter of seconds, not minutes or hours, is supported 
by some preliminary evidence. Examining spontaneous emotional events suggests 
a short time span. When subjects have reported experiencing an emotion for 15 or 
20 minutes, and I have access to a videotaped record of their preceding behavior, I 
found that they showed multiple expression of that emotion. My interpretation of 
such incidents is that people summate in their verbal report what was actually a 
series of repeated but discrete emotion episodes” (Ekman 1992, 186). 
Similarly many others will reserve the label of an emotion for emotional experiences 
that last a matter of a few minutes and a few hours (Oatley & Jenkins 1996, 124-125). 
In an introductory book on emotions, Oatley and Jenkins say that emotion is, in 
general, taken to have a limited time and that those emotions that are reported by 
people are typically described as lasting between a few minutes and a few hours. 
And they show a spectrum of affective phenomena (Oatley and Jenkins 1996, 124) 
where emotions last from seconds to minutes, while moods last hours and 
emotional disorders and personality traits are alteration that last from days to 
months.   
Interestingly in the same book Oatley and Jenkins claim that there also seems 
present in the literature the idea that emotions do not happen as a whole, nor do 
they all happen in the same chronological time. That is, emotions do not usually 
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happen all at once because they are usually caused, then they run through a process, 
and then have consequences. Thus, Oatley and Jenkins point out, there is a widely 
accepted proposal made by Frijda (1986) of an emotion as a set of stages (Oatley & 
Jenkins 1996, 98). Oatley and Jenkins never explain how it is possible to hold both 
accounts true and both sustain that emotions last only seconds and that they have 
stages, so perhaps they assume these stages last for half or less than half of a second. 
Regardless it raises many questions: how we can measure the duration of theses 
different stages? Do different emotions have different durations of the different 
stages? Can the same emotion have two or more different states and different 
durations of the different stages? Regardless, it becomes clear that emotion is a 
temporal occurrence and that it implies that there is feeling it and being altered by 
it and then returning to a point of absence of feeling. Even if we assume that one 
never returns to the initial equal state after the alteration suffered from feeling an 
emotion, it still is the case that an alteration had been experienced and that there is 
a process, which with time becomes something else. It is this sense of time that 
emotions demand that is missed from the practice of the education of an emotion. 
That is, time interferes with emotions not only in their duration but also in the way 
in which people get out of the emotion  
And that even if we maintain that an emotion lasts a few seconds it is still the case 
that a longer period of time must be considered to fully understand the alteration it 
causes. Rolls, for example, writes that emotion is a helpful concept to understand 
the mechanisms of reward and punishing decoding for a number of reasons, in 
which the fifth is that “[e]motional states have the important property that they 
persist for times in the order of minutes or hours, thus, maintaining persistence of 
behaviour and consistency of action even after the emotion-provoking stimulus has 
disappeared” (Rolls 2005, 37) pointing out that the alteration promoted by an 
emotion can last longer than the few seconds one can identify to be in a certain 
emotional state.   
In sum, the fact that our education of emotion assumes and accepts that emotions 
are episodes that last a few seconds ignores several aspects of emotional processes, 
namely that its effect can last more than the reaction to a specific stimulus.  
Thus, the poor analysis of the connection of emotion with time is far more complex 
as it encompasses not only the duration of an emotion, but also its frequency, the 
sequence of events before and after and the timing in which it happens (Flaherty 
2003, 21).  Consequently, a proper analysis of anger must include not only the 
alteration the subject suffers when one feels angry but also the return to a 
subsequent mode of something like a non-alteration after the occurrence of anger.  
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That is, if we define anger as an emotion that relates to one's psychological 
interpretation of having been offended, wronged, or denied and a tendency to react 
through retaliation, it is necessary to describe what happens after its occurrence, 
how does that feeling change afterwards. Similarly to the way one would like to say 
that feeling fear ends when one subsequently feels safe after having acted on fear. 
If a man feels fear when a bear is attacking, to use James’s famous example, then 
the same man will only feel safe and out of the claws of fear when is his no longer 
within the reach of the bear’s attack and has changed to another situation which is 
clearly safe. That is, we should read Aristotle famous statement that “A man who 
is angry at the right things and with the right people and, further, as he ought, when 
he ought, and as long as he ought, is praised” (Nichomachean Ethics 1125b32-34), 
as indicating that this alteration of the self is desirable within the proper and 
adequate limits and that the return to a non-alteration state is part of the adequate 
feeling of anger.  
More importantly, it might even suggest that if anger does not happen, it is a sign 
of a type of failure, an undesirable indifference that we should be attentive too. 
Underlying the previous statement is the assumption that adequate anger happens 
when there is a violation of deep ethical values.  
Accordingly, in Sound Sentiments, Pugmire shows that our deep emotions are 
connected to our deep values writing that, “it does not seem that an emotion can be 
profound unless it is morally adequate, where its subject has a moral status. Its 
moral adequacy can turn on the quality of the feeling of it, which give it the specific 
character that may serve as an analogue to a value. Thus, for instance, sentimental 
emotion strikes us both as hollow and as contemptible” (Pugmire 2005, 63). Though 
we may question Pugmire conclusion that Depth of emotion is a sign of excellence 
of character (Pugmire 2005, 64), no doubt Pugmire seems to be on a right track that 
deep emotions reveal our deepest values, though given that “[b]y the same token, 
deep emotion is a reflection of the world” (Pugmire 2005, 64) it may be the case that 
those deep emotions reveal character is a much larger scope that only excellence in 
character and that it may be quite hard (perhaps even impossible) to identify 
ourselves with a value we have been taught not to hold. But if we take the lesson to 
heart our emotional processes should not take into account only its causes, effects, 
alterations, but also what they reveal about what we hold dear and crucial for our 
lives. Consequently, when we look at anger we should be aware that we can only learn 
how to avoid becoming angry, how to cease being angry and how to deal with other person’s 
anger by considering seriously the hidden values it displays. That it is, an episode of anger 
is a way into a search bellow the surface and an opportunity to investigate values 
that are somehow structural and verify in what ways one connected to crucial 
aspects of our life (e.g. people, ideas, objects) as well as how one is connected to 
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crucial events (e.g. childhood experiences, traumatic experiences), and how one is 
connected to difficult aspects of ourselves and the world to face (e.g. that one can 
feel envy, one can be mistaken, that the world is indifferent to our singular 
existence), and also how one is connected to emotional habits that sustain emotional 
life structure (e.g. righteous indignation promotes sense of self-worth necessary for 
daily function; being sad, miserable and pessimistic makes the events that go well 
feel thrilling), and what our character reveals.  
Yet maintain that situations and finding oneself in certain situations is clearly 
connected to our feelings for a person may not know she is courageous until she is 
presented with an opportunity to exhibit courage and therefore whether or not one 
continues to be angry over a period of time does depend on the circumstances in 
which one finds oneself (Gert 1998, 255). Similarly it is possible to conceive a life in 
which someone’s values are never threatened nor offended and the insight of this 
absence may be due both to absence of certain circumstances or lack of insight into 
them and consequently, education of emotion should include education of what to 
do in certain circumstances. As Kristjansson puts forward in “Can We Teach 
Justified Anger?” (2005) when he writes that there are behavioral strategies that 
allow the regulation and modification of behavior.  
In addition, education of emotion should provide tools of identification and 
interpretation of situations so as to allow both a better grasp of selection of 
situations and their modification. For example, we can interpret diversion of 
attention as a way to avoid feeling a certain emotion, like the way young people use 
music to forget their unpleasant emotions, or the way older people are more likely 
to tend to chores or to engage in spiritual activities for the same purpose (Ben-Ze’ev, 
2000, 238; Gross, 1998, 284). Yet, we can also read it as a way to transform the 
situation at hand and a way to modify the situation by bootstrapping ourselves in 
which we force ourselves, or are forced by others (de Sousa, 1987, 11) to transform 
an emotion-situation into another emotions-situation such as we can read the 
inhibition of a behavior that accompanies such bootstrapping as a way to modify 
the meaning of the situation. Accordingly, the young person who listens to music 
may be described as someone who is avoiding feeling angry and the demands of 
life and can also be described as developing a strong connection to music. Therefore, 
though “conative strategies of emotion regulation are more profound, and at the 
same time more difficult to implement, than are behavioral strategies because they 
involve a modification of desires and attitudes. (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000, 234–235), they 
may better be understood with a situational approach to emotions (Mendonça 2012) 
for it may be more clear that that the way in which they require “a serious overhaul 
of our self-assessment and our whole evaluative structure: of what we take to be 
our deepest engagements” (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000, 234–235) is also determined by how 
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we can interpret and analyze emotional processes within situational wholes. For 
these interpretations or reinterpretations of situations are ways in which we may 
change our beliefs or their meaning.  As Kristjansson points out some of these 
strategies can assume the form of cognitive manipulations where one seems to be 
deceiving oneself, for instance “by managing to convince oneself, without good 
reason, that someone who leveled a bad insult did not really intend to do so. Flight 
attendants apparently learn an array of such techniques to avert anger towards 
obnoxious passengers by construing them as victims of suffering and hence as 
deserving of compassion rather than anger” (Kristjansson 2005, 678)  
The description above indicates that the education of emotion is not like schooling 
(only obligatory up to a certain level) and that it continues throughout life. 
Therefore, just like education of emotion is not just telling children to not feel what 
they are feeling but also telling them stories, the fact that they experience seeing 
other people live their emotions, their experiencing of art, and other ways certain 
emotions are fostered in which we are not even aware such as the way fostering the 
ability to raise questions cultivates hope (Mendonça 2009) in the same manner our 
continuing emotional education is maintained in the same fashion. Of course, the 
openness to its possibility is an important part of the educational potential. If 
someone thinks there is only learning to control emotions then this will be the kind 
of learning that is mostly cultivated and perhaps the one with the most visible 
success. Regardless, a lot of our educational practices about emotional processes ask 
for hiding, accommodating others, redoing our emotional responses and 
perpetuates the denial of expression of certain emotions, the denial existence of 
other emotions and it is perhaps within the research on meta-emotions that its effect 
can best be understood (Mendonça 2013). Yet, regardless of how one deals with 
one’s outburst of feeling anger and how one manages to control them or redirect 
them they should also be sources of information about ourselves such that we can 
say that being angry works as a type of sonar device which senses and identifies the 
boundaries of my social world, the boundaries of the ability and power to change 
the social world, as well as the boundaries of my ability and power to accept (or 
not) events of various kinds, and the boundaries of my abilities, the boundaries of 
my relationships, and finally the contours and boundaries of the ways of mastering 
emotions. It is of course the case that anger (or any other emotion for that matter) 
does not work only as a sonar device. It is known that anger also allows us to set 
social limits and boundaries4 as theories about the sites of anger emphasize the 
importance of the social threats to identity and fairness (Schieman 1999, 275) and its 
impact on economics testifies how it sets boundaries (Zizzo 2008) for “anger works 
as a commitment to reject low offers if these are made, and, since it is a credible 
commitment, potentially angry receivers end up better off even in terms of their 
material utility” (Zizzo 2008, 154). 
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However, its sonar ability and how it causes alteration of the self and how this 
alteration demands a recovery is not an easy matter. Therefore the suggestion is but 
a first step to further research for it indicates that perhaps we should be pointing 
out to people the “sonar capacity of anger” as a way to monitor how emotional 
processes alter self and thus reveal its boundaries instead of simply and only 
teaching others and ourselves to restrain and hide feelings of anger. At the 
beginning of the paper I pointed out how others have identified that link to 
subsequent action with anger does not always refer to the same type of action. In 
“Moderation or the Middle Way: Two Approaches to Anger” Peter J. Vernezze 
shows that our historical inheritance also testify this ambiguity of action in anger. 
He writes that besides the Aristotelian tradition, which admits anger within the 
right and adequate circumstances, lies the Stoic and the Buddhist traditions which 
accept the underlying possible disturbance cause by anger but totally reject acting 
on it (Vernezze 2008, 6). The last perspective indicates that anger provides useful 
information about ourselves and the world even if we choose not to act on it.  
I want to conclude by pointing out that the fact that we can be angry with ourselves 
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Abstract:  Although there has been much discussion regarding shame and guilt, not enough 
has been said about the complexities of the relationship between the two. In this paper, I 
examine one way in which I take shame and guilt to interact – namely in cases of so-called 
“survivor’s guilt” among victims of trauma. More specifically, I argue that survivor’s guilt 
may represent a kind of response to feelings of shame – one which is centrally tied to the 
central philosophical notions of autonomy and integrity.  
Keywords: guilt, shame, selfhood, agency, autonomy, integrity, trauma 
It is so unjust, so unreasonable, that of all people the survivor should have to struggle, all 
by himself, with some of the greatest psychological difficulties imaginable […] – why should 
he in addition be obliged to feel a special responsibility, be persecuted by guilt, tortured by 
obviously unanswerable questions?  
—Bruno Bettelheim1 
[M]an has a right to be considered guilty and to be punished. To explain his guilt away by 
looking at him as the victim of circumstances also means taking away his human dignity. I 
would say that it is a prerogative of man to become guilty. To be sure, it also is his 
responsibility to overcome guilt. 
—Viktor Frankl2 
Shame is inventive.  
—Friedrich Nietzsche3 
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1. Introduction 
There has been much philosophical ink spilled on the subjects of shame and guilt. 
However, although much has been said about both how these emotions resemble 
one another and how they differ, not enough has been said about the complexities 
of the relationship between the two. Yet we may be able to come to a better 
understanding of these emotions if we look more closely at the ways in which they 
actually interact with one another. In what follows, I will examine one extreme type 
of case in which shame and guilt may be said to interact – namely in cases of so-
called “survivor’s guilt” among trauma victims. 
Although no longer considered an official diagnostic criterion, the phenomenon of 
survivor’s guilt played a very prominent role in the post-WWII development and 
discussion of the concept of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).4  Indeed, 
researchers have found that “trauma survivors often experience guilt that relates to 
the trauma in some way” (Kubany et al, 1996, 428).5 Ruth Leys (2007) proposes that 
the deprioritization of the role of guilt in diagnosing PTSD is, in part, indicative of 
a “shift in attitude” regarding the survivor experience from a predominantly guilt-
centric, “mimetic” approach, on which the survivor is said to unconsciously identify 
with the perpetrator of the trauma (8), to a more shame-centric approach that 
focuses on the “antimimetic consciousness of being seen” (10). Characterized in this 
way, the debate regarding the nature of survivor’s guilt reflects an unfortunate 
theoretical polarization that views survivor’s guilt solely in terms of either guilt or 
shame and thus fails to make room for the interaction of shame and guilt in the 
survivor experience.  
In what follows, I hope to show that both shame and guilt play an important role in 
the etiology and manifestation of survivor’s guilt. In so doing, I will resist the idea 
that shame is a mere reaction to a subject’s “consciousness of being seen” and that 
survivor’s guilt, likewise, is not best cashed out in terms of straightforward 
identification (unconscious or otherwise) with the actual perpetrator(s) of the 
trauma. Nevertheless, I hope to show that survivors’ feelings of shame and guilt are 
importantly related. More specifically, I will argue that survivor’s guilt, properly 
understood, may represent a kind of response to feelings of shame – one which is 
centrally tied to the philosophical notions of autonomy and integrity – and that it 
may serve the psychological function of helping the trauma victim grapple with the 
difficult process of re-integrating a shattered self into and within a world that no 
longer makes sense to her, albeit at a high cognitive price.  
 
2. Understanding Shame and Guilt 
To understand the phenomena that we are dealing with here, it will be helpful to 
look at the concepts of shame and guilt in a little more detail. Although they often 
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go hand in hand (and are thus sometimes conflated in the literature), shame and 
guilt are clearly distinct emotions. They are aimed at different kinds of objects and 
have distinct phenomenologies. Whereas the intentional object of guilt is something 
the agent does (or fails to do), the object of shame, properly speaking, is something 
about the agent herself. In other words, guilt focuses on an action, shame on the self. 
Of course, we regularly talk about feeling ashamed of things we have done or failed 
to do, but we really only experience shame in connection with these actions insofar 
as we take them to reveal something negative about who we are (e.g., in light of who 
we would like to be). Likewise, although concepts like “original sin” or “white 
guilt” appear to have persons as their object, the “guilt” in both of these cases refers 
back to the actions of some party or another, even if not those of the agent herself.  
This distinction between shame and guilt can help us see how these two emotions 
may sometimes come apart. For example, I may feel ashamed, though not guilty, 
for having missed a free throw in an important basketball game. I experience shame 
in this scenario because I take the action to reflect something about me, about who I 
am (in this case, a basketball “failure”), in contrast with who I would like to be (e.g., 
a team hero). Likewise, I may feel guilty for having failed to fulfill a commitment to 
my significant other in a particular scenario (perhaps a work emergency makes me 
late for our anniversary dinner) without thereby feeling ashamed for having so 
failed. That is, I may take myself to have done something wrong (here, having failed 
my significant other) without believing that this particular case of wrongdoing 
reveals something about who I am as a person (e.g., that I am an unreliable partner).  
A second important distinction to make between shame and guilt is in the way they 
present themselves to the agent. Although the felt character of both shame and guilt 
is unpleasant, Deonna et al (2011) note that in shame one often experiences a sense 
of insignificance and lack of control (5), whereas in guilt this sense of feeling “small 
and helpless” may be lacking, though the persistent “gnawing” of guilt at the agent 
may be accompanied by a desire to make up for the wrongdoing (13). Indeed, 
shame usually involves a desire to hide or disappear, whereas guilt (except insofar 
as it is accompanied by shame) rarely does. This desire to flee that accompanies 
shame is often characterized as a response to a feeling of being exposed under the 
disapproving gaze of a felt other (whether that other be physically present or not), 
and indeed many cases of shame do appear to display this voyeuristic aspect. Guilt, 
on the other hand, is less associated with the metaphor of sight than with that of 
sound – that is, of “hearing” the “voice” of judgment. The guilty person feels judged, 
either by herself (as with the “voice of conscience”) or by another.6    
However, we must be careful how far we extend these metaphors. As Deonna & 
Teroni (2008) note, to interpret shame as a wholly “social” emotion (that is, as always 
involving the perceived disapproval of a real or imagined audience) might be to 
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exclude certain cases of shame, in which no real or imagined audience appears to 
be present (69) – e.g., cases in which I feel ashamed, despite knowing that no one 
else would disapprove if they noticed.7 Similarly, it seems clear that guilt – although 
involving a definite evaluative component – need not be triggered by an explicit 
recognition (the “hearing”) of a negative moral judgment. Indeed, in some cases, 
the very fact that I feel guilty may be the first explicit indicator I have that I view an 
action of mine as morally problematic. 
Given these distinctions, in what follows I will understand shame as an agent’s 
affective apprehension of herself as failing to exemplify a certain trait that she 
values in a situation in which exemplifying that trait is relevant to maintaining her 
desired self-image.8 Guilt, on the other hand, I will characterize as an agent’s 
affective apprehension of an action or omission of hers as violating a (usually moral) 
normative requirement to which she adheres.9 Thus, as Deonna et al. (2011) point 
out, shame appears to be a primarily value-driven notion, whereas guilt is norm-
driven (82). Understood in this way, it should come as no surprise that in many 
cases, guilt and shame go hand-in-hand, given the common overlap between 
adhering to a norm and valuing the corresponding character trait that following 
this norm would exemplify. 
Moreover, understanding shame and guilt along these lines allows us to make one 
more crucial distinction between these two emotions, namely that the latter always 
appears to imply an attribution of responsibility to the agent, whereas the former 
need (and, indeed, often does) not. While there is much debate in the literature as 
to whether or not guilt is a purely moral emotion,10 there seems little doubt that it 
is primarily moral. In general, we do not feel guilty for violating what we take to be 
non-moral norms, nor for unknowingly or unwillingly violating those we take to 
be moral. One does not generally feel guilty about using the dessert fork instead of 
the salad fork when dining at a fancy restaurant (though one may feel ashamed), 
and neither do we think one ought feel guilty for unwittingly giving someone 
wrong directions or for missing a friend’s wedding because one’s flight was 
cancelled. If one feels guilty in these scenarios, we are likely to characterize that 
feeling as irrational, inappropriate, or at the very least unnecessary. Shame, on the 
other hand, is often experienced regarding features for which the agent is not 
directly responsible, as when one finds out one has unknowingly committed a 
social faux pas or when one is ashamed of certain of one’s physical features, like nose 
size or skin color. Indeed, as we have said, the phenomenology of shame often 
includes a feeling of lack of control, as opposed to a sense of responsibility. (I return 
to this point below.) 
Shame, then, may be said to be inappropriate11 when either a) the values at stake 
are themselves silly or misguided (e.g., being ashamed for having thumbs or for 
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being female) or b) the agent perceives herself as failing to exemplify an appropriate 
value relevant to her self-image, when in fact she does not (e.g., feeling ashamed of 
one’s physique in front of a person who finds one’s body sexy). Guilt, likewise, may 
be inappropriate in two different ways: a) when the adherence to the norm in 
question is inappropriate (e.g., feeling guilty for failing to prioritize one’s fantasy 
football team over one’s spouse), or b) when one attributes responsibility to oneself 
for an action for which one was not, in fact, responsible. Yet the latter is precisely 
what appears to be the case in instances of survivor’s guilt, in which the survivor of 
trauma feels guilty about something he had little to no control over. In fact, in many 
cases, survivor’s guilt – given its sometimes stubborn persistence over time – 
appears straightforwardly irrational, insofar as the agent herself judges that she is 
not responsible for the traumatic event(s) in question. So how are we to understand 
this phenomenon?  
The mimetic theories mentioned in Section (1) above would maintain that the agent 
unconsciously identifies with the actual perpetrator of the trauma, yet this seems to 
leave out cases in which there is no identifiable perpetrator to be imitated, as when 
one feels guilty for having outlived one’s own child. Likewise, it fails to fully 
account for the deep sense of shame typically exhibited by trauma victims. 
Antimimetic theories, on the other hand, do emphasize the survivor’s shame at 
being exposed in a certain way, but this both fails to account for cases in which there 
does not appear to be any real or imagined exposure (as with the case above) and 
does not fully appreciate the extent to which survivors appear to take on actual 
responsibility for some action or actions relevant to the trauma in question. Thus, a 
further account is needed to make sense of the complex relationship between shame 
and guilt in survivors of trauma. And I intend to provide just such an account. 
However, it may be helpful to first briefly classify a few of the various 
manifestations of survivor’s guilt, in order to get a tighter grasp on the cluster of 
phenomena we are dealing with here. 
 
3. Varieties of Survivor’s Guilt 
A prevalent manifestation of guilt feelings emerges among trauma survivors in the 
form of what we might call substitution guilt, namely the feeling that someone else 
has paid the price for or taken the place of the survivor. Agamben (1999) quotes 
author and activist Elie Wiesel, himself a concentration camp survivor, as saying: “I 
live, therefore I am guilty. I am here because a friend, an acquaintance, an unknown 
person died in my place.” Another well-known Holocaust survivor, Primo Levi 
(1989), writes, “It is no more than a supposition, indeed the shadow of a suspicion: 
[…] that each one of us […] has usurped his neighbor’s place and lived in his stead. 
It is a supposition, but it gnaws at us; it has nestled deeply like a woodworm; 
although unseen from the outside, it gnaws and rasps” (81-2). This type of guilt – 
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namely the feeling that one has done something to “usurp” the place of another, or 
that someone who died is more “deserving” of life than oneself – is often found 
among survivors of genocide or war, but it is also observable in other instances, e.g., 
when children experience the death of a sibling or parents outlive their children. At 
the heart of this kind of guilt appears to be the perception of an unfair inequality or 
a gross injustice.12 The agent assumes that she must have done something wrong to 
be on the receiving end of this unmerited benefit, even if she cannot exactly pinpoint 
what the relevant action was.13  
In another form of survivor guilt, however, an agent may know precisely what she 
feels guilty for – namely for an act or omission of hers that under normal 
circumstances might be considered morally suspect or even impermissible but 
which either is excusable under the circumstances or bears no moral relationship to 
the traumatic event itself. Call this manifestation of survivor’s guilt transgression 
guilt. Thus, a concentration camp survivor may feel guilty for having hoarded or 
stolen food, or for having failed to keep the Sabbath, or for having (forcibly) worked 
for the enemy. A soldier may feel guilty for having killed enemy combatants. A 
victim of date rape may feel guilty for having gotten drunk. But the object of the 
survivor’s guilt need not be so specific. Sometimes the act or omission in question 
is much broader. Levi (1989) writes that many Holocaust survivors feel guilty, not 
for some specific action but more generally for “having failed in terms of human 
solidarity” (78). In several places, Levi expresses his guilt over having failed to help, 
to resist, to revolt, both during the rise of fascism and national socialism in Europe 
and later in the Lager itself, despite admitting that “on a rational plane there should 
not have been much to be ashamed of” (77).14 In all of these cases – whether the 
action be of short or long duration, of narrow or broad scope – the agent has the 
feeling that she has committed a morally unjustifiable offense, despite her 
acknowledgement that the circumstances in fact permit, exculpate, or even morally 
justify such action.15 Here, we might find a survivor’s feelings of guilt somewhat 
easier to understand, since she feels guilty about an action or omission in which – 
under normal circumstances – guilt might be appropriate. Yet insofar as the agent 
sincerely admits that she does not deserve blame and yet still continues to feel guilty, 
and these cases are no less irrational or inappropriate than the above cases of 
substitution guilt, although they may occur at a different psychological level.  
A related but distinct form of survivor guilt – what we might call causal role guilt – 
is found among many survivors of rape and other violent trauma, in which the 
agent does not necessarily feel guilty for having survived where others did not, nor 
for having committed an otherwise morally questionable action, but rather simply 
for having in some way or another causally contributed to the traumatic event in 
question. Thus, a rape victim may feel guilty for, e.g., having attended the party at 
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which she met her rapist, or for having worn supposedly “provocative” clothing, 
or for having failed to fight back harder against her attacker. In other words, she 
may feel that she somehow “invited” the rape or at least failed to prevent it from 
happening.16 Here, an agent may not view her actions as morally reprehensible, but 
she may nevertheless experience feelings of guilt insofar as she attributes to herself 
a key causal role in the bringing about of the traumatic event that she did not 
actually play or that is irrelevant to the moral status of the event in question. This 
type of guilt is even more puzzling than transgression guilt, insofar as the agent 
blames herself for having merely been a part of the causal chain that led to her 
trauma. Yet playing a causal role is not tantamount to having transgressed a moral 
norm, so the guilt here appears especially displaced.   
These three species of survivor’s guilt are not meant to provide an exhaustive list of 
the various forms that survivor’s guilt may take. Moreover, in some cases agents 
likely experience a kind of “mixed guilt” containing elements of each of these 
variations. Nevertheless, I think that this list suffices to get at one possible way that 
survivor’s guilt may be plausibly understood, namely as a response to a certain kind 
of shame that often follows the experience of trauma – one that is closely tied to the 
agent-centered notions of autonomy and integrity. It is to a discussion of this 
relationship between shame and guilt in the manifestation of survivor’s guilt that I 
now turn. 
4. From Shame to Guilt: Trauma, Autonomy, and Integrity 
As mentioned above, survivors of trauma – especially of violent trauma – often 
experience a deep sense of shame, both during the traumatic incident itself and as 
a result of it. But in what sense does the trauma survivor experience an “affective 
apprehension of herself as failing to exemplify a certain trait that she values in a 
situation in which exemplifying that trait is relevant to maintaining her desired self-
image”?  
It is my contention that for many trauma survivors the “self-relevant value” in 
question is not just any value. Rather, it is the fundamental self-relevant value – the 
value that grounds or otherwise frames all other values that we have – namely, the 
value we place on agency. To be a rational agent, one has to be able to set ends for 
oneself and to govern oneself in light of those ends – that is, one must be able to 
exercise one’s autonomy. Further, rational agents are not isolated agents; they are 
diachronic agents within an intersubjective context that, in part, establishes the 
framework within which they can meaningfully and willfully undertake their 
intentional projects. Thus, being an agent means also that one must possess a 
minimal sense of one’s self as doing things that make sense within one’s immediate 
environment and have a set of commitments that is at least minimally coherent over 
time – that is, one must possess a sense of integrity. When either of these basic 
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conditions is threatened to a severe degree, this is likely to threaten one’s overall 
sense of agency.  
It is not difficult to see in what sense traumatic events threaten one’s sense of 
autonomy. Indeed, it is likely that a perceived lack of autonomy is often (at least in 
part) what makes an event traumatic for a subject in the first place.17 In most cases 
of violent trauma, the victims are treated by the perpetrator(s) as though they were 
not autonomous persons. The physical and emotional violation of a rapist toward 
his victim, the inhumane treatment of concentration camp prisoners and prisoners 
of war, the attitude toward slaves as “subhuman” beings or toward women as 
“weaker specimens” of the human race, the dehumanization of torture victims by 
their torturers – these are all ways in which perpetrators of trauma may be said to 
restrict (sometimes even to the point of eliminating) the autonomy of their victims 
(at least temporarily). But the examples need not be so extreme. A father may feel 
helpless to save his terminally ill child. A soldier may feel unable to defy orders, 
even when this results in the death of an innocent.18 Or a child may not be able to 
stop his father from abusing his mother. And that same mother may herself so 
greatly fear making her way on her own that she feels unable to leave her husband. 
All of these cases might represent situations that severely threaten one’s perception 
of oneself as an full-blown agent and contribute to a very basic experience of shame, 
given one’s perceived inability to instantiate one’s autonomy to the degree required 
for one to have a sense of agency (at least regarding the event(s) in question). 
Of course, not every experience of lack of control is perceived as traumatic, and 
neither do we feel ashamed every time we are unable to implement our autonomy 
in situations that we care about. However, the shame experienced in trauma often 
goes deeper than a mere feeling of lack of control, though the agent’s perception of 
her own powerlessness still plays a crucial role. Traumatic events are those that do 
not fit neatly into an individual’s implicit or explicit worldview.19 Not only does the 
trauma survivor experience a lack of control or a threat to her autonomy – the 
traumatic event is, by its very nature, one that disrupts the “flow” or “consistency” 
of her self-narrative. The traumatized subject can no longer make sense of herself 
and the world in which she lives in the way she did prior to the traumatic event. In 
a very important sense, she has lost the trust in the world necessary to orient herself 
to and within that world. Gry Ardal Printzlau points to this feature of trauma in her 
poignant discussion of the effects of torture on the victim: 
“What survivors of extreme violence try to suggest when they talk about the loss of 
trust seems to be this profound loss of orientation, meaning, and connection with a 
shared social world. The loss of trust is a symptom of the shattered embeddedness 
of the self, and perhaps inextricable from it. Without being connected to a shared 
world we cannot give coherency and order to our experiences, and disorientation 
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results. Trust is not only an instrument for manoeuvrings in a complex world or a 
weak kind of belief which one can hold when proper proof is lacking, but appears 
to be fundamental to how we perceive our world as meaningful and real.” 
(Printzlau 2011, 62)   
When one’s fundamental trust is shattered in this way, one may lose the ability to 
see oneself as a full-blown, unified self living in a comprehensible world in which 
one’s actions and ends still make sense. In other words, one may lose one’s 
fundamental sense of integrity. Thus, the trauma survivor finds herself unable to 
relate adequately to herself and to others in the way necessary for viewing herself 
as an autonomous, integrated self – as an agent-in-the-world. 
We are now in a better position to tell a plausible story about the origins and 
persistence of survivor’s guilt in victims of psychological trauma. As a matter of 
empirical fact, in everyday situations the subjective negative experience of lack of 
control often gives rise to superstitions and superstitious behavior, in which 
engaging in a kind of “magical” causal thinking serves the psychological function 
of allowing an agent to maintain or regain a sense of control over that which she 
perceives to be uncontrollable in situations where she cares about the result.20 I want 
to suggest that something similar occurs in survivor’s guilt, though on a much more 
profound level (given the severity of the perceived lack of agency) – namely, that 
the survivor of trauma attributes a kind of “magical” causality to herself (here, agent 
causality) as a response to the shame that arises from the perceived lack of 
autonomy she experiences regarding the traumatic event and the lack of integrity 
she experiences in its aftermath. 
Assuming a subject cares about being an agent, she thus (at least implicitly) takes 
autonomy and integrity as constitutive self-relevant values. An event may present 
itself as traumatic, then, at least in part because it is perceived as severely restricting 
her ability to exemplify these basic values in the sense fundamentally relevant to 
her self-image (or to her having any self-image whatsoever).21 Her apprehension of 
this inability, then, may manifest itself in a deep and pervasive shame regarding the 
traumatic event – and perhaps about herself in general (if the perceived violation of 
autonomy cuts deep enough). Thus, shame may arise in the form of a negative 
emotion directed at an agent’s perceived lack of autonomy and integrity – and it is 
this negative emotion, I argue, that may motivate the attribution of guilt to oneself. 
Survivor’s guilt, then, serves the psychological function of allowing a traumatized 
agent to retrospectively maintain a sense of agency in the perceived absence of 
autonomy and integrity, where this guilt assists the agent in coping with her life 
post-trauma. It is a way of reinstituting a sense of meaning for the agent that may 
allow her to re-orient herself in the world. As Susan Brison (2002), a philosopher 
and rape survivor, writes in her account of the aftermath of her rape, “it can be less 
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painful to believe that you did something blameworthy than it is to think that you 
live in a world where you can be attacked at any time, in any place, simply because 
you are a woman” (13). That is, it is better to perceive oneself as guilty than to try to 
eke out an existence in a fragmented world that no longer makes sense. 
However, one might wonder: If guilt serves this positive, self-(re)building 
psychological function, wouldn’t a more positively-oriented emotion be better 
equipped to do the job? Guilt, like shame, is a negatively-valenced emotion, and 
even if it does serve as a coping mechanism, it comes with its own burdensome 
psychological baggage. Yet as opposed to denial or repression, in which a traumatic 
event is no longer recognized (or recognized as such) – and in contrast to positive 
thinking, which downplays the “badness” of the trauma itself – survivor’s guilt 
appears to be a somewhat more honest way of grappling with the negative nature 
of trauma. It does not reject the evil or badness of the traumatic event in question 
but rather attributes at least partial responsibility for that event or its consequences 
to the survivor herself. This allows for the recognition of the event as something 
objectively bad, but makes room for the subject to retain a sense of agency in light 
of her trauma. That is, although survivor’s guilt may transform the subject’s 
recollection of the relevant event(s) into something she can understand and control, 
the nature of the trauma remains itself negative and something that cannot merely 
be “done away with” via some sort of emotional transformation.  
Thus, from the point of view of the subject, in the face of the evil nature of the 
event(s) in question, it is better to be a guilty agent than no agent at all. Re-establishing 
this sense of agency may represent a step toward the subject’s being able to affirm 
her own humanity and to re-integrate herself and her experience into a meaningful 
whole. The narrative of autonomy established via survivor’s guilt can help her 
recover a sense of meaning and thus of integrity, even if it results in a radically 
different worldview than the one implicitly held pre-trauma. As Bruno Bettelheim 
writes:  
“What more impressive demonstration could there be that only the ability to feel 
guilty makes us human, particularly if, objectively seen, one is not guilty? […] [Our 
experience] taught us that there is meaning to life, […] a much deeper meaning than 
we had thought possible before we became survivors. And our feeling of guilt for 
having been so lucky as to survive the hell of the concentration camp is a most 
significant part of this meaning—testimony to a humanity that not even the 
abomination of the concentration camp can destroy.” (Bettelheim 1976, 52)  
In this way, survivor’s guilt may assist a trauma survivor in recovering an at least 
minimal sense of autonomy and integrity – one that may be psychologically 
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necessary for her to overcome the pervasive shame of a subject whose very selfhood 
has been severely compromised.  
5. Dealing with Survivor’s Guilt 
For the reasons given above, survivor’s guilt may be said to (at least initially) 
perform a therapeutic function for the trauma survivor, and as such should not be 
immediately underplayed or dismissed as wholly irrational by family and friends, 
and especially not by medical or psychological professionals involved in the 
treatment of the survivor of trauma. Indeed, there is some evidence that, from a 
therapeutic standpoint, subjects who experience a sense of action-centered guilt 
cope better with their trauma than those who remain mired in person-centered 
shame. Ronnie Janoff-Bulman (1979, 1985) has shown that what she calls 
“behavioral self-blame” (blaming oneself for a particular action or actions, or a 
specific piece of behavior) may, indeed, be therapeutically adaptive, whereas 
“characterological self-blame” (blame aimed at an enduring character trait or 
tendency) is primarily maladaptive and associated with depression. I submit that 
this is because in the former case the subject affirms her agency by positively 
attributing autonomy to herself regarding the action in question, whereas in the 
latter case the subject negatively evaluates her own person and character – a 
phenomenon that looks much more like shame as we have characterized it above. 
Still, even as a coping mechanism, survivor’s guilt can be extremely psychologically 
taxing. It is, as we have said above, in some sense emotionally “inappropriate,” 
insofar as the subject’s guilt is centered on something for which she is not 
responsible (or at least not culpable). Thus, even if it helps the traumatized subject 
to establish a retrospective sense of control and thereby to make sense of the 
ultimately senseless evil she experienced, there is still a sense in which she might 
be at odds with herself, especially insofar as she in some sense sincerely and 
honestly assesses herself as innocent – as a victim. Whereas the presence of guilt 
feelings and the resulting belief that one is guilty22 may start out as the result of an 
automatic defense mechanism or even as a kind of “motivated mistake,” a subject 
may come to psychologically rely on and identify with her guilt in unhealthy ways. 
Indeed, subjects who obstinately hold onto their guilt over an extended period of 
time in the face of strong, recognized evidence to the contrary may slip into a kind 
of willful self-deception, which often comes at an even higher cognitive price and 
which can ultimately be autonomy-undermining. Not only does self-deception 
threaten one’s general truth-orientedness and thus one’s ability to act in a reality-
responsive manner within one’s environment, it aims at undermining the very 
standards that establish one’s epistemic (and perhaps thereby also one’s moral) 
agency. Furthermore, it is not clear that the consequences of self-deception are 
always (or even ever) better for one’s overall happiness and flourishing than more 
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self-honest approaches. For this reason, although survivor’s guilt itself may not 
always be maladaptive, professionals treating survivors of trauma would do well 
to look for alternative therapeutic strategies aimed at fostering a sense of autonomy 
and self-integration that can take the place of survivor’s guilt in the subject’s 
response to and evaluation of her trauma.23   
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have presented an account of survivor’s guilt that demonstrates one 
very interesting way in which shame and guilt may interact in the etiology of and 
response to trauma. My account neither assesses the phenomenon as a 
straightforward unconscious identification with the perpetrator of the trauma nor 
reduces it to an instance of reproachful shame under the gaze of another. Instead, I 
have argued, survivor’s guilt represents a response to a very basic sense of shame 
arising from a disrupted sense of agency grounded in a perceived lack of autonomy 
and integrity. The adoption of a feeling of guilt, then, allows the agent to maintain 
or regain a sense of responsibility and therefore of autonomy, one which can assist 
in the re-integration of the self into a world that has become otherwise 
incomprehensible to her. There is, of course, certainly more work to be done on this 
and related issues. How is survivor’s guilt related to paradigm cases of epistemic 
irrationality, such as wishful thinking or self-deception? How can we evaluate 
mixed cases in which subjects are simultaneously both the perpetrators and victims 
of trauma (e.g., perpetrators who are traumatized by their role in inflicting trauma 
on others, or victims who as a result of their traumatic experiences become 
perpetrators)? Similarly, in contrast to the innocent subject who experiences guilt in 
order to escape the shame of heteronomy, what about the responsible agent who 
denies autonomy, in order to escape guilt? These are all fascinating avenues for 
future research, and it is my hope that this paper will serve as a springboard for the 















1  Bettelheim (1986), 42. 
2  Frankl (1978), 51. 
3 Nietzsche (1886/1966), §40. 
4 For a more detailed discussion of the role survivor’s guilt has played in post-WWII 
discussions of PTSD, cf. Ley (2007).  
5 Nevertheless, although guilt is “associated” with PTSD, it is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for a diagnosis. However, for this paper’s purposes, it is sufficient to note that feelings of 
guilt and the survival of trauma often go hand in hand. 
6 I have borrowed these metaphors from Williams (1993), 89-91. 
7 For a more detailed discussion of this point, cf. also Deonna & Teroni (2011), 146-52. 
8 Here, I depart from Deonna et al.’s (2011) characterization of shame as occurring “when we 
apprehend a trait or an action of ours that we take to exemplify the polar opposite of a self-
relevant value as indicating our incapacity to exemplify this self-relevant value even to a 
minimal degree” (102). I am not sure that the agent need apprehend herself as exemplifying 
the relevant value’s polar opposite to count as experiencing shame, nor that she need 
apprehend her failure as indicating an incapacity to exemplify the valued trait even to a 
minimal degree.  
    I also wish to note here that I do not intend my characterizations of either shame or guilt to 
imply a strong cognitivist theory of the emotions. I would like to leave room for the 
possibility that the apprehension in question may be non-propositional. 
9 Here I remain somewhat closer to Deonna et al.’s (2011) definition (cf. 114). I have inserted 
‘affective’ into my characterizations of both ‘shame’ and ‘guilt’, since it seems that in either 
case, one could apprehend the relevant facts in question and yet fail to feel the appropriate 
emotion. 
10 On this point, see for example Morris (1987); Deigh (1999); Murphy (1999); and Teroni & 
Bruun (2011). 
11 The use of the term ‘inappropriate’ here is meant to be non-pejorative, since the 
inappropriateness of the emotion may rest on a mere cognitive or factual error, on the one 
hand, or a psychological compulsion, on the other. In such cases, although the emotion may 
rightly be said to be inappropriate in the sense of ‘misdirected’, it is non-culpably so.  
12 I am indebted to Steven Arkonovich for pointing me to this feature of substitutionary guilt. 
Blacher (2000), too, notes that survivor’s guilt often involves the feeling of “getting more 
than one’s share” (46). 
13 In some cases of substitutionary guilt, the object of the agent’s guilt may simply be “some 
action or another,” where the object of the agent’s guilt remains vague and undetermined. 
In other cases, the agent may focus on an arbitrary incident prior to the traumatic event(s) 
in question for which she was responsible and postulate a false causal connection between 
that incident and her unfairly profiting. 
14 Levi often conflates shame and guilt in his writing, but in this passage he is talking almost 
exclusively of guilt. Of course, that he and his fellow survivors are likewise ashamed of the 
being the kind of people who “had not done anything, or not enough, against the system 
into which we had been absorbed” (76) should also come as no surprise.  
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15 Whether the guilt feeling is “inappropriate” here will lie in the details of the action in 
question. In some cases, we might think agents ought to feel guilty – as when a soldier 
brutally beats a prisoner or shoots an innocent civilian. In such cases, the agent may rightly 
feel responsible for a piece of wrongdoing, and it may be this very recognition that (in part) 
leads to his traumatization by the incident. Such “mixed” instances, in which an agent is 
traumatized by his role in perpetrating trauma, are worth exploring in more detail. 
However, my main concern in this paper is with instances in which the agent cognitively 
evaluates herself as having technically done nothing wrong and yet continues to experience 
pervasive guilt for the action(s) in question. 
16 Of course, in many cultures, the blame is in part often either explicitly or implicitly placed 
on the victim herself, and this may also directly contribute to the survivor’s feelings of guilt.  
17 In their chapter, ‘The Defining Moment of Psychological Trauma: What Makes a Traumatic 
Event Traumatic?’, Everly & Lating (2003) suggest that one factor that makes a particular 
event traumatic for an agent is a feeling of helplessness, of lack of self-efficacy or control 
over a situation (45-7). 
18 Alternatively, a soldier may admit that he willingly followed orders (that is, that he 
exercised his autonomy in this respect), but he may still feel a lack of control regarding the 
situation in general – or, say, regarding his ability to both follow orders and save the 
innocent person. Indeed, one of the reasons moral dilemmas – e.g., in which fulfilling one’s 
duty to X rules out fulfilling one’s duty to Y and vice versa – are so psychologically 
conflicting might hinge on the fact that one perceives oneself as unable to fulfill the prima 
facie demands of morality, namely to do both X and Y. 
19 The idea of a disrupted explanatory worldview is another central feature of Everly & 
Lating’s (2003) discussion of what makes an event traumatic for a person (cf. 36-8).  
20 Cf., e.g., Malinowksi (1954) and Thompson et al. (1998). Cf. also Griffioen (forthcoming, 
2013) for a closer discussion of the connection between lack of control and superstitious 
belief, especially in sports contexts. 
21 This may also explain why some experiences are perceived of as traumatic by some subjects 
but not by others. Certain subjects may not apprehend the event(s) in question as restricting 
their agency in ways as devastating as others do, or they may have other methods of coping 
with the perceived failure of autonomy or integrity. 
22 Whether or not feeling guilty is always accompanied by the belief that one is guilty is an 
interesting question for further examination. But the fact that subjects who experience 
survivor’s guilt also tend to experience a significant amount of cognitive dissonance 
indicates that there is likely some perceived tension between feeling guilty and the 
assessment that one has done nothing wrong – a tension that might be best explained by 
recourse to conflicting beliefs. 
23 Brison (2002) suggests, for example, that rape survivors take self-defense courses or engage 
in political activism as means “to break out of the double bind of self-blame or helplessness” 
(76). 
24 I would like to express my thanks, first and foremost, to Gry Ardal Printzlau, whose lively 
discussion with me at the Tivoli Circus in Copenhagen planted the seeds of the ideas 
developed in this paper. I am also grateful to Scott O’Leary, Steven Arkonovich, Alastair 
Norcross, Christoph Jäger, Sarah Buss, Dina Emundts, Johannes Rusch and the Zentrum für 
Psychiatrie Reichenau, and the members of the German Peace Psychology Association for 
their comments and assistance. Finally, I would like to thank Alexander Gerner, Jorge de 
Almeida Gonçalves, and the other members of the Cognitive Foundations of the Self 
Research Group for organizing the conference that led to the development of this paper in 
its final form.
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Abstract:  In this paper, Douglas Hofstadter’s view of the self as a “strange loop” is used 
in order to understand how several acting techniques work. As examples of acting techniques 
I will use the work of Lee Strasberg, Constantin Stanislavski, Stella Adler and Sanford 
Meisner. I will argue that Douglas Hofstadter’s view of the self as a strange loop allows us 
to understand how acting works. I will furthermore argue that because Douglas Hofstadter’s 
view is successful in explaining how different acting techniques work, that is a good 
indication of its adequacy as a theory of the self. 
Keywords: Self, Acting, Acting Techniques, Douglas Hofstadter, Strange Loop. 
“A strange loop is a paradoxical level-crossing feedback loop.” 
Douglas Hofstadter, I am a Strange Loop, p. 102  
Douglas Hofstadter has created an interesting and original theory of the Self, which 
he defines as being a “strange loop”, a circular multi-leveled looping structure in 
the brain that would explain our psychological experience of having a self. 
Hofstadter’s Self is created not only with an internal loop, but also with the external 
interaction of the Self and the world, what happens to the individual becomes 
formative in the Self’s strange loop. Furthermore, one of Hofstadter’s most original 
points is saying that we create these strange loops not only to represent ourselves, 
but also to represent others, and that there is no essential difference between these 
two types of loops. Hofstadter’s wonderfully complex ideas about the Self loops 
and loops for Others, can help us understand how acting techniques work and how 
actors are able to build many characters and personify these characters in their 
work. Hofstadter’s ideas can also explain how different acting techniques, or 
different approaches to acting, work. 
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This paper will be divided in three parts, in the first part I will introduce 
Hofstadter’s views about the Self as a strange loop, including their original 
background in Hofstadter’s earlier work, Gödel, Escher and Bach (1979). In the second 
part of the paper I will suggest a quick summary of different acting strategies, going 
from an emotion based acting (Strasberg, 1987), mixed strategies involving 
imagination (Stanislavski, 1936; Adler, 1988, 2000), and ending with action based 
acting (Meisner, 1987). In the third part I will use Hofstadter’s views of the Self to 
explain how these different acting techniques can all function in creating convincing 
Self loops that flesh out the characters built by the actors.   
1. The Self as a strange loop 
In his book, I am a Strange Loop, Hofstadter goes through great lengths to explain 
what he means by a strange loop. A loop is a closed circuit where there seems to be 
an ever increasing in level, but nevertheless we end up where we started. One of 
Hofstadter’s favorite examples is what we calls an enchanting experience he had as 
a kid when closing a cardboard box and folding the flaps in a cyclical order: “It 
always gave me a frisson of delight (and even today it still does a little bit) to perform 
that final verboten fold and thus feel I was flirting dangerously with paradoxicality.” 
(Hofstadter, 2007, p. 101). 
There are many other examples of different types of loops, some are circular, some 
tend towards infinity. Among the circular loops, Hofstadter includes de “lap loop”, 
a game where each individual is sitting on another individual’s lap until a complete 
circle is achieved and it is hard to say who is holding the group, but the lap loop 
does not collapse. Another simple illustration of a circular lap can easily be 
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This is another version of the original example presented by Hofstadter when we 
close a cardboard box with overlapping flaps. The infinity generating loops are the 
ones that happen when we place two facing mirrors or when we have a camera that 
is plugged into a certain monitor that is showing what it is recording and we turn 
the camera towards the said monitor, in that case we get a video loop. Here is an 










Image 2:  
Mirror loop: infinite regress;  
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But what does Hofstadter mean when he says the Self is a strange loop? Does he 
mean that there is an actual physical loopy structure in the brain that supports what 
we call the self? Yes and no. Hofstadter does think that there must be some structure 
in the brain that supports the self, but the exact nature of that structure is still 
unknown to us. What he means for the time being is that we can use this idea of a 
strange loop and create an abstract theory of the Self: 
 “What I mean by “strange loop” is - here goes a first stab, anyway - not a physical 
circuit but an abstract loop in which, in the series of stages that constitute the 
cycling-around, there is a shift from one level of abstraction (or structure) to 
another, which feels like an upwards movement in a hierarchy, and yet somehow 
the successive “upward” shifts turn out to give rise to a closed cycle.  That is, despite 
one’s sense of departing ever further from one’s origin, one winds up, to one’s 
shock, exactly where one had started out.” (Hofstadter, 2007, p. 101-102) 
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1.1. Gödel, Russell, Strange Loops, Self-reference and Paradox. 
Hofstadter started thinking about strange loops in his earlier book, Gödel, Escher and 
Bach (1979).  In this book Hofstadter talks about the first Gödel incompleteness 
theorem. Gödel incompleteness theorem was developed after Russell and 
Whitehead’s Principia of Mathematica. In the Principia of Mathematica Russell and 
Whitehead were trying to reduce mathematics to logics, but the first Gödel 
incompleteness theorem states that there is a truth that cannot be proved in the 
system presented in Russell and Whitehead. Gödel was able to construct a self-
referential sentence in PM by mapping the symbols used by Russell and Whitehead 
to Gödel numbers, which allowed him to construct what is called the Gödel 
sentence. The Gödel sentence is a statement that is true, but not provable in PM. 
Gödel statement is: 
“This statement 
cannot be proved” 
Russell and Whitehead where well aware of the problems and paradoxes arrived at 
when constructing Self-referential sentences. In fact, their own system was 
developed after Russell encountered Self-referential issues in the previous work of 
Frege (1884) who had tried to reduce arithmetic to set theory. Russell had developed 
what is known as the Russell Paradox. Russell constructed a set that was defined as 
the set of all sets that do not belong to themselves, if this set belongs to itself, then 
it does not belong to itself and if it does not belong to itself, then it belongs to itself. 
To avoid these types of self-referential paradoxes, Russell had introduced what he 
called the Theory of Types that was build in order to prevent the construction of 
paradoxical self-reference logical sentences by keeping hierarchical levels separate, 
however, Gödel constructed a different interpretation of Russell’s symbols broke 
the hierarchy blocking strategy that Russell had devised and the paradox 
reappeared.  
As a young man, Hofstadter was fascinated by these are other examples of self-
reference. However, what touches him the most is not that self-reference in certain 
systems can create paradoxical contractions, instead he is delighted by the idea that 
there is no way to block self-reference if the system presented is sufficiently 
complex, that is the uptake of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem for Hofstadter. 
However, the “self loop” that Hofstadter wants to introduce, is not necessarily of 
the self-destructive kind: “...negation plays no essential role in strange loopiness. 
It’s just that the strangeness becomes more pungent or humorous if the loop enjoys 
a self-undermining quality. Recall Escher’s Drawing Hands. There is no negation in 
it - both hands are drawing. Imagine if one was erasing the other!” (Hofstadter, 
2007, p.159) 
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Hofstadter’s is mainly interested in the idea that sufficiently complex systems 
cannot help themselves and become self-referential. This is the main vision that 
arose from Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem: “What makes a strange loop 
appear in a brain (...) is an ability - the ability to think - which is in effect a one 
syllable word standing for the possession of a sufficiently large repertoire of trigger-
able symbols. Just as the richness of whole numbers gave PM the power to represent 
phenomena of unlimited complexity and thus to twist back and engulf itself via 
Godel’s construction, so our extensible repertoires of symbols give our brains the 
power to represent phenomena of unlimited complexity and thus to twist back and 
engulf themselves via a strange loop.”  (Hofstadter, 2007, p. 203). 
1.2. Hofstadter’s Self 
The original intuition for Hofstadter is then that sufficient complex systems will 
inevitably be self-referential. But what is this and how does a Self appear and 
develop? What is a Self? For Hofstadter, the “I” represents a rather large and 
dominant structure in the brain that is not essentially different from other structures 
in the brain, but its presence has a larger impact because of its size and complexity. 
The structure that comprises the “I” includes endless episodic, emotional and 
introspective memories associated with it. The “I” is built as these memories are 
constructed and as the person interacts with the world the vision of the “I” changes 
accordingly:  
“The vast amounts of stuff that we call “I” collectively give rise, at some particular 
moment, to some external action, much as a stone tossed into a pond gives rise to 
expanding rings of ripples. Soon, our action’s myriad consequences start bouncing 
back at us, like the first ripples returning after bouncing of the pond’s banks. What 
we receive back affords us the chance to perceive what our gradually 
metamorphosing “I” has wrought.” (Hofstadter, 2007, p.  203) 
For Hofstadter the Self is therefore a large complex looping structure that is not 
essentially different from other structures in the brain. The Self loop has a larger 
impact on our experience and behavior mostly because of its size. The Self loop 
consists of endless episodic, emotional and introspective memories. The Self also is 
affected and formed as the person interacts with the world, the Self loop is not 
completely internal, it reaches out to the world and changes as its experiences 
develop. One of the most fundamental ideas in Hofstadter is that the Self is not an 
essentially different from other brain structures and in fact the way we represent 
others is very similar to the way we represent ourselves. 
1.3. Others are Strange Loops 
According to Hofstadter strange loops do not only build Selves but they also 
represent Others. Besides being able to create our ever changing “I” with our 
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interaction with the world, we are also able to create similar structures to represent 
others, “you”, “he”, “she”, “Robert”, “Sandy” and so on.  When we interact with 
other people, we assume that they perform the same creation of self that we do and 
we create a smaller loop to represent what we assume to be their own self-creation. 
However, since we have less information about others than about ourselves these 
loops, according to Hofstadter, are less elaborate, but not radically different from 
ours.  
The Other for Hofstadter is a smaller structure, not essentially different from ours, 
only smaller in size, the fact that it has limited information makes it a less complex 
system and therefore it might be less rich and complete. One interesting result of 
Hofstadter’s view of the Other as a strange loop is that one has to admit to some 
introspective access of the other. Our introspective access to others loops is limited 
by the amount of complexity of other loops, but in fact, if we know someone very 
well, we can introspect from the inside of our representation of the other. Of course 
this probably will not correspond with the experience the other has of his own Self 
loop, but there is no reason in principle that will necessarily stop the possibility of 
the introspection of other’s Self loops. In fact, the more we have experiences with 
Others, the more we can tune our representations of them in our Other loops and 
the closer we can be having a similar introspective experience as they do. This 
ability to represent others as we do ourselves opens to way to understanding how 
acting works and how an actor can be successful in creating a character.   
In the next section of this paper I will present several acting techniques in order to 
understand the tools actors use to create loops that represent the characters they 
want to embody. There are several types of acting techniques and I will try to give 
an overview of them in order to have a general perspective of how they work. 
Finally in the last section I will try to see how the acting techniques can be 
understood using Hofstadter’s theories of the Self. 
2. Acting 
In a documentary for the PBS TV Series American Masters about Sanford Meisner, 
Sydney Pollack while speaking about Constantin Stanislavski, defined acting in the 
following way: “Acting has to do reproducing honest and truthful human behavior 
in imaginary circumstances.”  Even though this is a very good definition of acting, 
I would tweak it slightly in this way: “Acting is reproducing human behavior in 
imaginary circumstances in an honest and truthful way.” I think this is probably 
closer to what Sydney Pollack meant, since not all characters played by actors are 
honest and truthful, an actor can also represent dishonest and misleading human 
behavior in imaginary circumstances in an honest and truthful way. After this small 
tweak I like this definition because it touches on three elements that pertain to all 
acting: behavior, imagination and truthfulness, which has space for the adequate 
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emotional content of the behavior being performed. Tentatively I will put forward 
the three essential elements of acting: emotion, imagination and action and I will 
try to show how different acting techniques use these three elements, although each 
kind of technique can stress one element as more important than the others. 
In the next sections I will skim through the teachings of the four main acting 
teachers in theater history. I will organize them not chronologically but by how they 
stand in the line from emotion to action based acting with imagination being 
somewhere in between emotion and action. I will therefore start with Lee Strasberg 
(1987) because he has the most emotion-based approach also know as The Method. 
Then I will look at the teachings of Costantin Stanislavski (1936) who started as an 
emotion based acting teacher and later in his career is said to have stressed the 
power of imagination. After that I will look at the work of Stella Adler (1988) who 
stresses the importance of imagination in an actor’s work. Finally, I will look at the 
technique proposed by Sanford Meisner (1987) that stresses the importance of 
action while teaching his acting technique. I will argue that even though each 
teacher stresses a different aspect of acting, they all agree with the triad of acting as 
involving emotion, imagination and action. 
2.1. Strasberg 
Lee Strasberg is an American actor and acting teacher who was the director of the 
Actor’s Studio and who is considered the father of Method Acting in the United 
States, a method followed by many famous film actors: James Dean, Marilyn 
Monroe, Paul Newman, Robert De Niro, Al Pacino and many others are all said to 
be followers of Method Acting. Method Acting, as proposed by Strasberg, is a group 
of techniques and exercises that help an actor connect to a character by using their 
own personal emotions and memories. Method actors use what they affective, 
emotional and sensory memory, when they are building a character. A method 
actor will start by building a complete profile of the character he wants to portrait 
or embody, he will consider his history, relationships, experiences and so on, 
however, to be able to really embody the character, Method Acting encourages the 
actor to look into their personal emotional experiences in order to “flesh out” the 
emotional experiences of the character. The aim of the actor is to move the audience 
and the idea is that he can only move the audience if he is able to move himself. The 
basic idea is that a performance can only be experienced by the audience as moving, 
if it is experienced as moving by the actor and brining up deeply personal emotional 
memories is supposed to help in the genuine experience of the performance. 
In his book, A Dream of Passion (1987), Lee Strasberg talks about the main dilemma 
of the actor, what is sometimes called “inspiration”. How can an actor be moved 
day in and day out in a theater performance? Does an actor need to be moved in 
order to move the audience? This topic was analysed by Diderot in his book The 
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Paradox of Acting (1883), basically the problem for Diderot is that emotional 
performers cannot be expected to deliver a consistent performance, we can expect 
no “unity” from players who “play from the heart”: “Their playing is alternately 
strong and feeble, fiery and cold, dull and sublime.” (Diderot, 1883, p.8). However, 
Lee Strasberg did not conclude with Diderot that we must strip emotion from the 
performances, instead he looked for ways to preserve emotion in performances in 
a consistent way. He knew that this would be possible after seeing the Moscow Art 
Theater performances of Chekov plays in New York city guided by Stanislavski. 
Here is how Lee Strasberg describes these productions: “In the productions we saw 
in America, the plays were alive with vivid, intense, colorful experiences, while 
each moment was filled with marvelous creations of the experiences of the 
characters. There was never anything maudlin or pathetic or sentimental.” It was 
after seeing the Moscow Art Theater performances that Lee Strasberg decided to 
become an actor and being that he knew Stanislavski had developed a consistent 
method for achieving performances of the stature that Lee Strasberg had witnessed, 
he later looked to develop such a method himself as director of the Actor’s Studio. 
After seeing the Moscow Art Theater, Lee Strasberg was convinced that “acting in 
the process of living on the stage” (Strasberg, 1987, p.63).  There are two main parts 
of the stage experience that have to be dealt with by the actor, one is adequate 
preparation and the other is adequate expression.  When setting up a character the 
actor in Stanislavski’s method uses what Strasberg calls the “creative if”, where he 
imagines himself in a certain set of circumstances and tries to see how he would 
react to such circumstances. Strasberg found that this only worked if the setting of 
the play was close enough to the actor’s own experience, in classical plays were the 
experience is very far from the actor’s lived experience, this strategy does not work. 
Strasberg suggested that the actor can imagine a different set of circumstances that 
he is familiar with and react with those in mind even if they have nothing to do with 
the play. By using this strategy the actor’s performance will come across as credible 
because his emotions are sincere. Sincerity of emotion and experience on stage is 
the key to a good performance according to Lee Strasberg and the way to achieve 
this is by using one’s existing previous emotional experiences.  
There is a lot to say about each acting technique, but for the purposes of this paper 
I will just try to concentrate on the essential aspects of each technique and hopefully 
in the end we will be able to have a general view of acting technique in general and 
we will be able to try to understand the techniques in view of Hofstadter’s theory 
of the Self. In the next chapter I will present a summary of the approach developed 
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2.2. Stanislavski 
Constantin Stanislavski was the master of social realism in theater in Russia and 
inspired all psychological realism in theater in the United States. I am describing is 
work after Less Strasberg because even though he stresses the emotional content of 
a performance, he has a more balanced view on how to learn the art of acting. 
Stanislavski defines acting first and foremost as action with a purpose. His main 
instructional book, An Actor Prepares, is a fictional work written from the point of 
view of one of his students. In this book, the student describes going to the Moscow 
Art Theater and doing all the exercises proposed by the teacher. In many examples 
and situations the teacher shows the students that one can only perform an action 
convincingly if the action to be performed has a defined purpose, one cannot simply 
perform an action and arouse emotion, one needs a complete set up of the scene’s 
background and character motivation in order to have the emotional content of the 
scene appear in a natural and honest way: 
“Fix this for all time in your memories: On the stage there cannot be, under any 
circumstances, action which is directed immediately at the arousing of a feeling for its own 
sake. To ignore this rule results only in the most disgusting artificiality. When you are 
choosing some bit of action leave feeling and spiritual content alone. Never seek to be 
jealous, or to make love, or to suffer, for its own sake. All such feelings are the result 
of something that has gone before. Of the thing that goes before you should think as hard as 
you can. As for the result, it will produce itself.” (Stanislavski, p. 38) 
So even though emotion is important for a performance to be moving, it cannot be 
the starting point for a performance. Stanislavski says that in order to perform a 
convincing action one must develop the character’s situation, motivation, 
background and so on. In order to do this the actor will use the big “what if” 
guideline. However, since many of the plays will present the actor with situations 
that are far beyond what he has experienced in life and because the actor has to 
perform in a non-realist environment, the stage, one of the actor’s main challenges 
is to develop his imagination. Stanislavski proposes several exercises regarding the 
development of an actor’s imagination. In one example he asks the student to 
imagine that he is a tree, then asks the student to develop this in more detail: the 
student imagines he is a giant oak tree in the mountain standing alone in a large 
field, he hears the rustle of the leaves and he sees the birds on his branches but he 
can’t imagine much else. The teacher then suggests that the student should explain 
why he is alone in a field and the student places the tree in a feudal era and says the 
feudal lord had all the other trees cut down for fear of the enemy and left that one 
tree because it created a shadow on a spring of water and in order to climb on it and 
look out for the enemy. At this point the student has a much more fleshed out idea 
of the tree. Now, since a tree does not move, it is a particularly difficult challenge 
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for an actor to create much more with this subject, but at this point the teacher asks 
the student to look into his personal emotional history and bring up something that 
stirs him in his real life. The student says he is particularly moved by fights and so 
the teacher says he should imagine the enemy’s army is approaching, he is being 
attached with arrows and gun shots and so on. The student is able to bring up 
several strong emotions but since the tree cannot move, his physical dramatic 
expression is limited. Stanlislavski uses this example in order to illustrate how 
much background and preparation is before any action at all is performed. 
(Stanislavski, p. 61-66) 
Imagination is important in order to create the background for action, but when 
action is being performed there are other techniques that are important to make the 
action look natural and real. Strategies like concentration of attention in certain 
objects and exercises in muscle relaxation are also a part of the actor’s preparation. 
Finally, because an actor must be ready to repeat an emotional and truthful 
experience on stage day after day, Stanislavski stresses the importance of what he 
calls sensory and emotional memory. Sensory memory is memory of sensory inputs 
like sound, tactile memory, smells and so on. If an actor trains his sensory memory 
he will be able to bring it about on stage and he will be able to flesh out a scene with 
real sensory experience. Emotional memory is like regular action memory but its 
focus is on past emotions. If, for instance, one had a close friend who died, it is 
relatively easy to recall the emotion felt when one heard about their death. The actor 
must practice the recollection of all kinds of emotions. Then, besides practicing the 
recollection of emotion, the actor will associate certain actions to a certain emotion 
in order to create a conditioned reflex where a certain action brings forth a certain 
emotion. This requires a lot of training, but it is a way to achieve emotionally filled 
performances on stage that can be consistently repeated. 
Summing up Stanislavsky’s method: the aim of a theatrical performance is to 
achieve a truthful embodiment of a play on stage. All action on stage must be with 
a purpose and in order to establish that purpose actors need to exercise their 
imagination while fleshing out the characters background. After developing the 
character’s setting the action on stage should bring forth the adequate emotional 
content for each scene. The actor then needs to develop his emotional memory so 
that he can repeat the emotional content of the play in a consistent way and in order 
to develop his emotional memory the actor associates certain actions with certain 
emotions. So, in Stanislavsky’s method he uses the three aspects of acting: action, 
imagination and emotion, in a balanced way. 
2.3. Adler 
Stella Adler also witnessed Stanislavski’s Moscow Art Theater performances in 
New York City, she was also part of the Group Theater with Lee Strasberg and 
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actually travelled to Paris to study with Stanislavski himself. Generally, Adler 
follows the Stanislvski’s system, but her interpretation is different from Lee 
Strasberg in that Strasberg underlined the importance of personal emotions in the 
performance, while Adler underlined the importance of imagination. Adler had 
distain for the idea that actors have to look onto their personal emotional past in 
order to flesh out the characters. In most plays, the characters embodied by actors 
where so far from what the general middle class American experience had to offer, 
that it seemed to her absurd that the actor should look for the emotional content of 
his performances in such an experience: 
“Nowadays a lot of what passes for acting is nothing more than finding yourself in 
some character. That doesn’t interest me. Of course you have to bring your own 
experience to bear on the characters you play, but you have to realize right from the 
outset that Hamlet was not “a guy like you”.” (Adler, 2000, p. 19) 
Adler stressed that the actor should spend large amounts of time reading and 
becoming more and more knowledgeable about different cultures and different 
attitudes. The actor, according to her, should be constantly enriching himself and 
by doing so he will furnish more and more the most important quality an actor 
needs in order to succeed, his imagination: 
“Ninety-nine percent of what you see and use on the stage comes from imagination. 
Onstage you will never have your own name and personality or be in your own 
house. Every person you talk to will have been written imaginatively by the 
playwright. Every circumstance you find yourself in will be an imaginary one. And 
so, every word, every action, must originate in the actor’s imagination.” (Adler, 
1988, p. 17). 
Adler also admits that emotion is very important in order to construct theatrical 
truth or a sense of being genuine on stage, however she claims that emotion and 
action in theater must have their root in imagination and therefore most of her 
exercises are constructed in order to develop this faculty in the actor. 
2.4. Meisner 
Last, but not lease, Meisner is another follower of Stanislavski’s system, however, 
instead of stressing emotion or imagination, he stresses action. Meisner thought that 
the most important thing in order to achieve truthfulness on stage was to be 
completely present in the moment while doing the action. Meisner’s motto was: 
“The foundation of acting is the reality of doing” (Meisner p. 16) 
In order to achieve this presence in the moment Meisner’s students start by 
developing the ability to improvise first, the ability to live in the moment of the 
scene, to react to the other actors in the moment of the scene. Meisner’s most famous 
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techniques are the repetition exercises where the actor’s repeat something to each 
other until something impels them to move forward, for instance, one actor will say: 
“Your smart” and the other will answer: “I’m smart”, then the first actor will repeat: 
“Your smart” and the second: “I am smart.” The inflection in both actors will change 
as they repeat this exercise and certain emotions will arise, they might get irritated, 
bored and so on. The most important thing for Meisner is moment to moment 
spontaneity. When learning the lines, a Meisner actor will say them with no 
intonation, the intonation will only occur in the moment and can be radically 
different from performance to performance. This does not produce consistent 
performances, but guarantees honesty and truthfulness in each performance. 
Emotion and imagination are also present in Meisner’s method, but the over 
stressing of each of these made for actor who had a very deep presence but acted 
with themselves and not with others, not in the moment of the scene.  
There is much more that can be said about each approach to acting that I sketched 
here. However, for the sake of this paper I only wanted to try to show that these 
approaches all use the same basic elements in constructing a character: emotion, 
imagination and action. The starting point and the focus is in either one of them in 
each case, Strasberg started from emotion, Adler from imagination and Meisner 
from action, while the original teacher being this realist method, Stanislavski, 
balanced all three. Here is a graphic illustration of this idea:  
Emotion                Imagination                 Action 
 
Lee Strasberg / Constantin Stanislavski / Stella Adler / Sanford Meisner 
 
In the next and last section I will try to understand why this triad works in building 
a character by using Hofstadter’s view of the Self. If the Self is somehow a unique 
system in the brain that belong only to the person in who it exists, it cannot be easily 
understood how actors can build convincing and non-artificial characters. If the Self 
is unique and exclusive of the bearer, then acting is doomed to fail and the aim of 
truth on stage that the realist Methods try to achieve is a red herring. However, if 
the Self, like Hofstadter claims, is not fundamentally different from other structures 
in the brain that we use to represent others, then all the techniques employed by 
these Methods make sense and we can understand how an actor builds a character. 
 
3. The Actor’s “Self” 
How do Hofstadter’s views allow us to understand what happens in the types of 
acting techniques presented in the previous section? Hofstadter’s view of the Self 
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can help us understand how acting techniques work in several interesting ways: the 
idea that Self and Other are not substantially different in the brain allows us to 
understand how it is possible for an actor to create and embody a convincing 
character; self-referentiality can only be achieved in sufficiently complex systems, 
this is why the actor needs to create a sufficiently complex body of experiences and 
background for the character in order to incorporate it; when we attribute selves to 
others we do not need complete access to their intimate experiences, so we are also 
willing to attribute selves to the actor’s characters when we witness them, however, 
there is a minimum of complexity in the actor’s character self experience, if that is 
not present we experience the performance as fake or unconvincing; acting 
techniques also help us understand how selves are constituted by inner and outer 
relationships, actions and reactions, in the case of real life we have the cyclic triad: 
circumstances, action, emotion. In acting the circumstances are replaced by 
imagination, but the cyclic experience is the same; finally Hofstadter’s views also 
allow us to understand why the techniques work no matter what aspect of the 
experience is underlined as long as all aspects are taken into consideration. 
3.1. Self and Other 
One of Hofstadter’s main points about the Self is that the loop that constitutes the 
Self in the brain is not substantially different from the loops that represents Others. 
According to Hofstadter, the only difference between our Self loops and those that 
represent Others is that our loop is much larger and much more detailed than those 
that represent others. If this is so, then it is easy to understand that actors can indeed 
create and assume a character in their acting roles. Furthermore, Hofstadter’s view 
explains why the actor has to go through such lengths in order to create that 
character, why he has to include endless circumstances, emotions and actions before 
the character can come to life. The complexity of the loop an actor creates to 
represent the character he wants to embody is somewhere in between the loops we 
create for ourselves and the loops we create for others.  
Another of Hofstadter’s main insights is that, following Gödel, any sufficiently 
complex system can become Self-referential, therefore if the actor works long 
enough and creates a complex enough character, self-referentiality will appear. In 
other words, an actor does not have to worry about “creating” a character out of the 
blue, what he needs to do is work on several aspects of a character, circumstances, 
emotions, actions, experiences, and the self-referential loop will necessarily appear 
once sufficient complexity has been achieved. In this way, what seems like an 
incredibly difficult achievement, creating a living character within ourselves, is 
actually a pretty innocuous result of the acting practices. Acting techniques help in 
that they speed up the process by picking out on the most essential elements and 
activities that bring about character creation and therefore make it easier and faster 
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for an actor to find the character in a theatrical setting. The character, therefore, is 
not created by the actor as a sculptor might create a statue, it appears from the work 
of the actor because the complexity of the psychological experience and content will 
necessary bring forth self-referentiality. When this happens, it is easy for a 
performance to look convincing and moving since in fact the character they are 
witnessing is a sufficiently embodied Self and can move others just as regular Other 
selves do. 
3.2. Self and the World 
Yet another aspect of Hofstadter’s views about the Self is that the external world, 
including other selves, also has a constant constitutive role in our ever-changing 
loops. The loop is not only internal, but also external. The Self constituting loops 
can be illustrated as something of this sort: 
 
 
                                 





                                
In the real world, our Selves are constituted by elements of the ever-changing 
circumstances we find ourselves in, our interactions with others, our emotions and 
our own actions. The Self is a constant construction from these elements and an ever 
changing loop that becomes more and more complex with every step. In acting 


















(imaginary circunstances, others 
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This understanding of acting also explains how the different strategies presented 
by Strasberg, Adler and Meisner work. It seems that one can start building character 
from either of the elements in the above graph, as long as all elements are present, 
each element is as good a starting point as any other. According to this 
interpretation of how acting techniques work, it seems that the most important 
aspect in acting is the extensive work an actor can do in all these elements for only 
with a sufficiently complex array of them can the character’s Self naturally appear. 
Finally, the fact that Hofstadter’s views about the Self allow us to create an 
understanding of how acting techniques function, can be a good argument for the 
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Abstract:  One way of self-alteration is the alteration of the subjective experience of gender 
identity. In this case the alteration is defined in relation to an alleged social normality. 
Psychoanalysis tries to think this alteration but does so in an extremely conservative and 
normalizing way. These are limitations that prevent Judith Butler, who works with some of 
Sigmund Freud’s key texts, to have a more open approach to thinking about the alterations 
of gender undergone by the self. In order to overcome these limitations and think about 
gender beyond sexual orientation I propose combining Judith Butler’s insights with René 
Girard’s work. In this paper I confront Judith Butler’s ideas on gender and sexuality with 
René Girard’s concept of mimesis. Through this theoretical encounter I wish to show how 
certain paths of interrogation are foreclosed for Butler because psychoanalysis does not offer 
conceptual tools to think about them. We will be able to observe how Girard’s model accounts 
for constellations that Butler is interested in, such as the transgender, but which she does 
not and cannot fully explore using psychoanalytical framework. Girard’s model is able to 
account for different modalities of the ‘self’: for being a man, a woman or a third entity; and 
for different modalities of desire: desiring homosexually, heterosexually, and polysexually. 
In mimesis the spectrum of gender behaviour is as broad as the scope of the model’s desires 
and behaviours. This is where the disjunction between sexuality and gender is both possible 
and necessary. The idea of alteration based on mimesis is based on bodily repetition of models 
that are available to the subject in her socio-historical context. 
Keywords: Judith Butler, transgender, René Girard, mimesis, triangular desire 
Judith Butler has been deeply preoccupied throughout her work with the question 
of transgender. Her theoretical thinking about gender and sexual identity is mainly 
anchored in psychoanalysis where she criticizes, reformulates and reuses 




harshly criticized for not accounting for transgender identity as an identity 
operating in its own terms.1 Namaste (1996) goes as far as to say: “Clearly, as 
scholars and as activists, we need to challenge Butler’s negation of transgender 
identity” (Mamaste 1996, 188). In this paper I would like to confront Judith Butler’s 
ideas on gender and sexuality with René Girard’s concept of mimesis. Through this 
theoretical encounter I wish to show how certain paths of interrogation are 
foreclosed for Butler because psychoanalysis does not offer conceptual tools to 
think about them. We will be able to observe how Girard’s model accounts for 
constellations that Butler is interested in but which she does not and cannot fully 
explore using psychoanalytical framework. She deals with the prohibition on incest 
and homosexuality but with psychoanalysis she lacks the tools to account for 
transgender position. René Girard will help us to propose an alternative way to 
conceptualize the relationship between sexuality and gender and so distance Butler 
from psychoanalysis. 
Butler’s account of gender identity in Gender Trouble draws on Freudian paradigm 
of ego formation through melancholia in an Oedipal constellation. She brings to our 
attention the fact that Freud in “The Ego and the Super-Ego” does not only describe 
“character formation” but also acquisition of gender identity. Freud claims that 
identification happens as a response to loss of a loved object. In order to preserve it 
we install the lost object in the ego. Freud claims that in the process of ego-formation 
a child desires one of its parents but the taboo against incest means that the desire 
has to be given up. Like the melancholic, who takes the loss into her and thereby 
preserves it, a child preserves the desired and lost parent through identification. 
The ego in Freud is then a repository of all desires that had to be given up. As Freud 
(1923) puts it: “the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes 
and […] it contains the history of those object-choices” (368 quoted in Salih 2002, 
53). If the primary object of desire is the mother then the identification will be with 
her and if it is the father then with him. Freud does not, however, determine why a 
child desires one parent rather than another but he attributes it to a child’s 
“disposition”: either “feminine” or “masculine”. The disposition of the child is its 
innate desire for the member of the opposite or the same sex. However, Freud 
himself is hesitant about dispositions and gives an example of a “little girl” who 
identifies with her father that brings “her masculinity into prominence”. It would 
seem that the primary object choice is the result of primary disposition, feminine or 
masculine to start with, and Butler rejects such postulations (cf. Salih 2002, 52-56; 
Freud 1923, 372). “Feminine” would mean identifying with the mother and desiring 
the father and “masculine” - identifying with the father and desiring the mother. 
Butler (1990, 82) asks: “to what extent do we read the desire for the father as 
evidence of a feminine disposition”? Even though Freud suggests bisexuality as 
“originally present in the children”, it seems to Butler that bisexuality in Freud “is 
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the coincidence of two heterosexual desires within a single psyche” (Butler 1990, 82). The 
masculine disposition is never directed towards the father as an object of love and 
the feminine disposition is never directed at the mother.2 Therefore, there must be 
according to Butler another prohibition at work that directs this gender 
identification and is the source of problems that Freud encounters in accounting for 
identification.3 Butler is interested in precisely those dispositions and how this 
primary object choice works.4  
She proposes in this context the concept of primary prohibition on homosexuality 
where heterosexuality and gender identification are established not only through 
implementing the incest prohibition but, prior to that, through the prohibition on 
homosexuality (cf. Butler 1997, 135). As we know, for Freud identification with the 
same sex other is a psychic form of preserving the lost object. Due to cultural taboos 
against incest and homosexuality our passionate attachment to the same sex person 
(mother or father) is rejected. A girl becomes a woman by losing her mother as a 
primary object of love. This giving up an object of love is only possible through a 
melancholic “bringing inside” of her mother through identification with her and so 
becoming feminine (Butler 1997, 134). In case of a heterosexual union with the 
parent the object of desire is denied but not the modality of desire (heterosexual 
desire). In consequence, desire is deflected to other objects of the opposite sex 
constituting the normal process of mourning. In case of homosexual union with the 
parent both the object and the modality of desire require renunciation and so 
become subject to internalization through melancholia. In this way gender is 
acquired as internalization of prohibition on homosexuality. This identity is 
constructed and maintained by the consistent application of the taboo against 
homosexuality (cf. Butler 1990, 86). Thus, “homosexuality is not abolished but 
preserved, though preserved precisely in the prohibition on homosexuality” (cf. 
Butler 1997, 135-142) and gender identification is based on this set of disavowed 
attachments.  Femininity is then formed through the refusal to grieve the feminine 
(the mother) as a possibility of love - “an exclusion never grieved, but ‘preserved’ 
through heightened […] identification” (Butler 1997, 146). A woman becomes a 
heterosexual melancholic where she refuses to acknowledge the attachment to the 
same sex and so a strictly straight woman is the truest lesbian melancholic (cf. Butler 
1997, 147).5 Butler finds it interesting because this account seems to follow from 
Freud’s own claims (cf. Butler 2004, 199-200).6 
To this Freudian interpretation, Butler importantly adds the surface of the body as 
the site where identification takes place (cf. Salih 2002, 56; Butler 1990, 86). 
Identification happens through bodily acts of “incorporation of the Other by 
mimetic practice” (Butler 1990a, 132-133): “Identifications are always made in 




seeks to incorporate the lost love within the very ‘identity’ of the one who remains” 
(Butler 1990a, 132). As we said above, the choice of the model is directed by the 
taboo against homosexuality and gender identification, therefore, follows from the 
“acting out” this prohibition. This constitutes precisely the difference between 
melancholia caused by separation, death or breaking of an emotional tie and 
melancholia in the Oedipal situation.  As she puts it in Gender Trouble: “In the 
Oedipal situation […] the loss is dictated by a prohibition attended by a set of 
punishments” (Butler 1990, 87). A child that enters the Oedipal drama with 
incestuous desires has already been subjected to prohibition of homosexuality. 
“Hence, dispositions that Freud assumes to be primary or constitutive facts of 
sexual life are effects of a law which, internalized, produces and regulates discrete 
gender identity and heterosexuality” (Butler 1990, 87). For Butler, therefore, gender 
identity is produced by incorporation of the cultural prohibition on homosexuality.7 
Our bodies enact this incorporated prohibition as femininity or masculinity 
constituting a residue of this primary, most important loss. The question that one 
needs to pose to Butler, however, is what about other prohibitions apart from incest 
and homosexuality that we incorporate in our bodies and which contribute to our 
gender identity? What about all that the melancholic phrase “I have lost nothing” 
incorporates? Does gender has to be always already sexual? What about the 
transgender position where sexuality and gender identity are disjoined?8 
In order to see how Girard tackles the problems ingrained in psychoanalytical 
matrix let us first make explicit the undercurrent assumptions that Butler works 
with. First, for Freud and Butler desire is always already there. That one desires is 
a precondition for the functioning of their systems. Second, Butler assumes that 
taboo against homosexuality permeates our culture and affects the structure of 
desire and identity irrespectively of our immediate collectivity. The Foucaultian 
prohibition produces the primary desire as homosexual. Third, she takes up the 
psychoanalytical assumption that the disavowed, like the Lacanian Real, structures 
our psyche. And fourth, that sexual desire is central to the formation of gender 
identity. 
With Girard we can explain identification without recourse to primary prohibition 
or initial desire or, to put it in more psychoanalytical terms, without turning to 
castration or lack. Desire for Girard is produced in result of the mechanism of 
mimesis – desire is never autonomous but originates in the desire of the other that 
we see and unwittingly imitate. Therefore, desire always operates in triangular 
constellations. Girard accounts for the Freudian Oedipus complex with the double 
bind of mimesis. In his view, there is no way for a child to distinguish between the 
behaviour that is “good” to imitate (i.e. non-acquisitive mimesis, imitating a model) 
and behaviour that is not good to imitate (acquisitive mimesis that leads to mimetic 
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rivalry and thus violence because it wishes to appropriate the object of desire). In 
the case of a disciple-master relationship, which Girard gives as an example of a 
double bind, the disciple imitates the master. This imitation is clearly expected in 
the educational process. However, once the disciple surpasses the master, the 
master will become hostile towards this disciple due to emerging rivalry. The 
double bind takes place when a subject is incapable of correctly interpreting the 
double imperative that comes from the other person: as a model, imitate me; as a 
rival, do not imitate me (Girard 1987, 291). In Oedipus complex, Freud assumes that 
a child has the intrinsic desire for the mother and inherent narcissism. Girard 
refuses Freudian essences and claims that the farther is a model for apprenticeship 
and this inevitably involves also being a model in terms of sexual desire. The child, 
in Girard’s view, does not know what it does when it imitates the father’s desire for 
the mother. It does not distinguish between imitation and rivalry. It is the adult’s 
interpretation, in this case Freud’s, that accuses the child of sexual desire for the 
mother, whereas the child, according to Girard, only imitates unwittingly a model, 
i.e. the father (cf. Girard 1987, 352).  
In Girard’s system, therefore, gender identity would come from non-acquisitive 
imitation of a model or models: mother or father, mother or mother, father or father. 
This would mean imitating a whole range of conducts, norms embodied and 
repeated in their behaviours, and also, but not necessarily, the modality of their 
desires (be it homosexual or heterosexual). A disjunction of gender identity and 
sexual interest would be possible here. Let us, however, first think through the 
options that Girard’s system proposes for the conflation of desire with identity 
which psychoanalysis makes. Let us also analyse the modalities of desire that are 
involved in triangulation. It has to be noted that these are purely structural 
considerations. 
The triangular mimetic structure involves both heterosexual and homosexual desire 
at the same time. Depending on the constellation: heterosexual configuration 
implies homosexual desire or homosexual configuration implies heterosexual 
desire. Let us think it through step by step and first consider a triangular mimetic 
structure involving two men, as models and rivals, and a woman as the object of 
desire. It has to be pointed out that we are thinking here strictly in terms of triangles 
of desire that are characteristic for Girardian thinking. The constellation of 
departure here involves a heterosexual desire: both men desire a woman. One man 
admires the other and imitates his desire for the woman and so becomes a rival. 
Both imitate each other’s desires for the woman and intensify the involvement with 
each other. The fierce rivalry leads to the obsession with the rival rather than the 
object of desire and leads to eroticizing of the rival. This is how heterosexual 




However, if the constellation of departure is homosexual then there are two options 
with different consequences. Let us start with the simpler one. If all three tips of the 
triangle are of one gender, all parties involved are either only women or only men, 
then the structure would inevitably be of exclusively homosexual nature. This poses 
no further problems. If, however, the constellation of departure is homosexual yet 
mixed: a man and a woman are rivals over a woman as an object of desire then the 
rivalry is heterosexual in structure. Therefore, Girard claims that “there is no 
structural difference between the type of homosexuality and the type of 
heterosexuality that we are discussing at this point” (Girard 1987, 347). Both desires 
are involved here. The interesting part, however, in this constellation is the question 
of identification that results from such a structure and the question of the nature of 
desire. As Girard claims, obsessive rivalry can lead to becoming the double of the 
model-rival. If we conflate for a moment sexual desire with gender identity, as 
Butler does, then in the proposed “mixed homosexual structure of departure” this 
would mean that a man by imitating a desire of a woman for another woman would 
become a male lesbian and a woman by imitating the desire of a man for the woman 
would become a female straight man. This would then posit a structure of desire of 
a transgender person: a lesbian trapped in a male body, a straight man trapped in a 
female body. The interesting part in such a triangular structure is that Girard’s 
structure of mimetic desire involves both desires operating at the same time if the 
parties are of different gender. And that it is able to account for desire in a 
transgender person whereas psychoanalysis is not. It could also account for a 
transgender desire of wanting to be a different gender irrespectively of the modality 
of desire (homosexual or heterosexual) or irrespectively of any sexual desire at all 
if we do not conflate sexual desire with gender identity. 
We can observe here how Girard’s model accounts for constellations that Butler is 
interested in – the transgender – but which she does not and cannot fully explore 
using psychoanalytical framework. She deals with the prohibition on incest and 
homosexuality but with psychoanalysis she lacks the tools to account for 
transgender position. The question of identification in transgender does not make 
itself available for conceptualization with Freud and we wonder if it is a necessary 
spectre that has to haunt Butler’s system. Transgender desire is unintelligible from 
within psychoanalysis because there are only two options possible in that 
framework: homosexuality and heterosexuality, the man and the woman. However 
problematic Butler has tried to make those psychoanalytical presuppositions, her 
subversive reading could only lead her reformulation to occur within the bounds 
of psychoanalytical framework: questioning heterosexual matrix and binary logic 
of male and female rather than actively exploring other modalities. This is perhaps 
why Butler does not account for transgender as much as she could if she employed 
a different framework, despite the fact that transgender and violence towards 
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transgender people is such an important preoccupation to her thinking. 
Transgender serves as the abject that panics heteronormativity. Yet, the 
mechanisms of transgender identity are not explored as much as mechanisms of 
homosexuality and heterosexuality, masculinity and femininity. 
There is a profound conservative normativity in psychoanalysis that is at variance 
with Butler’s theoretical interests and Girard offers a possibility to overcome it. 
Girard’s model is able to account for different modalities of being and desire: for 
being a man, a woman or a third entity and desiring homosexually, heterosexually, 
and polysexually. Butler makes the connection desire-loss and prohibition-identity 
through Freud and Foucault to show how unacknowledged loss structures who we 
are. For Girard, the pathways of desire and identity do not have to necessarily 
overlap. Desire is constructed through mimesis and identity is constructed through 
mimesis but there is a whole spectrum of gender identity that is not constructed as 
a result of sexual desire, prohibited or not. This is where the disjunction between 
sexuality and gender would be possible. Hence the link desire-identity is much 
weaker in Girardian theory than it is in Butler and forecloses the possibility of a 
formative primary experience. The question that one is compelled to ask Butler is if 
this “ungrievable loss”, if this melancholia which constitutes our gender identity, 
has to be necessarily related to sexuality. And more importantly if an asexual 


































1  On transgender critique of Butler see Prosser 1998 and 2006; Namaste 2000 and 1996, 183-
190; Bettcher 2009. For Butler on transgender see many references scattered throughout 
Butler 1993; Butler 2004; Butler 1990; in particular: Butler 1993, 128-137; Butler, 2004, p. 76-
101 and Butler 1990, 130-150; also Butler 1993a; Butler 2006; Butler 1998. Unfortunately, we 
lack space to comment in detail on all the vehement disagreements between transgender 
studies and Butler, as one of the founding figures of queer studies. 
2  We can, however, ask provokingly, this time perhaps more of Butler than of Freud, why this 
masculinity of the little girl could not possibly be read as a case of foreclosed transsexuality 
rather than foreclosed homosexuality? “Sigmund Freud never discussed transsexualism per 
se” (Rosario 1996, 38), yet Butler has and this foreclosure in Butler could be considered to be 
problematic from transgender perspective. Butler pays little attention to the case of the 
masculine “little girl” in Freud’s text and so, in a way, erases the figure of the transgenderist 
here. 
3  For the problems Freud has with positing the source of identification see (Freud 1923, 371-
372; Butler 1990,  78-89). 
4 Butler often uses examples of female Oedipus complex structure because, from the 
perspective of her reading, the male Oedipus complex has a more complicated double 
displacement (cf. Butler 1997, 127-138). From Girardian perspective, however, the difference 
between female and male Oedipus complex is irrelevant and that is why we do not follow 
the psychoanalytically based distinction between male and female Oedipus. 
5  Butler acknowledges that “a homosexual for whom heterosexual desire is unthinkable” will 
maintain his or her heterosexual desire through melancholic incorporation. However, due 
to different cultural sanctions towards homosexuality and heterosexuality the two types of 
melancholia are not equivalent (Butler 1990,  95; cf. Salih 2002, 57). 
6  A similar structure of melancholia is posited in Antigone’s Claim where Antigone becomes, 
in a way, her brother because she lost him. However, the question is then why she chooses 
particularly her brother Polyneices as a figure of identification if she had also lost other 
people including her other brother Eteocles, her sister (whom she repudiates), her mother 
or her father-brother Oedipus, who are all left ungrieved (cf. Butler 2000, 67; 79-81). There 
is an implication of incest in the relation with Polyneices. Does the object have to be sexual? 
7  Although in 1990 she explicitly concedes a doubt: “whether loss or mimetism is primary [is] 
perhaps an undecidable problem” (Butler 1990a,  133), it seems that a couple of years later, 
in 1997 in The Psychic Life of Power, she decides on loss.  
8  From transgender position there is no necessary relationship between gender identity and 
sexuality: “Trans people generally undergo gender reassignment without changing their 
sexual orientation – transsexual people are just as likely to be straight, gay, lesbian or 
bisexual in their new gender role as any people are. […] There is no relationship to sexuality” 
(Whittle, 2000, 19). 
9  Butler  problematizes  the separation  of  gender from sexuality I n her “Against Proper 
Objects” (1994) and argues that “an analysis of sexual relations apart from an analysis of 
gender relations is [not] possible” (9). Although we agree that analyses of gender and 
sexuality should not be strictly separated, the point of contention is that sexual orientation 
(irrespective of whether hetero- or homosexuality) should not be posited in a causal relation 
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to gender identity. This is, however, what Butler implicitly does in her interpretation of 
heterosexual melancholia. Although she underlines the importance of categories of “class” 
and “race” as equally important as gender to feminist analyses and criticizes the binary 
frame, in which the gender-sexuality discussion entraps feminism, it is not race or class that 
are reinscribed into her re-reading of Freud but foreclosed homosexuality (see Butler 1994 
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We are our bodies—but in that very basic notion one also discovers that our bodies have an amazing 
plasticity and polymorphism that is often brought out precisely in our relations with technologies. We 
are bodies in technologies.  
—Don Ihde, Bodies in Technologies  
Keywords: cinematic experience, immersiveness, cinematic self, perspective- taking, OBE  
Introduction 
What we generally suppose in this chapter is that film experience is, from its very 
beginning, thought of as an experience rooted in our brain-body system, aiming to 
externalize our cognitive processes, feelings, emotions, and motor behavior 
(Münsterberg 1916; Freeburg 1918) and that certain modalities of perspective 
taking, switching perspectives, dynamic emotional empathetic behaviour with 
other bodies are part of a general cinematic experience that might be also present 
especially in technically induced or manipulated Out-of-Body Experiences (OBE´s).  
Therefore we propose an explorative journey in the territory of the cinematic 
(bodily) self in relation to (1) Out-of-body experiences and (2) different modes of 
“(inter-) embodied” cinematic experience in relation to perspective taking and 
immersion. This will be persued in a theoretical “bifocal vision” of plastic and 
polymorphic bodies and selves in technologies.  
Therefore we explore the notion of self in OBE experiences in relation to the natural 
medium of the human body that sometime has been iconically related to the 
Alexander Gerner & Michele Guerra 
86 
cinematic apparatus. We give a short overview on a debate on film rooted in the 
idea that this relatively new form of art is to some extent rooted in a “neurological 
conception of modernity” (Singer 1995) and that its appeal is basically related to 
what Georg Simmel would call an intensification of the nervous stimulation 
resulting from the swift and uninterrupted change of outer and inner stimuli.  
During the first decades of XX century, several physicians start studying movies 
because they guess that something physical is happening to a viewer whose mental 
and bodily faculties are altered cinematographically.  Such a position is basically shared 
by the tradition of French filmology – gathered around the “Revue International de 
Filmologie” –, by people like Erich Feldmann (1953), who quite clearly talked of a 
bilocated mind (cf: Furlanetto et al 2013) during film-watching, describing film 
experience like formed by two ellipses, one related to the real world and the other 
to the fiction with a small area in between intersection enacted by the viewer still 
on his seat in the darkness. Henri Wallon (1953) then linked this discussion to 
viewers’ motor behavior and mirror mechanisms.  
 Finally we will make a first explorative journey into the concept of “Cinematic 
experience as a temporally limited immersive self-loss in the other” or inside –the-other- 
(body) experience a) suspended in its status nascendi b) a flight interrupted when 
the lights are switched on, or c) a morphing that regresses when we “drop out of 
the game”.  
1. Cinematic experience 
According to a consolidate tradition within film studies, film experience challenges 
our spatio-temporal cognition and implies an alteration of viewers’ self and body 
and thus their embodied self, by using film style and editing to trigger in some cases 
something very similar to Out-of-Body-Experiences (OBEs), switching the 
spectator’s viewpoint and her emotional and empathetic identification or better: his 
or her immersivenes into the film’s body.  
With such a term – which has been used both in studies within film phenomenology 
and in those within cinematic subjectivity (Sobchack 1992, 2004; Barker 2009; 
Chateau 2011) – we refer to the layers of resonance represented by the bodies 
depicted on the screen, but also to the gestuality simulated by the complex 
experience with the movie itself, that is to the ability of film techniques of conveying a 
peculiar form of subjectivity, including the immersiveness of the self of the spectator 
in the cinematic experience. Let´s recall editing style that conveys such a form of 
cinematic (inter-) subjectivity as proposed by Walter Murch (2001):  
According to the American film-editor’s Rules of Six an “ideal” editing style conveys 
six criteria at once and in a certain hierarchy of importance: 1) emotional 
entanglement with the emotion of the cinematic moment (“51%”) 2) Advancement 
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of the story (“22%”) 3) Rhythm (“10%”) occuring at the rhythmically right moment 
4) Attentional Eye-Trace (“7%”), acknowledging the audience’s focus of interest at 
each moment 5) Planarity (“6%”) of the screen and 6) the three dimensional 
continuity of actual space (“4%”) where people are in the room and in relation to 
one another.  
Interestingly, one could add the suspension of feeling one´s somatic body as one of the 
self-evident rules of cinematic experience together with the getting emotionally 
entangled within not only the character of the movie but with the whole “body of the film”: 
cinematic experience becomes an outcome of a specific embodied technique (Ihde 
2002,2010). 
ȡ 
If we vary our perspective, we can ask: Could we consider OBE as a cinematic 
experience without a screen in which the proper body image would be projected 
outside? 
Why does perspective matter (Petkova et al 2011)? How do alteration of perspective 
introduce change in the 1st Person Perspective (1PP) realized by a) alienation (OBE) 
or b) appropriation (avatar identification) (see: Ganesh et al 2011) as well as by the 
switch in between 2nd, 1st and 3rd PP in order to better understand (altered) cinematic 
self experience: The egocentric reference frame, our orthodox 1PP might be not as 
clearly as it seems our principal perspective we can assume. Beccio et al (2011) calls 
the First person perspective “egocentric perspective” while imagining another 
opposite perspective of our own would be for her a “disembodied perspective 
taking”, while a second person actually sitting in front of someone would be an 
“embodied perspective taking”. For her, perspective taking needs the presence of 
another person to function plainly.  However, we suppose that by our image-
consiousness (Husserl 2006) we are enabled to take the embodied perspective of 
another embodied person also in his artificial presence on a movie screen (in all its 
degrees of embodiment). If we talk here of perspective taking we have to clearify 
that we can distinguish at least the following basic forms:  
1) Visuospatial perspective taking 2) affective perspective taking 3) kinaesthetic perspective 
taking 4) motivational or volitional perspective taking.  
All four should seen as joint/ coordinated and sometimes segregated as in altered 
self -experience. 
Clearly the doubeling of the somatic /virtual self in autoscopic experiences, in which 
the virtual body or body image is doubled and the attentional self-location between 
the constitutional virtual body image (see: Ihde 2002) and the somatic body schema 
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may switch as in OBE, should be considered different from the orthodox film 
experience, where a moviegoer sits still in a dark movie theater.  
And nonetheless, the viewer’s empathetic relations and social perspective taking 
with the other on the screen, that is from a fixed body position to a virtually mobile 
one, could lead to something similar to the feeling of displacement of one’s own 
body (as in OBE), or transformation of one’s own body (OBT; see Gardner 2013).  
Our proposal is connected to what Don Ihde (2002, 2010) designates as “embodied 
technics” of cinematic experience: our embodied and mediated experience with and 
through contemporary technologies, in our case mainly cinema (a 2D moving 
picture in a dark room experience in which our body is quietly sitting on a chair) 
and derived new forms of cinematic experience and immersiveness (from frontal, 
stereo-sound to sensouround-sound in Apocalypse Now to several screens to being 
immersed in a 3D atmosphere). 
If we start from the position that our self in its dynamic constitution is actually 
mediated by and through our body and the technologies we experience our bodies 
though, we can´t favor a position of media-technologies, imaging, digital-
compuational or virtual reality and film being responsible for just “disembodying 
ourselves”. Neither could we hold a position that our bodies might be reducible to 
machinic bodies in which we can utopically “upload” our minds, but with John 
Ihde we can realistically argue that the somatic human experience of embodied 
technics is actually embodied or re-embodied in new interactive ways and thus our 
self experience is transformed through new somatic externalization and 
reinternalization: we become a cinematic self in its technically instilled and mediated loops 
of intersbjective and empathetic embodiments- disembodiments and reembodiments. 
ȡ 
What if, the lights never turn back on again in the embodied cinema, or if we turn 
them on and we were in another place or in another body? Thereby different degrees 
of self-loss and its different modes of the suspension/alteration of the self in filmic 
(2D, 3D) or virtual reality can be thought of. These ideas are not so far from 
contemporary research by Visch, Tan, and Molenaar (2010) on film immersion (2D, 
3D, VR), and from Don Ihde’s proposals on embodied techniques (2010), where he 
describes the position of the viewer respect to movies and videogames according to 
three different typologies: embodied, disembodied, avatar. These proposed triads 
of cinematic experience help us in understanding the different possible modes of 
the self in altered self-experience and we might include OBEs as a forth mode of the 
body-image in the sense of a doubled self.   
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2. The of Out of Body (OBE) Experience and the general mechanisms of 
perspective and perspective-taking 
2.1 OBE´s 
 
Diagram©2013 Alexander Gerner, In: Gerner (fc 2014) 
 
OBE is often described as a breakdown of several necessary aspects of bodily self-
consciousness (see: Brugger et al. 1997; Blanke et al. 2002; Aspell et al 2012, Gerner 
fc 2014). Thus Out-of-body experiences challenge and alter our everyday experience 
of the spatial unity of self and body and the identity of self and body, whereby the 
body is given as the most complex multisensory “object” in the world (Aspell et al 
2012).  
Out-of-body experiences are conventionally analyzed as “autoscopic phenomena” 
that- as Bolognini et al (2012) put it- “refer to complex experiences involving the 
illusory reduplication of oneތs own body”. According to Mohr&Blanke (2005) 
autoscopic phenomena (AP) are rare, illusory visual experiences during which the 
subject e.g. has the impression of seeing a second own body in extrapersonal space. 
AP - in their view- consist in “out-of-body experience, autoscopic hallucination, and 
heautoscopy”.  
“The main forms of doubles are the visual own-body reduplications: autoscopic 
hallucination (AH), heautoscopy (HAS), and out-of-body experience (OBE) as well 
This diagram (adopted from: Blanke & Metzinger 2008, 10) shows the dynamics of the 
attentional self-location [SL] or point of view in autoscopic experience: Three cases of 
direction of the attentional point of view in natural cinematic experience without a screen, 
either from the hallucinated body towards the somatic body in Out-of-body experience 
(virtual observer perspective) or from the somatic body towards the hallucinated virtual 
body (somatic 1P perspective) in Autoscopic hallucination or both ways in Heautoscopy 
(switching between somatic 1P perspective and virtual observer perspective).  The 
somatic and the virtual body in these three cases of observer perspectives always face each 
other on the contrary to a “felt presence” from behind (existential feeling perspective of 
autoscopy), another form of autoscopic experience 
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as the rarer forms including polyopic heautoscopy and inner heautoscopy. These 
are referred to here as visual doubles. Other own body reduplications include 
feeling of a presence (sensorimotor doubles), hearing of a presence (auditory 
doubles), and negative heautoscopy (negative doubles).” (Blanke2 et al 2008, 451)  
For Brugger et al (2006) Heautoscopy is the encounter with one’s double (the 
reduplication of a single body and self and thus a breakdown of integrative 
processes that let me identify with my body or my self), in the sense of a multimodal 
illusory reduplication of one’s own body and self. The phenomenon of polyopic 
heautoscopy (a multiplication of body and self) according to Brugger et al (2006) 
“points to the multiple mappings of the body, whose disintegration may give rise 
to the illusory experience of multiple selves.“  
Autoscopic phenomena deal with viewpoint changes, illusionary self-
identification, altered or abnormal self-location(s) and changes in the first- person 
perspective (cf. Blanke 2012). They can be ideopathic, self induced or induced by 
non-invasive technological aid (Blanke & Metzinger 2009) using for instance video 
(Lenggenhager et al 2007), virtual reality (Ehrsson 2007) or robotic devices (Ionta 
2011), inducing changes in the self-location, self-identification or first person 
perspective in healthy subjects; Moreover, recent research has not only described 
phenomenologically these strange doubeling, mirrowing or shadowing 
phenomena of a “disrupted” self (Mishara 2010) but has shown as well that invasive 
manipulation of the brain can even induce a “illusory shadow person” (Arzy et al 
2006) by artificial brain stimulation.  
Phenomenologically OBEs can be characterized by three elements:  
(1) The impression that the self is localized outside one’s body. This can mean a 
feeling of disembodiment or the impression of a virtual body phenomon- e.g. a 
doubeling phenomenon of the body or an extrasomatic attentional self-location. A 
person experiencing an OBE in this sense would be absorbed by the experience of 
an (supplementary) allocentric self, besides the somatic self;  
(2) The experience of seeing the world from an extracorporeal and elevated or even 
lowered first-person perspective, and thus changing and doubling the proper point 
of view: what we would generally describe as a dynamics of points of view and 
perspectives and their perspective switches. This dynamics in autoscopic and 
heteroscopic perspective-taking is of course not at all exclusive to OBEs by asking: 
“Could there be spatial situations in which people spontaneously adopt another’s 
perspective rather than their own, even when not communicating to other person?” 
(Tversky and Hard 2009) 
(3) Experience in OBEs are mostly accompanied with the non-unitary notion of the 
self as doubeling or splitting of one’s own body image: the impression of seeing one’s 
own body from alternated allocentered perspectives in relation to the somatic body. 
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OBEs in healthy persons are often related to sleep-paralysis, REM sleep (see Zippel 
2014, this volume), lucid dreaming, trance and traumatic experience. Thus OBEs 
challenge and alter our “everyday” or expected experience of the spatial and 
temporal unity of self and body and the “identity” of global self and body in its 
multimodal constitution between senses, attentional self-location, action and 
imagination.  
Autoscopic experiences in our view question: 
1) the coherence of the body as one and only and exclusively mine: the “naturally” 
assumed somatic self-“identification” (i.e. the degree(!) to which humans identify 
with their own bodies: “What I experience as my body” (Blanke and Metzinger 
2009)” 
2) the stability and “permanence” (Merleau Ponty) of my self-experience (visual or 
proprioceptive feeling or vestibular) in relation to my body and to self-location (i.e., 
the volume in space: “Where I experience to be”) 
3) the relation between my experiential point of view of my self and the point of 
view of the somatic body: first-person perspective ( i.e. , the directedness of 
conscious experience: “From which vantage point I experience the world”) 
Autoscopic experiences can help elucidate body ownership3. According to Tsakiris 
(2011) body ownership “gives somatosensory signals a special phenomenal quality, 
and it is fundamental to self-consciousness: the relation between my body and “me” 
differs from both the relation between my body and other people’s bodies and the 
relation between external objects and me” (Tsakiri 2011, 181).  
We argue that on the one hand we can partly describe autoscopic experiences such 
as OBE or heautoscopy as cinematic experiences of a body without a screen. On the 
other hand we can observe that the viewer’s film experience in a movie theater 
resembles an extended sense of “out-of body” experience that diverges in the sense of 
being more of an extended “inside-of-the-other-(body)-experience” What 
differences do we feel when the subjective perspective puts us in the situation of 
emphatizing with the murderer, someone of another sex etc.? Could we actuallz put 
this switch of perspective to test with neuroscientific methods? 
What we want to draw attention on by describing film experience as an out-of-body 
experience is something detectable as well in an experiment by Slater et al (2009), 
which shows strong evidence for the plasticity of the body image. Hereby male 
participants in a virtual reality situation even perceived the avatar of a young girl 
as their own body (Slater et al 2009). This brings us up to the point that these drifts 
of perceptions, imaginations and affects of the perspective spatially and 
psychologically are important to be studied by sitations of cinematic experience 
including 2D cinema, 3D virtual reality and avatar studies that will help us to 
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understand the drifting attribution of a certain body image to me or to another 
person or character depending on the perspective we are taking on or shifting away 
from. In the analysis of film experience including virtual reality and avatar studies, 
nonetheless we have to stay conscious about the fact that such experiences imply 
completely different positions of the viewer and this is crucial as we talk of 
dynamics of perspective taking, besides attentional self-locations (SL). The very 
goal of our proposal is to problematize some relevant aspects of our behavior 
during film watching, when we are challenged to move ourselves to a virtual 
environment populated by virtual agents with whom we can interact through the 
peculiar behavior of the camera.  
Why OBEs could be interesting to be treated as cinematic experience in itself and 
why OBEs can be called "cinematic experience without a screen"? We need to ask 
further: why we not only have a) a sense of self-agency, the “prereflective 
experience that I am the one who is causing or generating a movement or action or 
thought” (Gallagher 2012) b) a sense of “self-ownership” the pre-reflexive 
experience that I am the one who experiences, but also the c) Perspective switches, 
the possibility to consciously or mostly prereflectivly switch perspectives in relation 
to the body-location and different extension levels of embodiment and its relation 
to others: my body, the other body on the screen and the film as body, the general 
body of the cinematic experience (that can have interbodily components) and then 
come back to our core body self after the screen is dark again and the lights are 
switched on.  
How can we temporarily identify and lose ourselves/ our feeling of embodiment in 
an absorbing or immersive experience and then come back to a self-localisation of 
our own core body? These questions bring us to the topic of perspective taking. 
2.2 Perspective –Taking 
For Thomas Fuchs (2012, 2013) every encounter is based on the capacity to switch 
between your own embodied perspective and the perspective of the other and at 
the same time to distinguish both perspectives that is to assert yourself in front of 
the other. Hereby Fuchs (2013) quotes an interesting point of Blankenburg that we 
will take up here: That is, one has to able to integrate the egocentric and the 
allocentric perspective without loosing one´s own bodily center permanently.  
 
“Or as Blankenburg 1965 says this to the point: Every taking over of perspective 
implies already a potential self-loss that however is suspended in its status 
nascendi.” (Fuchs 2012b).  
According to Fuchs schizophrenia is best analysed as the alienation of its own body 
or as a "disembodiment" (Stanghellini 2004, Fox 2005, Fuchs and Schlimme 2009). 
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This refers to the concepts embodied subjectivity (Embodiment), as currently used 
in the cognitive sciences (Varela et al. 1991, Gallagher 2005, Thompson 2007, Fuchs 
2012c). Disturbances of embodiment may be classified according to Fuchs & 
Schlimme in two fundamental categories:“(1) as primarily affecting the subject 
body or prereflective embodied sense of self; such is the case, for example, in 
schizophrenia or depression, or (2) as being more related to the bodyimage or 
explicit body awareness. These include, for example, body dysmorphic disorder, 
hypochondriasis, somatoform disorders or eating disorders such as anorexia 
nervosa” Fuchs & Schlimme 2009, 571, and we could add the second type is 
important in cinematic experience. 
Schizophrenia thus includes, according to Fuchs & Schlimme the weakening of the 
basic sense of self. This means a disruption of implicit bodily functioning and a 
disconnection from the intercorporality with others: “As a result of this 
disembodiment, the prereflective, practical immersion of the self in the world is 
lost” (Fuchs & Schlimme 2009). We could call this the natural media immersion of the 
bodily self in the world in difference to artificial technologically induced immersion 
as by cinematic experience or virtual reality environments. For Fuchs there is a 
foundational role of second person interactions for the development of social 
perspectives (Fuchs 2012). He argues that embodied second person interactions are 
not only an enabling, but also the constitutive condition for the development of an 
explicit first and third person perspective. This elevates the possibility of OBE´s and 
different kinds of perspectives and perspective taking to fundamental importance 
not only in social cognition but as well in the proper idea of a cinematic self and its 
technologically mediated existence, one of it foundational part is the switch of 
perspective. 
Perspective taking is a developed “natural” technology of a lived human body. Perspective 
taking can mean the embedded ability to follow the eye gaze of the other and get 
empathically entangled and experience the other´s complex perspective ( visual, 
empathic-affective, motoric etc.) and in a metaperspective describe the presentation 
of a scene, object, event or atmosphere from different situated vantage points in the 
world. This ability of perspective and orientation isdeeplz related to the possibility 
of switch of perspective and involving the attention to another self or ourself from 
another point of view, but does persepctive always imply the feeling of being 
grounded in a somatic body?  
A) Perspective taking involves the perspective from x such as a situated subjective 
either extended spatio- (somato) corporal self location or a virtual or imagined 
selflocation as in autoscopic experiences and B) the perspective/ angle towards y, 
for instance the objectifying one’s own view of the object, and anticipating that 
moving to another situated vantage point. C) These changes of vantage points can 
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result in specific changes in presentation of an event, object, scene or atmosphere, 
such as a feeling towards someone, one´s own body-image, or self-concept. D) The 
differentiation and self/other coordination of viewpoints is an important feature of 
multiple perspective-takings as well as E) the constancy/stability/permanancy of 
perspectives towards a scene/atmosphere/object event or world during taking on a 
perspective and accordingly the point of view of the self. We can as well distinguish 
perspective-taking in the following modalities: 
a) Spontaneous, involuntary or effordless Perspective-Taking (without volition or 
intention of taking on the perspective of oneself, the you or the other), and that is 
what Fuchs (2012b) calls implicit 1PP, 2PP or 3PP and we can also call transparent 
perspectives for the one taking on the corresponding perspective. For example 
spontaneously feeling oneself in someone else´s shoes, but also effordless 
attentional switches between the 2nd, 1st and 3rd PP. 
b) Non-spontaneous, voluntary, effordfull, self-conscious or explicit (Fuchs 2012b) 
perspective taking (1PP, 2PP and 3PP) goes far beyond the feeling of empathy; it 
involves for example active effordful figuring out what others feel, perceive and 
think.  The effordful acquisition of a perspective – as in an actors work on a role) is 
based on on many of the brains executive functions. It may require inhibitory 
control over our thought and feelings to consider the perspectives of others, and 
thus in a metacognitive reflection to consider the possibility of someone else besides 
our own thinking, cognitive flexibility to be able to see and interpret a situation in 
different ways can be seen. 
 
OBE and other forms of autoscopic experiences are first of all unorthodox forms of 
spectatorship and they entail different forms of immersion which have to be 
researched on and considered within a dialectic between alienation (of self from 
own body, loss of somatic self) and appropriation (of avatar body among other 
possibilities), according – for instance – to Ganesh and colleague’s works on the 
human brain and the virtual (2011).  
Hereby we can refer to cinematic experiences as immersive stretegies in modulating 
and enhancing the possibility of taking on involuntarily and later also reflectively 
the perspective of a certain “fictional” point of view of the other.  
2.3 OBE, the self and cinematic experience 
So far we have been wondering whether it would be possible to compare OBEs to a 
sort of cinematic experience without a screen and to detect something similar to 
OBEs in traditional cinematic experience, by mainly focusing on the dialectic 
between different forms of perspective taking. As we have demonstrated so far, 
OBEs could be thought of as a weird form of spectatorship, which implies a 
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dissociation of the viewer from her own doubled (visible and somatic) body and the 
observation of it from an imaginary location in the extracorporeal space. Alienation 
and self-loss are constitutive elements of an experience that we would describe as 
an illusory, phantasmagoric and fictious experience. The body is bilocated and we 
see our own body from another dimension and position, and although this position 
is an illusory one, we experience our illusory second body as our own body and our 
real body as an image of it. This is the reason why OBE represents a very particular 
type of immersion of the self: the OBEer is immersed in an imaginary space, 
perceived within an illusory sensory-motor perspective, responding to very 
particular stimuli, which holds as well for cinematic experience in general.  
If a non-OBEer should try to imagine an OBE, he or she would inevitably end up to 
refer to his or her experiences as spectator, he or she would imagine of occupying 
an impossible position, usually above the real body, and they should imagine an 
absurd point-of-view moving freely inside their room, and perhaps flying out of the 
window, and finally coming back to rejoin the real body. In short, they would 
imagine a cinematic experience: the camera is able to place us in unfamiliar 
positions, it can provide us an absurd point-of-view, it can wander across our room, 
and – as every moviegoer knows – it can make us fly with the means of the film’s 
body. Moreover, film editing is able to regulate our attention, to elicit our emotion, 
to link very different places and environments in perfect continuity and 
transparency, and then – at the end of the movie – to allow us to re-enter our somatic 
body, we had forgotten about. 
At the very beginning of cinema, when film theory was more a physiological matter 
than a cultural one, we find several writings in which film experience is described 
as an alteration of the human self, or as a loss of self-location and self-identification. 
We could recall here many writings from the first years of film history, to emphasize 
the sensorial novelty displayed by the movies and to demonstrate how impressive 
the new experience was from an affective point of view. Let us quote just two 
exemplar passages written in 1896 and 1919 by Maksim Gorki and Urban Gad 
respectively. Gorki offers a disturbing description of film experience:  
“Cette vie grise et silencieuse finit par vous troubler et vous oppresser, vous avez 
l’impression qu’elle contient comme un avertissement, dont la signification vous 
échappe, mais qui est lugubre, et étreint votre cœur d’angoisse. Vous oubliez peu à 
peu où vous êtes, d’étranges images surgissent dans votre tête, votre conscience 
semble s’obscurcir, se perturber…” (Gorki 1896).  
Gad’s description of film experience is quite surprising and provides elements that 
make the comparison with the OBE’s spectatorship even easier: “Les hommes dans 
leur grande masse naïve doivent se retrouver dans le film comme dans un miroir – 
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un miroir, il est vrai, suspendu en hauteur et qui contraint à lever les yeux.” (Gad 
1919). 
The alteration of the viewer’s self seems to be implied in these first descriptions of 
cinematic experience. On the one hand, Gorki talks of the distress of such an 
oppressive experience, emphasizing the alteration and perturbation of the viewer’s 
consciousness, while on the other Gad describes the screen as a mirror placed above 
the viewer and capable to double her position and to put herself in a totally new 
dimension.  
At the beginning of 20th century it is a common and widely shared idea that film 
experience should have been conceived as an altered state of consciousness, 
something between daydreams and a mysterious form of hypnosis. There is a very 
telling short story, published in 1907 by the popular Italian writer Edmondo De 
Amicis, through which we can perfectly grasp such a feeling about cinema. It is the 
story of a middle class Italian man, alone in his house since his wife and daughters 
went to theater. He sits on an armchair and thinks of his life. Gradually he starts 
having a weird sensation, like one who leaves his own body and floats through the 
room, and then along hills, mountains and valleys. Suddenly he thinks of a 
newsagent and he sees him quite clearly, and what is more interesting and scaring 
he feels the newsagent as a secondary self, having the impression that the 
newsagent’s face has overlapped his own. If we should find a term to describe, 
nowadays, the experience narrated by De Amicis, maybe we would choose OBE. 
Nonetheless, in 1907, De Amicis chose another term: cinema. The title of the story 
is “Cinematografo cerebrale” (“cerebral cinema”), in which film experience and the 
brain are connected to emphasize the alteration of human cognition at the movies. 
Although someone might sell off these judgments as naives and too strongly 
connected to a not yet well developed idea of film experience, it is a matter of fact 
that the relationship between the movie and the human mind is at the heart of what 
is considered to be one of the most insightful book of early film theory: Hugo 
Münsterberg’s 1916 The Photoplay: A Psychological Study (2002). This distinguished 
Harvard psychologist – who moved from Germany to Massachussets at the end of 
XIX century on the invitation of William James – noticed that cinema could not be 
understood without referring to the effect it has on our brain-body system. Cinema, 
in other words, externalizes our affective-cognitive processes, feelings, emotions, 
and even motor behavior, by means of stylistic techniques and innovative narrative 
solutions: a flashback would be a kind of externalization/representation of memory, 
while a close-up would be the same for attention. Münsterberg’s book, as we can 
read it nowadays, would represent the most clear reflection of a common and 
shared feelings about modernity as a form of intensification of the nervous 
stimulation, resulting from the swift and uninterrupted change of outer and inner 
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stimuli, to borrow Georg Simmel’s description of the new metropolis at the very 
beginning of XX century. According to scholars like Ben Singer (1995), or more 
recently Christof Türcke (2002), film culture would be part of a new form of 
modernism based on the hyperstimulus and on a new form of affective interaction, 
and it would precisely grounded on a “neurological conception of modernity”, as 
Singer calls it, including the distraction from one´s own somatic body. In other words, 
there is a new form of self-technique capable of shaping up our imaginary by 
affecting our mind and body and by challenging the viewer’s spatio-temporal 
cognition in a totally new and impressive manner. Recalling the idea by Daney 
about the dialectic between two spaces and two kinds of vision – basically the same 
form of dialectic suggested by Feldmann and by two film phenomenologists like 
Sobchack and Voss –, we could observe how it is the film style which pursues and 
at the same time regulate this spatial negotiation, and how our multilayered and 
multimodal film cognition depends on the success of such a negotiation. 
To better understand such a story, we should get back to the long neglected season 
of film-physiology, that is a period – from the beginning of 20th century to the 1920s 
– during which many physician start working on film in order to evaluate the 
impact of the new medium on the human brain (Guerra 2013) and cognitive make-
up such as the “attentional self” (Gerner upcoming). Both in Europe and in US we 
have important studies on this way, like those of the French physician Edouard 
Toulouse, who, for instance, was convinced that the impression of reality largely 
depended on the viewer’s motor simulation of the events depicted on the screen – 
some passages in Toulouse’s works seem to anticipate the research on embodied 
simulation promoted after the discovery of mirror neurons (Toulouse 2010; Gallese 
and Guerra 2012) and its empathy in relation to a film character or a virtual object 
(Fuchs 2014). 
Among physicans, we could mention the case of the Italian neuropsychiatrist 
Giuseppe D’Abundo, who wrote a paper in 1911 entitled “Sopra alcuni particolari 
effetti delle projezioni cinematografiche sui nevrotici” (Concerning the effect of film 
viewing on neurotic individuals). His idea was that a movie can determine states of 
psychic instability in patients like neurotics, hysterics, or paranoids. According to 
him, the responsible of this state is not the film plot, but “the rapid and vibratory 
movement of the cinematic action” (D’Abundo 1911: 434), which is able to transport 
the viewer in another dimension, giving him the impression to be at the same time 
here and there. He concludes saying that film projections should be considered 
dangerous for many categories of subjects. 
To us it is important to rethink such an experimental background, since we know 
how crucial it has been for film theories like those proposed by Sergej Eisenstein 
(we know today how close to Aleksandr Lurija he was) in the 1920s and 1930s – 
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think of his idea of film editing as a form of “ek-stasis” – or by Walter Benjamin in 
the 1930s.  An affective and sensory approach to film experience was also implied 
in Antonin Artaud’s few writings on film, where he said that cinema “acts directly 
on the grey matter of the brain” (Artaud 1972, 166). It is not by accident if, in the 
1950s, the new school of French filmology will restart from here, trying to shape up 
a field of research on film where psychology and anthropology would converge.  
In 1956, the German philosopher Erich Feldmann wrote a brilliant article on the 
“Revue Internationale de Filmologie”, in which he claimed that film experience 
basically depends on the viewer’s ability to move from a real environment – that 
she occupies in the dark movie theater – to an imaginary dimension – that provided 
by the world depicted on the screen –, feeling herself localized outside her body. 
Feldmann stresses that such an experience, during film watching, is elicited without 
what he calls “modifications psycho-physiologiques”. These are his words: “Le film 
réclame du spectateur ce qui semble à première vue impossible : se transporter, sans 
l’aide d’excitants, de stupéfiants, ni de modifications psycho-physiologiques 
engendrées par la seule projection lumineuse, dans une situation irréelle, tout en 
demeurant dans la situation réelle de la salle un être éveillé qui croit à la réalité du 
film qui l’absorbe.” (Feldmann 1956, 84). After few lines, he adds that “l’individu 
voit surgir dans le cadre de sa vie une combinaison de conditions qui modifient son 
attitude habituelle et qui demandent une accomodation.” Feldmann seems to 
suggest that this “accomodation” would need a kind of ability that the viewer 
should have in order to enjoy the movie. His assumption implies not only a change 
of perspective and a doubling of the viewer’s presence-to-a-world, but also an 
alteration of the viewer’s consciousness, as if she would need a cinematic 
consciousness provided by film techniques to enter the fictitious world of film. 
Without entering a debate on what we mean when we talk of cinematic 
consciousness (see Morin 2005, who was strongly influenced and inspired by 
French filmologists, Pepperell and Punt 2006, McGinn 2005), we could borrow Serge 
Daney’s theory (1993) of film viewing and describe it as a form of alternation 
between a “vision bloquée” (meaning body centered, situated), and a “vision 
liberée” (meaning disembodied, experienced in an extrapersonal space).  
We could as well recall some of the theories according to which cinema implies an 
alteration of the self based on a doubled spectator capable of living simultaneously 
in two different environments- inside a world which is unreal or all too hyperreal. 
Such positions are still widely shared if we think of how contemporary film 
phenomenology basically oscillates between the idea that the reciprocity between 
the viewer and the screen would originate a strange subject to be denominated 
“cinesthetic subject” (Sobchack 1992), and the idea that the viewer’s body, 
resonating with the events on screen, would loan a three-dimensional body to the 
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screen, making the viewer nothing less than a “surrogate body” for the screen (Voss 
2011), an idea amplified by the independence view of a doubled self, or artificial 
extention of “secondary persons”(Bainbridge 2014).  
Also, more recent theories of cinematic subjectivity (Chateau 2011) seem to wonder 
how and whether the movie can be endowed with subjectivity, at least a simulated 
ot enacted form of intersubjectivity assured by the degree of immersion and self-
loss of the viewer into the movie and its “extended empathy”4 (Fuchs 2014) and 
immersion towards the characters represented on the screen (without their real 
bodies being present).  
ȡ 
For instance seeing Pedro Costa´s film “Juventude em Marcha” for the first time in 
the movie theatre in Lisbon and noting a switch/twist or crack in the way of 
perceiving while empathetically taking on perspective and feeling inside the shoes 
of the main character Ventura getting disoriented in a fragil world of his cultural 
survival. The anti-hero Ventura that already lost the one he loved and is disoriented 
in the cleanness of social housing that have windows and doors that close but don´t 
let the common life or the community occur, shows what could be formulated with 
Peter Handke as the loss of the open image, or as we could call it the whitening out 
of the image as a bleeching out a stain and belonging to a life world: The loss of an 
image of the world ("Der Bildverlust" Handke 2002) is as well a self loss of existential 
feeling of belonging to a fundamental self-world-image at the time of its loss. In the 
movie Colossal Youth [original: Juventude em Marcha] (2006) of Pedro Costa 
something of a life (Ventura) and culture (capverdian) is milled. This empathetic 
world-image that is installed in the viewer is proposed to open up the viewer´s self 
in the sense of an “existential feeling of being” (Ratcliffe 2008). Ventura becomes 
you and me, we are affected by him and become part of the film´s body: we become 
the one that lost a friend a woman, a life a home a culture, or simply a human 
belonging to this world. The film of Pedro Costa describes a bleaching of the image 
that simultaneously opens and makes the viewer empathetically belong to film’s 
body, a property of pain, a memory,  a march against the loss of an image and a 
body that holds, resists, that is valid. The film starts with the emptying of the 
interieur of a house by defenestration, a concrete (and political) act of ejectment of 
an old furniture (an interior- or a former self is defenestrated, through a window frame 
that never had a window in the first place, a place without the protection against 
the cold, but as well a place of social possibility of permanent openings for instance 
if there is need to call someone for help from the street or for company and the one 
who is called answering right away. In the film Ventura is obliged to accept social 
housing, all white walls and double windows, which is shown as the opposite as to 
the inicial fenestration of old furniture. The loss of viscerally felt entanglement with 
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the living by institutionalized, whitened and cleaned atmospheres that are aseptic 
and disorienting living spaces in which the doors close on their own and the 
window are double and soundproof, that no life sign can be detected by a call of a 
friend from the street: what this movie shows is a double autoscopic self-closure, a 
losing myself immersively in the character Ventura and the body of Collosal Youth, 
and the expression of a cultural self-loss in the narrative of the movie: a double 
cinematic OBE experience.  
Let us therefore explore the concept of “Cinematic experience as a temporally limited 
immersive self-loss in the other”. What could be the reason why players prefer to see 
their own avatar character entirely from an overview perspective from above (OBE 
perspective) and not from within a direct and absorbing 1st PP? How can we relate 
this back to the cinematic experience as a proto-OBE?  For this we have to have a 
look at immersive experience. 
3. Immersive experience 
It seems phenomenologically more correct to not simply equal OBEs with Avatar 
experience- as technologic self- extension of self concept in which a distance 
towards the technical virtual double can be reinstalled at any given moment. 
However, we have to ask the following question in relation to immersive 
experience: Can we be distracted from our somatic body and immersed into a fictional or 
cinematic body- the body I feel and am affected by as long as the cinematic experience lasts?  
Let’s start to tackle this question by looking back on a phenomenological account of 
the basic bodily self: The basic bodily self before having a referable 1st PP or any 
kind of self-knowledge or self-concept in relation to contents or objects is 
characterized by a (pre-predicative) bodily affective self feeling, of an immediate 
pre-reflective self-presence. The question is if this self-feeling is already attributed 
to my somatic body and if this is always a conscious, or in the sense of Thomas 
Fuchs, explicit 1PP?   
The self in this first ipseity or immanent account of radical self-affection, can also 
be described as an existential feeling of being (Ratcliffe 2008) –a self, an worldly 
awareness of being that is not already an object, an emotion or a mere disposition 
of something or itself. I feel through bodily appearing and by being affected, but this 
constant floating feeling of being makes me myself.  This does not – however- mean that 
“I” feel exceptionally from a pure 1st PP and always consciously a “what”, that is 
“my body”. This in turn means my body through which I feel and am by what I am 
somatically and physicologically affected with is already part of something else 
than me- an internal other- and thus is experienced in different ways, that is in 
Altered Self-Experiencs. Ratcliffe5 defines existential feeling therefore as a relational 
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bodily awareness in which the body is a seen as a kind of a natural medium of this 
existential feeling “through which” something is experienced. 
Therefore Irene Mittelberg (2013), when referring to bodily movements as gestures 
calls these already natural media of an “exbodied mind”.  How strong the bond 
towards this natural medium – the bodily self- is can be the degree of natural 
immersedness inside our bodies. This feeling of being affected for Fuchs is inherent 
in all conscious processes and thus is able to be differentiated into a a) primarily 
bodily self b) an ecological self and c) a social self. All of these are seen under the concept 
of ipsiety or the experience of self-affection. How can we see now the immersivenes 
inside our body being altered by cinematic experience and its different technically 
produced modes by film style and editing and the atmosphere of the cinema 
theatre? 
For a short while we start by the feeling of absorption by the cinematic dark room, 
leaving the conscious nexus with our somatic body by being affected by entering 
this cinema world. In this darkness your senses go to the light, your body is fixed 
on a seat, your bodily self is still, stillness as if being in a temporary tank of sensory 
deprevation, in which your gaze is channeled by image sound and rhythm as film 
editing and film style: your gaze onto the screen, and reducing the complexity about 
the self awareness “about” your own body by the immersion with other bodies. 
From the start of cinematic experience people wanted to see bodies like ours moving 
in space, people, animals running leaving the factory, the first kiss in film -“that´s 
how people leave the factory, that’s how people kiss”, “that’s how people walk”, 
and that´s how people escape from the train coming towards us”, the scientific 
instinct of seeing, and feeling and running with the others on the screen as a 
necessity to see ourselves (as explored in the thought provoking Elias Canetti’s 
theatre play “The comedy of vanity” (Canetti 1981) in which the only reason for a 
revolution is the sensory deprivation of seeing ourselves in other people, thus the people 
loosing themselves by not seeing themselves in the others, in their own double image 
of  a self-other; we still want to see ourselves autoscopically in arts in the movies in a 
TV showbut also to immerse our body within the other– as we have a technique of 
social perspective taking and joint intentionality (Tomasello 2014): or let´s better 
say: we constitutionally need to see ourselves in order for me to be able to form, 
maintain or alter myself. We could call this the natural media immersion of the bodily 
self in the other. This natural immersiveness of the body can be technologically 
enhanced and become an artificial technologically induced immersion by external 
media, both natural and artificial imersiveness are part of cinematic experiences 
that alter the experience of self.  
For Fuchs (2012, 2012b) there is a foundational role of second person interactions 
for the development of these immersions in the other that he calls social 
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perspectives. He argues that embodied second person interactions are not only an 
enabling, but also the constitutive condition for the development of an explicit first 
and third person perspective. Maybe cinematic experience can give us back a basic 
–almost childlike- belief in the world as if for the first time looking at the other; 
cinematic experience then would be another form of reembodied self experience 
with the other that is me on the screen:  that is what Deleuze talks about in his 
cinema books. 
When we see a bad movie, we “drop out” of the state of immersion, or bounce back 
to our seat and feel the uncomfortable position our body is squeezesd in, we start 
moving on our seat, or we look at details that are unimportant – in bad theatre we 
start noticing the lighting equipement- we let our attention stray in the image 
instead of being immersed and transported, entertained or even transformed. 
Instead of loosing our self we loose track of the narrative the plot, the character the 
situation, the film´s body, and we start thinking about something else, ruminating. 
The cinematic guidance of a psychogenic flight stops or crashes we are on land of 
our own reality instead of being in the air and out and away with the film.  
ȡ 
The cinematic phenomenon of immersion into a new cinematic body has similarity 
to the technically induced »body swap illusion« (Petkova/Ehrson 2008), in which 
manipulation of the visual perspective and correlated multisensory information 
(passive tactile information) from another person’s body is sufficient to create the 
illusion of inhabiting a non-somatic body by means of a continous match between 
visual and somatosensory information about the state or location of the new 
humanoid body and the adoption of a 1PP moving the person´s perceived center of 
awareness from the somatic body  to another artificial body. 
We can describe immersion as a voluntarily induced bodily or embodied somatic 
self-loss experience in the other – on the contrary to involuntary or pathologic self 
absorption.  This is exactly what aesthetic cinematic experience, in the large sense, 
seems about: “a new method to move a person’s perceived centre of awareness from 
one body to another”. We become part of the body of the movie, we are carried 
along by hands of narrative and the face of empathy and rhythm of editing style 
and all the characters affects, performatively presenting us with our actually 
unfolded complexity, in which by taking on the perspective of the other.  We 
discover new knowledge about us and the world by the unfolding of the characters 
on the screen that become my other self, the story relates to my life, myself and 
other ыs around me: in a cinematic experience the you – I-here relation: the somatic 
body, the body of the characters and the film ыs body, as well as the narrative, mingle 
into a complex technically induced and experiementally felt cinematic self and with 
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the next illusionary continuity shot we don ыt cut out parts of our body or our 
position in space or change our point of view etc., but we might drift or switch into 
the film, by shortening the loops between the filmic double of my body and the 
body that is the cinematic experience of the film. As Becchio et al put it: 
“perspective-taking entails an altercentric remapping of space, i.e. remapping of 
objects and locations coded with reference to the other person’s body“ (Becchio et 
al 2011). 
 But: can we become a cinematic self who’s self-location can be temporarily be shifted out of 
its body? The notion of a cinematic -self and its possible mode OBE looking back on 
us, is still to be discovered: the screen becoming my virtual body, then looking back 
onto myself, might be described as a “proto” heautoscopy in cinematic experience. 
The magic latern lights up on the skin of my body- still a metaphoric way of 
speaking- but, maybe in the future, this might change and become reality.  
Experiences as the bodyswapping art/gender project of “The Machine of Being 
another” hints into this direction by the direct swap of female/male bodies and the 
looking back onto my body from the viewpoint outside of myself. To avoid nausea 
the gender pairs are asked to choreograph their movements while looking onto 
themselves from another outside body of the other. 
screenshots (p/w) from:  http://www.themachinetobeanother.org/?p=1062 
 
Getting lost, drawn into or involved in a plot, a narrative, a character a feature of a 
body or even a full body, our filmic-somatic loop becomes alive.  Does being dragged 
into a movie or being absorbed by a virtual cinematic experience mean that I loose myself? 
The lights would never turn back on again exactly the same way as time passes in 
Through the use of Oculus Rift headsets, and first-person cameras, the Gender Swap 
experiment creates a visual-perceptive enhancement that partner A can see what is being 
recorded by the visor worn by partner B, and vice versa. A technically mediated cinematic 
Out-of-Body Experience created by Barcelona-based artists BeAnotherLab, in which both 
are asked to coordinate their body movements. 
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the screening room, or in my visual field. What if this temporary self-loss experience 
in an extreme situation would never stop? Blankenburg describes the self-loss in 
the other in the case of schizophrenia, and that we are always in general already in 
a state of self-loss by being with the other- and we can add by being in the movie 
with each other- however: we can suspend this self-loss in the other by going out of 
the movie or taking off the VR googles, a fact that schizophrenia patients in their 
condition can’t, they are stuck to their episodic hallucination for the time being. We 
usually can suspend this self-loss in its status nascendi and reassure that my somatic 
body is mine and your somatic body is yours. What if our imaginative flight does 
not land in the same place again? A question has to be answered: Is our bodily self 
the same/ identical after having had a cinematic experience?  
Two other fundamental questions arise at the very beginning of this work in 
progress: 
1) How can we provide empirical data in order to test the plausibility of these proposals with 
respect to theories of the self and film phenomenology, and technically enhanced cinematic 
experience and virtual immersion?   
2) Would this approach be the right one in order to disentangle the complex articulation of 
the embodied, disembodied, and re-embodied relation to cinema and, more generally, visual 
media in an immersed cinematic self? 
1  Research of Alexander Gerner is supported by a FCT Post-Doc grant: SFRH/BPD/90360/2012  
2  According to Blanke et al (2008) we can distinguish several forms of autoscopic phenomena 
or illusiory doubles of a bodily self, visual, auditory the sensomotor. He also includes 
negative heautoscopy, the impossibility to see onself when looked up directly in the mirrow 
(see: Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935) also called negative doubles, but we will not include 
these phenomena in this paper.  
3  Bolognini et al (2011) report the third long-lasting case of autoscopy in a patient with right 
occipital lesion in their study “Spatial perspective and Coordinate Systems in autoscopy. A 
Case Report of a “Fantome de Profil” in Occipital Brain Damage”. Instead of the commonly 
reported frontal mirror view (fanto  me spéculaire), the patient saw her head and upper trunkࡂ
laterally in side view (fanto  me de profil). The autoscopic image changes in relation toࡂ
movement of the body. While the body is still just the perfile of the face and the upper trunck 
are visible, in arm movements also the arm gets visible and in full movement (walking) all 
correspective body parts get visible in the autoscopic image. This is important for the fact 
that autoscopy may come in degree and thus we should as well consider immersive degrees 
of embodiment in one´s own or another body. 
4  Empathy towards the “virtual other” in Fuchs account is seen as captured “notions of (1) 
phantomization as a media-based simulation of direct reality which undermines the as-if-
consciousness, and (2) disembodied communication which shifts the modes of empathy towards the 
fictional pole at the risk of merely projecting one’s own feelings onto the other.”(Fuchs 2014)  
 Endnotes 
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5  “I argue that most, if not all, bodily feelings are relational- they are seldom, if ever, directed 
exclusively at the body. Indeed, there are “bodily feelings” that do not involve the body as 
an object of experience at all. Instead the body manifests itself as that through which 
something else is experienced.”(Ratcliffe 2012, 38)  
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Abstract. The dream state represents a very peculiar condition of bodily experience: while 
during Non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep one experiences a muscular-skeletal 
relaxation, in Rapid eye movement (REM) sleep one undergoes the paralysis of her own 
body, coupled with a vivid mental process triggered by the ponto-geniculo-occipital (PGO) 
waves. During this phase of the sleep, dreaming takes the shape of a bizarre narration that, 
despite its incongruity, uncertainty, and discontinuity, inserts itself in the network of 
neural connections already in place, and for this reason it is another way of performing 
personal emotions, thoughts, and associations. Precisely by the inability to move, the 
embodied self experiences such a rich mental performance as an alienating dimension of 
his/herself, since the body becomes an inactive though often invoked part of the dream (e.g. 
one tries to escape or to jump in a dream without succeeding in doing it). On the other hand, 
being the motionless counterpart of the frantic activity of the dreaming mind, the body, as it 
were, is outside the dream events.  
This complex neurophysiological situation is extremely interesting from a phenomenological 
perspective, for it offers the opportunity to consider the condition of the embodied subject as 
regards the unaware mental process of dreaming. As a general goal, the paper aims at 
showing the basic features of the relationship between the dreaming self and his/her own 
body in the light of the most significant empirical dream’s research findings.  
The analysis will be based on some common marks of dreaming state highlighted by both 
phenomenology and neuroscience such as engrossedness, entanglement, self-splitting, and 
transformed relation between the subject and his/her space/time. More in particular, the 
paper will deal with the very peculiar state of the out-of-body-experiences, which will be 
considered in conjunction with both sleep paralysis and vestibular-motor hallucinations. 
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Such an unusual condition of dreaming state, involving the experience of seeing his/her body 
from a location outside the physical body, entails an alteration of the selfhood with regard to 
his/her relationship with one’s own bodily features and spatial position.  
The paper will propose a phenomenological description of dreaming in general and of OBE 
in particular, aimed at working out a conceptual framework able to explain the essential 
structures of mental processes involved in the dream state. As a conclusion, I will stress the 
relevance of the notion of the self for the proposed approach and suggest a possible 
cooperation among phenomenology, neuroscience, and psychology in dream research.                  
Keywords – Dreaming Self, Out-Of-Body Experience, Sleep Paralysis, Bodily Selfhood, 
Phenomenology  
 
“Either the well was very deep, or she fell very slowly, 
for she had plenty of time as she went down to look about her and to wonder 
what was going to happen next. […] 
‘Well!’ thought Alice to herself, ‘after such a fall as this, 
I shall think nothing of tumbling down stairs! 
How brave they’ll all think me at home! Why, I wouldn’t say anything about it, 
even if I fell off the top of the house!’ (Which was very likely true.)” 
 
Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 
 
1. Neurophysiology of embodied dreaming  
Thanks to the most relevant findings of the last 60 years regarding the dreaming 
experience, it has also been possible to shed light on the physical elements of the 
dream, about which Freud openly confessed his lack of knowledge1. I am especially 
referring to the discovery of REM (rapid eye movement) sleep in 1953 by Aserinsky 
and Kleitman and the number of important studies addressing it. Based on these 
studies, we can explain also the physiological or, more precisely, the 
neurophysiological processes that underpin the very particular state of the body in 
dreaming.  
Before proceeding, we must clarify and better express the still unclear notion of 
“body in dreaming”. As we saw with Freud, it is possible to talk about two kinds 
of bodies involved in dream: the dreamt body and the dreaming body. In the dream 
Freud speaks of, we deal with the dreamt body, but in the general discourse on 
motility presented by Freud, he is talking about the dreaming body. Nonetheless, I 
would suggest that this distinction has no reason for being. It is clear that we are 
taking into account two forms of bodies corresponding to the two levels of dreamt 
content and dreaming mind, wherein we find in the former the dreamt body and 
we identify the dreaming body as the one of the dreamer. Nevertheless, given the 
intrinsic interrelation between the two dimensions of what is dreamt and what is 
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dreaming, the motility of the dreamt body is not lacking in the relationship with the 
motility of his dreaming counterpart, i.e. the body of the dreamer. Expressed 
simply: the neurophysiological conditions of Freud’s dreamt body, glued to the 
steps, are one and the same of the neurophysiological conditions of Freud’s 
dreaming body, glued to the bed. In this sense, it is possible to talk of “embodied 
dreaming” as a homogeneous phenomenon. 
The close connection between the two bodies, the dreamt one and the dreaming 
one, can be explained on the basis of the aforementioned research on REM sleep. In 
their famous article on this issue, Dement and Kleitman observe, that “(d)uring the 
actual experiments it was seen that rapid eye movement periods often started 
immediately after a series of body movements and that a body movement often 
coincided with their termination while the sleeper seemed relatively quiet during 
the eye movement period itself”. The study of the EEG makes clear “the incidence 
of body movement in terms of the onset and termination of REM periods”. The 
graph proposed by Dement and Kleitman shows “the tendency of body movement 
to increase up to the beginning of eye movements at which point it decreases 
sharply and rebounds at the end of the period of eye activity” (Dement and 
Kleitman 1957, 682).  
In his seminal book on the dreaming activity of the brain, Allan Hobson devotes 
some enlightening pages to the issue of body motility. Referring to the studies by 
David Hubel and Edward Evarts, Hobson states that “(d)reams are characterized 
by a sense of continuous movement, and brain neurons concerned with movement 
fire intensely during REM sleep” (Hobson 1990, 171). This constant “sense” of 
moving, i.e. the pervasive presence of motility in our dreams, is so strictly linked to 
the eyes movement characterizing the REM sleep, that “the brain is both seeing and 
moving in REM sleep” (Hobson 1990, 171)2. The neurophysiologic source of this 
sense of moving can be identified in the ponto-geniculo-occipital (PGO) waves 
triggering the REM sleep, whereas the pons (P) instigates waves that go to the 
lateral geniculate body of the thalamus (G) and to the occipital lobes (O).  
Hobson bases this description on his hypothesis of a physiological structure 
enabling the dream process that he worked out starting from the 1970s calling it 
both the “activation-synthesis hypothesis” (Hobson and McCarley 1971, Hobson 
1990) and, enriched with new empirical findings, the “AIM model” (Hobson 2009). 
The basic assumption of such a hypothesis is the “neurally determined genesis” 
(Hobson and McCarley 1971, 1346) of dream state that entails the activation of the 
forebrain and, more specifically, of the pontine brain stem. This process, entirely 
endogenous, involves the discharge of reticular, vestibular, and oculomotor 
neurons that proceed and interact with a double and simultaneous effect of inhibition 
and excitation that, in turn, synthetically integrates diverse sensory, motor and 
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emotional elements. Precisely such a contradictory process has been examined in 
depth by Hobson in further studies leading to the renewed hypothesis of “AIM 
model”, whereas the activation (A) is thought along with an “input-output gating” 
(I), i.e. the process that inhibits both external stimuli and internal motor activity, 
and “modulation” (M), i.e. the peculiar chemical balance of de-enhanced aminergic 
neurons and hyper-enhanced cholinergic neurons. This complex physiological 
course involving both visual and motor areas is the origin of the formation of 
images in dreams and of the sensation of moving3.    
The source of the sense of moving, as purely physiological, implies that we don’t 
voluntarily move ourselves while dreaming; this means the dreamt body, for 
instance Freud’s dreamt body jumping hastily over the stairway, isn’t set in motion 
from any will of moving, but rather moves according to a neural unwitting activity4. 
Nonetheless, if one carefully looks at this situation, one has to recognize that there 
is no body that is moving. During the REM sleep the real body, i.e. the dreaming one, 
is totally in rest, absolutely paralyzed; what is moving is indeed the dreamt body, 
the one jumping over the stairs or, for instance, flying in the air (Schönhammer 
2004). Nevertheless, being the dreamt body the product of neural activity, i.e. of an 
activity entirely occurring within the brain, there is no body, neither real nor unreal, 
that is moving. This condition is about only what Hobson calls a “curious state of 
the brain-mind”, in which “motor systems act independent of input and output. 
Since output is blocked by inhibition, the operation of the central motor commands 
is free of feedback from the consequences of the movement” (Hobson 1990, 171). 
This means that it is about the movement, i.e. the activity, not of the body, but rather 
of the brain.  
And yet, this movement and the related sense of movement concern the body as 
well, since the body is not only structurally involved in the process of dreaming, 
but is determined in its own state by the process of dreaming. Though it can be 
appear paradoxical, both the involvement and the determination by the movement 
of the brain take the shapes of the immobility of the body. Such a motionless 
condition of the body has to do with how the sleeping individual relates to the outer 
world. As Freud already observed, the detachment from the world and the 
suspension of any activities dealing with worldly commitments that characterize 
the dream state are linked to the bodily paralysis of the REM sleep. As Hobson 
explains: “Access to the internally activated brain-mind by input from the outside 
world has to be excluded in order for sleep – and the illusions of dreaming – to be 
maintained. This appears to be accomplished in at least two ways. First, active 
inhibition of the nerves denies stimulus signals of peripheral origin access to the 
central nervous system; […]. The second mechanism for excluding external sensory 
signals is competition, or occlusion, by which the higher levels of sensory and 
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associative circuits are kept so busy processing the internally generated messages 
that they ignore external signals” (Hobson 1990, 206. See also Hobson 2009). To be 
detached from the outer world doesn’t mean to be internally switched off, as if the 
sleep were a death-like state, but, on the contrary, the inner activity of the sleeping 
– and dreaming – brain is so full that it can’t need a relationship with the outer 
reality. The sleeping /dreaming brain creates its own living world. This peculiar 
condition of the brain-mind, that Hobson accurately denotes as “internally 
activated but sensorially disconnected” (Hobson 1990, 206), doesn’t allow the body 
to establish a relation with the outside and so it remains in rest for all the duration 
of the REM sleep phase5. This coexistence of two contrasting processes is always 
due to a very particular neural state: on the one hand, at the upper levels of the 
motor system some reticular neurons send “go” commands usually generating the 
urgency to move; on the other hand, other reticular neurons are sending at the same 
time counter-commands of “no-going” and so it is creating a situation Hobson calls 
“a ‘zero-sum’ game”, in which “internal motor commands are generated, but their 
external activation is effectively canceled by concomitant inhibitory signals” 
(Hobson 1990, 206). This complex process of inhibition, that occurs at the level of 
both the spinal cord and the brain stem, indicates that the sensation of moving 
doesn’t involve the performance of moving6. If the brain is the locus of origin of such 
an entirely mental process, the body is the main subject of this intricate play, since 
it directly feels the contrasting game of different neurons, as it lies necessarily 
immobile though it refers to a fully active occurring. The contrast is vividly felt by 
the body in those dreams, in which we try to move, for instance to escape, without 
succeeding. At the level of brain-mind processes, the dreamt body aims at moving 
according to the “go” commands, but the dreaming body, the only one real, is not 
able to follow such a will because of the “no-go” commands occurring 
simultaneously. Each of us perfectly knows the result of such a situation that 
Hobson clearly describes basing on its neurophysiological conditions: “When the 
need or desire to escape becomes intense and one’s voluntary effort increases, the 
muscular system is not likely to respond to that command. When dreaming, we 
experience this inhibition of motor output as heaviness in our legs” (Hobson 1990, 
171)7.    
 
2. Non ordinary ways of living one’s own body: Out-of-body experience and 
sleep paralysis  
In this paragraph, I will deal with some very peculiar manners of experiencing one’s 
own body that allow us to stress the involvement of the self in the dreaming process 
due to her relationship with the body. Moreover, the strangeness of these 
experiences will help us to face the many ways in which one relates not only to one’s 
own body, but also to one’s own self in conjunction with one’s own body. Thus, it 
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will offer the opportunity to highlight the unity of self and body according to the 
idea of the embodied self, which I will discuss in the last paragraph while 
presenting my phenomenological theory.  
The human body can undergo further even stranger mental situations, such as the 
so called Out-of-body experiences (OBEs) that represent a subject matter discussed 
in several recent neuroscientific studies. OBE can be described as “the experience in 
which a person seems to be awake and to see his body and the world from a location 
outside the physical body” (Blanke et al. 2004, 243). A strictly connected experience 
is autoscopy (AS), “which is characterized by the experience of seeing one’s body 
in extrapersonal space” (Blanke et al. 2004, 243). The main difference between the 
two kinds of bodily experiences is that “during the OBE, the experiencer appears to 
‘see’ himself and the world from a location other than his physical body 
(parasomatic, visuo-spatial perspective), whereas the experiencer during AS 
remains within the boundaries of his physical body (physical, visuo-spatial 
perspective)” (Blanke et al. 2004, 244). The study focuses its attention on the position 
of the real body and the imagined one, the visual-spatial perspectives, and the 
emotional reports associated with vestibular-motor sensations8. In their theoretical 
considerations, the authors come back to the issue of the disruption of self 
representational unity: “We speculate that, during AP, the integration of 
proprioceptive, tactile, and visual information of one’s body has failed due to 
discrepant central representations by the different sensory systems. This might then 
lead to the experience of seeing one’s body or body parts in a position that does not 
coincide with the felt position of one’s body” (Blanke et al 2004, 255)9.  
Though their observations regard awake patients and don’t deal with the dream 
state, in a passage of the paper Blanke and co-authors remark: “Interestingly, most 
techniques that are used to induce OBE voluntarily propose that the subjects use a 
supine and relaxed position” (Blanke et al. 2004, 254, emphasis added). I stressed the 
reference to the position assumed by the participants in Blanke’s experiment, 
because it is about the same position assumed by the sleeper during the REM sleep, 
in particular during that phase of REM sleep that immediately precedes the waking 
and that can assume the shapes of sleep paralysis (SP). This similarity in the body 
position between who undergoes OBE’s and who sleeps was grasped by Allan 
Cheyne and Todd Girard (2009, 203), who devote a very analytical paper to the 
interrelation of vestibular-motor hallucinations, out-of-body experiences, and sleep 
paralysis. Cheyne and Girard define SP as follows:  
“Sleep paralysis (SP) refers to a brief period at sleep onset or offset during which a 
person is unable to move or speak while remaining awake and aware of the 
immediate environment. Consistent with the hypothesis that SP represents an 
intrusion of a rapid eye movement (REM) state into waking consciousness caused 
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by defective coordination of sleep-wake and REM-NonREM transitions, 
polysomnographic studies report mixed REM and waking electroencephalographic 
components during SP episodes. […] SP is frequently accompanied by diverse and 
often vivid hallucinations” (Cheyne and Girard 2009, 201)10. 
Such hallucinations take different forms of expressing that entail not only OBE, but 
also the phenomenon of felt presence (FP), strange bodily sensations, and illusory 
movement experiences. Referring to Ronald Melzack’s notion of “neuromatrix” 
(Melzack 2001) Chayne and Girard state that  
“OBEs may, in common with phantom-limb experiences, reflect a failure of 
integration or binding of tactile, proprioceptive, vestibular, motor, and visual 
experiences of the bodily-self, likely implicating relevant regions within parietal, 
temporal, and frontal cortices. […] In essence, we argue that OBEs represent a 
failure of the neurosignature, the pattern of activation of the neuromatrix that 
signals that the body is intact” (Cheyne and Girard 2009, 202). 
 In their study, based on the interaction between SP and OBEs, the authors present 
various hypotheses to explain such a relationship, concluding that the diverse states 
implicated in it lead to a general feeling of disembodiment along with a parallel 
disruption of bodily-self processing. As to my interest in this research, the results 
show a strict connection between bodily experience and sense of self hence 
indicating that both the body and the self can be understood only in their reciprocal 
correlation. Such a correlation emerges in a very fascinating way in the dreaming 
state and in the peculiar bodily phenomena related to the dream state we are 
dealing with.   
Further neurological implications of these findings are that “hypoactivation of 
cortical vestibular areas during SP may render these areas unable to cope with the 
conflicting information coming from different sensory sources as well as potentially 
increased activity of subcortical vestibular centers. In general, this evidence 
implicates parietal areas in the generation of vestibular dream imagery and, by 
extension, in vestibular-motor (V-M) hallucinations during SP” (Cheyne and Girard 
2009, 209). In another contribution, Cheyne did already stress the link between SP 
and dreaming, with particular reference to the experience of hallucinations as a 
nightmare: “These hallucinations constitute a waking nightmare (w-nightmare) 
REM experience and are the original referents of the term ‘nightmare’. W-nightmare 
hallucinations are described by a three-factor structure involving experiences 
consistent with 1) threatening intruders, 2) physical assaults, and 3) vestibular-
motor (V-M) bodily sensations” (Cheyne 2003, 163).  
The theoretical ground of the speculation by Cheyne and Girard is the already cited 
notion of “neuromatrix” by Melzack, who proposes the following description of 
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such a notion: “The anatomical substrate of the body-self, I propose, is a large, 
widespread network of neurons that consists of loops between thalamus and cortex 
as well as between the cortex and the limbic system. I have labeled the entire 
network […] as a neuromatrix” (Melzack 2001, 1379). The neuromatrix produces a 
cyclical processing and synthesis of nerve impulses called by Melzack 
“neurosignature”. To these two features, Melzack adds two more, i.e. “the sentient 
neural hub, which converts (transduces) the flow of neurosignatures into the flow 
of awareness”, and “the activation of an action neuromatrix to provide the pattern 
of movements to bring about the desired goal” (Melzack 2001, 1379). What is very 
interesting in Melzack’s proposal is the philosophical assumption underlying it, 
according to which the sense of self is meant as the result of neurophysiological 
processes constituting the bodily experience whereby one feels herself also as a self. 
In a certain way, it represents an upsetting of the Cartesian perspective, as Melzack 
says: “The neuromatrix, distributed throughout many areas of the brain, comprises 
a widespread network of neurons that generates patterns, processes information 
that flows through it, and ultimately produces the pattern that is felt as a whole body 
possessing a sense of self” (Melzack 2001, 1380). 
Following Melzack’s schema, Cheyne and Girard observe that:  
“disruption of the widely distributed neuromatrix can affect the processing of a 
variety of bodily senses involving vestibular, motor, and proprioceptive systems as 
discussed. This disruption may directly produce anomalous bodily experience as 
well as contribute to the breakdown of the neurosignature, particularly when 
central integration is compromised” (Cheyne and Girard 2009, 210).  
The SP, interacting with these neuro-disruption, influences some sensory processes 
such as the “environmental change picked up by exteroceptors” (very attenuated 
during SP), and “the kinesthetic feedback from the body periphery” (unavailable 
during SP). At the same time, SP leaves intact the “enhancement of sensory areas 
either directly via corollary discharge/efference copy” or “indirectly through the 
construction of a forward model (emulator)” (Cheyne and Girard 2009, 210).  
3. Phenomenological account of embodied dreaming  
I will present an interpretation of the body in dreaming, both as a normal experience 
of a paralyzed body during REM sleep and a pathological experience of OBEs and 
FP during SP, grounded on the philosophical perspective of phenomenology.  
According to phenomenology, any mental act is characterized as “intentional”, 
which means the inborn trait of the act to be directed towards an object and in doing 
so to confer sense to it. The basic scheme of “intentionality” can be briefly explained 
as follows: to any act that “performs an intention”, an object as “intentioned” 
corresponds.  To further clarify by means of concrete examples: as to a perception, 
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one has “the perceiving” (i.e. the act that performs the perception) and “the 
perceived” (i.e. the object that is the target of perception); as to a memory, one has 
“the remembering” (i.e. the act that performs the memory) and “the remembered” 
(i.e. the object that is the target of memory). It is the same for any act of mental life, 
such as expectation, imagination, and dream. Within this general feature, 
consciousness’ acts receive a further division between: 1) the “presenting” acts, i.e. 
the acts that present an object, the acts that confer sense to an object that is in turn 
present. The perception is the basic shape of “presentation” (Gegenwärtigung): I can 
perceive only something present. This means that the perceiving and the perceived 
are simultaneously. And 2) the “presentifying” acts, i.e. the acts that “make 
something present”, the acts that make present something that is not currently 
present. Memory, expectation, and imagination are basic shapes of 
“presentification” (Vergegenwärtigung): I can remember, expect or imagine only 
something not present. This means that remembering, expecting, and imaging work 
on a double level of temporality: as mental acts they occur in the present, but their 
objects (the remembered, the expected, and the imagined ones) belong to the an 
unreal – non actual, i.e. non present - dimension (and so they are “presentified”, 
“made present”, from the Latin “fac¼re”). 
I propose to define the dream as a presentification too11. In the case of the dream, 
such a relationship between the double level of consciousness is even more peculiar: 
the first level is the one of sleeping, in which there is no aware activity, while the 
second level, the one of presentification, is the layer of dreaming, in which there is 
no aware activity either. While dreaming, one makes present something 
(presentifies) without being conscious of it like when imagining or remembering.   
Few, though relevant thinkers of the phenomenological tradition highlight some 
common traits of the dream state, such as: absorption, entanglement, ego-splitting, 
transformed relation between the subject and her space/time, the re-constitution of 
a world12. 
I would propose a phenomenological description on dreaming state based on the 
idea of a phenomenological formalism for describing the consciousness’ mental acts, 
referring to the concept of intentional mental process. Starting from this 
phenomenological perspective, Eduard Marbach (1993, 2006, 2010) provides a 
conceptual framework aiming at describing the essential, fixed features of 
consciousness’ experience. He calls such a framework “phenomenological 
notation”, which is a formal description of mental acts inspired by Frege’s concept 
of “Begriffsschrift” (Frege 1964) and consisting in a series of symbols and signs. As 
Marbach explains, “The notation should serve the purpose of expressing with 
precision reflectively elaborated forms of consciousness following methodological 
devices of Husserlian phenomenology” in order to “make concretely intelligible 
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that the very ways of intentional referring to something are simultaneously so many 
modes of inner consciousness” (Marbach 2010, 61-62). Basing on the rich notion of 
presentification, Marbach elucidates that it regards all acts which are “modifications 
of the basic form of perceptual consciousness” (Marbach 2010, 62) and so 
presentification stands for a very useful conceptual feature to understand the life of 
consciousness occurring in conjunction with the presentness of the ego while 
referring to something absent or unreal. Following Marbach’s proposed 
phenomenological formalism, I suggest explaining the dreaming experience as a 
compound of consciousness’ intentional acts13. 
The phenomenological description of dream experience based on the notation 
appears as follows: 
i_____________(PRE² Ō [PER] ) Ō x 
(  PRE¹) s 
This formula means: I (i), while based in potentially presenting (PRE¹) my 
surroundings (s), am actually presentifying (PRE²) something that is dreamt (x), 
believed to be real, by means of presentifying (dreaming) a perceiving (PER) of x 
believed to actually occur.  
The elements of this description are symbolized as follows: the triplets of upper case 
letters serve to denote mental activities; a pair of parentheses ‘(...)’ together with ‘x’ 
indicates the intentional correlation between a mental act that actually occurs and 
its object; pairs of square bracket, ‘[…]’ surrounding expressions for mental 
activities designate the occurrence of an intentional implication or modification of 
a mental activity contained within another activity; the sign of the shape ‘ Ō’ stands 
for the “belief-stroke” that, put in front of the symbol of intentional correlate, means 
that this is taken for something actually existing; the sign of the shape ‘ ’ stands 
for the “negation-stroke” that, put in front of triplet upper case letter, means the 
non actuality of mental act;  the horizontal stroke ‘____’ is called the “foundation-
stroke” and signifies the presentational experience (the presentness) that always 
happens at the very same time of the presentifying performance as its basis either 
as perceived, conscious (in the case of a presentification as imagination) or 
unperceived, unconscious (in the case of a presentification as dream); the letter “i” 
is put at the beginning of the formula, in order to indicate the I-consciousness 
involved in the presentificational experience14. The only sign I added to Marbach’s 
original work is the “negation-stroke” ‘ ’ that I draw from Frege’s notation 
wherein it indicates that something doesn’t take place (Frege 1964, 10). I introduce 
this sign in order to formally describe the peculiar condition of sleeping self who is 
presenting potentially (she can wake up at any time maintaining the perceptual 
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features though “sensorially disconnected” (see: Hobson 1990, 206). It is about “the 
having the world in the extreme manner of absorption” (Fink 1966, 64); hence, it is 
not about an actual presentation, but rather about a potential one.   
Now, through the elements of the “notation”, I would suggest a phenomenological 
description of dreaming as it occurs during OBE’s in conjunction with SP (Fig. 1). 
Keeping in mind the aforementioned description of SP, I propose:                      
   i____________(PER-PRE² Ō [PER] ) Ō x 
   (  PRE¹) s 
This formula means: I (i), while based in potentially presenting (PRE¹) my 
surroundings (s), am actually perceiving/presentifying (PER-PRE²) something (x), 
believed to be real (and actually moving, flying, floating), by means of 
presenting/presentifying (hallucinatory perceiving/dreaming) a perceiving ([PER]) 
of x believed to actually occur.  
Let us consider the two formulas put together: 
1)      i______________(PRE² Ō [PER] ) Ō x 
                                         (  PRE¹) s 
 
2)      i_____________(PER-PRE² Ō [PER] ) Ō x 
         (  PRE¹) s 
When comparing both formulas, one notices that in the second one both the 
hallucinatory trait of the OBEs and the hybrid nature of SP as a mixed state of REM 
sleep and waking exclude a performance by dreaming only. For this reason, the 
second formula lacks an authentic presentificational act. Nonetheless, the common 
signs in both descriptions are the sign ‘Ō’, which indicates that the experienced ‘x’, 
either as content of dream or an illusory moving body, is believed to be actually 
existing, and the sign ‘ ’, which means that it is about sleeping state.  
As to both formulas, it is worthy highlighting the coexistence of different mental 
acts, which characterizes the dream state as a presentificational process. While 
dreaming, the self and her body experience an overlapping of mental layers that 
should perform in diverse ambits of consciousness’ life. In remembering and 
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imagining, the presentational (perceptual) level and the presentificational one, 
though overlapping, don’t pretend to the same grade of validity nor confuse the 
respective ambits of validity. On the contrary, in dreaming the basic layer of 
presentation is unaware (sleeping), while the layer of presentification (dreaming) 
hosts in itself a series of presentation (i.e. the dreamt seeing, hearing, touching, and 
so on) that are believed as actually occurring and to which a series of dreamt bodily 
movement are associated. As a result, while sleeping one is basically presentifying 
through a sequence of acts that take the shapes of presentations. By means of the 
notions of presentation and presentification and of their overlapping interaction, 
phenomenology is able to offer a conceptual description of the complex state of 
dreaming meant not only as a neurophysiologic or psychological process, but also 
as an intentional one. The formal stage of description allows showing through 
commonly recognizable signs the basic features of this process: the formulas can be 
from time to time adjusted to the peculiar dream state to be described and, thanks 
to the recurrence of the same signs and symbols, they can help to conceptually read 
the specific dreaming process taken into account15.   
Finally, it is very relevant to stress the presence of an ‘I’ at the very beginning of the 
discussed formulas. The reference to the ego/the self is of basic importance for the 
phenomenological account, since it allows it to anchor the complex interplay of 
mental acts (and of the neurobiological processes underpinning them) to the central 
dimension of individuality16.  
Conclusion. The body and the self as a whole: Towards a meeting point between 
phenomenology and neuroscience 
My proposal is based on the idea of an interdisciplinary approach to the issue of 
dreaming, and of consciousness’ states in general, i.e. an approach in which there is 
no leading thought as primus inter pares, but rather each field of inquiry contributes 
to the whole explanation of the subject matter17. As to phenomenology, it can find 
in the neuroscientific studies not only a realm of empirical data lacking in a purely 
philosophical inquiry, but also a fascinating way of accounting for the 
consciousness’ life through a different language than the philosophical one. In this 
case, the differences in speaking must be more a reciprocal enrichment than a source 
of misunderstanding. The latter can be avoided if one keeps in mind that both 
phenomenology and neuroscience deal with the same topic – what consciousness is 
like – adopting diverse manners of approaching it. Precisely in this regard, 
neuroscience can find in phenomenology a conceptual clarity able to make its 
assertions more solid and legitimate.  
As our reflection on dreaming body has shown, this centrality of the self doesn’t 
imply a potentially disembodied soul or a potentially “disensouled” body, but 
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rather it is about an embodied ego – a person -, i.e. an ego whose understanding is 
possible only by referring to the body/self as a whole18. 
I wish thus to offer the following reflections, which don’t represent an arrival point, 
but rather a foundation for a new beginning in the process of inquiring the dream 
state together:  
1) The interrelated features of phenomenological description of the existence, i.e. 
self and body, are represented in dreaming 
2) Dreaming is a very fascinating and complex mental experience that can be 
explained without forgoing an idea of selfhood as either metaphysical or 
naturalistic entity, but rather as embodied selfhood  
3) The phenomenological notation is a conceptual tool aiming to formally explain 
the essential structures of mental process of dreaming, and  
4) By doing so, it becomes possible to recover and interpret the objective validity of 
neuroscientific results according to a perspective that aims at emphasizing the 
subjective layer of mental acts rooted in the bodily existence19.  
As a conclusion, I would like to briefly outline a hypothesis on how the 
phenomenological notation could contribute to further research on dreaming. If one 
thinks of an integrated study on the complex phenomena of OBE’s and SP that 
would entail both neurophysiological analyses and psychological interpretations, 
such formalism would allow an interpretation of the data beyond just a medical 
reading or psychological explanation. Basing on the empirical findings obtained by 
neuroimaging techniques, the phenomenological notation would aim at describing 
on a conceptual level the nature of mental acts in any single dream related to OBE 
and SP, the interplay among such acts, the emotional involvement of the subject 
(due to the philosophical assumption by the notation of the constant reference to 
the “I”), and the complex relationship of the presentifying act of dreaming with the 
present state of sleeping.  
In this way, very peculiar mental and bodily events like OBE and SP would receive 
a global description referred to their neurobiological, psychological, and conceptual 
elements concerning the dream state. The added theoretical reading would supply 
the medical and psychological analysis with the formal account of the composition 
of mental acts involved in dreaming.     





1  Allan Hobson highlights Freud’s early purpose to develop a scientific psychology in 1890s. 
See: Hobson 1990, 60-65 
2  The stress put on the connection between the sense of moving and the eyes movement aims 
at emphasizing the neurophysiologic basis of both the visual dream and the dreamer’s 
sensation of moving. It doesn’t entail the adoption of the scanning hypothesis, which is 
currently under debate. See e.g. Arnulf 2001.   
3  “[…] during dreaming, PGO signals are used in the construction of the hallucinoid visual 
imagery of dreams. The robust evidence for the generation of feedforward information, the 
excitability and functional significance of which varies systematically with brain state, is an 
important element of dream consciousness theory. In dreams, we see – in the absence of 
light – by activating the visual system of the brain from the motor side up” Hobson 2009, 
809 
4 In the present paper I will deal only with those dreams in which there is no active 
involvement by the dreamer for controlling somehow the dream course. Hence, I will 
exclude the complex and very fascinating case of the so-called lucid dreams (LaBerge 1985; 
LaBerge and Rheingold 1990) 
5  I am referring to the “phasic” stage of REM sleep which is the specific trait of PGO activity, 
thus I am not taking into account the “tonic” stage of REM sleep that is characterized by an 
ocular quiescence 
6 Commenting Edward Evarts’ study (Evarts 1960) on the neurobiological basis of the 
similarity between dreaming and waking states, Hobson remarks: “This finding meant that, 
during dreaming, motor commands are actually being issued by the cortex but not being 
enacted, and thus could be related to our sense of constant movement during dreaming. 
Such ‘fictive’ dream movements have a nonfictive base!” Hobson 1990, 169.    
7  Such a peculiar condition of high brain activity and bodily atonia represents a paradoxical 
though normal state of sleeping whose loss can determine a serious sleep disorder known 
as REM Sleep Behavior Disorder (RBD). RBD was carefully investigated by Schenck et al. 
(1986) and Schenck and Mahowald (2002, 2005). Revonsuo (2000) takes into account RBD 
and NREM-related sleep disorders in conjunction with his original theory of dream as threat 
simulation, observing that such disorders “show that threat simulation during sleep 
includes realistic and adequate motor activation in the brain in response to the perceived 
threats.” (Revonsuo 2000, 890)    
8   More to the point, paying attention to the vestibular sensations implies considering the basic 
role played by the vestibular cortex, whose core region “is situated at the temporo-parietal 
junction (TPJ) and/or the posterior insula”, Blanke and co-authors stress also “the 
importance of the TPJ in normal and pathological visuo-spatial perspective taking […]”. The 
basic implication of the vestibular processes makes clearer the involvement of the body – 
both as real and as unreal, illusory – in these special mental states and the related 
involvement of the sense of self: “the present data suggest that AP might also relate to a 
failure to integrate proprioceptive, tactile and visual body-related information 
(disintegration in multisensory personal space) in a coherent central representation of one’s 
body (body schema)” (Blanke et al 2004, 253) 
9  The disruption of the bodily self implies the co-disruption of the spatial self, which seems to 
be the condition to experience a parasomatic condition. See Blanke et al 2004, 255 and 256. 
The interactions between spatial and psychological dimensions in autoscopic phenomena 
and their relationship with the bodily self have been highlighted by Brugger 2007 
10 It is about a hybrid state very similar to the one recognized as a lucid dreaming, in which 
the boundary between wakefulness and dreaming becomes uncertain (Voss et al 2009). Such 
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an uncertainty between both states gets lucid dreaming close to OBE’s too. See: Metzinger 
2009, 133 ff 
11 Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenological thought, doesn’t consider dream a 
presentification, since he states that a presentification needs experiencing an aware contrast 
with perceptual reality. Such a contrast is experienced in the case of remembering or 
imagining, but it doesn’t occur in the case of dreaming (Husserl 2005). In defining dream as 
a presentification, I follow Eugen Fink’s (1966) remarks. In his considerations on 
imagination as a presentification, Fink, the last Husserl’s co-workers in the 1930s, affirms 
that the absorbed status of the ego stands for the other fundamental character of subjectivity, 
beside the mental state of full awareness. As a consequence, the dreaming process is meant 
by Fink as a more absorbed (versunkener) mental state that assumes the shape of a 
presentifying act. See Fink 1966, 54-55  
12 Fink 1966, Sartre 1972, Conrad 1968   
13 Marbach applies such a phenomenological notation to the acts of remembering, imagining, 
picturing something, and their combinations, since, according to the Husserlian standpoint, 
he doesn’t consider the dream as a presentification either (Marbach 1997, 607)   
14 As regards all the aforementioned signs and further ones I didn’t deal with, see Marbach 
1993, 25-27; Marbach 2010, 64-65 
15 As to the descriptive function of these signs, I refer to the clear words by Marbach himself: 
“The artificial signs of the phenomenological notation will enable us to separate the 
particular moments of an activity clearly from one another and simultaneously make their 
phenomenological unity, i.e. their intentional relations more readily visible than all too 
longwinded expressions from ordinary languages would permit. […] Once the notation will 
be more developed, improved, and hopefully standardized, the logic of the systems so 
discovered may even lead to new phenomenological discoveries” Marbach 1993, 23. See 
also: Frege 1964, 97           
16
 As Marbach properly states, the “complexity of the components of a representing 
[presentifying] activity is simultaneously unified in an I-consciousness. The unification of 
temporally and spatially discontinuous moments takes place in an I-consciousness. […] I-
consciousness in acts of mentally representing [presentifying] x can be said to occur as a 
subjective unifying reference of the plurality of the actual moments and of the non-actual 
ones that are intentionally implied in the unity of performing one and the same activity 
converging objectively on one and the same x” (Marbach 2010, 67-68. See also: Marbach 
1993, 89-92) 
17 Valuable proposals to apply the phenomenological method to consciousness’ study have 
been suggested by Amedeo Giorgi (2009; 2012) and Don Kuiken (Kuiken et al 1989) referring 
both to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s inquiries 
18 See: Merleau-Ponty 1962, 408 
19 My attempt is not the first one to put phenomenology in conjunction with neuroscience. 
Already in the 1990s, Francisco Varela proposed the so-called “neurophenomenology”, i.e. 
a phenomenology that practices its methodological insights interfacing with the scientific 
studies of consciousness. My proposal is somehow situated in the field of inquiry opened 
by Varela whose inspiring principles I completely agree with. I am especially referring to 
some Varela’s statements (1996) such as the mutual constraints between phenomenology 
and neuroscience, the thought of the two ambits of research as different ways to consider 
the same world, the existence of shared topics like attention, time-consciousness, body 
image, among others. Nonetheless, I prefer to speak of my idea as a phenomenological 
formalism of dreaming instead of a neurophenomenology of dreaming, because of the 
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Abstract: Full-Body illusions (FBI) and Out-of-Body Experiences (OBE) are two 
phenomenological experiences with increasing importance in current studies regarding the 
nature of the Self. Although distinct, these two phenomena share some phenomenological 
properties and several authors have been suggesting a deep relation between them.  
The article aim is twofold: in one hand to explore the nature of the aforementioned relation 
between FBI and OBE. On the other hand, to put at test my own proposed taxonomical 
distinction of the concept ‘Core-Self’ into two more fundamental categories (Core-Self 
Simpliciter’ and ‘Cognitive Core-Self’) as previously suggested in other places.    
The article starts by reassessing the proposed taxonomical distinction of Core-Self into Core-
Self Simpliciter’ (CSS) and ‘Cognitive Core-Self’ (CCS) and then proceeds by suggesting 
that FBIs and OBE are phenomenological consequences of CSS and CCS respectively.  
In the second part of the article this hypothesis is put to test and its consequences both to the 
taxonomical proposed distinction of CSS and CCS and to the relation between FBI and OBE 
are discussed.   
1. The ‘Core-Self Simpliciter’ /‘Cognitive Core-Self’ distinction 
In this section, I start by briefly reassessing my own proposed taxonomical 
distinction regarding the concept ‘Self’ as suggested in previous talks and articles. 
I will consider first the now widely accepted division of the concept ‘Self’ into two 
sub-types: ‘Core (or Minimal) Self’ (corresponding to the most basic 
phenomenological sense of oneself) and ‘Narrative Self’ (regarding the proprieties 
of self-identification related to auto-biographical contents). My proposal was, and 
still is, to divide the very concept of ‘Core-Self’ further into two sub-concepts: what I 
call ‘Core-Self Simpliciter’ and ‘Cognitive Core-Self’   
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This distinction was initially motivated when I was confronted with two distinct 
proposals regarding the neural implementation of Core-Self: Shaun Gallagher’s 
cortical proposal (Motor, Pre-Motor and Prefrontal areas) and Björn Merker’s sub-
cortical one (Upper-brainstem complex: superior culliculus – Pariequeductal Grey 
Area/hypothalamus - Substancia Nigra/Basal Ganglia )1.  
Without going further into details concerning each of these two proposals, the fact 
is that they seem, not only different but also incompatible answers to the question 
regarding the neural implementation of Core-Self. In fact, one proposal is cortical 
whereas the other is subcortical. Thus, and assuming both proposals as empirically 
correct, we are faced with a sort of an explanatory dilemma: either 1. the two 
proposals select the same concept and the claim of Multiple Realization of ‘Core-Self’ 
is vindicated (i.e., it has several different neural implementations), or 2. the two 
proposals select different and unrelated concepts. The explanatory ‘dilemma’ (so to 
speak) consists of the fact that either of the two possibilities implies a fragmentation 
in our explanatory practices where some kind of unity would be preferable. My 
own suggestion in order overpass the dilemma was to notice that the two answers 
are, in fact, not incompatible. What happens is that Gallagher and Merker are 
addressing two distinct although related perspectives on the concept of ‘Core-Self’. 
The relationship obtained between the two concepts is what allows for the 
avoidance of the dilemma.   
To better understand what’s really at stake here; take the analogy with the concept 
‘Vision’. Sure we can study vision at the level of the visual cortex (call it ‘Cortical-
Vision’). But we could also study vision at the more fundamental and evolutionary 
older level of ‘photo-reception’ (call it ‘Vision Simpliciter’). These two perspectives 
on vision of course, are not incompatible and can and should be accommodated into 
a single unified approach. This is so because, among other things, ‘Vision Simpliciter’ 
(photoreception) is a necessary structural condition to all kinds of vision, including, 
of course, ‘Cortical-Vision’. In the same vein, my suggestion is that the concept 
‘Core-Self’ could be fragmented/divided in two distinct concepts but related in a 
way similar to that of ‘Vision Simpliciter’ and ‘Cortical-Vision’. These two concepts 
will, of course, relate to Gallagher’s and Merker’s proposals. So, to Merker’s 
proposal I suggest the designation Core-Self Simpliciter (CSS) whereas for 
Gallagher’s I suggest Cognitive Core-Self (CCS). 
Just like in the case of Vision, my proposal states that a unified approach to Core-
Self is both possible and welcomed. This is so because just like ‘Vision Simpliciter’ 
is to ‘Cortical Vision’, CSS is a necessary condition to CCS.  
This necessary condition relation is justified by CSS and CCS properties. I’ll state, 
in an over-simplified way, the main phenomenological and computational proprieties 
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of each concept (to be developed in more detail in the next sections): 
  
Core-Self Simpliciter: at the Phenomenological level it provides the basis for the 
emergence of the ‘first person perspective’ (1PP) and the basic contrast between Self 
and external world. This is achieved, at the Computational level by Pure On-line 
processing of sensorimotor integration through coordinate transformation in a 
common reference framework. 
Cognitive Core-Self: At the Phenomenological level it adds cognitive complexity to 
CS Simpliciter, namely the capacity for imagery. This is achieved at the 
Computational level by processing off-line over the contents of CS Simpliciter, 
possibly trough the implementation of a Forward Model/Comparator (on the 
mechanisms responsible for CSS). 
So, again, just like ‘Cortical Vision’ adds computational and neural complexity to 
the (already existent) mechanisms for ‘Vision Simpliciter’, CCS adds neural, 
computational and even phenomenological complexity to the more basic CSS. 
For now, this brief and somewhat simplified portrayal of the distinction between 
CSS and CCS is sufficient for making the point of the remaining paper. It is time 
now to bring the notions of Full Body Illusions (FBI) and Out of Body Experiences 
(OBE) into the discussion. My main claim in this paper, and which I will try to argue 
for in the next sections is enounced in the following statement:  
FBIs and OBEs are manifestations of, respectively, CSS and CCS.  
Put simply, the idea is that FBI are a kind of sensorial illusion made possible by the 
CSS computational properties and the same for OBE in relation to CCS.  
Supported in this hypothesis, my aim in this paper is twofold: in one hand I will try 
to suggest that FBI and OBE are intimately related (that relation being that of 
dependence of CCS from CSS). On the other hand, I hope to show some empirical 
and conceptual evidence in the process, in favor of my previous distinction between 
CSS and CCS. 
2. A Characttarization of ‘Core-Self Simpliciter’  
This section aims to explore, in more detail, the computational and 
phenomenological properties of CSS and how those properties predict or explain 
the FBI phenomena. In order to achieve this end, I will address Bjorn Merker’s (2005, 
2007) own suggestion for the biological and evolutionary origins of what I call Core 
Self Simpliciter. In particular, the main question concerns the biological and 
evolutionary constraints in the emergence of this most basic form of (core) Self. 
Merker departure is the so-called Stability Problem. This is basically the sensorial-
motor integration problem faced by creatures with more complex bodies given the 
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several distinct sensorial modalities and the huge number of different possible body 
actions. In a nutshell, there are too many scattered variables at the level of sensory-
motor integration, which prevents good sensorial-motor coordination in the 
environment. Merker (2005) provides a nice snapshot of the problem: 
The evolution of higher animals leads not only to increased complexity of single 
sensory and motor systems but produces a diversification of such systems in the 
equipments of a given species. Vision, hearing, touch, smell, taste, interoception, 
proprioception and vestibular systems are some of those on the sensory side, 
while a great variety of locomotors, orienting, grasping, and manipulation 
appendages – often paired in sets and with multiple, independently moving 
joints – proliferate on the motor side. Such diversity brings special problems in 
its train. On the sensory side, for example, the receptor arrays of different 
modalities are often disposed in different parts of the body. They are therefore, 
not affected in the same way by self-motion and so cannot be subject to the same 
compensatory remedies, nor be integrated directly. (Merker 2005, 92)  
In order to achieve a satisfactory sensory-motor coordination to survive in the 
environment, ‘complex’ creatures thus need some sort of centralization/integration 
of the different sensorial and motor ‘local solutions’. In a more formal terminology: 
we have several separate frames of reference for each sensorial and motor specific 
information and what is needed is to frame all this disparate information under a 
single coordinate reference system. 
How can such different sensorial and motor frames of reference be unified? The 
answer is: trough Coordinate transformations.   
Merker’s own proposal is that nature’s structural answer to this challenge relates to 
the phylogenetically very old and widely conserved structures corresponding to the 
basic Vertebrate Brain Plan, namely the roof/tectum of the midbrain/Superior 
Colliculus (S.C.). Merker stresses the peculiar anatomical and functional roles of this 
structure: 
[T]he spatial senses are topographically superposed in laminar fashion within a 
common, premotor, framework for multieffector control of orienting. Its 
functional role appears to center on convergent integration of diverse sources of 
information bearing on spatially triggered replacement of one behavioural 
target by another (Merker 2007, 67) 
The S.C. laminar structure is such that some information registered in one layer (say 
a mapping of auditory space) translates directly to another layer (say, a mapping of 
occulomotor orientation) by means of coordinate transformation. This is why when 
we hear a sound our eyes ‘know’ immediately where to look in the search for the 
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source of the sound. What this means is that the S.C. laminar structure in fact brings 
the various local sensory-motor solutions under a common referential system 
framework. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the SC is not the only place in the brain capable of 
implement sensorial-motor coordinate transformation. Several different places in 
the brain seem to implement this computational solution. As we going to give 
evidence later, one of those areas is the Posterior Parietal Cortex (PPC). That being 
so, and for the purposes of this article, my approach consists in abstracting the 
general computational formulation for coordinate transformation from its specific 
neural implementation (be it the SC, the PPC or any other). That is, all the specific 
brain structure responsible for sensorial-motor coordinate transformation can be 
described (at a very abstract and general level) in the same way. Therefore, generally, 
in neurological terms, this solution takes the form of an integrative brain structure 
where information is encoded in a specific neural population and pre-specified 
coordinate transformations communicate synaptically that information from one 
neural population to another.  
My purpose now is to suggest how certain phenomenological features generally 
attributed to the first person perspective (1PP) can arise from this sensorial-motor 
coordinate transformation computational framework. 
As suggested above in the description of the SC laminar function, coordinate 
transformations of both different sensorial sources (visual, tactile, audio, 
proprioceptive) and motor behaviours gives rise to a coherent unified perceptive 
experience. For instance: A visual space can be ‘calibrated’ to an audio space 
through coordinate transformation, such that we can visually identify the source of 
a sound. Suppose I see a glass being broken and hear a shattering sound at the same 
time. The coordinate transformations from one space to the other makes me 
associate the two, making me able to visually identify the source of the sound. 
This example suggests how the sensorial side of experience can be unified. Now, to 
this external input of sensorial integration let’s add internal information regarding 
the motor aspect of experience, i.e., body movements and position. Take the 
example of extra-occular proprioceptive information regarding the movements of 
the eyes of their eyeballs relative to the rest of the face. In this case, coordinate 
transformations provide a body/face-relative reference frame for eye position. The 
coordinate transformations from an extra-occular proprioceptive space to a ‘face’-
map space turns possible to detect where the eyes are in relation to that facial space; 
if they are looking down, up, left, right, etc, relative to that facial reference system.  
Now, if we add to this the information of what the eyes actually see (i.e., the visual 
information space) what emerges is an eye orientation frame for that visual 
 João Fonseca 
130 
information. As I move my eyes I experience –for example- looking right, left, up, 
down. A fundamental distinction arises in this context: the contrast between my 
body (my eyes in this case), which I move voluntarily, and the external world, which 
rests ‘indifferent’ (i.e., stable) to my volition. I voluntarily move my eyes to the right 
and can see what is positioned at my right in the external environment. Moreover, 
in geometrical terms, there must be a point of origin of this body frame of reference. 
This point of origin defines a phenomenological, subjective spatial perspective in 
the sensorial space, corresponding to what is known as First Person Perspective (1PP). 
For instance, Blanke and Metzinger define a weak 1PP as follows: 
A purely geometrical feature of an egocentric model of reality, most often 
referred to as a visuospatial model. [It] includes a spatial frame of reference, plus 
a global body representation, with a perspective originating within this body 
representation. (Blanke & Metzinger 2008, 7) 
We should focus our attention on the two features identified by Metzinger and 
Blanke regarding 1PP, that is: 1) a spatial frame of reference and 2) a global body 
representation (with a perspective originating within this body representation).  
Regarding the first feature, we have already shown evidence how information 
concerning the body (in our example, information regarding eye-position relative 
to the face) defines a frame of reference to orienting external sensorial information. 
Gallagher stresses this fundamental role of the body in providing a spatial frame of 
reference for sensorial input:     
[O]ne of the important functions of he body in the context of perception and 
action is to provide the basis for an egocentric (or body-centred) spatial frame 
of reference (…) this egocentric framework is required for the very possibility of 
action, and for the general structure of perceptual experience. The fact that 
perception is perspectivally spatial is a fact that depends precisely on an implicit 
reference to the spatiality of the perceiving body. (Gallagher 2005, 137) 
Why so much dependence on the body? According to Gallagher, body awareness 
provides the only way to avoid the infinite regress in defining a perceptual-spatial, 
egocentric point of view: 
If one accepts the premise that sense perception of the world is spatially 
organized by an implicit reference to our bodily framework, the awareness that 
is the basis for that implicit reference cannot depend on perceptual awareness 
without the threat of infinite regress. To avoid the infinite regress one requires 
a pre-reflective bodily awareness that is built into he structures of perception 
and action but that is not itself egocentric. (Ibid, 137)  
Proprioceptive information is particularly well suited to the task since: 
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[P]roprioceptive awareness is not itself a perception of the body as an object; for 
if it were, it would require an ordering system, a spatial frame of reference that 
was independent of the body. Generally speaking, the proprioceptive spatiality 
of the body is not framed by anything other than the body itself. (Ibid, 137-138) 
The above warning that proprioception is not itself a perception of the body as an 
object takes us to the second feature of 1PP, as proposed by Metzinger and Blanke, 
namely the requirement of a ‘global body representation’.  
At this point it is probably useful to introduce the notions of Body-Schema and Body 
Image2. Whereas a Body-Schema consists in a series of body structures and (mainly) 
unconscious contents constitutive of conscious experience itself, a Body Image 
corresponds to the actual conscious perception of ones body. It is more or less clear 
that, in the present context, the body frame of reference constitutive of 1PP relates 
to the notion of Body-Schema and the ‘global body representation’ requirement to 
Body Image. Regarding the latter, the (simple) idea is that, the perceptual experience 
of an external space includes several objects and events occurring in that external 
space, one of which is one’s body itself. The main difference between our body as it 
appears in our perceptive field and other external objects, is the fact that we can 
recognize our body as ours whereas the other objects (other’s bodies included) are 
experienced as independent from us (recall the above discussion considering the 
distinction between ones body and other objects in terms of conscious voluntary 
control of one rather than the other). 
Accordingly, Metzinger and Blanke’s requirement for a ‘global body 
representation’ as a necessary feature of 1PP can be rephrased as a requirement for 
a Body Image. This demand can be fulfilled in our coordinate transformation 
framework in the way loosely described above, that is: in one hand, the sensorial 
detection of the body in the external space and, in the other hand, the recognition of 
that body as belonging to us trough, among other things, its voluntary motor 
control. 
Metzinger and Blanke make a further claim concerning this ‘global body 
representation’ (or Body-Image), namely that a (subjective) perspective should have 
its origin located within this Body Image. It is more or less easy to understand how 
this requirement is met within the coordinate transformation framework discussed 
so far. Take again the above-discussed case of the face as providing a coordinate 
reference for eye position. Loosely, at their ‘resting position’ (when just ‘looking 
forward’, not up, not down nor left or right) the eyes define the origin (i.e., the point 
zero) of this coordinate system (as the eyes move in a certain direction their position 
is defined as a certain point-vector in that system). Assuming this, one can conclude 
that this origin is implicitly «located behind the nose bridge inside our head. From 
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there we appear to confront the visible world directly through an empty and single 
cyclopean aperture in the front of our head» (Merker, 2006, 73, emphasis in the 
original). That is, the Body-Schema (namely trough proprioception information) 
defines the 1PP point of origin as being located within a certain specific place in the 
Body Image, more particularly, inside our head (as part of our Body-Image). One 
should not forget that this Body Image is not only visual but also a tactile and 
somesthetic one. Surely, we cannot see our own head (aside from mirror 
information) but other kinds of sensorial information other than vision fill the gap 
in the construction of our Body Image. As Merker stresses: 
The cyclopean aperture is a convenient neural fiction through which the distal 
visual world is “inserted” through a missing part of the proximal visual body, 
which is “without head” as it were or, more precisely, missing its upper face 
region. Somesthesis by contrast maintains unbroken continuity across this region. 
(Merker 2007 73, emphasis added)    
So, summing up this section: through multisensory-motor coordinate 
transformation (as an evolutionary answer to the stability problem) we have the 
generation of: 1) a self-perspective first person position (1PP), 2) the postulation of 
an external independent world and 3) an image of body [a Body Image] where the 
origin of the subjective perspective is located. These are, in a nutshell, Core-Self 
Simpliciter’s (CSS) proprieties.  
3. ‘Core-Self Simpliciter’ and Full Body Illusions 
In this section I propose to frame the Full Body Illusions (FBI) phenomena within 
the context of CSS properties as described in the last section.  First, I describe 
succinctly the basics of FBI illusion, and then I propose to show how this 
phenomenon is (at least) partly explained in terms of CSS properties. 
In their fundamentals, FBIs are very simply depicted: a subject is stroked in the back 
and sees, trough virtual-reality goggles, her own back a few steps ahead being 
stroked in real time and in synchrony with the felt strokes. After some time the subject 
reports feeling as being physically moved to the body they see in front of them. As 
an illustration of this, after blanking the image shown in the goggles and slightly 
displacing participants’ position, they were asked to move to where they felt 
themselves being during the experiment (their original or previous position). As a 
result, subjects moved towards the supposed location of the body as indicated by 
the virtual-reality goggles and not their actual original position. This general effect 
is technically known as proprioceptive drift (Lenggenhager et al 2007).   
How is this strange experience possible and what does it tells us about the self? My 
claim in this section is that the computational model for CS Simpliciter proposed in 
the previous section, in fact, predicts this phenomenon.  
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Of crucial importance here is the notion of ‘pre-specified coordinate 
transformations’. Essentially, this is the idea according to which at least some of the 
multi-sensory coordinate transformations discussed above are determined by 
experience (or innately) resulting in enduring and specified space-to-space 
mappings. These cordite transformations are, so to speak, built-in in order to allow 
successful sensorial-motor coordination. This pre-specification can explain (and be 
clarified by) several illusions, FBI being one of them.    
Take a first illusion as an illustration. In a well-known experiment (Stevens et al 
1976), the muscles of subject’s eyeballs were artificially paralysed by a 
pharmacological agent. When asked to look right, subjects reported watching the 
complete visual scene as jumping to their right. This is because the pre-specified 
coordinate transformation makes the (possibly efferent copy of) eye-motor 
command to have an effect on the orientation space in a pre-specified way (e.g. turn 
right in x degrees) whereas the visual scene stays the same since there is no actual 
eye movement. Therefore, the whole visual scene will be perceived as turning right 
in x degrees. 
Before turning to FBIs, let’s take another illusion that can be helpful in this context: 
the well-known ‘Ventriloquist Illusion’. In this case the coordinate transformations 
establish a pre-specified correlation between sounds and their spatial source 
location by matching temporal synchrony between those sounds and visual events. 
This explains why we, despite knowing the contrary, tend to attribute the source of 
the speech to the dummy.  The same rationale explains why when watching a movie 
we hear the speech as coming from the actors in the screen and not from the 
loudspeakers located in the movie-theatre.  
The ‘Ventriloquist Illusion’ is of interest here since FBI can be explained in a similar 
way. In the former, pre-specified visual-audio coordinate transformations localize 
the source of the sound to where synchrony is found. Mutatis mutandis, in FBI pre-
specified visual-tactile coordinate transformations spatially localize the body as 
standing in the position where synchrony between tactile and visual information is 
found. In the case of the experiment setting described above, this synchrony is 
found in the body that is located in front of the subjects. As a result, subjects report 
as being dislocated to that body, that is, they report a dissociation of their Image of 
the body (Body Image) from their 1PP. As we have seen, in normal circumstances 
the two features of 1PP, the Body Image and the Body-Schema, coincide, meaning 
that the geometrical origin of the orientation-in-space coordinate reference system 
(Body-Schema) is localized within a specific body location (Body Image) (inside the 
head just behind the nose bridge). It is this coincidence that breaks down in a FBI.  
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But this is just part of the explanation, since things turn to be slightly more complex 
than suggested. In fact, what seems to happen is that subjects do not experience 
disembodiment of the self (i.e. a separation of their subjective perspective from their 
body). Instead, subjects report a spatial misplacement of their Self and body (the 
experience is reported as “I am ‘there’” and not as just “My body is ‘there’”) 
(Lenggenhager et al. 2007). There seems to be a Body-Schema and Body Image 
coincidence after all. Lenggenhager and colleagues give a general characterization 
of FBIs as follows:  
[A] n illusion during which healthy participants experienced a virtual body as 
if it were their own and localized their “selves” outside of their body borders at 
a different position in space. (Ibid, 1096, emphasis added) 
So, what is possibly happening and what could explain the phenomenon? 
Again, coordinate transformation suggests a possible explanation for this total 
displacement of self-position and not just body-position in FBIs. What possibly 
happens is that again in this case a pre-specified configuration in coordinate 
transformation is preserved. More specifically, and as already testified, in normal 
circumstances the geometrical origin of the body-schema (that is, the sense of 1PP) 
is experienced as being located within a certain specific part of the body-image: 
inside the head just behind the nose bridge. This strongly suggests that the 
coincidence between body and 1PP is preserved in a pre-specified way, in the sense 
used here. Either acquired or innate, there is probably a mechanism of 
compensation if, in abnormal circumstances, the ‘normal’ location of 1PP in the Body 
Image is disrupted. That is precisely what happens in FBI; visual-tactile synchrony 
is spatially located in a different position than the actual body, but given the pre-
specified coincidence between 1PP and body-image, is not just the body-image that 
suffers displacement but 1PP as well. In other words, the 1PP-Body-Image 
coincidence is preserved, ‘all things being equal’, trough pre-specified coordinate 
transformation enabling the judgement: ‘if my body is located there so is my Self/ 1PP’.  
Can we find any neuroscientific evidence supporting the hypothesis here suggested 
concerning the computational explanation for FBI phenomena? As far as I know, no 
Neuro-image studies have been undertaken concerning FBI experiences. 
Nevertheless, those studies have been conducted in the realm of so-called ‘Rubber 
Hand Illusion’ (RHI). RHIs were conceived and studied before but can be 
understood as FBIs ‘sisters experience’. In a RHI setting, a subject rests her arm on 
a table while a screen is positioned to hide the arm from the subject’s view. A real-
sized rubber hand is placed on the table in front of the subject. Both the ‘real’ hidden 
hand and the rubber model are then stroked in synchrony with a small brush. After 
some minutes, subjects report as feeling the rubber hand as being their own hand.  
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Some Brain-Image studies suggested a correlation between the misattribution of the 
ownership of the rubber hand and the Posterior Parietal Cortex (PPC) (Ehrsson et 
al, 2004). The PPC is a brain region known for multi-modal sensorial- motor 
integration much in the way here proposed trough coordinate transformations 
(Anderson et al, 1997; Pouget & Sejnowski, 1997). Now, if we assume the claim 
according to which the FBI is conceived as a generalization of RHI to the totality of 
the body (see, for instance, Lenggenhager et al, 2007) then, the computational model 
for Core-Self Simpliciter I have been deploying, gains empirical credibility and the 
same is valid for the tentative explanation of FBIs in terms of pre-specified 
coordinate transformations.  
It seems, therefore, that CSS’s properties, achieved through multisensory-motor 
coordinate transformation (recall: 1) a self-perspective first person position (1PP), 
2) the postulation of an external independent world and 3) an image of body [a 
Body-Image] where the origin of the subjective perspective is located) is capable of 
sustaining all the phenomenological features of FBI’s experiences.  
4. The CSS/CCS Distinction and Out-of-Body Experience 
This section explores the hypothesis- according to which the set of 
phenomenological experiences known in the literature as ‘Out-of-Body Experience’ 
(OBE) - are ‘built upon’ and add complexity to the computational, 
phenomenological and neuronal proprieties of CSS and FBI mentioned in the 
previous section.  
I start by briefly characterizing the main features of OBE and comparing them to 
the ones of Full-Body-Illusion (FBI).  
OBE is a phenomenological experience where, in certain extreme situations an 
individual reports to experience her or himself as detached from its own body and 
being able to see its body from an external perspective.    
Generally and succinctly, OBEs can be defined as satisfying the following 
phenomenological proprieties (Following Bünning and Blanke 2005): 
 Sense of disembodiment (Self outside the body) 
 Experience of the world from an extracorporeal but ego-centric visual-
spatial perspective 
 Autoscopy: seeing one’s body from this perspective  
These proprieties mark some fundamental distinctions in relation to FBIs. Recall 
that in FBIs there is no sense of disembodiment: subjects report a sense of complete 
dislocation to a position different from where the actual body is (proprioceptive 
drift) but there is not a full-blown ‘separation’ from it. What seems to happen in 
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OBEs, in clear contrast to FBIs, is a non-coincidence between 1PP and an image of the 
body. What and how can such a difference be supported? According to the main 
hypothesis/claim suggested in this article and stated in the first section, OBEs are a 
consequence of the computational and phenomenological properties of CCS as 
much as FBIs are consequence of CSS’s proprieties.  
Recall that it was suggested that, at the phenomenological level the CCS adds cognitive 
complexity to CSS, namely the capacity for imagery. On the computational level this 
is achieved probably by processing the contents of CSS off-line. 
In line with this hypothesis it makes sense to suppose that OBEs are the result of a 
capacity to provide a sort of meta-representation of instances and contents made 
possible by CSS. For instance, the capacity to imagine a first-person visual-spatial 
perspective as independent of the body could explain the disembodiment feeling 
typical of OBE. In fact, this hypothesis seems to be supported by a series of empirical 
findings regarding OBE.  
I will briefly sort out some of those findings: In recent years, some neuroscientists 
have stressed the crucial role of the Temporal Parietal Junction (TPJ) on the 
occurrence of OBE. More particularly, this structure seems crucially responsible for 
two distinct cognitive capacities with an important role in the occurrence of OBE: 
1) the generation of mental imagery of body location (Blanke 2005) and 2) as 
providing an internal multi-modal off-line representation of the body. Regarding 
the first capacity, in a study conducted by Blanke and colleagues it was shown that, 
in an evoked potential study, 10 out of 11 healthy subjects activated their TPJ when 
mentally imagining their visual-spatial point of view (that is, their first person 
perspective (1PP)) in a location different from the ‘normal’ one. They conclude that: 
”Our evoked potential data show (in healthy subjects who have never 
experienced an OBE) that mental own-body transformations, which mentally 
simulate the body position and visuospatial perspective that is experienced 
spontaneously during OBEs, selectively activate the TPJ at 330-400 ms. In 
addition, we show that this activation correlates with behavioural measures and 
phenomenological characteristics of OBEs (…)” (Blanke et al 2005, 555)   
On what concerns the second cognitive capacity, a series of experiments undertaken 
by Tsakiris and colleagues evaluated the role of TPJ in the production and 
maintenance of an ‘off-line internal body-model’. 
”Recent studies suggest that the right temporal and parietal lobes and in 
particular the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) underpins an internal 
model of the body that could allow the brain to maintain a coherent 
representation of ones body” (Tsakiris et al 2008, 3014) 
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They devised an experimental protocol, which modifies the Rubber Hand 
experiment discussed in the previous section. This new setting was conceived to 
address the role of TPJ in the proprioceptive drift of the real hand to a fake rubber 
hand or, instead to a neutral object that doesn’t look like a hand at all. They found 
that, by disrupting the TPJ trough transcranial magnetic stimulation, there was a 
much more higher probability of subjects to report a proprioceptive drift to a 
neutral object. Tsakiris and his team suggested that: 
”[T]he rTPJ is involved in updating and maintaining [a] body-model by testing 
which stimuli are relevant to one’s own body. We suggest that the rTPJ is 
actively involved in testing the fit between current sensory input and a stored 
body-model (…) [t]his model describes the pre-existing visual, anatomical and 
structural features of the body”. (Ibid, 3017)        
These two cognitive capacities made possible by the TPJ are of crucial importance 
for the occurrence of OBEs. The first capacity, regarding the ability to manipulate 
mentally a dislocation of the first-person visual-spatial perspective, can support and 
explain phenomenological proprieties 1 and 2 of the above definition of OBE (the 
sense of disembodiment and the experience of the world from an non-corporeal 
visual-spatial perspective). The second capacity, the off-line representation of the 
body, can help in understanding phenomenological propriety 3 of OBEs (i.e., 
autoscopy). 
Now, each of these two capacities seem to assume some other capacities and contents 
already being provided. The first capacity assumes a previous first person 
perspective (1PP) in order to be capable to mentally manipulate it. The second 
assumes an on-line image of the body that is capable of being modelled off-line. As 
it happens, and as we have seen, a 1PP and an (on-line) image of the body are 
precisely the two features attributed to CSS (and ‘expressed’ in FBIs). If so, then a 
first important consequence can be extracted, namely that that CCS (as defined in 
the first section) supports OBEs by providing the additional off-line and imagery 
processing to CSS contents and cognitive capacities responsible for FBIs. A second 
consequence is the backup to the idea that CSS is a necessary condition to CCS. That 
is, as stated in section 1, just like ‘photo-reception’ (‘Vision Simpliciter’) is 
structurally and functionally necessary for the more elaborate and complex Cortical 
Vision the same applies to CSS in relation to CCS. We have just testified this 
necessary relation more specifically at the functional and phenomenological levels. 
But this suggestion implies that a similar relationship between CSS and CCS should 
be expected to occur also at the structural level. Although to my knowledge no 
empirical confirmation to this claim seems to exist, important neural pathways 
seem to link the Posterial Parietal Cortex and the Temporo-Parietal-Junction (the 
areas suggested to correspond to CSS and CCS respectively). The structural 
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dependence relation between the two is an empirical consequence of my general 
hypothesis and suggests the need for further experimental inquiry. Thus, the idea 
is that whereas the PPC provides a multi-modal sensorial- motor integration 
through coordinate transformations which in turn is phenomenologically 
responsible for 1PP, the notion of an external world and an on-line image of the 
body, the TPJ adds complexity to these contents by computationally re-represent 
(or meta-represent) these contents turning phenomenolgically possible the capacity 
to imagine off-line the 1PP, the external world and the image of the body. These 
‘extra’ cognitive capacities, in turn, make possible the detachment of the 1PP from the image 
of the body by ‘suppressing’ the pre-specified coordinate transformation establishing the 
coincidence of these two features (still present in FBIs) and, therefore enabling the 
phenomenological feeling of disembodiment typical of OBEs. If this is the case, then some 
strength is given to the notion that FBIs are a constitutive and necessary part of 
OBEs. As Lenggenhager et al say regarding their study in FBIs: 
”Because the present illusion was neither associated with overt disembodiment 
nor with a change in visuospatial perspective, we argue that we have induced 
only some aspects of out-of-body experiences (…). [T]he present data suggest 
that other mechanisms in addition to conflicting visual-somatosensory 
information (…) are involved in generating full-blown out-of-body experiences 
and a more complete transfer of selfhood to an illusory body.” (Lenggenhager 
et al 2007, 1098)   
My own conclusions and hypothesis seem to support this dependence/necessary 
relationship between Full-Body-Illusions and Out-of-Body-Experiences. On the 
other hand, taking both this relationship between FBIs and OBEs and the 
characteristics of both illusions, the very proposed taxonomical distinction between 
CSS and CCS gains empirical and conceptual strength.   
Conclusion 
At the end of the first section it was stated the main hypothesis that guided this 
article: that FBIs and OBEs are, respectively, manifestations of (malfunctioning) CSS 
and CCS. 
The point of departure was a suggested taxonomical fragmentation of the concept 
‘Core-Self’ into ‘Core-Self Simpliciter’ (CSS) and ‘Cognitive Core-Self’ (CCS), with a 
certain relation of dependence where CCS adds neural, computational and 
phenomenological complexity to the more basic CSS. 
In sections 2 and 3, it was proposed the relation between CSS and FBIs. CSS was 
presented as the result of evolution’s ‘answer’ to the Stability Problem in complex 
vertebrate bodies. This solution was identified as a multi-modal and motor 
integration through coordinate transformation. It was argued that, the result from 
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this solution, was the emergence of a first person perspective, a notion of an 
‘external world’ and a image of the body (a ‘Body-Image’). The suggestion was that 
FBIs could be viewed as a result of a misjudged pre-specified coordinate 






1  As a matter of fact, Björn Merker never uses the phrases ‘Core-Self’ or ‘Minimal-Self’ in his 
writings. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that he is referring to the set of properties usually 
identified with such concepts. 
2  This distinction is a contentious one in current Cognitive Science. Several authors use these 
notions in very different ways, sometimes inconsistently. Here I am using this distinction 
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“To achieve intimacy, one must first be oriented to value and seek closeness. Second, one 
must be able to tolerate and even embrace the intense emotions that are inextricably part of 
close relationships and be able to share emotional experiences freely. Finally, one must be 
capable of self-disclosure, mutual reciprocity, sensitivity to the feelings of the other, and 
concern for the other’s well-being” (Collins and Stroufe 1999, 127; cit. in: Bartz 2011, 716) 
This chapter examines the relationship between intimacy and the self. I utilize one 
of the paradigmatic narratives about intimacy, an extremely liquid story from the 
Bible about the first human couple, Adam and Eve, to explore some of the 
theoretical baggage in the concept of intimacy. I present a way to make sense of 
intimacy from the perspective of Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism. Davidson 
argued convincingly that, although the first-person has a certain kind of authority 
in ascribing mental states to him or herself, the concept of the self is irreducible 
because it is grounded in intersubjectivity (Davidson 2001). Since intimacy requires 
a sense of ownership of the subjective self, this can lead to problems within a 
Davidsonian framework, in which the intersubjective level is often prioritized. 
Taking the subjective perspective seriously from a Davidsonian point of view 
requires a radical subjectivity that even takes the conference ASASE where these 
ideas were presented into account, since the scholar writing this paper is 
undeniably also a subject. This was a conference I attended in Lisbon in May 2013 
on the subject of the altered self. Academic conferences are places where ideas come 
together, but -at least as importantly- they are sites where intimacy can take place, 
where selves meet intimately. In this way, this chapter pursues the subject of 
intimate selves from subjective, intersubjective, and objective levels.  
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The quotation reprinted above is an example of a typical attempt to define what we 
need to achieve intimacy. It is perfectly adequate as far as a strategy. This chapter 
tries to delve a little deeper into the concept of intimacy, bringing in scholarship not 
only from the social sciences but also the humanities to help us make sense of it. We 
should keep in mind that intimacy is something that is better lived than described 
and analyzed. I am the last person who should be writing a chapter on intimacy—
but perhaps this makes me just the right person to do so. 
Recognition 
If the intimate self is the core self, it is during intimate moments that we feel most 
authentically ourselves. Why? because we are recognized by another as ourselves 
(and we recognize ourselves). Since we are in a constant negotiation about what this 
particular self is, another way to put this might be that in the company of intimates, 
we prefer that performance of our self. It is not just a performance, since we are not 
pretending to be ourselves. We get to know ourselves better in the company of 
intimates because they reflect back a self that lets things be- a thought, I hope gets 
clear during this paper. Fear of intimacy involves a rejection of this dynamic on a 
number of different levels, but primarily concerns a self for whatever reason in 
fear—vulnerable, under stress, caught in negative paranoid mind-loops, depressed 
and looking inward at an unrealized inner core- fighting, flying or both. 
If we follow the American philosopher of language and mind, Donald Davidson, 
we should say that the concept of the self is irreducible and has subjective, 
intersubjective, and objective layers. Davidson saw each of these layers as 
autonomous, but interacting (anomalously). As noted, he argued convincingly that 
the first-person has a certain authority in ascribing mental states to him or herself, 
but the intersubjective level is where these states begin to make sense (Davidson 
1984 and 1987). The intersubjective layer is made up of agents in interaction. It 
involves a relation between two or more embodied agents (and the world). This is 
the space of second person address. Objectively speaking, we learn about ourselves 
partly by standing outside ourselves and observing ourselves. This is not something 
we do in real-time, but “off-line,” when we sit back and reflect on our actions and 
speech. Intersubjectivity is the ground of objectivity, but subjectivity is equally as 
important. Though Davidson does not broach the subject, it may be lack of real 
engagement with the subjective that leads to self-alienation (see: Kyselo and Di 
Paolo 2013). We have unique access to our own mental states, our own feelings and 
emotions, even though we might not have external evidence of these states. These 
states are real, and they are not necessarily internalizations of something external -
as some versions of externalism would argue. These states are recognized in 
different ways.  
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In this language, intimacy is a condition of two selves owning their subjective states in 
dynamic interaction.  The core of the word intimacy involves a spatial metaphor of 
becoming closer within a space, deriving from the Latin word intus, meaning 
“within.” In intimacy what becomes closer in space are these selves, paradoxical 
selves because they are subjective, intersubjective and objective at the same time. 
Davidson thought the concept of the self was irreducible for precisely this reason: 
it neither could be reduced to the subjective self, nor to an intersubjectivity relation, 
nor to an objectification. 
One image that might represent this dynamic of multilayered intimacy is a 
holograph. Holographs can show two or more images depending what angle they 
are viewed. So more rightly, we can imagine human interaction as two holographic 
prints facing one another. The holographs would also have a reflective and 
refractive surface, one that integrates some perspective of the other. The holographs 
each have a physical makeup, they are materially embodied, they reflect light 
differently and may be made of different material, and the material is organized 
differently. These special holographs have an awareness of their material makeup. 
When the holographs face one another they move back and forth, sometimes 
confusingly, between seeing some sort of reflection of themselves in the other and 
seeing the other. From one perspective the holograph sees itself, from another it 
sees the other. The holographs in this sense could line up in “healthy” and 
“unhealthy” states. 
Another way to understand intimate interacting selves comes from the field of 
psychoanalysis, which has at times argued for an interpersonal and dynamic 
concept of the self within the background of what we could describe as an 
intersubjective world of emotions. Davidson only addressed this to a limited degree 
in his musings about Freud, probably influenced by his third wife, philosopher and 
psychoanalyst Marcia Cavell, known for her groundbreaking book The 
Psychoanalytic Mind (Cavell 1993). Though psychoanalysis is more than a form of 
talk therapy, it reduces psychological problems to language. It assumes that with 
enough talk, in principle, we can fight our way through neuroses. However, talk is 
often not enough. 
At least what we have in psychoanalysis would be a serious attempt to articulate 
the subjective self, a topic many disciplines refuse or fear to tread. In many ways 
the linguistic layers of psychoanalysis get in the way, rather than facilitate, 
realization and recognition of subjective states. For some people it may help offer 
language and words to feelings, but to others this language may get in the way, and 
the recourse to apply direct phenomenology of bodily existence may be a better way 
to realize and recognize subjectivity. 
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According to his small “intellectual autobiography” Davidson began his romance 
with Cavell at a conference dedicated to his work, at Rutgers (NJ) in April 1984 (Hahn 
1999, 60). Davidson was then teaching at Berkeley and Cavell at Purchase, a college 
in the New York State University system. By June they spent a week together in 
Venice and by July they were married; what a whirlwind it must have been. Cavell 
eventually left her position at Purchase to move to Berkeley. It was in these years in 
the 1980s that Davidson’s work shifts a bit; he begins his attempt to account for 
subjectivity within his own system, ultimately postulated three distinct and 
irreducible kinds of knowledge, three particular strange loops, necessary for human 
thought as we know it: “knowledge of the objective world… knowledge of the 
minds of others… and knowledge of the contents of my own mind.” The last is what 
psychoanalysts like Cavell are especially interested. 
Davidson has called his philosophical approach “spinozistic,” because he 
considered himself an ontological monist, while at the same time maintaining 
conceptual dualism(s) (Hahn 1999, 63). As such, anomalous monism has been used 
as an antidote to phenomenology that posits naïve forms of dualism or a simplistic 
relation between knowledge and experience. There are two sides to this. Of course 
Davidson is a monist in the sense that he does not recognize any ontological 
distinction between the mind and body, the soul and the body. They are one and 
the same. But it is also a more thoroughgoing kind of monism that rejects the 
distinction between self and world. We can’t stand outside ourselves to see the 
world: we are embedded. He did not advocate the self-certain subject so often 
criticized as a mirage of modernity by the likes of Foucault. This is a self of 
misrecognition, a self that cannot feel intimacy because it cannot realize the 
dynamic between two actively realized subjective selves. 
Cavell uses Davidson as a starting point to try to rethink psychoanalysis from a 
monist position, one that does not bifurcate the soul or self into a rational self and 
an emotional self. These should be integrated. She argues, among other things, that 
though emotions differ from beliefs or desires, they are similarly propositional. 
Davidson’s musings on psychoa nalysis often come in the context of his writings 
about “Irrationality” – paradoxes, incoherence, Self-deception. The self plays tricks 
on itself, often precisely because it is intersubjectively entangled. Demons come out, 
seek to deceive you and others. They do the talking for you. They pull one into ruins 
and negative feedback loops. Since the intimate self is often a hidden self – 
conspiracy is often seen as one source of intimacy – these forms of thinking put 
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Intimacy 
I do not want to mislead you to think that intimacy is easy. It is a precarious thing 
because not only is it a constant effort to recognize and own the subjective self, 
intersubjective dynamics add an addition layer of complexity where selves 
inevitably filter through the intersubjective prism. Intimacy breaks down. But do 
not confuse negativity necessarily with a loss of intimacy. Intimacy requires a 
degree of negativity, discord, and pain. Without kindness, as we will see, intimacy 
can verge on torture, because the rawness of torture also involves a close dynamic 
of realized subjective selves. Negativity is something that must be moved through 
for a true intimacy to arise. So intimacy needs a form of kind negativity. After all, 
demons are fallen angels. 
Along these lines, the best book we have on intimacy comes from Ziyad Marar, 
Global Publishing director of Sage publications (Marar 2012). He argues that 
intimacy is a subtle emergence. We only feel intimate in brief, fleeting, moments—
it is a special thing. He enumerates four features, or what he calls “lenses,” that he 
thinks characterize intimacy in its clearest cases. They are reciprocity, conspiracy, 
emotion, and kindness. 
All four of these features are useful for my purposes. By reciprocity Marar has in 
mind something like the notion of intersubjectivity. For Marar, intimacy is a 
dynamic between two people, no more no less. Group solidarity has similarities to 
intimacy, but Marar thinks the most authentic form of intimacy is a form of self-
discovery that takes place between two people. 
By conspiracy, Marar means that true intimacy involves a form of keeping secrets. 
Intimates know things about one another that others don’t. There is an inside and 
there is an outside, and those on the inside have privileged knowledge. In the 
Archaeological Museum in Naples they have the Gabinetto Segreto or secret room, 
which like the Secretum or secret annex at the British museum, houses all the 
artifacts deemed obscene by 19th century eyes. In other words, in ancient Pompeii 
where these artifacts were recovered from, these forms would not have been 
considered obscene. In this sense intimacy should be considered a Gabinetto 
Segreto, a secret room. 
Marar has a whole chapter on “the kiss.” Of course the kiss is intimate. Apart from 
sex, it is the closest thing to two selves experiencing the same thing. In my own field 
of religious studies dual nature of intimate knowledge comes through resolutely in 
the double meaning or ambiguity of the verb “to know” as in ancient Hebrew, 
which has both a cognitive and a sexual connotation. The first book of Genesis has 
an intense meditation on this connection. 
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Gen. 4:1: wࢥh¢Ҵ¢١¢m y¢١aҵ Ҵe٭-ړaww¢ Ҵištôwattaharwattµle١ Ҵeړ-qayinwattÛҴmer
q¢nı Ƹړı ƸҴı ƸšҴeړ-yhwh 
Previous to this verse, we have the famous story about Man and Woman’s 
expulsion from Eden because they ate from the “Tree of Knowledge of Good and 
Evil.” The main issue after they ate, the main knowledge they appear to then have, 
was they could see one another’s nakedness.  What they knew, in other words, was 
that they were naked. God ends up punishing, Adam, Eve, and the serpent. He 
makes Adam and Eve some clothes before he kicks them out of Eden. It is right after 
this point we get the verse “The man knew Hava (Eve) his woman, so she 
‘conceived,’” another word with cognitive connotations, at least in English. 
Scholars- I think- have had some trouble tying these two meanings, epistemological 
and sexual, together, but I think we are helped looking at it through this lens of 
intimacy. Knowledge involves a kind of intimacy about a subject or about a person. 
Sex is often an incomplete way to intimacy, and of course one can have sex without 
intimacy. Nevertheless sexual knowledge is often the most direct way to a sense of 
intimacy, partly because we usually see one another naked. A similar sense of 
intimacy can come, for example, with a personal physician who may examine our 
“private parts.” This is someone who has seen your body exposed. Private parts get 
their name because they are meant to be private. 
Along these lines, I would note that there is a deep connection between privacy and 
intimacy. Intimacy makes a barrier. This is part of the point made by Richard 
Schickel in his book Intimate Stangers about the intriguing place of celebrity in 
modern life. Celebrities are paradoxical because we feel like we might know them 
intimately, but they are in fact strangers. Voyeurism and reality TV are similarly 
ways to get at a certain form of intimacy without risking anything ourselves 
(Schickel 1985). 
These forms of voyeurism and celebrity lack, among other things, Marar’s third 
feature of intimacy, a mutual closeness and connection through emotions. 
Expanding from Marar, we can say that the intersubjective reciprocity of the first 
feature of intimacy must extend to the domain of emotions. At the same time 
emotions can only be recognized and owned from the subjective self. 
All emotions do not have to be shared, but there has to be a kind of contract in place 
to accept each self owning its emotions without that expression refracting and 
reflecting in the other. Somehow pause or slow down the holographic flicker. There has 
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to be a place for the pure expression of subjective feeling without it being filtered 
through the prism of intersubjectivity1.  
Marar’s fourth feature is kindness. As mentioned, without the last one, kindness, he 
thinks we are left with something like torture. He uses the example of O’Brian in 
Orwell’s 1984, the torturer of the main character Winston, with whom he had many 
of the trappings of intimacy without kindness. 
These points are admittedly somewhat normative. I do not lay these features out in 
order to make a normative point, about what indeed “authentic” intimacy is and 
how we can authentically reach it, but to rather gives us some tools to think about 
intimacy and the self. I submit that the intimate self is a kind of altered form of the 
self, or perhaps it is the other way around. The self, realized in intimacy is a healthy 
self. 
Intimacy is not about losing yourself in the other. There is a romantic conception of 
the relation between two people that perhaps we get from that original dual monad, 
Adam and Eve. Both versions of the Genesis story lead to the same problem. In the 
priestly version (Genesis 1) there is no sense that Eve comes from Adam’s bone, but 
rather Adam and Eve are created in God’s image. God is both male and female at 
once. In the more poetic version of the story (Genesis 3), Eve comes from the bone 
of Adam. These two are one “flesh.” We repeat this idea at marriages. 
As nice as it is to loose yourself in a kind of codependency with the other, this 
feeling should not be confused with intimacy. Initmacy in this respect is a lot closer 
to friendship than to romance. But of course, sex can often lead to intimacy, as can 
romance. 
Romantic attachment involves a certain amnesia or cognitive dissonance. It leaves 
aside, at least temporarily, the corners and sharp edges of an individual personality. 
It does not seem to leave room for the other as truly other. It tries to incorporate him 
or her into the self. Intimacy feels instead like one is appreciated as a distinctive self 
at the same time that one is authentically (as much as possible) participating in an 
interaction.2 
Intimacy feels like a balance between distinction and participation. According to 
Kyselo’s work we see that the quotation in the epigraph of this text does not 
emphasize the distinctive self enough. It does not emphasize that intimacy is partly 
a project of self-realization and ownership. 
Davidson’s concept of communication fits well in this respect because it allows for 
the distinction between subjective, intersubjective, and objective layers. Perhaps the 
subjective self is the distinctive self. The intersubjective self is the participating self. 
The third type of level is a kind of online-offline perspective on the interaction itself, 
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the objective level, the third person. The objective self is perhaps the traditional 
notion of the self, the main character in the ongoing narrative about our lives, given 
content by the story we tell about ourselves. There has to be a place for the self, 
given in memory and narrative, not just the distinct and participating self.  
Marar’s book is based on some of the latest research about intimacy, most of which 
occurs in the context of social psychology. So far, what I can glean is that in the 
surveys conducted people say that vulnerability and communication are two keys to 
intimacy. And further, that men and women may have different experience and 
expectations about intimacy. This is of course a very coarse and general statement. 
There are also vast similarities. However, it seems clear that natural selection has 
led to some important sex differentiations given the different roles that men and 
women play in procreation. 
It is a debated subject, but much of the research suggests that women have intimacy 
as a higher priority (See Laurenceau et al. 1998 and Reis, Clark and Holmes 2004). 
More precisely it seems women and men have different types of intimacy; we can 
think of these as two attractors or poles, not necessarily something essential about 
men and women. In other words there is the “male” mode and the “female” mode. 
The female mode has intimacy by connecting and working through emotions, 
talking about them, while men more often describe intimacy (with other men) as 
doing things together. Culture plays an important role here, but perhaps we can 
tentatively say that men gravitate to that form of intimacy because the emotional 
world is more confusing to them as the more autistic sex. Men are often seen as 
fearful of intimacy as it specifically connects to “responsiveness” – that is men are 
often perceived as not responsive to the emotional world. Men may fear conflict in 
emotional world, perceive it as a binary, as a kind of wall, a stop, not something to 
pass through to the other side. Men fear their emotions, they do not see emotions 
as a strange loop, but a line. Expectations seem to guide that fear in the sense that 
men are expected to act in certain ways. Control or the loss of it, more than anything 
guides the fear. In other words, men set up that wall as a way to control emotions. 
Passing through them involves a loosening of that control. 
 
Intimate Triangulation 
Just as Cavell appeared to influence Davidson’s work, Davidson influenced 
Cavell’s. There were two important ways in which this took place: first, Cavell 
began to consider the psychoanalytic session as an important case of triangulation 
and second, she began to consider the role of triangulation in development. 
But by way of bringing this chapter to a close, I want to consider how we need to 
modify the triangle to account for intimacy. Clearly the notion of intersubjectivity 
is important. Intimacy involves someone sharing perspectives on one’s self; in other 
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words, part of it includes discovering new things about one’s self. But other factors 
are not addressed in the theory. For example, as noted, an important factor in 
intimacy is responsiveness. Responsiveness is a quality of the interaction, it is a 
judgment or appraisal of the communication partners reaction. This quality has the 
kind of nuance and granularity not found in Davidson’s original idea. But what 
about the other aspects of intimacy? 
 
Perspective and Temporality 
Marar does not touch on two concepts that I think are essential for understanding 
intimacy. The first is perspective. As I have noted, intimacy differs depending on 
what perspective--first, second, third (or other?)--one takes on it. On the face of it, 
this is a statement of the obvious. When looking at an intimate relationship, 
everything hinges on whether it is I, you, he, she or their pluralized forms that take 
part in the dynamic. 
With this point in mind, we can say that at its most basic level intimacy is about the 
relationship between YOU and I, the second and first person respectively. Thus the 
third person, the perspective of science, seem to miss something essential about 
intimacy. Historical narratives, such as the snapshot in Davidson’s biography I 
presented in this chapter, can capture the first and second person perspectives by 
referencing documents written from those perspectives at the proper place and 
time. Similarly, autobiography and memoir obviously have the potential to capture 
intimacy because they are in the first person. Most historical narrative, however, is 
written in the third person. Perhaps this gap between first and second person and 
the third person conventions of academic conferences is what makes academic 
conferences often so impersonal and unempathetic. 
These perspectives, but especially the relation between YOU and I are not static; 
they are essentially temporal. They involve an active engagement with memories 
about one’s self and about the intimate interaction over time. The actors taking part 
in an intimate connection often approach the interaction at different speeds and 
reflect on the interaction, through various media, from different temporal 
perspectives; thus the dynamics of the interaction is some kind of compromise or 
balance of these speeds when easy, and temporal dissonance when strained. The 
third person, unlike the first and second, has the broadest perspective on 
temporality. This is possible by virtue of its narrative constitution. The third person 
perspective allows for a certain type of memorializing that can make or break 
intimacy. 
Narrative Interude: 
Billy’s wife said she wanted him to have an extra-marital fling before she did, even 
though it was her idea to have an open marriage. He didn’t realize how funny this was 
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until he talked to Mary about it. He met her in Amsterdam yesterday. She is coming to 
meet him now at a café. What a lovely comfy place this is, he thought. He immediately 
broached the subject of some weird, overly enthusiastic emails he sent her in the past 
month. Billy was bored, a bit paranoid, falling into old habits, they die hard. He really 
believed that story. He was looking through some old journals from college on his 
computer on the way to Amsterdam on the plane. He fell for some girls a bit too easily, 
started acting weird, especially when they started pulling away. Mary mentioned a guy 
who started to get too clingy to her, though Billy forgot most of the story by now, but 
she (and all) women don’t find that at all attractive. At least not when it comes out of 
nowhere for no reason. Billy thinks some guys are actually programmed to rush things 
in that department. Women are the more selective sex. 
Billy came to Amsterdam to work on this paper with her. He was also there because they 
seem to have a nice connection, and he is attracted to her. . . Billy wasn’t sure what 
Mary wanted with him, but he knows he went too far with the romantic implications of 
their relationship a while back. She is not that interested in romance. She says she does 
not want to get caught in a symbiotic relationship. She is dating men like crazy. She 
says it’s a way for her to feel like she is alive.  
Mary and Billy met at an academic conference that his friend Josh, whom he met a year 
or two ago, organized. Billy gave a paper. Now he can sort of see that there was nothing 
unique or special about her coming on to him. This type of thing often happens at 
conferences. It was no big deal. Billy took it as one because he had been married for 7 
years, and was such a sincere, nice guy. 
When she arrived she immediately told him she had come to the decision that she was 
not going to have sex with him this weekend. Billy got the impression they would just 
have to see how it goes. Things are a bit hazy for Billy today, a day after, because after 
that point they had such a wonderful day together. He actually felt better after she said 
that because it took some pressure off him. He wasn’t all that aware of the pressure he 
felt from his wife to have an extramarital fling (so she can). 
They worked for a few hours on their paper topic. They are trying to write a paper 
together. This was the first time they actually tried to come up with something. Mary is 
brilliant, has a beautiful mind. So it was really nice to get going on the paper. 
By the end of the night they were, after going to a few bars, having Sushi (…) 
Billy noticed she brought up the subject of kissing a few times, and it was obvious he 
needed to kiss her at some point. The only question was when. It was a hard task for him 
because he hadn’t kissed anyone aside from his wife for eleven years. They were at a bar 
here in Amsterdam called Minsk, a kind of Russian inspired theme, they were able to 
make his current favorite drink. Mary was drinking Mojitos. 
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Billy remembers saying something like, “I think I am supposed to kiss you.” And she 
said something like “academics are always overthinking things – you need to act instead 
of think” – well, he didn’t need to hear that twice. Billy remembers that a few seconds 
later he did act. He kissed her. Wow, was it nice to melt into her lips. To open the eyes 
and be able to stare into her beautiful green-brown beams, some kind of very earthy 
feeling, something so lovely. When the kissing got a little heavy, she would let out the 
most astonishingly lovely phrases, in her cute French accent, “Oh my God” she said a 
couple times. That was so cute. 
So you get a sense now, I guess, of how the night went. They talked the whole time. Now 
he has a room at the Hilton. He is waiting for her to come over and they are going to do 
the same sort of thing again. 
They spent the night together, but they didn’t have sex. They were so close and they both 
wanted to, something stood in the way. Something went wrong by the end. . . She was 
working for a very long time, and they both realize afterwards that it was the first time 
they were really disconnected. How ironic that this thing they both really want would 
actually disconnect them and push them apart. 
There was pain the day after. They spent the morning being together in bed, they 
couldn’t get enough. Not having sex was a bit painful, but the pain was worth it. Saying 
goodbye was quick and chaotic. Billy jumped in a cab outside the hotel so he wouldn’t be 
late for his plane. She was leaving later in the day for a conference where she was a 
keynote speaker. Billy just wanted to sit in silence, in the chaos, excitement and mystery 
of the wonderful connection they had made in those days. But the cab driver was an old 
guy who insisted on talking. Strangely and immediately Billy felt a sense of communion 
with this guy. Somehow Mary was in him. Billy could find her through him. 
There was a sadness and frustration about the limits that his present life put on him (…) 
Guilt in that feeling of ambivalence. Of course he wanted to see his kids, but he wanted 
to stay with Mary more. 
Adam, Eve and the Serpent: 
The state I’m in is an altered state. I’m not the same self that I was when I started. The 
motions are dangerous, but at the same time I feel a sense of freedom. Monogamy and 
marriage traps selves in a certain type of relationship. The feelings I have, involve a kind of 
pull, we both have described it as a certain kind of pull that feels itself centered in the rib 
cage. Whatever the physiology of this feeling is, it is the likely source for seeing emotions 
centered in the heart, in the bodily center of the rib cage. 
So the loop we’re in is an emotional-cognitive one. It is dynamic and changing. It is 
intersubjective and embodied. I’m trying to figure out where the self fits in there. 
I’ve been saying that the intimate self is a kind of altered self. It is not the self of 
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everyday interaction. The intimate self is a vulnerable self, perhaps. It is a self, taking 
part in an interaction. People are closed off from intimacy for this reason. It takes a 
certain degree of risk to put oneself out there. But it’s not the same as romantic 
attachment. It is not about losing oneself in the other. To the extent that we want to 
be dependent on the other, this seems to stand in the way of intimacy. There should 
be space for the other to be a distinctive self (Kyselo fc.). 
Intimacy emerges out of a balance of interaction, so not all pairings have the 
potential for intimacy. These are part of the constraints and limitations placed on 
intimacy. Selves seem to need intimacy. Emotional and physical intimacy put 
together almost always veers toward romantic codependency. This is a biological 
attractor with deep roots in our evolution as a species. In some ways we could think 
that romantic codependency was a clarified form of intimacy. Some of the same 
elements are there. 
The etymological roots of the Hebrew word for heart, Lev/Levav may go back to the 
idea of motion. In this sense it is tied directly to our word emotion. But what is the 
motion? I’m trying to capture for you that self in motion, not a static notion of the 
self. Certain motions are healthy- certain are unhealthy. The dynamics of intimacy 
is a certain type of healthy motion. 
Two selves are structured much more in relation to the other, a type of 
codependency. It doesn’t have to be that way, but it usually is. Males and female 
are attractors to different approaches to intimacy. In the poetic version of the 
Genesis story previously noted, after Yahweh Elohim forms Adam, he makes a 
garden, and plants two trees (among others) there, the Tree of Life and the Tree of 
Knowledge of Good and Evil. He says Adam can eat from any tree except the latter; 
if he does eat from that tree, he will definitely die. 
Adam is lonely, and the animals in the garden don’t make him feel any better, so 
Yahweh Elohim makes him a “helper” (ޏeࡃzer k୿neg do࡮  literally a helper fit or in - ࡂ
front of him). Eve is created (or “built” - baࡃnaࡃ) from Adam’s rib or bone (s щeࡃlaޏࡃ). 
While Adam (Man) is made from dust, Eve (Woman) is made from Adam. Adam is 
“formed” (yaࡃs щar), while woman is “built”. Then Adam riffs in verse about Eve being 
part of his flesh and bone and being made from him and for him. The narrator then 
explains that this is why a man leaves his parents and “cleaves” (daࡃb  aq) to his࡮
woman (or wife or Eve). 
The pair was naked (ޏaࡃro  m) in the garden but they were not ashamed. The nextࡂ
section begins with a play on this word for naked. It points to the snake or serpent, 
who- it says- was more “crafty” (ޏaࡃruࡂm, crafty or wise when used positively) than 
all the other beasts. The word for snake, incidentally, is close to homophonous with 
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the word for magic (naࡃhщas  Is the author pointing to some connection between .(ࡊ
these concepts, between wisdom and nakedness (and magic)? 
The serpent convinces the Woman to eat from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and 
Evil, and subsequently their “eyes are opened,” the pair realize that they are naked 
and they cover themselves. Yahweh Elohim finds out about this when Adam lets it 
slip that they know they are naked. And in perhaps the greatest example ever of 
throwing someone under the bus, Adam blames Woman, who in turn blames the 
serpent. Yahweh Elohim curses all three and kicks the human pair out of the garden, 
after making (ޏaࡃïaࡃ) them some clothes. The reason given for kicking them out is that 
Yahweh Elohim thinks Adam/Man (this part of the verse ignores the woman) is 
becoming too much like “one of us” (k୿ގahщad mimmennu ࡮  too much like a ,(ࡂ
superhuman agent, and wants to avoid that he eats from the tree of life and thereby 
live forever. Upon leaving the garden the pair immediately start making babies and 
the genealogy of humanity begins in earnest. 
While Adam is made from dust from the earth, Eve is made from Adam’s rib, from 
his chest cavity, from the bone of his bones. This is all from the patriarchal biblical 
perspective: The idea that Woman was put on this earth to keep Man from being 
lonely, that Woman is part of Man; some form of ownership. She was basically a 
piece of him, literally taken out of him–his inner core, his substance.  
I’ve been trying to capture the subjective component of intimate selves. This is as 
risky as any intimate encounter. This is anecdotal, narcissistic, but it makes me 








1  In this context more should be said about “dirty talk,” the role of sexually explicit 
language in intimacy, but I will have to leave that to another time. 
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Proceeding from Pierre Hadot’s conception of ancient philosophy as therapy, 
William James’ notion of the ‘sick soul’ and certain key concepts in Heidegger’s 
Being and Time, we shall look at a case of existential suffering from Nausea, where 
Sartre depicts a redemptive, albeit temporary, mystical experience of alteration of 
the self, which is prompted by Roquentin’s close attention to a piece of music. I will 
then compare Sartre’s description to Simone Weil’s autobiographical account of her 
mystical conversion. Roquentin’s attention to an aesthetic object - which he equates 
with supernatural value as opposed to the nauseating weight of material existence 
- precipitates a sense of release of the self (non-self). We can find a parallel to his 
account, mutatis mutandis, in Weil’s concepts of gravity and grace.  
 
I will then contrast the notions of temporary and long-term alterations of self by 
comparing these concepts to William James’ distinction between gradual and 
sudden spiritual unification (lysis and crisis). This difference in forms of spiritual 
healing will open the way to an explanation of two types of attention: aesthetic vs. 
religious. Roquentin’s criteria for a redemptive work of art will provide us with 
some clues to the sort of thing artworks can do and how we relate to the world 
through forms of attention. 
Keywords: Attention, Art, Religion, Therapy 
Philosophical Sickness and Therapy 
I have chosen conversion as a topic because it is by definition an experience that 
effects a significant alteration of self. Hadot says that  
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“conversion in its religious and philosophical acceptations (…) deals with a change 
of mental order, which may range from the simple modification of an opinion to the 
total transformation of the personality.”(Hadot 2010)  
This conception refers back to the Greek term of metanoia, which literally means ‘a 
change of mind’ or ‘of understanding.’ I am going to start by relating the need for 
metanoia to existential anxiety. Sartre’s Nausea is a depiction of the role of 
philosophy in existential anguish, as Roquentin, the main character, gropes his way 
through the meaning of existence. Pierre Hadot tells us that in ancient Greece 
philosophy was “First and foremost (…) a therapeutic, intended to cure mankind’s 
anguish.”(Hadot 1995, 265-6). This is what Roquentin’s quest amounts to. Sartre’s 
book tells of a philosophical journey that starts with existence as a source of anguish 
and ends with what seems to be a release from it. 
Conversion likewise presupposes a shift from a divided self, which perceives itself 
as essentially wrong (‘sick’) in its relation to the world, to its subsequent unification. 
This ‘inner’ struggle of the dramatic attempt to discover one’s sense in the world is 
crucial to the Judeo-Christian tradition, as is patent in the myth of Original Sin 
which structures its theology, and where the process of conversion is regarded as a 
reunification, a going back to a prior state of ideal, moral health (where health is 
defined against sickness and is equated with the previous divine order, mythically 
expressed by the Garden). This split between the self and an idealized world can be 
taken to heart. As William James puts it, in his discussions of religious experience:  
“unhappiness is apt to characterize the period of order-making and struggle(…) 
will take the form of moral remorse (…) The man’s interior is a battle-ground for 
what he feels to be two deadly hostile selves, one actual, the other ideal.”(James 
n.d., 169)  
This difference between the actual and the ideal in respect of existence itself, Sartre 
makes salient in the figure of the Nausea. 
Roquentin has, in his own words, grown sick. At the very beginning of his diary he 
writes that  
“Something has happened to me, I can't doubt it any more. It came as an illness 
does (…) A little while ago, just as I was coming into my room, I stopped short 
because I felt in my hand a cold object, which held my attention through a sort of 
personality. I opened my hand, looked: I was simply holding the door-knob”(Sartre 
Nausea, 8).  
Roquentin’s Nausea is the experience of an overwhelming sense of existence – the 
perception of existence per se. With the Nausea, Sartre has created an image for 
what, in Being and Time, Heidegger calls ‘objective presence’, which Heidegger 
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claims lies at the base of the Western metaphysics’ traditional dichotomy of subject 
and object (Cf. Heidegger 2010, 60). ‘Dasein’ is Heidegger’s ontological 
appropriation of ‘the self’ as the kind of being the human being is in our world is 
hinged on our attention to phenomena and primordially united with the world.1 
(Cf. §12) As opposed to the traditional mind/body and self/world dualisms, “being-
in designates a constitution of being of Dasein (…) But we cannot understand by 
this the objective presence of a material thing (the human body) "in" a being 
objectively present. Nor does the term being-in designate a spatial "in one another" 
of two things objectively present, any more than the word "in" primordially means 
a spatial relation of this kind. "In" stems from innan- to live, habitare, to dwell.” 
(Heidegger 2010, 54) Roquentin is, from a Heideggerian perspective, striving to be-
in the world, looking for his ‘home’ in the world, which he feels cut off from.2 
Heidegger contrasts ‘existence’ in the sense of the Nausea (thingness, Cartesian 
materialism3) with what is disclosed in our everyday use of things (handiness). The 
being of the thing is disclosed in the sense that ‘the less we just stare at the thing 
called hammer, the more we take hold of it and use it, the more original our relation 
to it becomes and the more undisguised it is encountered as what it is, as a useful 
thing.’ (Heidegger 2010, 69) The being of other beings (‘beings’ comprising things, 
people, ideas, language) comes out in our interrelation with them, in our implicated 
perception of them, which is, after all, our normal way of being. In this description 
of our meeting with things, Heidegger uses the Greek term for ‘things’, pragmata, 
which is “that with which one has to do in taking care in dealings (praxis).” This 
care, a sense of relatedness, is the key element in Being and Time and is what 
structures Dasein. He calls this kind of seeing ‘circumspection’, meaning that things 
only make sense within a totality of reference.4 Circumspection is a mode of 
attention to things5, and indicates that useful things, when used and not simply 
‘stared at’, reveal themselves as participating in a world.6 This revelation of being-
in the world is a disclosure of something that is already in place, namely our being 
in the world in modes of understanding and participation. 
Roquentin’s problem is that, in his growing obsession with the Nausea, he stares: 
as we have seen, he simply holds the doorknob. Heidegger’s pragmata, on the other 
hand, are to be used: and before usage lies our already knowing our way about the 
world. In our everyday dealing with things, “in opening the door, I use the 
doorknob.” (Heidegger 2010, 67) In using doorknobs we do not exclusively pay 
attention to what a doorknob is, as something occupying space in reality – we pay 
more attention to how it works. This is especially true if it fails to work (we might 
discover it turns the other way). We discover what a doorknob in how it is used. 
Accordingly, I am trying to suggest that ‘in disclosing being-in-the-world, I use the 
poem.’ Roquentin’s failure to participate in the world is made salient through his 
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failure to simply open doors (his ‘Nauseas’). Heidegger indirectly describes 
Roquentin’s experience of the salience of everyday things in existence as 
conspicuousness.  
“When we discover its unusability, the thing becomes conspicuous. Conspicuousness 
presents the thing at hand in unhandiness. But this implies that what is unusable 
just lies there, it shows itself as a thing of use which has this or that appearance and 
which is always also objectively present with this or that outward appearance in its 
handiness.” (Heidegger 2010, 73)  
Roquentin is himself conspicuous, obtruding in his surrounding world, unable to 
participate in the world by interacting with both people and things because he is 
stunned at the material substantiality of the world:  
“The Self-Taught Man is babbling and his voice buzzes gently in my ears. But I don't 
know what he's talking about . . . I feel this black wooden handle. My hand holds 
it. My hand. Personally, I would rather let this knife alone: what good is it to be 
always touching something? Objects are not made to be touched. It is better to slip 
between them, avoiding them as much as possible.’ (Ibid, 82) 
 Heidegger warns that an ‘analysis which starts with such beings [i.e. things] and 
goes on to inquire about being comes up with thingness and reality” (Ibid, 67). 
Roquentin is a philosophical parody of Cartesian materialism.  
But Roquentin’s problem is not simply one of sensorial disagreeability; he is 
grappling with a philosophical problem of the meaning of our being in the world, 
not just things. Roquentin is anxious about the world as such, not anything in 
particular. As Heidegger tells us, the “fact that what is threatening is nowhere 
characterizes what anxiety is about.”(Heidegger 2010, 180) The leveled dreariness 
of everything around him (and of himself) makes the world salient: “innerworldly 
beings in themselves are so completely unimportant that, on the basis of this 
insignificance of what is innerworldly, the world in its worldiness is all that obtrudes 
itself.”(Ibid, 181) The Nausea does not matter only as the thingness of things, but as 
the risk of not being. “What crowds in upon us is not this or that, nor is it everything 
objectively present together as a sum, but the possibility of things at hand in general, 
that is, the world itself.” (Ibid) How to be or not to be in the face of the multiple 
possibilities of fate is also a source of anxiety for Roquentin.7 It is nothing definite 
that assails us, it is the very way in which we do not belong as ourselves to the 
world, in participation: “what anxiety is anxious for is being-in-the-world itself.” 
(Ibid, 187)  
Roquentin’s Nausea is a symptom of the philosophical disease of Cartesian 
dualism. Yet the dualism is itself is born out of philosophical inquiry. Moreover, in 
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the ancient perspective of philosophy brought out by Hadot, a counter-philosophy 
is needed to dispel these philosophical thoughts. This is, to a large extent, what 
Heidegger’s ‘destruktive’ method is about. Yet theoretical discourse does not 
summon us to actually participate in the being of things, it only argues against other 
sets of arguments. Poetic language, Heidegger claims, is the right therapy: ‘The 
communication of (…) the disclosing of existence can become the true aim of 
“poetic” speech.’ (Ibid, 162) By focusing on expression over informative content – 
on how instead of what - poetic speech gives emphasis to the way things are, not only 
to substantiality, thus disclosing being-in.8 In the same way that we instantly 
understand the ‘signs’ of the world – ””Initially” we never hear noises and 
complexes of sound, but the creaking wagon, the motorcycle” (Ibid, 163) –, neither 
do we generally fail to understand the being of things except through an abstractive 
effort of the imagination. The Nausea is not an insight into the nature of reality, but 
an abstraction of the actual, which already includes an understanding of our 
dealings in the world: ‘It requires a very artificial and complicated attitude in order 
to “hear” a “pure noise.”’ (Ibid, 164) Thus philosophy invents distorted thought: 
“Gaining phenomenological access to the beings thus encountered consists rather 
in rejecting the interpretational tendencies crowding and accompanying us which 
cover over the phenomenon of "taking care" of things in general”. (Ibid, 67) To find 
being is to let things be; and this might mean not thinking ‘philosophically’, or at 
least like Roquentin has been thinking. 
Inspiration and Grace 
When at the end of the book Roquentin is mystically uplifted by a jazz melody, the 
weight of existence is extinguished. This episode marks a redemptive experience of 
alteration of the self, prompted by Roquentin’s close attention to a piece of music. 
We have just seen that paying close attention to things provoked existential anxiety 
in Roquentin, yet at this point attention to a thing made of language, a song, seems 
to be palliative. This is also framed by his attention. Notably, his decision to attend– 
‘I’m going to pay attention because, as Madeleine says, I’m hearing it for the last 
time’ – is bound to an awareness of his existential condition. This is why the 
objective presence of the world becomes a source of anxiety; it is proof of our 
condition as mortal creatures, as perishable things among other things. At the same 
time, however, this very condition determines us as Dasein, the kind of being of 
human beings.  
So Sartre’s allusion to finality and death frames the attention he grants the tune, and 
this pulls him out - in contrast to his own sense of self as a mere thing - from the 
thingness of the world.  
“A while ago I was certainly far from swimming in beatitudes (…) Thoughts of (…) 
my wasted life. And then, still further down, Nausea, timid as dawn. But there was 
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no music then (…) All the things around me were made of the same material as I, a 
sort of messy suffering (…) the very existence of the world so ugly that I felt 
comfortable, at home.” (Sartre Nausea, 113)  
Listening to the tune, Roquentin is absolved from his thingness – the beauty he 
describes is so essentially different from everyday thingness, that it provides 
Roquentin with a counterpoint for objective presence. His experience of self is altered 
through his understanding of the tune as a beautiful thing. Turning from the actual 
to the ideal, both he and the world have become less ugly. Where there was only 
existence, now there is also value. In this sense, art is the creation of value in 
existence. 
The tune has triggered a change by having been able to sequester Roquentin from 
his daily routine: “like a scythe it has cut through the drab intimacy of the world 
(…) it has taken us unawares in the disorder, the day to day drift”(Sartre Nausea).  
It has forced him into a change of perspective, jolting him from his usual mood, and 
framed within the concept of conversion as Hadot understands it – philosophy, a 
form of adult education: ‘philosophy itself has always remained essentially an act 
of conversion (…) philosophical conversion is an uprooting from and a break with 
the quotidian, the familiar, the falsely “natural” attitude of common sense’ (Hadot 
2010). 
Recapitulating, the thought of death led Roquentin to really attend to the song; the 
song, in turn, enraptured him, seized his attention because it presents something 
completely out of the ordinary, and was thus able to produce a notable change in 
his sense of self: “And I am ashamed. A glorious little suffering has just been born, 
an exemplary suffering. Four notes on the saxophone. They come and go, they seem 
to say: You must be like us, suffer in rhythm.” (Sartre Nausea, 113) 
 It is his implicit comparison of his habitual (actual) perception of the world and self 
as fundamentally ugly to the beauty he perceives in the tune that generates a 
humble desire to imitate this (ideal) beauty. He falls in love with the tune because, 
as he puts it, it is inexistent: ‘It does not exist because it has nothing superfluous: it 
is all the rest, which in relation to it is superfluous. It is. And I, too, wanted to be. 
That is all I wanted; this is the last word.’ (Ibid, 114) But this ideal purity that stands 
out against Roquentin’s usual existence by no means ceases to be real. There is a 
transition from a focus on existence to being.9  
The melody can act as a counterweight to ‘existence’ conceived as the thingness or 
‘substance’ of things and people in the world because the focus has shifted from 
what to how things are. The (‘being of’ this) song and Roquentin, the attentive 
listener, suffer in rhythm. That portion of time is in a particular way. In listening, 
he is ‘inspired’, ‘possessed’ by the song. When Roquentin asks Madeleine to play 
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the record again, he begins to muse about the creator of the song. ‘I no longer think 
of myself.’ In other words, he ceases to be the subject who is the object of his own 
thoughts. He no longer posits himself as a self-reflexive thinking subject, a res 
cogitans thinking about the world. This is, in turn, why his sense of redemption is 
linked to his (and the tune’s) inexistence. Since the tune has already been described 
as inexistent, Roquentin’s disappearance as a subject depicts his turning into the 
same mode of being as the tune: the separation between subject and object 
disappears through participation. “I am in the music.” (Ibid, 18) In other words 
Roquentin, who had ‘nauseatingly’ equated his self with existence, ‘is’ by not being 
himself – i.e. by (phenomenally) being the tune. What he perceives, in the broader 
sense of understanding, during this time in which he is attentively listening, is the 
tune. During that time – the episode, which I had initially referred to as an 
“alteration of self” – the phenomenal fact is that Roquentin, is the tune. Truly paying 
attention to a thing is phenomenally becoming that thing. The picture of beauty as 
having the capacity alter one’s essential self is an extension of the classical picture 
of inspiration, of Platonic origin and largely propounded by the Romantics. Beauty 
is captured by the seer and conveyed in poetic language, which is regarded as 
having an ability to communicate with our essence, our ‘true self’. Objects of art are 
regarded as doorways to the ideal realm, as icons for participation. The Muses 
descend to inspire by taking the seer up to commune (communicare) in the idea of 
Beauty, who in turn embodies the idea in linguistic representation, or imitation 
(mimesis). The oracle is traditionally the person who can attend to the transcendent 
(or listen to the ineffable) and convey that message in language. Within this model 
of mediation, artworks are icons and artists are oracles. Artistic inspiration finds its 
analogue in the religious doctrine of grace. Simone Weil describes the same 
movements between realms, “Creation is composed of the descending movement 
of gravity, the ascending movement of grace and the descending movement of the 
second degree of grace’, and ‘Grace is the law of the descending movement.” (Weil 
2002, 4)  Simone Weil’s thought is fundamentally structured by a basic dichotomy 
of gravity and grace. 
”All the natural movements of the soul are controlled by laws analogous to those of 
physical gravity. Grace is the only exception.”(Ibid, 1).  
The grace of God is the ideal counterpoint to the actual - the inspiration that comes 
down to redeem creatures. Curiously, the conceptual equivalence of the models of 
conversion and inspiration is visible in the Nausea, where the story of an atheist being 
inspired by a song bears the same structural similarities as that of a conversion, a 
metanoia. 
Weil’s mystical experience that resulted in her conversion to religion is also related 
to attention to an aesthetic object, namely the poem “Love (III)” by George 
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Herbert.10 In a letter, she writes, ‘I learned it by heart. Often, at the culminating point 
of a violent headache, I make myself say it over, concentrating all my attention upon 
it and clinging with all my soul to the tenderness it enshrines. I used to think I was 
merely reciting it as a beautiful poem, but without my knowing it the recitation had 
the virtue of a prayer. It was during one of these recitations that, as I told you, Christ 
himself came down and took possession of me.’ (1951, p. 27) Mutatis mutandis, both 
experiences exhibit the same elements, framed by inspiration and a sense of 
spiritual healing: contemplation of ideal beauty, shameful humility, and a suffering 
that opens way to the presence of a joyful love. The major difference lies in what 
follows from the experience: Roquentin decides to write a book (he is ‘inspired’); 
Weil becomes a Christian (she is inspired by the grace of Christ). Somehow both 
their lives gain sense, are reunited with existence through their respective 
experiences. But while Weil gains a belief in God, Roquentin does not. Weil’s 
inspiration is explained by, and thenceforth secured by, grounded on, the example 
of the passion of ‘Christ’, which is expressed in the poem. She participates in a 
community of believers and enters into a way of life that is explained by ‘Christ’. 
Roquentin’s only wish and recourse, on the other hand, is the verb ‘to be’. That is 
all he desires, ‘to be’. Weil has a cause which provides her with a justification for 
existence, Roquentin has only effects to describe the world with, no concept to turn 
his mind to except the song. The song makes him feel right in the world.  
Conversion 
Both underwent a change, which presupposes a development in time. To explain the 
therapeutic unification of the self, James resorts to a medical analogy. ‘The older 
medicine used to speak of two ways, lysis and crisis, one gradual, the other abrupt, 
in which one might recover from a bodily disease.’ (James, 183) He pursues this 
analogy of conversion by relating it to two ways of searching (or desiring): by 
volition and by self-surrender. He gives the example of trying to remember a 
forgotten name: usually we make an effort to recollect, but if that fails sometimes it 
is best just to  
“give up the effort entirely, think of something altogether different (…) some 
hidden process was started in you by the effort, which went on after the effort 
ceased, and made the result come as if it came spontaneously.” (Ibid, 203)  
As in our examples, repetition (lysis) leads to crisis: Roquentin heard the same 
record every evening, Weil had read the poem many times: only later did these 
objects present themselves and thus the world under a new light. But for a crisis to 
take place, there must first be a search, a desire-for, and so lysis always precedes 
crisis:  
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“there are two things in the mind of the candidate for conversion: first, the present 
incompleteness or wrongness, the “sin” which he is eager to escape from; and, 
second, the positive ideal which he longs to compass.” (Ibid, 209)  
The poem and the song provide a token of this ideal. Roquentin summarizes the 
three ingredients necessary for the prospective work of art that is the key to his 
redemption. “It would have to be beautiful and hard as steel and make people 
ashamed of their existence.” (Sartre, Nausea, my italics) It also operates within the 
same mode of philosophical therapy: conversion as expressed in the models of 
inspiration and grace, where special forms of language and of attention – which we 
may call poetic language and accordingly poetic attention - are viewed as the 
healing means. I shall talk about (Roquentin’s) song and (Weil’s) poem as things of 
a particular kind. These things are no ordinary objects: they are overtly linguistic, 
and do not serve as a means for anything else than our participation in their being 
as instantiated by our attention. They are the product of a craft and require what is 
signified in ‘attention’. The criterion of beauty expresses the object’s capacity to 
mesmerize and continue to do so after Roquentin had conceded it his attention. In 
this sense, what we call ‘beauty’ is, more often than not, a retrospective description 
of how an object has effectively secured our attention.  
The criterion that his story be, like the tune, as ‘hard as steel’ to withstand the test 
of time and stay ‘the same, young and firm’ is, from the point of view of a crafted 
thing, a property of recorded language. As Plato and Derrida have insisted, writing 
- as opposed to speech - can be repeated on different occasions.11 The very fact that 
repeatability is a quality of ‘written things’ means that this kind of thing can also 
convey an idea of universality, which is what leads Roquentin to say “the melody is 
absolutely untouched by this tiny coughing of the needle on the record.” (Satre, 
Nausea, 114) We can read the character of universality in the form of poems because 
they bear the logical form of tautology: the words remain the same and yet we 
interpret the same poem differently on different occasions. That is, just as in 
tautological statements different propositions can be replaced for others ‘meaning’ 
the same thing, the poem, in its fixed form, is open to different interpretations 
(propositions referring to the same subject), and a ‘final meaning’ that would break 
the circle is never supplied.  
In trying to reach out to a poem, it just slips away and its indeterminacy and 
ambiguity keep calling on us to describe it. Its ‘meaning’ can never be supplied 
because it is writing, not speech: there is no one there to reply. This has the same 
communicative structure as prayer: the answer that one awaits has to be ineffable. 
Because God and poems do not speak (at least in any ordinary way), they make us 
speak. God and poems do not ‘speak’ because they do not referentially ‘mean’ – 
again, they do not offer a what but a how: a way of being. And no matter what we 
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say, our actual ‘tiny coughing’ does not touch the ideal melody. To call something 
‘a work of art’ (we might also allegorically call a person or an action this) is to grant 
an insignia of perfection: it is ‘hard’ because it is worthy of repetition because there is 
nothing that we feel should be replaced in it (‘ashamed of’) – it is ‘beautiful’. (So the 
three criteria hang together, in self-referential tautology). Art stands out on account 
of how it was done. And if nothing is out of place, then the world does not become 
conspicuous. When attention is circumspect there is being-in. In this sense, art 
makes us feel at home, because we are called upon to make a home, by granting care. 
But works of art are not always initially taken as expressions of home: more often 
than not their ambiguity means we have to interpret them, see how they reflect our 
own discourse about things. This is a sort of work and requires thinking: lysis 
always precedes crisis. 
As we have seen, the ideal superlative that is as hard as steel offers a counterpoint 
in regards to which Roquentin feels belittled, in shame and humility.  
“The Negress sings. Can you justify your existence then? Just a little? I feel 
extraordinarily intimidated.” (Sartre Nausea, 115) –The ideal awakens his shame 
because it brings his existential condition into perspective: he is a creature born into 
a world where beauty exists. His shame is his sense of the distance between his 
actual self and his ideal self as participative “being”.  As Simone Weil puts it,  
“The wrong humility leads us to believe that we are nothing in so far as we are 
ourselves – in so far as we are certain particular human beings. True humility is the 
knowledge that we are nothing in so far as we are human beings as such, and, more 
generally, in so far as we are creatures” (Weil 2002, 129).  
Roquentin’s shame is the result of the object’s beauty opening his self to a humility 
that forces the disappearance of his ego, in what Roquentin feels as a desire “to 
drive existence out of me (…)to purify myself”(Sartre Nausea). But his desire to 
surrender his self is already the result of his heeding to the song.  
Humility, Weil tells us, is what defines contemplative attention. ‘In the intellectual 
order, the virtue of humility is nothing more nor less than the power of attention.’ 
She also provides an example of music.  
“When we listen to Bach or a Gregorian melody, all the faculties of the soul become 
tense and silent in order to apprehend this thing of perfect beauty (…) The mysteries 
of faith are degraded if they are made into an object of affirmation and negation, 
when in reality they should be an object of contemplation” (Weil 2002, 129).  
As God for the believer, the mystery of beauty is contemplated, not explained. A 
major difference regarding our use of language and our sense of ‘being’ is at stake 
here, since propositional statements (the mode of explanation) do not enter into the 
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contemplative mode of attention. When we explain things we use the normal 
referential function of language where a subject is described by a proposition: x is 
y. But in contemplation our attention is focused solely on the thing or idea, not 
further descriptions of it, whereby the phenomenal occurrence is simply that x is. 
Roquentin’s desire is this, just to be. 
Yet trying to approach the ideal point ('to be’, or in Weil’s case, to be-in or be–with 
God) is not a product of effort – the rearrangement of dispositions of the self must 
be left to the quasi-automatic work, as it were, of the psyche itself. Weil also insists 
that if you strive too hard to understand, to find a solution, you will not find it:  
“We do not obtain the most precious gifts by going in search of them but by waiting 
for them. Man cannot discover them by his own powers, and if he sets out to seek 
for them he will find in their place counterfeits of which he will be unable to discern 
the falsity.” (Weil 1951, 62) 
The effort lies precisely in being able to wait (‘contemplate’), for things to make 
themselves evident. This seems to presuppose an attentional (negative) effort of 
silencing working in tandem with (positive) critical thinking. The silent part is 
attitudinal12; the discursive part is thinking through the solution of problems. If the 
doorknob does not work we try to find out what the problem is and fix it. The 
attempt to fix problems is interpretation. But solutions come of their own accord. 
The model of inspiration is, from this perspective, a causal picture of how thought 
arrives (out of nowhere). In the same tone as Weil but speaking of conversion, James 
says that  
“Where, on the contrary, the subconscious forces take the lead, it is more probably 
the better self in posse which directs the operation.” (James, 209-10). These examples 
help us see how both pictures of grace and inspiration, in what partakes to crisis, 
depend on a concept of self-surrender. Both descriptions presuppose that waiting 
in self-surrender will automatically direct us towards what we seek; in other words 
that the attitude of contemplative attention clears the way. For Weil, a believer, this 
kind of attention is equal to prayer (communion with god): “Absolutely unmixed 
attention is prayer” (Weil 2002, 117). We can also see how lysis and crisis as 
transformative processes of the self are ultimately grounded in two interspersed 
and interrelated ways of directing our attention: by searching and waiting.   
Like James, Weil says that contemplation of the ideal of itself guarantees goodness: 
“It is impossible to do harm to others when we act in a state of prayer” (Ibid, 126). 
Conversion (the religious desire that requires a moral transformation of the self) 
entails a change of character, and as such the long-term fixedness of desire for ideal 
goodness within the self. Self-surrender is taking the self (‘I’) out of the 
contemplative process. For Weil, self-surrender occurs through humility, in what 
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she calls the transformative process of ‘decreation’. James says the same thing when 
he relates conversion to self-surrender: “yielding (…) is giving one’s self over to the 
new life, making it the centre of a new personality” (James, 210).With decreation 
Weil points to a use for that ‘glorious suffering’ which is imparted by perceiving an 
ideal that triggers shame and praise in us. Crisis, in these examples, is the result of 
having surrendered the self to the contemplation of beauty (or goodness or truth). 
For Weil decreation is a systematic method, a form of continuous moral training in 
humility to suppress egotistical impulses. But James and Weil are describing a 
religious change, which is pinned on morality, on rules regarding attention to 
others. This negative impulse, however, is the same that underpins Roquentin’s 
sense of non-self: the experience, from the point of view of perception, is the same. 
As a whole, the allegory of the ‘non-self’ is essentially a description of 
contemplative attention: we are ‘nothing’ because we have turned our attention to 
a thing or another person, because we phenomenally participate in that being.  
At stake are two kinds of person: Roquentin desires to imitate beauty in a work of art; 
Weil desires to imitate Christ. These, in turn, relate to two types of attention: aesthetic 
and moral; or in other words, attention to things vs. people. Roquentin’s 
redemption hinges on what he may be able to achieve in his book:   
“perhaps, because of it, I could remember my life without repugnance (…)And I 
might succeed —in the past, nothing but the past—in accepting myself” (Sartre 
Nausea).  
He seems to view his book as a medal that may award him admiration and 
immortality (“‘there would be people who would read this book and say: “Antoine 
Roquentin wrote it””). His redemption would be attained by perfecting his artistic 
merits; he would desire, as W. H. Auden says In Memory of W. B. Yeats, that (b)y 
mourning tongues / The death of the poet was kept from his poems. But there is no hint of 
a desire to be good, to change his personality or attitude towards people. Auden 
also says that poetry makes nothing happen: it survives (…) A way of happening, a mouth. 
With poetry nothing changes in the world, only in descriptions of it. The difference 
lies in our belief in descriptions, on what we take as valid descriptions of the world: 
but the difference is not that between metaphor and fact13. Conversion in the broad 
sense of metanoia simply indicates how we are always ultimately open to 
paradigmatic shifts in our understanding of the world. 
Creative attention 
Inversely, because her attention is extended to others, Weil sees no difference 
between bringing life (‘being’) to a book or to a person:  
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“true creation means self-loss. We do not perceive this truth, because fame confuses 
and covers with its glory achievements of the highest order (…) Love for our 
neighbor, being made of creative attention, is analogous to genius. Creative 
attention means really giving our attention to what does not exist. Humanity does 
not exist in the anonymous flesh lying inert by the roadside. The Samaritan who 
stops and looks gives his attention all the same to this absent humanity, and the 
actions which follow prove that it is a question of real attention” (Weil 1951, 92). 
Creation is not only the backbone of the poetic, but also the religious mode.14 What 
is similar between Weil and Roquentin is that both have turned (metanoia) their 
attention from themselves to the ‘outside’, surrounding world (whence the self is 
self-evidently disclosed as always already having been in the world).  
Yet they are different in that Weil turns to the grace of ‘God’, Roquentin to the 
inspiration of writing. Her turning to God, with its moral implications towards 
others, implies a change in conscience. Of itself, it is silent, for it is above all an 
attitudinal change. Religious change is an assent to an entire grammar that is 
theology; but this structures a way of life, which is based on the belief of a 
community. Here communicare is too based on communion and community. As a 
tradition and a faith, religious conversion offers a long-term structure that 
explicates the world. Aesthetic changes are more of a temporary kind since the 
change is not necessarily of the moral self but attains to the perception of particular 
things crafted out of language. The song has managed to take ‘drab’ out of the ‘drab 
intimacy of the world.’ Intimacy, closeness to the world, has been restored, cured, 
cared for. The song turned Roquentin’s doorknob, as the poem did for Weil. Their 
turning around, their metanoia, meant that they have stepped into a new world, with 
new possibilities. For Weil, her new life makes sense within a certain set of 
retrospective descriptions. The cause for everything is God; and events are 
redescribable within that way of life. For Roquentin the future is unclear, for there 
is no background, universal structure to explain his existence. He just ‘is’ as 
opposed to just ‘existing’. His contemplation fleets in time to different particulars, 
and cannot always come back to the “God is” of Weil. His future is now a sea of 
possibilities but which now offer hope and not anxiety. It lies open before him, but 
he may fail again, fall out of sync with the world, and there will be nothing behind 
him to secure his writing but the world he makes. But before these things opened 
their doors, they suffered in rhythm and felt humbly ashamed. We do not look at 
our better or true self as a source of true answers; but the best answers come from 
our looking for our authenticity. Art has an important role to play in calling upon 
us to turn towards the anxiety and shame of being-in-the-world (which we 
otherwise might allow to remain dormant in our everyday routines and familiarity 
with the world). Being lost and searching precedes the possibility of our finding 














1  Strictly speaking, we can no longer speak of self in Dasein, since the term also aims to both 
resist and integrate the concept. 
2  ‘I suffer in my wounded flesh which turns, walks, I walk, I flee, I am a criminal with bleeding 
flesh, bleeding with existence to these walls. I am cold, I take a step, I am cold, a step, I turn 
left, he turns left, he thinks he turns left, mad, am I mad? He says he is afraid of going mad, 
existence, do you see into existence, he stops, the body stops, he thinks he stops, where does 
he come from? What is he doing?’ (Sartre Nausea, 68) 
3  Sartre’s reference to Descartes is explicit in spite (and as a source) of Roquentin’s confusion: 
‘I am. I am, I exist, I think, therefore I am; I am because I think, why do I think? I don't want 
to think any more, I am because I think that I don't want to be, I think that I (...) because (. . 
.)’ (Sartre Nausea, 67) 
4  So (the being of) a hammer initially and for the most part makes sense within (the being-in 
of) a workshop. ‘The total relevance which, for example, constitutes the things at hand in a 
workshop in their handiness is "earlier" than any single useful thing, as is the farmstead 
with all its utensils and neighboring lands.’ (Heidegger 2010, 84) This way of thinking turns 
the usual way of conceiving meaning around. Here ‘hammer’ only means because of a 
context of meanings: but these essentially originate in a world where we use hammers. Here 
we can clearly see the maxim of phenomenology, ‘To the things themselves!’ We can also 
recognize ‘Wittgenstein’s ‘forms of life’ in Philosophical Investigations are a close analogue, 
where the example is no longer things but people. Another Wittgensteinian metaphor for 
bringing out circumspection is ‘language games’, where words are things and grammar the 
totality of reference. 
5 ‘Our absorption in taking care of things in the work-world nearest to us has the function of 
discovering (…) and with a varying attentive penetration.’ (Heidegger 2010, 71) 
6 ‘In the scope of its heedful absorption in useful things at hand, does not Da-sein have a 
possibility of being in which, together with the innerworldly beings taken care of, their 
worldliness becomes apparent to it in a certain way?’ (Heidegger 2010, 72) 
7 ‘I don't know what to do in front of the Passage Gillet. Isn't anyone waiting for me at the end 
of the passage? But there is also at the Place Ducoton at the end of the Rue Tournebride 
something, which needs me in order to come to life. I am full of anguish: the slightest 
movement irks me. I can't imagine what they want with me. Yet I must choose: I surrender 
the Passage Gillet, I shall never know what had been reserved for me.’ (Sartre Nausea, 39) 
8 ‘Being-in and its attunement are made known in discourse and indicated in language by 
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9  In the terminology of Being and Time, this means a transition from the ontic to the pre-
ontological.  
10 Love bade me welcome, yet my soul drew back, 
        Guilty of dust and sin. 
But quick-ey'd Love, observing me grow slack 
        From my first entrance in, 
Drew nearer to me, sweetly questioning 
        If I lack'd anything. 
 
"A guest," I answer'd, "worthy to be here"; 
        Love said, "You shall be he." 
"I, the unkind, the ungrateful? ah my dear, 
        I cannot look on thee." 
Love took my hand and smiling did reply, 
        "Who made the eyes but I?" 
 
"Truth, Lord, but I have marr'd them; let my shame 
        Go where it doth deserve." 
"And know you not," says Love, "who bore the blame?" 
        "My dear, then I will serve." 
"You must sit down," says Love, "and taste my meat." 
        So I did sit and eat. 
 
   “Love (III)”, by George Herbert (1633) 
11 I am including musical notation and recording as kinds of ‘writing’, focusing on the concepts 
of repeatability and inscription. On these concepts see Derrida’s essay “Plato’s Pharmacy” 
(1968), which offers a dialogue with Plato’s Phaedrus. 
12 As Heidegger says, the call of conscience is silent. ‘The call does not say anything . . .  
Conscience speaks solely and constantly in the mode of silence.’ (Heidegger 2010, 273) 
13 To think of the world as groups of atoms would in this sense be no less of a myth, a 
picture, than to think of it as created by “God” or caused by Big Bang. 
14 ‘. . . createdness in the broadest sen se of something have been produced, is an essential 
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Abstract: In this paper I examine the work of Belgian-born poet Henri Michaux, who uses 
the concept of the mutative self to communicate his mescaline experiments of the 1950s and 
1960s and reify his status as the ultimate witness figure. Lacking an operative metaphysical 
vocabulary for expressing the encounter with the beyond, Michaux develops a secular 
language for talking about the unselfing that occurs during mind-altering experiences. This 
self-experimentation allows him to proclaim that synchronic disunity is a natural (albeit 
highly uncomfortable) state. The experience of mutative unselfing alters Michaux’s 
perception of time and space, leading him to discover unchartered expanses of the self.  
Keywords: self, self-experiments, altered-states, French literature, drug literature, 
unselfing 
Introduction 
Can narratives on drug experimentation shed light on philosophic and 
psychological accounts of the self? The questionable status of the self during altered 
states of consciousness was already present in John Locke’s highly influential 
account of personal identity in the seventeenth century. In Locke’s account, this 
problem is solved by the existence of an omniscient God that knows the entirety of 
ones identity, even the parts for which the subject is not fully conscious.1 This 
importantly includes the moments of that individual’s existence during which he is 
not “in his right mind,” including the time he spends asleep, or drunk, or on the 
drug mescaline, as in the case of Belgian-born poet Henri Michaux. Nietzsche 
pronouncing God dead at the turn of the century has become the cultural marker 
for the shift away from theological-based understandings of the self that posited 




could see our full identity, Michaux seeks to understand what happens to the 
metaphysical part of the self during altered states of consciousness.  
Knowing that hallucinatory drugs had long played a role in religious ceremonies in 
various cultures across the world, Michaux, at the age of 54 began taking mescaline, 
a naturally occurring psychedelic derived from the peyote cactus, used for 
thousands of years in religious ceremonies by Native Americans in Mexico and in 
South America. In the first of his mescaline texts, Misérable miracle (1956), Michaux 
writes that while “les Huichols, les Tarahumaras, et bien d’autres Mexicains (…) 
allaient à un dieu en allant au Peyotl” [the Huichols, the Tarahumaras and plenty 
of other Mexicans (…) went to a god in going to the peyote] 2 other gods, like the 
god of the volcanoes or of fire for example, were not far. (Michaux 1972, 69) Primed 
for the experience of the supernatural, he writes that the Native Americans had to 
simply name his god, and he would appear to the drug-taker. Westerners however, 
undergo a different experience on the drug, and only see “infinite cascades of 
relativity.” He explains, 
”Quant à l’Occidental d’à présent, depuis longtemps incroyant aux dieux, et qui 
serait bien incapable d’imaginer une forme sous laquelle ils seraient susceptibles de 
lui apparaitre, ce que son esprit saisit, seul dieu qu’il aperçoive encore et qu’il serait 
vain d’adorer, c’est l’infinie relativité, la cascade qui n’a pas de terminaison, la 
cascade des causes et des effets, ou plutôt des précédents ou des suivants, où tout 
est roue entraînante et roue entraînée." (Michaux 1972, 70) 
[As for the Westerner today, who for so long has been an unbeliever in the gods, and would 
be incapable of imagining a form under which they could appear to him, what his mind 
grasps, the only god of which he is still aware and one that would be vain to worshop, is 
infinite relativity, the cascade without ending, the cascade of cause and effect, or rather the 
precedents or the followings, where everything is pulling wheel and pulled wheel.] 
Underlining that his own interpretation of metaphysical experience is shaped by 
historical and cultural assumptions, Michaux compares the outcome of his 
experiments with the spiritual discourse of the Native Americans he mentions. His 
reflections are attempts at descriptions of the supernatural, without having recourse 
to a preexisting religious vocabulary. At certain points in these texts, Michaux 
acknowledges his fears that there may be nothing objective to be gained from these 
voyages into the beyond, since the human mind is highly suggestible. Peter Broome 
summarizes this tension in Michaux’s work: “Whatever one’s thought, one’s visual 
image of the moment, one’s current obsession, it will launch it on the road to the 
absolute. It has no objective truth of its own to propose, apart from that of a scientific 
process, and will lend accidentally to any vision” (Broome 1977, 91).  
ASASE 
The Mutative Self and the Language of Insight in Henri Micheaux’s Mescaline Experiments 
173 
Despite these worries, however, Michaux ultimately posits that altered states are 
privileged moments of insight on the self. Lacking an operative metaphysical 
language for what I refer to as the “unselfing”3 that occurs during mind-altering 
experience, Michaux develops a vocabulary for communicating this state of insight 
in a secular age. In the absence of a functional theologically based philosophical 
framework, Michaux attempts to track down the metaphysical piece of personal 
identity that persists through altered states. Given his understanding of the self as 
a witness figure living in an eternal succession of present moments, altered states 
of selfhood productively change his sense of time and space. The altered state is a 
monumental event that allows for the development of a narrative of before and 
after, one that opens up new expanses of the self. 
While terms like “mind-altering” are commonplace in discussions of drug culture, 
especially as related to the psychedelic 1960s, few studies of altered states have 
considered a connection with philosophical discussions of the self, and what self-
experimentation can tell us about the nature of the self during ordinary 
circumstances. In this paper I examine Michaux’s take on the process of unselfing, 
as described during the self-induced drug experiments that began in 1956 and were 
carried out through the 1960s. I first consider Michaux’s conception of the self 
during so-called normal states, using terminology from current research in 
psychology, philosophy and neuroscience to help understand the self-experience 
that Michaux describes in his work. It will then be possible to examine his take on 
altered states of selfhood in a synchronic sense, or, the way he describes the 
experience of disunity in the moment, as well as the effect of the experience in his 
long-term, or diachronic sense of the self. I also examine the implications of 
Michaux’s work on the development of a metaphysical vocabulary for otherworldly 
experience in the absence of faith in an omnipotent third party witness.  
Implicit in this study is the assumption that studies of writers like Michaux, and 
more generally speaking, studies of literary texts are valuable contributions to 
discussions of altered states of selfhood within empirical-based disciplines. It is my 
view that studies of literary accounts of altered states can contribute to 
philosophical discussions of the self. Especially given the fleeting nature of altered 
states, and the impossibility of pairing such highly unusual (and potentially 
unethical) self-experiments with technology in the hard sciences, the study of these 
accounts gives us precious insight into the phenomenology of experiences that 
might be impossible to study in the lab.  
To review, in this paper I first explore the altered self in Michaux’s work in a 
philosophical mode, arguing that Michaux experiences synchronic disunity at the 
moment of the experience, and later interprets unselfing in the diachronic sense as 




distinguished from other narrative models that account for dramatic change in the 
self over time, such as the conversion narrative.4 As opposed to Saul who becomes 
Paul, Michaux does not claim to become a different person entirely after his 
experience. Rather, mescaline allows for the illumination of formerly obscured 
contours of the self. I then situate Michaux in his literary and historical context in 
order to interpret the metaphysical language he develops for discussing altered 
states. At the end of this paper, I consider the value of Michaux’s self-experiments 
for relations with the outer world, comparing his interpretations of unselfing with 
other Francophone writers of the period.    
The self according to Michaux 
Michaux offers a unique perspective on the question of the self in his writings that 
fall somewhere between autobiography and auto-fiction. Indeed, in reading 
Michaux’s works one is made aware of the slippery boundaries between reality and 
fiction, as his narrators constantly wonder about the constructed nature of reality 
itself. Much like Paul Valéry, who created his Monsieur Teste character as a model 
for his theories on the self, Michaux over the course of his career created a pen name 
character, appropriately named “Plume” who serves as a testing ground for his 
ideas on consciousness and the self in writing. In turning to Michaux’s texts on 
altered states of selfhood during drug experiments, we must keep in mind that 
before these experiences, Michaux was particularly attuned to the constructed 
nature of self-unity, and saw disunified states of the self as more natural states of 
being than the usual state of ego-dominion.  
As such, before turning to Michaux’s exploration of altered states of selfhood, it is 
important to first examine how Michaux believed the self to function under 
ordinary circumstances. This question is especially difficult in studying Michaux; 
he famously proclaimed the eternal escape of the self when faced with attempts to 
pin it down – in language, in ancestry, in literary influences and otherwise. Broome 
writes,  
“There are enough warning-signs in Michaux’s work to make any biographer 
uneasy. Not only has he always refused to entertain a facile relationship with his 
public, retreating behind the wall of imagination and slipping from the grasp in 
bristling metamorphoses, but he has never felt any solidarity with his own life” 
(Broome 1977, 1).  
Indeed, there are many instances in Michaux’s texts where he claims to 
“désolidarise” or “break away” from his life, not to mention the extra distance he 
often sets up between himself and the first-person-narrators of his texts. The theme 
of the absurd also figures in Michaux’s works, and his texts on selfhood often testify 
to the divorce Camus once proclaimed between man and his life, the actor and his 
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décor.5 In Michaux’s work, the self is often described as an undifferentiated inner 
space without justification, identity, project or even reality. Because of this, he and 
his narrators are often frustrated by the lack of ensemble of life, the eternal 
documentation of the present.6  
In his texts on his experience taking mescaline, Michaux stresses that disunity 
would be our natural mental state, if not for the dominion of the ego, which holds 
us under its tyrannical control. He writes, “La drogue, qu’on s’en souvienne, est 
plus révélatrice que créatrice” (Michaux 1966, 33). [The drug, let us remember, 
indicates, reveals, more than it creates” (Michaux 1974, 22)]. Of the return from one 
such mescaline trip he writes,  
“Maintenant revient le pragmatique, l’utile, l’adapté, l’harmonieux, revient l’ego, 
ses bornes, son autorité, son annexionnisme, son gout des propriétés, des prises, son 
plaisir de s’imposer, de faire tenir ensemble, de forcer coûte que coûte. Et cela paraît 
naturel!”(Michaux 1966, 29) [Now the pragmatic returns, the useful, the adapted, the 
harmonious; the ego returns, with its limits, its authority, its annexationism, is 
possessiveness, its grasping, its delight in imposing, in amalgamating, in forcing at all costs. 
And it all seems natural! (Michaux 1974, 20)]  
Given these observations, we should understand the self during ordinary 
circumstances in Michaux’s work to mean a minimal degree of unification, as 
maintained by the ego. The process of unselfing, then, operates as a two-step 
process and undoes the ego’s unifying power. During altered states of selfhood, 
Michaux documents the experience of unselfing in the synchronic sense, and later 
reflects on its diachronic implications. That is to say, Michaux first describes a loss 
of perceived unity at the moment of the experience, and later, in the process of 
writing, reflects on the meaning of the experience in a narrative of mutation. In the 
scope of this paper, I focus on the first and last of Michaux’s texts on drug 
experimentation, Misérable miracle [Miserable Miracle] (1956) and Les grandes 
épreuves de l’esprit [The Major Ordeals of the Mind] (1966).  
Altered states: the “core” self and the “extended” self 
While documenting his altered self-experience, Michaux is most concerned with the 
effect of the substance on his basic or core self. The first level of the experience 
should therefore be understood as the effect of the experience on the most 
fundamental conception of mind. While disciplines such as neurobiology, 
psychology and philosophy account for a form of the core self, their definitions 
diverge. For instance, while Damasio (2010) writes that the “core self” is responsible 
for conscious attention to a given object, and emits “pulses” of provisional 
subjectivity in the field of neurobiology, phenomenologists Shaun Gallagher and 




consciousness. This discussion was contemporary to Michaux as well; In L’être et le 
néant (Being and Nothingness, 1943) Sartre argues for the existence of a pre-reflective, 
non-cognitive relation to the self.7 In this paper, I assume the core self as examined 
by Michaux to be a reflective state. While Michaux seeks to consciously witness the 
experience, often drawing or writing notes while taking the drug, his texts are 
delayed reflections on these changing mental states. The focus on unselfing at the 
level of the core self should be understood as a reflection on the philosophical 
problem of synchronic identity, as these experiments temporarily destroy the 
subject’s perceived experience of coherence or unity, and sometimes embodiment 
as well. 
The difference between unselfing understood as a temporary state of disunity, and 
unselfing understood as total annihilation of the self is aptly illustrated by 
Michaux’s description of his overdose experience. Whereas his other experiments 
with mescaline are characterized by an altered state that the observer is able to 
document, Michaux is not able to witness the experiment when he overdoses. 
During his fourth mescaline trip described in this work, Michaux writes that the 
overdose experience that caused him to fully “coincide with himself”, as he puts it. 
He writes, “Qu’avais-je fait? Plongeant, je m’étais rejoint, je crois en mon fond, et 
coïncidais avec moi, non plus observateur-voyeur, mais moi revenue à moi, et là-
dessus en plein sur nous, le typhon” (Michaux 1972, 124). [“What had I done? 
Plunging, I met myself, I believe in my foundation, and coincided with myself, no longer as 
an observer-voyeur, but me returned to me, and right on top of us, the typhoon.”] This is a 
different level of unselfing than Michaux had hitherto experienced. In a footnote to 
this passage, he writes, “Dans ma vie j’essaie (voulant observer) d’approcher le plus 
possible de moi, mais sans coïncider, sans me laisser aller, sans me donner” (Ibid). 
[In my life I try (wanting to observe) to approach myself as much as possible, but 
without coinciding, without letting myself go, without giving myself up.] Michaux 
attempts to distance himself from recreational drug use with this caveat, giving us 
an important feature of mutative unselfing: save for this exceptional overdose 
experience, the core self is never completely lost during these experiences. In this 
way, Michaux affirms the privileged status of the witness figure, the one who both 
lives and documents the altered-self experience. 
The second level of the experience involves what is referred to, across disciplines as 
an extended sense of the self. Damasio (2010) calls this sense of selfhood the 
“autobiographical self” and Schechtman (1996) refers to the “narrative self” in her 
philosophical work. Both designate a sense of self that is extended through time and 
that is teleological in nature. The eventual reconstruction of the self after the witness 
event should be understood within the context of the diachronic personal identity 
problem. Given that the experience happened, how does Michaux think about 
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events past and future? In the work of Michaux, the construction of a narrative for 
this self-experience occurs after the witness event, during the writing process. Of 
course, the distinction between the two steps that make up mutative unselfing may 
be difficult to discern, as they are mutually dependent on one another. Michaux 
presents his experiments as productive mutations in his temporal and spatial self-
experience.  
According to Michaux this leads to a state of insight that does not disappear once 
the substance has physically left his system. For example, coming down from the 
drug, he writes, “Au sortir de la Mescaline on sait mieux qu’aucun bouddhiste que 
tout n’est qu’apparence. Ce qui était avant, n’était qu’illusion de la santé. Ce qui a 
été pendant était illusion de la drogue. On est converti” (Michaux 1972, 80). 
[Leaving Mescaline, one knows better than any Buddhist that there is nothing but 
appearance. What was before, was nothing but illusion of health. What was during, 
was illusion of the drug. One is converted.] The word “conversion” here is not used 
traditionally. Michaux does not seem to mean he is converted to a transcendent 
absolute, not even the Buddhist philosophy he references. Rather, he seems to mean 
there is no “going back” to one’s former self once one has experienced the fragility 
of reality. Michaux insists that the self is changed by these drug experiments. This 
state of insight is “lightning on a dark night, all illumination” he writes, “but it is a 
lightning that lasts” (Michaux 1974, 166). 
At the end of his last text on mescaline, Michaux asserts emphatically that an inner 
space is opened up within the self thanks to these experiments, and persists after 
the experiment is over. He writes, 
“Mais dira quelqu’un, ces mondes sans objet, au-delà d’un objet, amour sans objet, 
contemplation sans objet, n’est-ce pas de la fume, dont il restera moins encore de la 
fumée? Une étendue nouvelle, un fond surcreusé, depuis en partie comblé, mais 
non annulé, subsiste après l’expérience et peut-être à jamais, non pas tout uniment 
non plus. ” (Michaux 1966, 207) 
[But, someone will say, aren’t these worlds without object, beyond an object, love without 
object, contemplation without object- aren’t such worlds so much smoke, leaving behind 
even less than smoke? A new expanse, a profoundly hollowed depth, which may afterward 
be partially filled, but not annulled, subsists after the experiment and perhaps forever, 
though not quite uniformly either. (Michaux 1974, 170)]  
Michaux represents the experience as an illuminating rupture that opens up “new 
expanse” within. And yet, each moment of unselfing always involves its 
corresponding return. While the rare state that one reaches during the drug 
experiment may lead to valuable insight, it cannot be maintained. The return to the 




dominion is more comfortable than the state of illumination. Michaux goes as far to 
compare his state of illumination to an “occupation.” He writes,  
“Fini! Les heures de l’occupation sont passées. A présent il est seul dans son 
cerveau. Admirable impression. Jouissance intime, de toutes peut-être la plus 
intime, si discrète pour être presque identique au ‘moi’ collant indissolublement à 
l’être en vie, et dont l’absence est une essentielle, indicible, incessante catastrophe" 
(Michaux 1966, 17). [Finished! The hours of alien occupation are over. Now he is alone in 
his brain. A wonderful feeling. Inner enjoyment of rights, perhaps inmost of all, so private 
as to be virtually identical with the ‘self’ clinging inseparably to the living being, and whose 
absence is a basic, inexpressible, unremitting catastrophe” (1974, p. 9).] 
What this vocabulary suggests, despite Michaux’s insistence on the ephemeral and 
provisional nature of selfhood in his work, is that even during extreme experiences 
of unselfing, someone is there to witness the unselfing event, to resist total self-
abandonment or self-loss, someone to recount the experience upon his return. The 
metaphysical piece of the self – the witness position – is never fully lost during 
mutative unselfing. Moreover, the witness’s viewpoint is improved by the 
experience, illuminated as by lightning on a dark night.  
Altered states and metaphysical insight: Michaux in his literary-historical context  
Much like his predecessors Baudelaire and Rimbaud, Michaux seeks to transcend 
everyday reality in order to access untapped expanses of human consciousness. 
With his psychedelic experiments and poetic writings thereupon, Michaux enters 
into a tradition of both Belgian and French avant-garde writers who positioned the 
poetic imagination as a site for revelation, naturally or unnaturally achieved. As 
early as 1836, the term Supernaturalisme appears in French when Nerval translated 
Faust. The term was then associated with German romanticism and referred to the 
power of revelation and the faculty of imagination, carrying the connotation of 
“above or beyond.” In 1855, Baudelaire uses the word surnaturalisme to mean a 
heightened sensory experience and an internal state of revelation. Baudelaire’s 
usage of the term marks a break with the traditional theological notion of 
supernaturalism, referring rather to an excess of experience. Influenced by De 
Quincey before him, Baudelaire was interested in the effects of wine, hashish and 
opium on the faculties of perception, writing on the subject in Les paradis artificial 
(1860). Like Baudelaire, Michaux would worry about the potential for solipsism – 
that the drugs represented a “cheap” route to revelation, and that what was 
revealed was only a distorted self-mirror, not a glimpse of the beyond. The 
Decadent movement further revived an interest in transcendence and the occult 
with Rimbaud embodying the figure of the poet-as-visionary. Of this influence on 
Michaux, Rigaud-Drayton writes, “Constructing the poet as a ‘Seer’, like Rimbaud, 
he conceived of poetry and painting as modalities of the visionary – and the 
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unlapsed. Nature and its poetic, visionary language was to be found locked inside 
the self, as much as outside it” (Rigaud-Drayton 2005, 5). While there are important 
differences between Rimbaud’s poetic project and Michaux’s mescaline 
experiments, (the centrality of aesthetics to Rimbaud and the supposed objectivity 
of Michaux’s project) there are clear overlaps as well. Michaux’s scientific/mystical 
explorations of the unknown recall Rimbaud’s famous quest for insight via 
dérèglement de tous les sens. 
In this lineage, the surrealist movement intended to transform modern 
consciousness in a practice or experience of the world leading to an altered state 
through art-as-knowledge, believing “that art arises from the imagination as a 
revelation: a form of insight-oriented knowledge.” (Rabinovitch 2002, 8) While he 
shared their desire to reduce the control of reason as a means of achieving insight 
on the self and the world beyond phenomenal reality, Michaux refused to officially 
join any organized avant-garde collective of the period. He was influenced by 
figures like Lautréamont, who he discovered in 1922, a poète maudit claimed by the 
Belgian avant-garde over twenty years before the French.8 Michaux had also read 
Aldous Huxley’s The Doors of Perception (1954) but he thought Huxley’s approach 
was too moderate – both in the dosage of mescaline that Huxley describes taking 
and in the level of alienation Huxley was willing to risk. (Martin, 2003, 516) 
Michaux’s mescaline texts - Misérable miracle (1956), L’Infini turbulent (1957), 
Connaissance par les gouffres (1961), and Les grandes épreuves de l’esprit (1966) explicitly 
deal with the question of the realm beyond reality, probing for a metaphysical 
vocabulary for extreme experience in a secular age. What distinguished Michaux 
from Huxley, and from other experimental writing of the period was his 
commitment to the witness position and his (perhaps naïve) desire to document the 
experience without cultural or personal biases. Of Misérable miracle, Martin writes,  
“Ce sera le seul livre de tremblement qui, par cet aspect documentaire, donnera à 
ce point l’impression d’une experience saisie sur le vif” (Martin 2003, 522). [This 
was to be the only trembling book, that by way of this documentary aspect would 
give the impression of an “on the spot” or unposed experience.]  
Michaux wanted to be both the observed and the observer, which plays an essential 
role in his writings on these self-experiments.  
“Je est un autre”: Reverberations  
One of the central products of Michaux’s mescaline experiments is the experience 
of the self as other, recalling Rimbaud’s famous “Je est un autre” formulation, which 
the poet used in a 1871 to express the strangeness of the self, and the need for the 
derangement of the senses to access the unknown. In the last mescaline text - Les 




Countless Minor Ones] – Michaux is disturbed by the experience of hearing another’s 
voice as his own. He writes, “Une autre voix que la mienne se pousse dans ma voix, 
en traître. Je m’arrête. Étrange. Freinant. Décourageant. Avec un mot, qui n’était pas 
de moi, une voix étrangère aussi, a voulu intervenir ” (Michaux 1966, 87). [Another 
voice than mine makes its way into my voice, a traitor. I stop. Strange. Dismaying. 
Discouraging. With a word, which was not mine, a voice, also alien, has tried to intervene 
(Michaux 1974 68).] While Michaux retains his position as the witness figure (who 
does not lose himself completely) in this example, he experiences the self as 
another’s voice, pushing through his throat.  
A decade later, this description becomes a marker for unselfing in a very different 
context. André Malraux, a contemporary to Michaux, describes an eerily similar 
experience of another’s voice pushing through his throat in his description of his 
near-death experience during severe illness in a hospital in 1940. Malraux writes of 
what he calls the je-sans-moi [I-without-the-Ego] experience in a volume called 
Lazare (1974) [Lazarus]. During his illness, Malraux is reminded of the Russian front 
where he fought in 1916, and writes that the je-sans-moi leads to a radical feeling of 
communion amongst soldiers during war. He writes,  
“Les hommes entendent toujours leur voix avec la gorge, et celle des autres avec les 
oreilles. Si nous entendions soudain une autre voix que la nôtre avec la gorge, nous 
serions terrifies. J’avais écrit que tout homme entend sa vie avec la gorge, celle des 
autres, avec les oreilles, sauf dans la fraternité ou l’amour” (Malraux 1974, 238). 
[Men always hear their own voice with their throat, and the voice of others with their ears. 
If we were to suddenly hear a voice other than our own through the throat, we would be 
terrified. I have written that every man hears his life with the throat, and the life of others 
with the ears, except in fraternity or in love.]  
Malraux affirms the value of unselfing in that it creates a radical feeling of 
communion amongst sufferers.  
This description of the je-sans-moi experience would later lead Jean-François 
Lyotard to theorize what he calls “stridence” [stridulation], or the sound-feeling of 
one’s own voice heard through the throat (as opposed to the voice of others, which 
one hears through the ears.) Lyotard writes that the abyss between “moi et je-sans-
moi” [the ego and the I-without-the-ego] is unsurpassable by outer others – except 
during experiences of love (as Malraux already asserted) or dread. While in 
Malraux, and later in Lyotard, unselfing involves an important inter-subjective 
dimension, Michaux conclusions seem limited to the self. Indeed, at one point, 
Michaux goes as far to say that his experiments are “peu utiles” [of little use] for 
relations with others, because they are supposedly incommunicable (Michaux, 
1966, 63). And yet, Michaux insists that the derangement of the senses is not about 
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escapism, and as we have seen, thinks proper self-experimentation demands a 
commitment to mental control throughout the process. In a long and tortured 
footnote to Les Grandes épreuves [Major Ordeals] Michaux writes,  
Que ceux qui prennent des produits pour s’adonner aux excitations collectives, 
trépignements, danses hystériques, bagarres ou viols, s’arrêtent et ne se mettent 
pas à croire qu’il y a quelque chose ici pour eux. On ne parle pas la même langue. 
On ne va pas aux mêmes effets. Celui qui est incapable de retenir les actes, 
incapable de garder tout dans le mental est complètement à côté. Le psychique 
contemplateur est ‘retranché.’” (191)[Those who take drugs in order to surrender 
themselves to the collective release and emotional abandon need not read further. There 
is nothing here that is meant for them. We do not speak in the same language. We do not 
look for the same effects. He who is incapable of keeping his actions under control, 
incapable of confining everything to the mind, has missed the point completely. The 
observer of psychic occurrences has to be “entrenched.” (156)]  
Michaux’s emphasis on “entrenchment” raises again the question of the 
communicability of drug experiments.  Throughout the mescaline texts, Michaux is 
constantly commenting in the margins, adding footnotes and directly addressing 
the reader in the text as the experimental subject, and in the margins as the 
experimenter, never fully engaging with his passing observation on the uselessness 
of the experiments for relations with others. The presence of others in Michaux’s 
mescaline texts is synecdochical: they appear in the form of hands, echoes, shadows, 
complicating his attempts to justify his drug trips with the claim that they are not 
motivated by escape of reality. The experience of the self-as-other, of another’s voice 
pushing through his own throat, does not necessarily push Michaux towards 
connections with the outer world, as it does for Malraux. Although he conquers 
new inner territories, outer ones are but shadows in the mescaline texts. Michaux 















1  Shelley Weinberg (2011) writes, “Locke also seems to see his theory of personal identity as 
complementing his moral and theological views. ‘Person’, Locke says, ‘is a Forensick Term 
appropriating Actions and their Merit’, for which ‘at the Great Day’ we are judged by God 
and receive eternal reward or punishment (II.xxvii.26, I.iv.5). For further discussion of the 
“metaphysical criterion” in Locke’s Essay, see “Locke on Personal Identity” Philosophy 
Compass, 398–407. For more on twentieth-century defenses and criticisms of Locke’s 
theory on personal identity, see: Perry (2008) 
2  Unless otherwise noted, translations are my own. 
3  I am indebted to Joshua Landy (2012) for this neutral term that covers both self-
transcendence and self-rupture, which he uses in his recent book, How to Do Things with 
Fictions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
4  In my PhD thesis, I explore other narratives for “unselfing”, such as destruction, 
multiplication and transformation.  
5  See: Camus 1965, 101 
6  Various Michaux critics have attributed to the writer an existential project, and on the 
whole have “tended to pay more attention to the existentialist undertones in his writings 
until the mid 1960’s” (Rigaud-Drayton 2005, 6) at which point a more psychoanalytic 
perspective on his work comes to the fore.  
7  For more on existentialism and the self, see: Guignon, C. (2004). The Existentialists: Critical 
Essays on Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers 
8  This would prove important for Michaux in his attempts to validate his native Belgian 
tradition at the same time that he sought to distance himself from it. See Rigaud-Drayton 
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Abstract: Mindfulness training has been used for centuries in eastern traditions such as 
Buddhism and Yoga, with the goal of reaching altered states of consciousness capable of 
changing the experience and perception of self, for spiritual purposes. In the west, 
mindfulness-based psychotherapy programs have become popular in recent years and their 
efficacy is well established, being used as a treatment for depression and anxiety. In 
accordance with the original descriptions of the goals and effects of these techniques, 
neurophysiologic studies have shown that meditation affects self-referential processing and 
that from the early stages of practice there is significant neuroplasticity in self-referential 
and attentional networks in the brain. In this article, the phenomenological and 
neurophysiologic effects of mindfulness practice are explored, in an attempt to understand, 
from a scientific point of view, how altered self-consciousness experiences associated 
traditionally with meditation techniques are generated, and contribute, to induce drastic 
changes in the implicit and explicit conceptualization of the self of the practitioner. Taking 
in consideration available data about the effects of mindfulness training, I propose that 
continued and regular practice of meditation techniques can lead to a dissociation of 
narrative and momentary self-reference modes, and to a progressive de-identification with 
the narrative-self and an identification with the minimal-self, that is experienced and 
perceived as an “empty”, non-personal psychological entity. 
Keywords: Mindfulness, meditation, altered states of consciousness, self, self-
awareness, self-referential processing 
Mindfulness and self-experience: no-self consciousness  
or empty-self consciousness? 
Mindfulness is an English word used to translate various Buddhist terms, mostly 
Sati (Pali), Smrti (Sanskrit) and dran pa (Tibetan). These terms refer originally to 
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“memory”, “remembering” or “keeping in mind”, and in the Buddhist tradition 
they are understood as referring to the quality of being aware and paying attention 
(Dreyfus 2011; Gethin 2011; Grossman & Van Dam 2011; Teasdale & Chaskalson 
2011a). Mindfulness practice is dedicated to develop the ability of the mind holding 
“on to its object and allow for sustained attention regardless of whether the object 
of attention is present or not” (Dreyfus 2011, 42-43). In the Buddhist tradition, 
mindfulness is described as “involving attention and awareness of bodily 
sensations, and also awareness of more expansive mental contents and processes, 
such as emotions and an altered view of self” (Nanamoli & Bodhi 2001, cited by 
Grossman & Van Dam 2011). 
Meditation techniques are central in mindfulness training, and can be found not 
only in Buddhism, but also in other traditions, such as Taoism, Yoga and Vedanta 
(Shear 2011). Meditation includes several types of techniques that are usually 
practiced in a specific context and that require a specific body posture, usually a 
seated posture in which the spine must be kept straight, although there are some 
forms of mindfulness meditation that don’t require necessarily sitting positions, 
such as Yoga or walking mindfulness techniques (Deshimaru 2003-2005; Kabat-
Zynn 1982; 1992; Lutz et al 2008). 
Meditation techniques are central in mindfulness training, and can be found not 
only in Buddhism, but also in other traditions, such as Taoism, Yoga and Vedanta 
(Shear 2011). Meditation includes several types of techniques that are usually 
practiced in a specific context and that require a specific body posture, usually a 
seated posture in which the spine must be kept straight, although there are some 
forms of mindfulness meditation that don’t require necessarily sitting positions, 
such as Yoga or walking mindfulness techniques (Deshimaru 2003-2005; Kabat-
Zynn 1982, 1992; Lutz et al 2008). 
Meditation techniques: brief presentation 
Eastern meditation techniques can be classified in two main categories (Lutz et al 
2008): a) focused attention techniques and b) open monitoring techniques. 
Focused attention techniquesThese techniques involve directing and sustaining 
attention moment by moment on a chosen object, which can be one’s own breath 
and bodily sensations accompanying respiration, a mantra or picture. 
While trying to keep attention focused on the selected object, it is normal to notice 
that the focus has shifted from the object to another stimulus (internal or external, 
such as a thought about what we will do for dinner later, the work we have to finish 
tomorrow, or a sensation of pain on our backs). The meditator should notice the 
distraction and, after noticing it, he should refocus his attention on the selected 
object. With practice, the time that is necessary either to notice the distraction or 
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return to focus on the selected object gets smaller, until the sustained attention 
becomes an “effortless concentration”.  
Neurophysiologic studies show that focused attention meditation techniques can 
train attentional skills and induce long-term neurophysiologic changes in 
subcomponents of attention. Consistently with the phenomenological reports of 
expert meditators, studies have shown that activation in brain regions implicated 
in monitoring, engaging attention and attentional orienting is stronger in novice or 
recent expert mediators (19 000 hours of practice), than on very well trained experts 
(44 000 hour of practice) – with practice the exercise really seems to become 
effortless (Brefczynski-Levis et al 2007, cited by Lutz et al 2008). 
Open monitoring techniques. Usually this type of meditation starts with focused 
attention mediation for calming the mind and foster concentration. The monitoring 
component of focused attention is used to progress for open monitoring, in which the 
goal is to remain only in the monitoring state, being attentive to whatever stimulus 
that might be detected, without a particular focus on a specific object. The 
practitioner should be in a nonreactive monitoring of whatever appears in attention. 
The instruction for novices is usually to label the experiences at each moment and 
then return to open monitoring. For example, if thoughts about the work one has to 
finish tomorrow are detected, they should be labeled as “worry”, and so on. The 
continuity of this process leads to a nonreactive awareness of automatic cognitive 
and emotional interpretations of sensory, perceptual and endogenous stimuli. 
The aim of this type of meditative practice is to “gain a clear reflexive awareness of 
the usually implicit features of one’s mental life” (Lutz et al 2008, 164). This 
awareness is supposed to help change cognitive and emotional habits, and lead to 
an awareness of self less emotionally reactive and more focused on the present and 
less on the autobiographical past, present and imagined future. 
Both styles presented are used in combined form. Focused attention can be seen as 
preparation for open monitoring. These two techniques are also used in western 
secular mindfulness-based psychotherapeutic interventions very popular today 
(Hofmann et al 2010), such as Mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn 
1982) and Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT; Segal et al 2002).  
Travis & Shear (2010) proposed a third type of meditation techniques, named 
automatic self-transcending. These are supposed to involve the transcending of the 
procedures of the meditation, involving minimal cognitive control or effort. 
Practices such as transcendental meditation1 are presented by the authors as an 
example of these techniques. Transcendental meditation (TM) involves the 
repetition of a mantra (word or series of syllables) and is sometimes considered as 
a focused attention form of meditation. For Travis & Shear (2010) this is not the case, 
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since TM is associated with different electroencephalography (EEG) frequency 
bands than focused attention and also because beginning practitioners of TM 
quickly develop a certain level of automaticity “in which the mantra becomes 
increasingly secondary in experience and ultimately disappears and self-awareness 
becomes more primary”(Travis & Shear 2010, 1116).  What seems to be happening 
here is that the meditation technique used, which is focused attention, is transcended 
during practice, and this allows the meditator to have a different type of experience 
which induces more profound changes in self-awareness, associated with “self-
transcendence” or “pure consciousness” states (Travis &Pearson 2000). 
In any case, it should be noted that traditional focused attention techniques also 
become effortless with practice (Lutz et al 2008). The same seems to happen with 
open monitoring techniques such as zazen2, the Japanese Zen Buddhist seated 
meditation, which can induce electrophysiological changes consistent with 
automatic self-transcending in experienced practitioners: high amplitude and low 
frequency alpha waves or low alpha waves (Deshimaru 2003-2005, 107).  
Travis and Shear (2010) recognize that most meditative techniques, with practice, 
become effortless and automatic and can be used to achieve the same consciousness 
states as what they call “automatic self-transcending” techniques (1116). The 
specificity of automatic self-transcending techniques is their capacity to induce this 
automaticity at the outset and not only after extended practice as the other 
techniques.  
“Pure consciousness” or “emptiness” states 
With continued practice, most meditation techniques seem to be able to induce an 
altered state of consciousness that is conceptualized differently by Hindu (such as 
Yoga and Vedanta) and Buddhist traditions3. While Hindu traditions usually label 
this altered state of consciousness as “pure consciousness”, “consciousness itself”, 
“being” or “self” (¬tman), the Buddhist traditions usually use expressions such as 
“emptiness”, “non-being” or “no-self” (an¬tman) to describe it (Shear 2011; Travis 
& Pearson 2000).  
This “pure consciousness” or “emptiness” experience is described as “free from the 
processes and contents of knowing”, and its content is supposed to be “self-
awareness itself” (Travis & Pearson 2000, 79). The “pure or empty ground of 
consciousness itself”, is experienced when all contents of awareness are removed 
(Shear 2011). It is different from regular waking conscious experience in the sense 
that usually the contents processed in our minds are inner or outer objects, but not 
consciousness itself (Travis & Pearson 2000).   
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This state of consciousness is also presented as the natural or original state of 
consciousness. Reaching “emptiness” or “pure consciousness” states is compared 
to returning to the natural state of the mind: 
Zazen is not a special condition of the spirit. Zazen is not a teaching method of 
special mental conditions; it is not a method for creating a special personality: it 
is the return to the natural and tranquility. It is because of this reason that zazen 
can put an end to the disturbances of our complicated and fragile society and 
bring it back to the authentic conditions of the spirit4. (Deshimaru 2003-2005, 
145; Zen monk of the Soto school). 
The time comes when no reflection appears at all. One comes to notice nothing, 
feel nothing, hear nothing, see nothing (…) But it is not a vacant emptiness. 
Rather it is the purest condition of our existence. (K.S, a Zen practitioner quoted 
in: Austin 1998, 463, cited by Shear 2011). 
While Buddhist traditions usually conceptualize this experience as a state of 
consciousness without self, and consider that this experience leads to the insight 
that the phenomenological basic self-experience is not real and that there is “no-
self”, Hindu traditions usually see it as the experience of the true self, or ¬tman, the 
“witness-consciousness” that is always present in the background (in the case of 
Vedanta traditions, Hopkins 1992) or the “minimal agentive self” (in the case of the 
Ny¬ya tradition, Ram-Prasad 2011). In the particular case of Zen Buddhism, both 
types of interpretation can be found (Shear 2011).  
Travis & Pearson (2000) asked meditators specialized in TM to describe their 
experiences during their practice and found that “pure consciousness” is described 
as “self-awareness isolated from the processes and objects of experience, and 
without a sense of time, space or body” (82).The authors wanted to verify the 
universality of this experience, looking for possible descriptions across cultures and 
time. They found that it is described since pre-history. They cite written 
descriptions of this experience in Egyptian hermetic writings, in the words of a 
Benedictine monk, a Japanese Zen Buddhist monk and even an English poet 
(William Wordsworth), considering that there is enough evidence to consider that 
“pure consciousness” is a naturally occurring experience in our species that is not 
dependent upon a specific cultural context. 
This altered state of consciousness is, apparently, available to every human being 
after enough practice of any mindfulness meditation technique. It is a state in which 
self-experience is deeply altered, so much altered that some interpret it as a state of 
“no-self consciousness”. It is also a state that is understood as a return to a more 
basic or original form of consciousness.  Both Hindu and Buddhist traditions agree 
that this altered state reveals experientially to its owner, the real nature of 
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consciousness and self. There is a self that is seen as illusory in each case: while 
Hindu traditions consider that in “pure consciousness” states the true self is 
revealed, Buddhist traditions accentuate the fact that, in these states, the illusory 
sense of self is absent. 
In an attempt to understand, from a scientific point of view, what these special types 
of altered self-awareness might be, and how they can be responsible for 
transforming the way the self is conceived, I will propose that we take into 
consideration dual-process theories of self-awareness and the neurophysiologic 
effects of meditation practice. 
Dual-process theories of self-awareness 
In western psychology and philosophy, self-awareness is frequently seen as a dual 
process that can occur in two basic modes. These two modes have been described 
and studied by several authors. The first mode has received several designations, 
such as: 
I (James 1890); Subjective self-awareness, Subject-Self, or awareness of the self-as-subject 
(Duval & Wicklund 1972; Sá-Nogueira Saraiva 2003; Damásio 2010, respectively); 
Pre-reflective self-awareness (Zahavi 1999; Legrand 2007); Minimal self-awareness 
(Gallagher 2000; Gallagher and Frith 2003; Fuchs 2010); and, Core or Mental self-
awareness (Damásio 1999). 
“Subjective pre-reflective” or “minimal self-awareness” corresponds to the most 
basic form of self-awareness that is present at birth, and allows human beings to 
distinguish their bodies and internal states from the world and other beings outside 
(Lewis 1991; Rochat 2003, 2011). Processing incoming information from the 
environment and responding to that information adaptively depends on some 
awareness of the self as an agent and receptor of information (Sá-Nogueira Saraiva 
2010). In the beginning, this minimal self-awareness is mostly dependent on 
sensorimotor cues. States of minimal or subjective self-awareness take place when 
attention is directed away from the self and the person “experiences himself as the 
source of perception and action” (Duval & Wicklund 1972, 3).   
This minimal form of self-awareness is somehow tacit, since it does not involve a 
reflective awareness of self, only an implicit one. “Any sensation, any perception or 
action directed towards an object implies a tacit self-awareness; it is given 
immediately, non-inferentially as mine” (Fuchs 2010, 549). This is the self-
awareness associated with the pre-reflective sensation of being a subject or agent 
who experiences, processes and represents the external and internal world. It is 
focused on the present moment: the action being performed, the feelings felt or 
thoughts being processed.  
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The second mode of self-awareness has been named as: Me (James 1890); Objective 
self-awareness, Object-self or awareness of the self-as-object (Duval & Wicklund 1972; Sá-
Nogueira Saraiva 2003, 2010; Damásio 2010); Reflective self-awareness (Zahavi 1999); 
Narrative self-awareness (Gallagher 2000; Fuchs 2010) or autobiographical self-awareness 
(Damásio 1999). 
In “narrative” or “reflective self-awareness” states our attention is focused in our 
own selves and we can become aware of ourselves as an object in the world, creating 
a representation of our self that includes physical and psychological characteristics 
(Fuchs 2010). Because of this it is sometimes referred to as a reflective form of self-
awareness. In these states of self-awareness we can focus our attention in our 
internal and private mental world and bodily sensations or on our more public 
characteristics that define as a social object: our body image, our behavior in certain 
situations, what others might think of us, our social and economic status, among 
other characteristics. The development of this type of self-awareness is dependent 
upon the acquisition of autobiographical memory, concepts and language (Rochat 
2003; 2011; Fuchs 2010).  
A representation of the Object-self (Sá-Nogueira Saraiva 2003, 2010) or narrative-self 
(Fuchs 2010) results from these states of self-awareness. It corresponds to an image 
of the self that takes into account how we are seen in other people’s eyes, and the 
autobiographical history of the self – its past, present and future. Some authors see 
it also as a symbolic-self (Sedikides & Skowronski 1997) since it is constructed and 
represented in different ways depending on the value that each cultural context 
attributes to different characteristic and traits (Chentsova-Dutton & Tsai 2010; 
Markus & Kitayama 1991). 
These two modes of self-awareness appear to be distinct psychological and 
neurophysiologic mechanisms or systems, since they are dependent upon different 
cerebral areas and have a different ontogenetic path: “pre-reflective minimal self-
awareness” seems to depend on limbic system activity and is present since birth, 
while “narrative self-awareness” depends on frontal and parietal lobe activity 
(LeDoux 1989, 2002; Lou et al 2004; Pribram 1984; Stuss 1991; Weiskrantz 1986), 
appearing only around the 2nd year of age (Lewis 1991; Rochat 2003, 2011). 
Self-referent processing in the brain and dual-process theories of self-awareness 
Neuroimaging research has shown that there are two types of self-referent 
processing in the brain that are distinct but usually occur in an integrated form: 
momentary or experiential self-reference and extended or narrative self-reference5 (Farb et 
al 2007; Mills 2011). These two processes appear to correspond to the two modes of 
self-awareness described in psychological and philosophical literatures. Momentary 
self-reference refers to one’s momentary experience or psychological present, and 
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involves a right lateralized network involved in somatic and visceral sensation, 
engaging older neural regions. Moment-to-moment self-awareness arises from the 
integration of basic interoceptive and exteroceptive bodily sensation processes 
(Farb et al 2007; Mills 2011). This momentary mode of self-reference appears to 
correspond to the notion of a “pre-reflective” or “minimal” form or self-awareness. 
Extended self-reference is involved with memory for self and other traits as well as 
the continuity of identity over time. It is associated with activation of the medial 
pre-frontal cortex (mPFC). It corresponds to the notion of a “narrative”, 
“autobiographical self-awareness” (Farb et al 2007). It is know that, in the absence 
of the demand to attend to external stimuli, there is an automatic tendency to 
engage in narrative self-referential processing, which generates a constantly running 
stream of thoughts full of self-related material (mental images, beliefs, feelings, 
thoughts and desires) (McKiernan et al 2006, cited by Farb et al 2011, and Mills 
2011). The cortical midline activity associated with narrative self-awareness is very 
similar to activity associated with the “default mode” of resting attention (Gusnard 
et al 2001; Raichle et al 2001, cited by Farb et al 2011). Since the narrative self-
awareness system is phylogenetically and ontogenetically more recent that the 
minimal self-awareness system, the narrative mode has probably become the default 
mode through practice (Farb et al 2007). 
When the attention is completely focused in outside stimuli or action being 
performed, such as in moments of new learning, intimacy or creative processing, 
the narrative mode is shut down and we engage in experiential self-reference mode, 
which keeps attention focused on the present (Mills 2011). 
These two self-awareness systems are related, since experiential/ momentary self-
referential processing activates narrative/extended self-referential processing: this is the 
reason why it is so easy to become distracted from the present moment and engage 
in self-related thoughts; attention to the present moment engages narrative self-talk 
(Farb et al 2007). 
Meditation and self-referential processing 
Neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies about the effects of meditation on 
brain functioning present some discrepancies concerning the areas activated and 
deactivated during mediation. These discrepancies can be explained by the 
diversity of techniques that were studied (Ives-Deliperi et al 2011; Lutz, Dunne, & 
Davidson 2007; Travis & Shear 2010), which might affect different brain areas. This 
means that more studies are needed before we can ascertain for sure what are the 
neurophysiologic and neuroimaging patterns related with each type of mediation 
techniques. 
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Despite the variety of findings, one pattern of results seems to be particularly 
relevant for clarifying what might be the psychological and neurophysiologic 
correlates of “pure consciousness” or “emptiness” states. These results are 
concerned with the effect of mindfulness meditation in self-referent processing 
(Berkovich-Ohana, Glicksohn & Goldstein, 2011; Farb et al 2007; Goldin et al 2009; 
Ives-Deliperi et al 2011; Mills 2011). Some studies appear to show that meditation 
practice helps to dissociate the experiential and narrative forms of self-reference, 
which are usually integrated. Mindfulness training such as the “Mindfulness-based 
stress reduction” program by Kabat- Zinn et al (1992) and “Music based 
mindfulness training”, by Shinzen Young, increase the capacity to disconnect the 
experiential from the narrative mode, and engage in present-centered awareness of 
self, that is not affected by narrative intrusions, such as thoughts, feelings and 
desires (Farb et al 2007; Ives-Deliperi et al 2011; Goldin et al 2009; Mills 2011).  
From a neurophysiologic point of view, this is associated with deactivations of the 
midline pre-frontal cortex (MPFC) region and an activation of right lateralized, 
prefrontal cortical and paralimbic structures (with the recruitment of posterior 
viscerosomatic representations). The novice practitioners also show different 
activation patterns, but they are not capable of de-activating the ventral and dorsal 
MPFC such as the trained practitioners (Farb et al 2007).  
With practice, the increased ability to shut down the narrative self-focus and 
disconnect it from the experiential self-focus, could lead to the “pure consciousness” 
or “emptiness” states in which, at least for a few moments, there is just an 
experiential, momentary self-reference without narrative intrusions. The lack of 
narrative intrusions could be experienced as the sensation of “thinking about 
nothing” (K.S, a Zen practitioner, quoted in Austin, 1998, 463, cited by Shear, 2011), 
as if consciousness was “free from the processes and contents of knowing” (Travis 
& Pearson 2000, 79). 
The capacity to progressively dissociate narrative and minimal self-processing 
appears also to introduce the possibility to start thinking about the self as something 
dissociated from specific mental contents such as thoughts, emotions, mental 
images, and representations, and as something not identical with the 
autobiographical or narrative-self (Ives-Deliperi 2011). This process is described by 
patients in “Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy” programs, which share with 
their therapists insights such as: “these thoughts and feelings aren’t me” (Allen et 
al 2009, cited by Teasdale & Chaskalson 2011b). 
The insights of patients in mindfulness-based therapeutic programs are in line with 
Buddhist and Hindu traditions: while Buddhist thinkers conclude that the self is 
not real because narrative self-talk is not identical or necessary for conscious 
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experience, Hindu thinkers appear to conclude that the experiential sense of self 
disconnected from time and specific contents of the mind is the “real self”, and that 
the narrative-self is an illusion.  
Continued meditative practice might have the following chain of effects: a) 
dissociation of narrative and experiential self-referent processing; b) identification of 
self with minimal pre-reflective or experiential sense of self and c) de-identification with 
the narrative sense of self.  In this process, the minimal pre-reflective self appears to be 
experienced as an “empty-self”, in the sense that it corresponds to an experience of 
the self as a source or point of awareness from which mental contents and external 
reality is observed, perceived and processed, that is different and independent from 
those same contents and which has no personal identity. This “empty-self” is 
identical to the Kantian notion of a “transcendental self-consciousness” (Keller 
1998, 2-3, cited by Ram-Prasad 2011). 
There are descriptions of this “empty-self” in both traditions. From the Hindu 
tradition: %tman is “(…) the witness only, that which experiences, but its own 
nature lies beyond all suffering, pleasure or confusion” (Taylor 2000, 18);  %tman is 
“ (…) the conscious being that underlies each person and remains unchanging in 
the midst of activity and change” (Hopkins 1992, 149). From the Japanese Buddhist 
Soto Zen tradition: 
What is the Self? My master Kodo Sawaki used to say: “We should know our 
pure and true self. We should become intimate with ourselves” (…) The real self 
can be named as the “pure subject” (…) Thanks to zazen, seated in tranquility, 
we can find our true nature, our superior pure self, avoiding to look for it 
consciously; what I mean is that we find it without “thinking” about it, stopping 
all mental activity directed at that search. (…) During daily activity we are not 
very sensitive to all of the varied impressions that appear and disappear in our 
spirit. (..) During zazen, we can objectively observe our mind. We perceive its 
movements, we observe them in freedom, we are intimate with them and have 
access to our own self, free and open (…). When we practice zazen, everything 
that is a part of the world around us, behind time and space, exists and does not 
exist objectively. Everything becomes one in our mind. That’s the result of 
activity of our objective superior spirit6. (Deshimaru 2003-2005, 149-150, Zen 
monk of the Soto school). 
“True self” versus “illusory self” appears to be more relevant for both traditions 
than “self” versus “no-self” distinction. The same was already noticed by Albahari 
(2011), which proposed that “the sense of “Who I am” versus “What I am not” is 
the true target of early Buddhist practices that seek to eliminate the sense of a self. 
What remains after the sense of self has dissolved is a unified perspectival “witness-
ASASE 
Mindfulness and self-experience: no-self consciousness or empty-self consciousness? 
193 
consciousness”, that insofar as it lacks the illusion of a personal self, is intrinsically 
ownerless” (82).  
In an attempt of conciliation between Buddhist and Hindu perspectives, I propose 
that we refer to “pure consciousness” or “emptiness” states as empty-self 
consciousness states. “No-self consciousness” is not descriptive of what is happening 
from a phenomenological, psychological and neurological point of view, since self-
referential processing is still occurring and the first-person perspective is still 
present. “It is a state of “consciousness” in that the knower is conscious through the 
experience, and can, afterwards, describe it” (Travis & Pearson 2000). The self, as 
perceived during empty-self consciousness states is like an empty canvas, since it is 
not identical with mind contents and is not identical with the autobiographical self, 
but it isn’t gone. 
Empty-self consciousness states: between experience and reflection? 
Although “pure consciousness” or “emptiness” states, from here on designated as 
empty-self consciousness states, are usually associated with non-reflection in the 
Buddhist tradition, which accentuates that nirvana (realization of no-self) is reached 
experientially (Albahari 2011), there are some reports of this altered state of 
consciousness that say that its content is “self-awareness itself” (Travis & Pearson 
2000). If this is so, than empty-self consciousness might be or become at some point a 
meta-cognitive state in which there is the possibility to attend to the process of 
present-moment minimal self-awareness, which is not common during typical 
minimal self-awareness states. Such as Sá-Nogueira Saraiva (2010) noted in an 
evolutionary account of the minimal or core-self, which he calls Internal Reference 
Point (IRP): “the IRP’s function is not to muse upon itself: it is a switchboard 
between the inside and outside [of the organism] and not a thing to be thought 
about” (955).  
The insight that there is a “real self” and an “illusory self” could be a part of the 
experience itself, instead of being just the result of post-experience reflection. This 
would also mean that there is a narrative or reflective side to this experience, 
probably occurring after the brief periods of pure non-narrative experiential self-
processing. Since pure experiential self-reference states not contaminated by narrative 
self-reference are difficult to maintain (Farb et al 2007), it is very probable that the 
experience is immediately translated into a narrative about the nature of the self 
being experienced during those states. This probably occurs also due to the 
meditators knowledge of Buddhist, Vedanta, Yoga or at least, New Age literature 
about meditation, which sets expectations and helps to frame the experience in an 
already know framework. 
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In any case, the realization that there is “no-self” or that there are two forms of self-
consciousness and that one is more basic, vital or truthful than the other, does not 
correspond only to an experiential, momentary, and non-reflective state, it requires 
insight and reflection. More research about the phenomenology and 
neurophysiology of these altered states of consciousness might help to clarify the 
psychological process taking place and how much experiential and non-reflective 
is the experience of empty-self consciousness states.  
As it happens with other religious and mystical experiences, the research of the 
phenomenology or psychology of mindfulness states faces the problem of 
distinguishing the experience itself from the meaning attributed to it, since 
mindfulness practice takes place in a particular cultural context, and even the 
novice practitioners are exposed to expectations and predictions of what will and 
should be happening during the experience. The ideal research situation to clearly 
identify and characterize this empty-self consciousness states would be to have naïve 
practitioners, exposed only to the techniques without any theoretical explanation 
about the intended psychological results.  
Final remarks 
The scientific literature available on the neurophysiological and neuroimaging 
correlates of meditation suggests that mindfulness techniques appear to be a 
specific kind of cognitive technology, which allows humans to enhance self-
experience and learn with practice to engage in a consciousness state in which the 
mind is not dominated by narrative or extended self-referential processing. I have 
suggested that this dissociation from narrative self-focus during meditation can be 
responsible, or at least involved, in the altered self-experience designated as “pure 
consciousness” or “emptiness” in ancient eastern traditions. Additionally I 
proposed that experiencing these altered states of self-consciousness can change the 
way the self is conceptualized due to a progressive identification of self with the 
minimal pre-reflective sense of self, and de-identification with the narrative or 
autobiographical sense of self.   
These assumptions should be seen as a modest attempt to link available data and 
theory in a coherent but provisory framework, since more research is necessary to 
understand clearly what types of meditation are linked with changes in self-referent 
processing and if these changes are associated with reports of empty-self 
consciousness states from a phenomenological point of view. The dissociation of 
momentarily and extended self-referent processing might be only the first step to enter 
in this altered state of consciousness, but not a sufficient condition to enable it. More 
neurophysiological changes might be responsible for, or at least correlated with 
empty-self consciousness states. Studies comparing self-referential processing and 
phenomenological reports from practitioners of different ancient traditions and 
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different mindfulness therapeutic programs, trained in several types of meditation 
techniques will be necessary to achieve a comprehensive vision of this altered self-
experience. These studies should also aim to clarify the extent in which this 
experience is non-reflective and subjectively felt as non-corporeal and not time 
bounded. 
Additionally to the lack of available data linking directly empty-self consciousness 
and self-referential processing modifications during meditation, another limitation 
can be addressed to the main ideas presented in this article. That limitation has to 
do with the fact that we have considered, in line with Shear (2011) and Travis & 
Pearson (2000), that “pure consciousness” and “emptiness” states are only one type 
of consciousness states, differently interpreted by two different traditions, when 
they could, in fact, be two different types of altered self-consciousness. The 
hypothesis that they are two interpretations of the same experience makes sense in 
light of the huge debate around the topic of “self” and “no-self” in the two 
traditions, which could probably have been settled easily, if there was a direct 
association of each interpretation with one particular kind of consciousness state. 
The present author has also considered the discrepancies found inside Buddhism 
itself, which has schools such as Japanese Soto Zen where we can find interpretations 
compatible with the idea of “pure consciousness” and “self”, as an indication that 
similar mindfulness techniques, which produce identical results, can lead to 
different interpretations even in the same tradition.  
Independently of what future research might unveil about the nature, quality and 
variety of mindfulness experience, one thing is certain: theories of self-awareness 
will certainly be affected by new and more precise knowledge of mindfulness 
meditation practice.  
 
1  Transcendental meditation is a meditation technique derived from the Vedic tradition of 
India that involves the repetition of a mantra (word or series of syllables), and that was 
popularized in the West by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi (1986, cited by Travis & Pearson, 
2000). 
“Zazen” is the foundation of Zen practice and consists in a sitting meditation that is “based 
on a trinity: posture, breathing and meditation” (Yamahata 2002, 22). In Japanese, “za” 
means “to seat” and “zen” means “meditation” (Deshimaru 2003-2005, 54). “Zazen” is the 
name given to seated meditation in Japanese Zen schools.
3  It should be noted that Hindu or Brahmanical traditions and Buddhist traditions include a 
huge variety of schools that have different positions about “self” (¬tman) and “no-self” 
(an¬tman). Here we will consider a classical opposition between the two traditions about 
the nature of self. When referring to specific schools of both traditions, they are identified 
by their name and/or specific authors within them. 
4  Translation from the Portuguese edition by Assírio & Alvim, 2003-2005. 
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5  Both expressions “momentary/experiential” and “extended/narrative” will be used 
interchangeably thorough the remaining article to designate the two types of self-
referential processing. 
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In this paper I intend to do a personal reflection on mental disturbance realism. The 
ideal of Psychiatry would be to define mental disturbance with the same degree of 
objectivity as physical illnesses. These exist regardless of our opinions about them. 
Genetic anomalies have existed before DNA had been discovered. In the same way, 
mental disturbance should be defined as existing in itself, regardless of the theories 
we have about it. However, Psychiatry, being closely related to specific values and 
social practices, has had difficulty in defining its object study in a “neutral and 
objective way”, according to the scientific ideal, which is to be “a view from 
nowhere” in the words of Thomas Nagel.  
In this paper I claim that mental disturbance is defined from a background of 
epistemic, social and ethic norms (Broome & Bortolloti 2009). This background is 
not always explicit. It is not my intention here to investigate the genesis and 
transformation of this background, only to defend that it is in relation to it that 
someone is labelled as mentally ill. Other alternative definitions have been put 
forward and I intend to support that these alternatives are no better than the 
definition from epistemic, social and ethic norms. 
A first objection to my claim consists of the “evolutionist naturalist” model which 
seems to me to be very influential in modern day Psychiatry (Wakefield 1992). Here 
mental disturbance is conceptualized in a model analogous to the physical illness 
model. The nervous system, namely the brain, is constituted of structures that were 
formed evolutionarily. Each of these structures is related to certain functions (for 
example: Pio Abreu 2012). The malfunction of one or more of these structures has 
consequences in the mind and behaviour yielding pathology. This perspective has 
been dominant in theoretical terms, with research being oriented towards neuronal 
mechanisms that are supposed to underlie mental disturbances. These, however, 
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are not diagnosed directly from the analysis of neurological condition of the person. 
The diagnosis is established by a professional from a symptomatological 
phenomenology, grounded in standardized norms. These norms in turn have been 
grounded in social and ethical norms prevailing in a certain social context. 
Take the well-known example of homosexuality. Until 1990 it was considered a 
mental disturbance by the World Health Organization. On 17 May 1990, the General 
Assembly of the World Health Organization (WHO) removed homosexuality from 
their list of mental disorders. After that date it was not considered a mental 
disturbance anymore. Progressively, homosexuality has been accepted as normal 
and today, in several countries, it is in equal footing with heterosexuality. However, 
the neuropsychological structure of the homosexual persons is the same. What has 
changed was the attitude of society towards this sexual orientation. Incidentally, its 
being disqualified as a mental disturbance was a very important factor in changing 
people’s attitude towards homosexuality. 
Could we generalize the case of homosexuality to other “mental disturbances”? 
Consider the example of schizophrenia for it does not seem to be a context-
dependent disturbance: in any society a person who presents the schizophrenic 
symptoms will be declared mentally ill. I am not sure that such is exactly the case. 
There are cultures where hearing voices is positively valued (Bracken & Thomas 
2010). However, let us admit that in all known cultures the symptoms associated 
with schizophrenia are recognized as a mental disturbance.  Such a fact does not 
imply that schizophrenia was not defined by social criteria. What we could affirm 
is that schizophrenia, or the symptoms grouped by this designation, is negatively 
valued in all known social contexts.  What I mean is that to classify an individual as 
“a schizophrenic” derives from his behavior in his social environment and not just 
from the direct analysis of the patient’s brain. 
Only in a later stage does one try to determine the neural correlates of this disorder. 
We must note that the fact that the mental disorder is defined in terms of epistemic, 
social and ethical norms does not prevent the research on its inscription in the brain. 
The point here is that the disorder’s definition does not depend on the identification 
of its neural correlates. Let us suppose we identify in a person’s brain a neural 
correlate normally associated with the presence of a mental disorder, for instance 
the aforementioned schizophrenia. Could this, by itself, be sufficient to consider this 
person as a mentally ill person? I agree when Pickard (Pickard, 2010) gives a 
negative answer for we would have to verify whether indeed the person has 
symptoms. If a person has a lesion in an area of the brain, frequently related with a 
certain function, we can affirm that she person potentially has a mental disorder, 
but she is not really a mentally ill person if she does not present symptoms. 
Therefore, that which determines the identification of a mental illness is its 
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symptoms and not the alterations in a brain state. To give an example, we identify 
a delusion by the subject's speech for it violates epistemic norms. We can identify 
the neural correlates of that delusion, but how can we know whether there are 
always the some neural correlates that unleash such delusions in any subject? Could 
it not be other correlates? Could a person have the some cerebral configuration and 
not suffer from delusions? The delusion is identified by the subject's speech; the 
research on its neural correlates comes after. We can think that in a very advanced 
phase of neuropsychology it would be enough to identify the neural correlates. 
However, the only proof we will have would be always the presence of utterances 
suggesting delirium. On the contrary, we can say at most that we are in the presence 
of a potential illness, but not in presence of an actual illness. The reference is always 
the speech and behaviours within the person’s social context. Thus, even in an ideal 
situation where the neural correlates associated with a disorder are known, we are 
not allowed to define a disorder if we do not have a phenomenological description 
of the symptoms. Note, however, that we are far from this ideal situation 
I do not believe it is possible to talk about mental disorders without using a 
language that does not include symptom descriptions. The description of lesions in 
a brain ideally separated from a social context seems per se insufficient to determine 
mental disorders. Another objection that can be made to the definition of mental 
disorders by epistemic, social and ethical norms is that from a pragmatic point of 
view what is at issue is the suffering, experienced by the actual person.  
Accordingly, suffering is not to be confused with labelling. It is not because a person 
is labelled as mentally ill that she suffers; on contrary, it is because she suffers that 
she is mentally ill. However, we must note that to suffer is not a disorder in itself. 
Not all sufferings are classified as disorders or illnesses. The concept of “illness” has 
its historical origin in the bodily illnesses. Certain lesions could cause suffering and 
we call them “illnesses”. In the case of mental illnesses the situation is more complex 
for the decision to classify a mental state of suffering, as an illness seems to me to 
have a strong social and ethical component. Remember that according to Freud we 
are all slightly neurotic. The determination of the degree of acceptable suffering, to 
which we do not attribute the status of "disease" is defined by the normative social 
background.  
But could we not say, if we take as reference the suffering that the subject is the one 
who knows better about her mental state, in that it is she who defines herself, so to 
speak, as a patient? 
In a sense the subject is the one who knows more about herself, but it is evident that 
it is not she who determines her own diagnosis. The subject complains about 
something, which makes her suffer, and which is an obstacle in her life. But it is not 
she that determines whether or she is “ill”. As proof, there are subjects that even 
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when diagnosed as suffering from a mental disorder do not, so to speak, “label 
themselves” as such. Some of them do not spontaneously consult professionals due 
to their being led by the influence of others. In this way it seems to me that the 
diagnosis is determined by professionals of a scientific community, from the 
exterior of the subject in a certain social context. 
Mental disorder and psychological suffering cannot, therefore, be seen as one. To 
considerer a certain state of psychological distress as a mental disorder implies a 
certain ethical-social perspective that can change accordingly to the context. 
If it is true that mental disorders are defined by social criteria, could Psychiatry 
preserve its status as an objective science, defining its object in a realist and 
transcultural way? Would a thesis that states that mental disorders are not objective 
facts but result from social conventions not be more accurate? We have already seen 
the above example of homosexuality that, if taken as a paradigm, can be extended 
to the whole field of mental illness.  
George Graham (Graham 2010) holds that the conventionalist thesis is not valid and 
supports the psychological realism of a mental disorder, as mental, not excluding, 
however, the presence of neurological factors. On contrary, the causal-mechanist 
factors will be always present if there is a mental disorder. Graham argues that if it 
is true that mental disorders depend on social values, this is not a reason for us to 
reject them as “illnesses” in the realistic sense of the term. As mentioned, the 
concept “illness” would have initially originated in bodily illness and exported to 
mental illnesses (Szazs 1960). However, Graham defends that the concept of bodily 
illness depends on social values as well. Physical illnesses are caused by lesions, but 
the lesion by itself does not define the illness. What defines the illness is the 
attribution of a negative value to the consequences of the lesion.  What happens is 
that these values are more universal and less controversial than the ones of physical 
illnesses and so they do not seem to have a historical-social origin, but they seem to 
be inscribed in the natural order itself. However, we must remember that 
adaptation in the case of a human being is to a social and symbolical environment, 
not to a natural one. Thus, for the author, the definition of a physical illness always 
implies an evaluative element and not only a descriptive one.  
Thus the argument would be that since the concept of “illness” derives from 
physical illnesses and implies social values, the fact that mental illnesses/disorders 
also imply social values does not prevent them from being illnesses/disorders. 
However, the author acknowledges that if the concept of mental disorders is 
dependent on social relativism, psychiatry will find a realistic definition of mental 
illness hard to come by (Graham 2010, 108-113). If in a social context we consider 
homosexuality as a disorder and not in another social context, then the author 
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believes there can be no objective progress in psychiatry. This is so because we have 
not defined whether homosexuality is a disorder or only a way of living.   
It is therefore necessary to identify the criteria for mental disorder with the highest 
possible degree of objectivity, even if it is known they will never lose their 
evaluative component.  After eliminating several possible methods, Graham 
(Graham 2010, 139-142) decides to use a modified form of the thought experiment 
known as “ignorance veil”, initially created by John Rawals in the context of 
Political Philosophy. Basically it consists of asking ourselves which basic 
psychological capacities we would like to have in any context unknown to us. The 
assumption is that we would rationally choose those capacities that would allow us 
to lead a "life worth living.”    
In this way he defined seven basic psychological capacities.  It would be the 
impairment of one or more of them that would permit to define a kind of mental 
disorder (as he exemplifies in the last chapters of the book). These capacities are 
based on the assumption that the mind is defined by the concepts of 
“consciousness” and “intentionality”. Consciousness is subjectivity or, 
grammatically, first person experiences. When we ask, “what is it like to be a 
schizophrenic?” we are asking ourselves about the conscious, subjective states of 
schizophrenia. Intentionality is the property of mental states to be about something. 
Beliefs, desires, fears, passions and other mental states are directed, in most cases, 
to objects, even if they are abstract objects. Graham, in line with John Searle and 
Donald Davidson, shares the thesis that intentionality is closely related with 
rationality (Graham 2010, 117). The latter does not mean the capacity to think 
logically in a narrow sense. Graham views rationality in a broad sense, which could 
imply emotions and the body. There is rationality, for example, in the way concepts 
interconnect forming a network. Another example of rationality is given by the 
interconnection between desires and beliefs. If I want to buy a book, I seek 
information where I can buy it according to my conveniences (price, distance and 
so on). Thus the idea is, assuming that the mind is defined by the concepts of 
consciousness and intentionality, to find the basic capacities, as aforementioned, in 
order to lead a life worth living. According to Graham (Idem, 147) these are the 
capacities: “bodily/spatial self-location”, “historical/temporal self-location”, 
“general self/world comprehension”, “communication, “care, commitment and 
emotional engagement”, “responsibility for self”, “recognition of opportunities or 
“affordances””. 
George Graham's idea deserves some criticism. First I am not so sure that we can 
equalize physical illnesses and mental disorders on the basis that both depend on 
values. It may be the case that both involve moral values, but the quantitative 
differences between these two types of illnesses seem to me so great that it is more 
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accurate to insert them into different categories. At one point in the evolution, 
consciousness and language appeared in our species. Culture developed with social 
and ethical norms, which put us in a meditated relation with Nature. The 
“functions”, which also exist in other animals as we can verify, pass, so to speak, 
through a cultural "sieve" and new features arise. These norms and values also exist 
in the dysfunctions that appear in physical illnesses; however, here it seems to me 
that the maladaptation is much closer to natural evolution independent of culture. 
Graham claims that he does not see a great difference between a person who dies 
of heart attack and a person who kills himself due to depression. Both would 
depend on our positive valuation of life. In a society where life was not positively 
valued (if it is possible to conceive it) neither case would be classified as an illness. 
However, while in the case of the heart attack there is a direct relation between the 
organ lesion and its effect, in the case of depression it seems to me that this direct 
relation does not exist. A simple description of the functioning of the heart and its 
lesion will be enough to deduce the death of the patient. I think this is not true in 
the case of depression. The description of neural mechanisms will never be enough 
to deduce that someone would commit suicide, I think. Thus we can see there are 
significant differences between the two kinds of “illnesses”. In the case of a heart 
attack the causes are mechanical and relatively controllable. Now, in the case of 
depression, the role of non-neurological factors (personal relations, individual ideas 
and so on) in the decision to commit suicide is always subject to speculation. 
Thus, although in both cases social values are at issue as in a heart attack and suicide 
due to depression, in the case of a heart attack we can say with much more priority 
that there was a function determined by evolution, which was directly interrupted 
by a lesion. In the case of depression it does not seem to me that we can say the 
same for there are cultural factors in the determination of the illness/disorder. To 
consider that depression is a disorder means to appreciate life as something that is 
extremely positive and joy must be our normal condition. Could we not say the 
same in the case of the heart attack? Yes, but here there is not an actual evaluative 
option. It seems impossible to conceive a situation where a heart attack would be 
something physically positive since the function of pumping blood was selected by 
the evolution itself. The same could not be said in the case of depression for it could 
be partially the result of human thought about her own existence.  
Nevertheless, despite large differences between physical and mental illnesses, I 
agree that both depend on values and it will not be for this reason that we cannot 
use the concept of “mental disorder”. However, for this to have the status of 
objective reality it will be necessary to define it in a non-relativistic mode. This is 
related to one more problem that I see in Graham’s proposal: the fact that he 
considers to have researched the basic psychological capacities necessary for any 
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human being to lead a dignified life, using the thought experiment known as “the 
veil of ignorance”, but at the same time he affirms rationality is always linked to a 
social context (Idem, 196). To give an example, a sadhu (Indian ascetic) is positively 
valued in his culture, but a person who behaved as a sadhu in our society would be 
probably diagnosed as suffering from a mental disorder. The interpretation Graham 
would give, seems to me (the example is not his), is that in this case the sadhu 
follows a rationality that for us is not really rationality, because we do not put 
ourselves in his point of view. Let us suppose that according to religious Indian 
beliefs sadhus want to mortify the body and its needs for the purpose of letting 
other spiritual states flourish. Because for us these states do not exist, behaviour like 
that of the holy man would be classified as psychotic. But in this case we will fall 
into relativism.  
One way to solve this contradiction which the author does not present (at least 
explicitly), will be to considerer that human reason progresses through time.  
In this case we can keep a certain sociocultural relativism and at same time defend 
that there are societies, which are “more rational than others”. Let us suppose there 
is a society, which considers homosexuality as a mental disorder and another, 
which does not. Do they have the same value? Would we say that it depends on 
context? It seems to me that we can claim it is “more rational” to not view 
homosexuality as an illness/a disorder given the knowledge we currently have in 
neurosciences and social sciences. Thus it would be more objective to exclude 
homosexuality from the labelling of mental illness/disorder. This position contains 
however a philosophical option, that there is a moral progress in human societies 
and that this progress is accompanied by scientific and technological progress.  
One last criticism is related to Graham’s thesis that if we are really dealing with a 
mental disorder then there will be necessary neurological alterations, which cause 
impairment of one or more basic capacities but without destroying them 
completely. If they were completely destroyed we would be in the presence of a 
physical illness, although the injured organ is the brain. This is the case of illnesses 
such as Alzheimer or Parkinson. In a mental disorder the basic psychological 
capacities continue to function but in an altered way thereby causing suffering to 
the subject. I think we can make a comparison with a broken CD that still lets you 
hear music, but defectively. However, Graham by stating that the impairment of 
the basic psychological capacities (and so rationality) is always related to the 
presence of brute causal-mechanical, neurological, factors, he implies that biology 
has a decisive weight in defining mental disorders. By itself this does not challenge 
the realism of mental disorders for we can always conceptualize it in terms of 
mental personality structures, which have an objective existence. Nevertheless, 
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these capacities always have a normative dimension, although they are not related 
to any particular context. 
To conclude, the study of mental disorders cannot be limited to neurological 
research. One cannot avoid the use of mental predicates, meaning the use of the 
concepts “consciousness” and “intentionality” (as discussed above). Mental 
disorders are defined by a symptomatic phenomenology within a background of 
epistemic, social and ethical norms. These norms depend on specific cultural 
contexts. In this sense, there is a certain relativity in a mental disorder which was 
sometimes politically explored. Some advocated that the concept of mental disorder 
would only be a form of power, and mental disorders do not exist in themselves 
(Bracken & Thomas 2010). However, the presence of social and psychic suffering 
obliges us to consider the thesis of realism about mental disorders. 
In order to make the concept of mental disorders objective it is necessary to release 
it from contingent social customs and try to define it in a transcultural way, 
searching to define the conditions of its determination in any social context. This 
operation does not preclude an evaluative dimension; it is not something neutral 
and purely empirical. It implies determining the basic capacities that allow leading 
a life worthy of being lived. However, this project for Psychiatry only seems 
possible to me if we admit that rationality progresses and spreads throughout the 
human species.  Otherwise, the norms from which we determine the concepts of 
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Abstract: Some philosophers suggest that a minimal form of self-awareness is an integral 
element of the way in which all experiences are given (SPC: self-presenting claim). The main 
argument for this is that the phenomenological quality of ‘mineness’ of the experience reveals 
the self as a part of all experiences. Since the sense of mineness is taken as intrinsic to the 
givenness of the experience, it counts as an argument for the SPC. In this essay, I assess this 
claim and its main argument. After describing the phenomenological approach to self-
awareness that grounds the discussion, I comment on some pathological cases that challenge 
the SPC. After this, I examine the standard reply in defence of the SPC and I focus the 
discussion on cases of thought insertion. I conclude that although the standard reply adds 
interesting elements to the general discussion, it becomes philosophically problematic 
especially when it tries to deal with cases of thought insertion. 
Keywords: Self-Awareness, Phenomenal Consciousness, Thought Insertion, Self-
Presenting Claim, Phenomenological Approach to Self-awareness, Zahavi 
Introduction 
Some psychiatrists and philosophers have claimed that conscious experience has a 
‘self-presenting’ character. This self-presenting claim can be stated as follows: 
SPC: A minimal form of self-awareness is always given as an integral element of the 
intrinsic intentional structure of all experiences. Phenomenal consciousness always involves 
self-awareness. 
One of the main arguments for the SPC is that the phenomenological quality of 
‘being mine’ of the experience reveals the subject of that experience as an integral 
part of its givenness (Zahavi & Parnas 1998; Zahavi 2005; Gallagher 2012)1. Since 
the sense of mineness is taken as a constant feature of this givenness, it counts as an 
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argument for the SPC. In this context, no experience lacks the sense of mineness and 
all experiences are self-presenting. In this chapter, I shall assess these ideas. After 
providing some background for the discussion, I discuss some pathological cases 
that challenge the SPC. I then examine the standard defence of the SPC and I focus 
the discussion on cases of thought insertion. I conclude that although the reply adds 
interesting elements to the discussion, it is philosophically problematic and, for this 
reason, the main argument for the SPC is not compelling. 
Zahavi’s Phenomenological Approach to Self-Awareness 
Dan Zahavi has become one of the main defenders of the SPC. He suggests that to 
have a conscious experience of, let’s say, X is also to have a degree of awareness of 
one’s self as the subject experiencing X (Zahavi & Parnas 1998, 691; Zahavi 2005, 
Chapter 5). For instance, while listening to a song, I am also aware that I am the one 
listening to that song. This does not seem controversial. However, Zahavi adds: 
“The ‘I’, the subject of self-awareness is simply a feature of the givenness of the 
experiencer” (Zahavi 2002, 697)2. 
Here, Zahavi suggests that the subject of the experience is integral to the way in 
which experience are subjectively given, i.e. the subject of the experience is an 
inherent and primitive element of the experiential stream and its natural 
appearance (Zahavi 2000; 2012)3. Zahavi suggests that one arrives at this conception 
of self-awareness simply by inspecting the structure of conscious experiences 
(Zahavi 2005, Chapter 1). Quite interestingly, according to Zahavi, this primitive 
self-awareness is ‘pre-reflective’, i.e. prior to any reflection on the experience and 
existing as a ‘background presence’ in the givenness of all experiences (Zahavi 2005, 
115-146; Gallagher 2012, 127-130). This pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes the 
foundation for any type of reflective self-awareness (Gallagher and Zahavi 2010, 4). 
In this context, Zahavi seems to use the term ‘pre-reflective’ to describe a type of 
‘unattended’ awareness of one’s self that is part of the structure of the way in which 
experience appears to us. At least, this is the impression he gives when – following 
Husserl – he states that:  
 “Self-consciousness, rather than being something that occurs during exceptional 
circumstances, namely whenever we pay attention to our conscious life, is a feature 
characterizing subjectivity as such, no matter what worldly entities it might 
otherwise be conscious of and occupied with” (Zahavi 2005, 11)4. 
In his work, Zahavi does not deny the existence of a ‘higher order’ self-awareness. 
However, he suggests that the pre-reflective type is a necessary condition for any 
other type of higher order self-awareness that Zahavi calls ‘reflective self-
awareness’. Let’s contrast these two types of self-awareness: 
 ASASE 
Self Awareness and the Self-Presenting Character of Abnormal Conscious Experience 
211 
(a) On the one hand, the so-called ‘reflective self-awareness’ is the product of 
directing our attention to the structure of our own occurrent mental states. This 
would imply a certain degree of cognitive and representational processing (Zahavi 
2005). However, according to Zahavi, this takes us away from the most 
fundamental nature of self-awareness, namely, its pre-reflective givenness. Zahavi 
seems to understandthe term ‘reflective’ in a Lockean sense i.e. as the mind’s ability 
to turn its gaze inward upon itself (self-directedness), becoming the object of its 
contemplation (Locke 1975, 107). As a result of directing our attention to a certain 
mental state, we can reflectively be aware that we are in that mental state. An 
example of this type of self-awareness would be the so-called ‘narrative self-
awareness’ (Gallagher 2000; Zahavi 2007). 
(b) On the other hand, the ‘pre-reflective’ type is understood as an ‘unattended’ 
awareness of one’s self that is ‘always present’ as an element of the common way in 
which experiences are given before directing our attention to them. Zahavi 
understands this type of self-awareness as part of the givenness of experience. The 
term ‘pre-reflective’ takes two meanings in this context: ‘(1) it is an [unattended] 
awareness we have before we do any reflecting on our experience; (2) it is an 
implicit and first-order awareness rather than an explicit or higher-order form of 
self-consciousness’ (Zahavi & Gallagher 2010, 1). According to Zahavi, we do not 
need to do any reflection on the structure of experience in order to be pre-
reflectively aware that we are the ones undergoing our experiences. Zahavi claims 
that the ‘reflective self-awareness’ just thematizes an awareness that belongs to the 
very same structure in which experience intentionally is, and hence: “an explicit 
reflective self-consciousness is possible only because there is a pre-reflective self-
awareness that is an ongoing and more primary self-consciousness […]” (Ibid). 
Finally, Zahavi states the relation between reflective and pre-reflective self-
awareness as follows: “Rather, the point is that this reflective self-awareness is 
derivative, and that it always presupposes the existence of a prior unthematic, non-
objectifying, pre-reflective self-awareness as its condition of possibility” (Zahavi 
2002, 17).  
Some philosophers will deny the notion of ‘pre-reflective self-awareness’ (see 
Metzinger 2003; Rosenthal 1997). But we might all agree that for any conscious 
experience it is possible to reflect on it and to become aware of it as our own 
experience. However, this is not what Zahavi has in mind. Zahavi’s claim is more 
controversial; he suggests that the reason why this is true is because of the existence 
of a pre-reflective self-awareness that is part of the structure of the givenness of the 
experience. However, it is reasonable to say that this idea requires further 
considerations. For instance, Thomas Metzinger (2003) does not deny the existence 
of a reflective self-awareness when we reflect on our experiences. However, he says 
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that this self-awareness has nothing to do with pre-reflective preconditions since it 
is an illusion created by a self-system. The main idea is that experience itself does 
not have a self-presenting structure and therefore, we cannot attribute to it any type 
of self-awareness as integral to its givenness. Let’s now examine Zahavi’s main 
argument for his claim. 
Self-Awareness and Sense of Mineness 
Zahavi proposes that in order to be reflectively aware of ourselves, we need to be 
familiarized with ourselves in a more fundamental way, namely, with our own 
ongoing experiencing. In Zahavi’s view, the SPC is revealed through the analysis of 
the concept of pre-reflective self-awareness. According to Zahavi, the way in which 
experiences are given contains certain basic phenomenological features. These 
features are ‘pre-reflective’ in the sense that they are prior to any reflection on the 
experience, and the most important of which is the so-called ‘sense of mineness’. 
This will be Zahavi’s main argument for the SPC.  
Zahavi (2005) suggests that the different modes of givenness of the experience 
(imaginative, perceptual, cognitive, etc.) share a common feature. All of them are 
marked as seeming to be my experiences; all of them have a ‘sense of ownership or 
mineness’. Gallagher & Zahavi (2010) claim that: “the experience [always] happens 
in an immediate way and it is implicitly marked as my experiencer”  (Gallagher & 
Zahavi 2010,1)5. Zahavi  writes: 
“Thus, whenever I experience something, my self […] is present and is, so to speak, 
therefore implicated. The experiences do not simply pass me by, as if they were 
foreign entities, but rather they are exactly mine” (Zahavi 2005, 81). 
Zahavi claims that the sense of mineness is intrinsic to all experiences in the sense 
that: ‘whether a certain experience is experienced as mine or not, however, depends 
not on something apart from the experience, but precisely on the givenness of the 
experience’ (Ibid, 124). Importantly, Zahavi suggests that the sense of mineness of 
the experiences captures an immediate and non-observational access to oneself. 
Since this property is pre-reflective and reveals the self as a part of the structure of 
any experience, the sense of mineness is taken as an argument to say that conscious 
experience is self-presenting.  
In sum, the sense of mineness is taken as intrinsic to the structure of the givenness 
of all experience (all experiences are given as mine) and it needs to be taken as an 
argument for the claim that suggests that a minimal self-awareness is revealed as a 
structural constant of the givenness of experience. This is because the sense of 
mineness presents the experiences as being mine, i.e. presenting me as the subject 
of those experiences. 
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Disrupted Sense of Mineness and the SPT 
It is hard to imagine what abnormal mental phenomena feel like. However, it is 
widely agreed that abnormal experiences constitute a valuable contribution to 
understating the most essential features of phenomenal consciousness and self-
awareness (Parnas & Zahavi 2003). These reports have been taken as a plausible 
way of testing theories in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, neuroscience and 
cognitive science (Gallagher 2000; Parnas & Zahavi 2000; Metzinger 2003, 439). 
Conversely, a theory which fails to accommodate pathological cases may be 
problematic. 
In the context of our discussion, pathological cases confront us with situations that 
challenge the argument from the sense of mineness. Since our discussion of the SPC 
concerns the way in which experiences are given to us, it is extremely important to 
pay careful attention to the phenomenology of these cases in order to raise plausible 
conclusions on this debate. In this section, I shall examine the claim that no 
experience lacks the ‘sense of ownership’ that underlies the SPC. There seem to exist 
an important number of empirical cases that suggest that it is possible to have 
experiences with no sense of mineness and therefore, that the argument from the 
sense of mineness is false. The most challenging cases come from people suffering 
from thought insertion in schizophrenia. For this reason, let me start with the 
weaker cases to finally focus our discussion on cases of disrupted experiences of 
thinking.   
Disrupted Bodily awareness 
Bodily awareness denotes a certain type of experience that presents our body from 
the first person perspective, including proprioception, kinaesthetic experiences, 
bodily sensations and the sense of balance (Martin 1995).  Usually, we experience a 
sense of mineness with respect to the experience of a body part, i.e. in normal cases 
the experience of our body part is marked as mine. However, there are cases in 
which this condition is not met, which suggests that this property would not be 
constant in the givenness of experience, contrary to Zahavi’s proposal. For instance, 
people suffering from somatoparaphrenic delusion deny the sense of mineness of 
the experience of a certain body part. With the lack of this experiential property, 
patients attribute the ownership to someone else or they personify it. In these cases, 
patients receive sensory stimulation from the alien body part; however, the 
experience of that body part lacks the sense of mineness, i.e. the experience of the 
alien limb is not marked as their own. Phenomenologically, patients suffering from 
this delusion experience some body part as not theirs. We might suggest that the 
lack of the experiential quality of mineness plus a delusional general state makes 
the patient claim that the owner of that certain body part is someone other than the 
patient. A similar case – and perhaps clearer – is given by the alien hand syndrome 
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in which patients although feeling the sensational properties of a body part, do not 
experience the body part as their own6. Patients suffering from this condition deny 
the sense of ownership for the experience of a body part. 
These cases give us prima facie evidence to suppose that at the phenomenological 
level, the sense of mineness can be somehow dissociated from a certain type of 
experience. This last distinction is important because Zahavi seems build his whole 
account specifically at the phenomenological level. If we take the reports of these 
patients at face value, we might suggest that: ‘such people experience bodily 
sensation in a limb that they do not experience as their own. That is, they posses 
bodily-awareness without a sense of ownership’ (Smith 2013, 10). Although these 
patients have sensorial inputs, these inputs do not imply the patients having the 
experience of the body part with a sense of mineness.  
Disrupted Action Awareness 
In normal cases, we feel a sense of mineness attached to our conscious actions. 
Usually, from the first person perspective, the awareness of an action reveals the 
action as mine. However, there are cases in which this experience is disrupted. Biran 
et al present the following case: 
“JC [56-year-old right-handed man] attributed wishes and plans to his right limb. 
These attributions were evident in statements such as “It has a mind of its own”, 
“Wants to be the boss”, “Its own way”, “Wants to dust the way it wants”, “It won’t 
go the way I want”, “Controls the towel while I dry myself”.” (Biran et al 2006, 567) 
In the so-called anarchic hand syndrome, patients are aware of their actions but they 
do not have the experience of those actions as their own (Marchetti & Della Sala 
1998). In these cases, patients receive sensory information given by the movements 
of the hand; however, the experience of that movement is not phenomenologically 
given as ‘their’ experience. From these cases we can raise a similar conclusion to the 
one offered in the last section. If we take the patients’ reports at face value, we can 
suggest that they experience action awareness with no sense of ownership (De 
vignemont 2007).  
Disrupted Experience of Conscious Thinking 
The phenomenon called ‘thought Insertion’ – TI henceforth – is widely recognized 
as one of the most significant symptoms of schizophrenia (first-rank symptoms; 
Mellor 1970)7. As a matter of fact, TI on its own is enough for a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia (F20, ICD-10; World Health Organization 1992). Smith (2013) refers 
to these cases as a disruption of the sense of ownership of intellectual experience 
i.e. ‘the experience of consciously thinking’. Smith suggests that:  
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[In normal situations] when I think through a problem I am aware of the problem 
itself, but it is also manifest to me that it is me that is thinking about it. That is, there 
is a sense of ownership over my episodes of conscious thinking (Smith 2013, 11) 
In contrast with normal cases, in TI, subject experiences thoughts which are not his 
own intruding into his mind (Mullins & Spence 2003). As Sims writes:  
“[In TI, a patient] experiences thoughts that do not have the feeling of familiarity, 
of being his own, but he feels that they have been put in his mind without his 
volition, from outside himself” (Sims 2003, 168) 
In these cases, patients do not experience a sense of mineness attached to the 
episode of conscious thinking. In TI, the ‘conscious thinking’ is not given as having 
the phenomenal property of mineness (Metzinger 2003). Quite often, patients 
suggest that the real owner has inserted the thought into their minds (Mellor 1970). 
The following reports are instances of TI: 
 
“I have never read nor heard them; they come unasked; I do not dare to think I am the source 
but I am happy to know of them without thinking them. They come at any moment like a 
gift and I do not dare to impart them as if they were my own.”  
(Jaspers 1963, 123) 
“I look out of the window and I think the garden looks nice and the grass looks cool. But the 
thoughts of Eammon Andrews come to my mind. There are no other thoughts there, only 
his. He treats my mind like a screen and flashes his thoughts onto it like you flash a picture”  
(Mellor 1970,  17) 
“Thoughts are put into my mind like ‘Kill God’. It’s just like my mind working, but it isn’t. 
They come from this chap, Chris. They’re his thoughts.”  
(Frith 1992,  66) 
“Sometimes it seemed to be her own thought ‘(…)but I don’t get the feeling that it is.’ She 
said her ‘own thought might say the same thing (…)But the feeling it isn’t the same . . . the 
feeling is that it is somebody else’s (…)” 
(Hoerl 2001,  190) 
“I didn’t hear these words as literal sounds, as though the houses were talking and I were 
hearing them; instead, the words just came into my head—they were ideas I was having. Yet 
I instinctively knew they were not my ideas. They belonged to the houses, and the houses 
had put them in my head” 
(Saks 2007,  29) 
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Taking the patients’ reports at face value, we can prima facie suggest that patients 
suffering from TI do not experience their thoughts as their own and therefore, from 
the first person perspective, they seem to lack a sense of mineness attached to 
intellectual experience8. In light of this, there are good reasons to think that the 
described cases provide plausible evidence to suppose that the ‘givenness’ of some 
experiences is not accompanied by a sense of mineness (as the SPC presupposes). 
We do not deny that there is ‘something it is like’ to be in the described states. It is 
quite natural and plausible to suggest that there is something it is like to experience 
an anarchic hand episode or an inserted thought that is qualitatively different from 
experiencing a full owned action or a full owned thought. However, the described 
cases show that the phenomenological sense of mineness can be dissociated from 
certain experiential modalities and therefore, this show that this property would 
not be integral to the ‘givenness’ of experience, as Zahavi proposes.  
The described cases show a disassociation between the metaphysics and the 
phenomenology of experience. The hand that a patient suffering from 
somatoparaphrenic delusion is aware of is necessarily the patient’s hand, however, 
the experience of it is not given as having a sense of mineness. The hand is not 
experienced as the patient’s hand. There seems to be a dissociation that occurs at 
the phenomenological level. Hence, taking at face value the reports, we cannot be 
completely sure that all experiences reveal a minimal pre-reflective form of self-
awareness (minimal self) as a constant structural element (SPC). This is because, on 
Zahavi’s view, the presence of a sense of mineness associated to each token 
experience is a condition for the self to be revealed in the experience. As we have 
seen to some patients certain experiences are not phenomenologically given as their 
own.  
Similar interpretations of these cases are found in different authors. For instance, 
Metzinger (2003) has suggested that cases of TI present patients alienated from their 
own thoughts for which they experience no sense of ownership or agency9. 
Explicitly referring to Zahavi’s view, Metzinger (2006) proposes that these types of 
cases demonstrate that the sense of mineness is not ‘an invariant dimension of the 
first-personal givenness’ as Zahavi claims (cf. Zahavi 2005, 143). In cases of thought 
insertion, patients might have introspective access to their own mental states, but 
still experience these states not only as being influenced or controlled by someone 
else, but as alien, as belonging to another. In line with this, Smith (2013) concludes 
from the revision of similar pathological cases that: ‘it seems reasonable to say that, 
in some sense at least, people can become alienated from their own bodily 
experience, action, memory and conscious thought’ (Smith 2013, 12). Based on this, 
he concludes that some pathological cases support the claim that some experiences 
can lack a sense of ownership. In conclusion, it seems plausible to say that it is 
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possible to have experiences with no sense of mineness attached to them, for this 
reason the main argument for the SPT is not compelling. 
Are cases of ‘disrupted sense of mineness’ an argument against the argument from 
the sense of mineness? Zahavi’s Reply 
Zahavi (2005) is well aware of the existence of pathological cases that challenge the 
argument from the sense of mineness. In this section I shall examine some of the 
main aspects of the reply offered by Zahavi and the problems that each aspect faces 
when it tries to deal with cases of disrupted episodes of conscious thinking. 
Zahavi claims that the most challenging pathological cases for his view come from 
the discussion of thought insertion in schizophrenia (Zahavi 2005, 3-4). However, 
although challenging, the author concludes that they do not show the disruption of 
the sense of mineness, but rather the disruption of the ‘sense of agency’10 (Zahavi 
2005, 143-144). Gallagher (2012, 132) distinguishes these two senses as follows: 
Sense of agency: The pre-reflective experience that I am the one who is causing or generating 
a movement or action or thought process. 
Sense of ownership: The pre-reflective experience that I am the one who is moving or 
undergoing an experience. 
Zahavi claims that in normal cases sense of agency and sense of ownership occur 
simultaneously, but in abnormal cases such the described ones, they can come 
apart. Zahavi claims: 
“Whereas the sense of agency refers to the sense of being the initiator or source of 
an action or thought, the sense of ownership refers to the sense that it is my body 
that is moving, that the experience I am living through are given as mine […] In 
cases of involuntary action [as in anarchic hand syndrome], the two [senses] can 
come apart. If I am pushed or if I am undergoing spasms, I will experience 
ownership of the movement(s)-I rather than somebody else, am the one moving-
but I will lack a sense of agency; I will lack the experience of being the agent or 
initiator of the movement” (Zahavi 2005, 143-144) 
This reply is based on the standard approach to thought insertion proposed by 
Stephens & Graham (2000) and Gallagher (2000a; 2000b)11. It is important to note 
that the distinction between agency and ownership was originally introduced by 
Stephens & Graham (2000) at the level of attributions and for this reason, in their 
discussion the term ‘sense of agency’ is treated as a result of a (reflective) disposition 
to make judgments about experience and not as an intrinsic (pre-reflective) 
property of the way in which experiences are given. However, Gallagher introduces 
this distinction at the experiential level by suggesting that the ‘sense of agency’ 
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belongs to the intrinsic –normal- appearance of experiences, i.e. pre-reflective12. 
Therefore, it is conceptually important to distinguish between the experience of 
mineness and the judgment (or attribution) of mineness in this discussion (De Hann 
& De Bruin 2010). Nevertheless, although this distinction introduces several 
interesting insights to the discussion, there are several reasons why it is 
problematic: 
First, the distinction looks plausible in cases of action awareness in which one can 
clearly phenomenologically distinguish between voluntary and involuntary 
movement, namely, as one being the author or having the intention of performing 
such actions. In fact, it is widely agreed that the standard approach to thought 
insertion establishes a parallelism between the loss of agency in cases of action with 
the loss of agency in thinking (Stephens & Graham 2000; Gallagher 2012). However, 
this is problematic. As in the case of actions, this model presuppose an ‘intention to 
think’ in any case in which the agent thinks (Mullins & Spence, 2003; Cermolacce, 
Naudin & Parnas, 2007). In cases of thought insertion, this ‘intention’ (T) would be 
disrupted resulting in a loss of the sense of agency. However, this leads to an infinite 
regress: The ‘intention’ (T) itself needs to be a type of thought that accompanies a 
thought (T*), and this type of thought (T*) needs to have a previous intention that 
is a type of thought (T**) and so on ad infinitum. Indeed, if every act of thinking is 
explained by a prior intention to think, the model leads to an infinite regress 
whenever and agent thinks. 
Secondly, the distinction cannot offer an account of the unique phenomenology of 
thought insertion, or at least: ‘it makes thought insertion lose all of its puzzling 
features’ (Bortolotti & Broome 2009, 217). The most puzzling aspect of the 
phenomenology of thought insertion is the ‘alien’ character of the thought that is 
experienced by the patient. In fact, this is the main aspect that distinguishes thought 
insertion from obsessive thought, thought withdrawal and influenced thinking 
(Mullens & Spence 2003). However, by explaining thought insertion on the basis of 
a disrupted sense of agency and a retained sense of mineness, Zahavi’s reply cannot 
account for the alien character of the phenomenon. In fact, this account cannot 
discriminate between normal cases of spontaneous thoughts, obsessive thoughts 
and cases of thought insertion. In everyday life, many thoughts pop into our mind 
without being preceded by specific intentions –as Zahavi’s distinction presupposes-
. However, this does not lead us to experience these thoughts as ‘not being mine’ 
i.e. with an alien character. Similarly, Jaspers (1963) claims that obsessive thoughts 
arise against the patient’s will. This leads the patient to perform different obsessive 
rituals as attempts to suppress the disrupting obsessive thought. Obsessions have 
been explained on the basis of a disrupted sense of agency and a retained sense of 
mineness. However, obsessive thoughts lack the ‘alien’ quality that inserted 
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thoughts present. Based on these two cases, it seems plausible to say that the 
distinction fails to offer a distinct account of the phenomenology of thought 
insertion different from intrusive thoughts and obsessions. This distinction cannot 
capture the characteristic conflict that a patient suffering from thought insertion 
faces. 
Trying to reply to these objections, Zahavi is forced to make an additional move to 
deal with the no-sense-of-mineness cases. This move is given by the author’s way 
of understanding experience. Let me explain this point. Following Williams James 
and against transparency philosophers, Zahavi claims that experiences are always 
something given to somebody; there are no ‘free-floating’ experiences13 (Gallagher 
2012). In experience –through them-, objects are given as having certain properties, 
‘as appearing in a certain way’ (Zahavi 2005, 121). There is therefore, a double 
dimension to the structure of the givenness of all experiences. According to Zahavi, 
there is an important difference between asking about the properties that a certain 
object appears as having (or what the object looks like to the observer) and asking 
about the properties of the experience of that certain object (or what the perceiving 
feels like to the perceiver) (Ibid 2005,  121). The former pertains to the properties of 
the perceived object -which Zahavi calls sensed-, while the latter pertains to the 
properties of the act of perceiving –which Zahavi calls sensing-. From this, Zahavi 
claims that: ‘We cannot be conscious of an object [a song] unless we are aware of 
the experience through which this object is made to appears [my listening]’ (Ibid,  
121) and exemplifies his point by claiming that: ‘The taste of the lemon is a 
qualitative feature of the lemon and must be distinguished from whatever qualities 
my tasting of the lemon has’ (Ibid 2005,  119). Finally, Zahavi suggests that although 
these two aspects –sensing and sensed- can be conceptually distinguished: ‘they 
cannot be detached and encountered in isolation from one another’ (Ibid,  123). 
Taking this into consideration, Zahavi concludes that in cases of disrupted sense of 
mineness in action awareness and experiences of conscious thinking (TI), the act of 
perceiving, acting or thinking (different modes of sensing) is always given as mine, 
i.e. I am the one undergoing those modes of sensing. In cases of thought insertion, 
the author concludes that the thought is not given as mine in the sense that I am not 
the source of that thought, but I am the one experiencing the thought as not being 
mine (Ibid, 144).  
Zahavi’s model of experience looks plausible in certain case, such as cases of visual 
perception. One can clearly distinguish between the way in which, say the chair is 
given (sensed) and the way in which my experience of the chair is given (sensing). 
The same applies in cases of bodily perception where one can distinguish, say my 
hand as having certain properties (sensed) and my experiencing (sensing) 14. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to say that this model deals in a more or less plausible 
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way with cases of disrupted bodily awareness. The model struggles to account for 
cases of somatoparaphrenic delusion, but for the sake of argument we can ignore 
this point here. However, this model leads us to some unavoidable problems when 
it is applied to cases of conscious thinking.  
First, as has already been pointed out by Metzinger (2006), a quite general worry is 
that Zahavi does not explain how the conceptual distinction between sensed and 
sensing grounds the distinction between the sense of agency and mineness. He 
explains neither why nor how the former supports the latter.  
Secondly and more relevant to our discussion, it is not clear if we can distinguish 
between the ‘givenness of a thought’ and the ‘givenness of my thinking the 
thought’. The distinction is equally problematic in cases of inserted emotions, where 
it is difficult to distinguish between ‘an emotion’ and ‘my experiencing the 
emotion’.  In fact, it is completely plausible that no separation between a ‘thought’ 
and ‘thinking the thought’ can be made. As Cermolacce, Naudin & Parnas (2007) 
suggest: ‘there is no separation here between thinking and a familiarity with what 
one is thinking’ (p. 709). This is because the thinking is the thought itself and –in 
cases of emotions- the experiencing is the emotion. Therefore, when a patient 
reports an experience of inserted thought it is not conceptually accurate to propose 
that the patient preserves a sense of mineness for her thinking. This is because in 
cases of thought insertion, it is the act of thinking (the thought) that is not given as 
the patient’s act of thinking (thought).   
Finally and more importantly, this model of experience leads us to (yet) another 
infinite regress. Let’s understand ‘thinking’ as a case of ‘intellectual experience’, just 
as Zahavi seems to do (Zahavi 2005, 124). Based on Zahavi’s model, we need to 
distinguish between the way in which a thought is given (T: sensed) and the way in 
which my thinking a thought is given (TT: sensing). In cases of thought insertion 
(T) would not be given as mine, but (TT) still given as mine. This distinction 
becomes problematic because ‘thinking the thought’ (TT) is a type of experience and 
by definition, we need to distinguish between the givenness of (TT) and the 
givenness of my thinking (TT) i.e. (TT*) and so on ad infinitum. Therefore, if we 
understand conscious thinking as a case of intellectual experience, Zahavi’s 
distinction leads to an infinite regress whenever I have an intellectual experience. 
Conclusion 
Dan Zahavi develops an interesting and philosophically detailed 
phenomenological approach to the relationship between phenomenal 
consciousness and self-awareness. In doing so, he suggests that conscious 
experience has a self-presenting character (SPC) via a sense of mineness. This essay 
has offered a philosophical assessment of his main argument, focusing on the claim 
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that no experience lacks a sense of mineness. Roughly speaking, Zahavi proposes 
that all experiences include a sense of mineness as a part of the way in which they 
are given. However, reports of people suffering from different pathologies 
challenge this idea. From the revision of cases of somatoparaphrenic delusions, 
alien hand syndrome and thought insertion, among others, we concluded some 
experiences can lack sense of mineness. Zahavi is well aware of the existence of 
these cases and he elaborates a reply based on the standard approach to thought 
insertion. However, the author’s reply presents several philosophical problems, 
especially in relation to cases of thought insertion. In analysing cases of thought 
insertion, Zahavi makes a distinction between the sense of agency and the sense of 
mineness, which establishes an implausible parallelism between the 
phenomenology of action and conscious thinking, eventually leading to an infinite 
regress. In addition, his distinction cannot discriminate between the 
phenomenology of obsession and everyday disruptive thoughts from cases of 
disruption of conscious thinking thought. The distinction explains neither the 
uniqueness of the phenomenology of thought insertion nor the conflict that patients 
feel when they experience this abnormal experience. Trying to save his argument 
from these kinds of objections, Zahavi makes a problematic distinction between ‘the 
givenness of an object’ (sensed) and the ‘givenness of my experience of the object’ 
(sensing). This distinction is plausible in cases of perceptual experience, but it is 
conceptually inaccurate when applied to cases of conscious thinking and leads to 
another infinite regress. Finally, based on the philosophical examination offered in 
this essay, I conclude that although the standard reply adds interesting elements to 
the discussion, it is philosophically problematic in cases of thought insertion. For 
this reason, we may conclude that the main argument given by Zahavi in support 
of the SPC is implausible. This does not refute the SPC, but shows that stronger 












1   I will follow Dan Zahavi – the main defender of SPC – and refer to this property as the sense 
of mineness and the sense of ownership interchangeably 
2 This must not be taken as a metaphysical claim. In his project, Zahavi (2005) takes a 
Husserlian phenomenological position towards the concepts he wants to explain. This 
means that Zahavi tries to avoid any theoretical and metaphysical presuppositions 
regarding the structure of conscious experience, making claims only from the way they 
appear 
3  This raises further questions about a possible metaphysical identification of the experiential 
stream with a ‘minimal self’ (Zahavi 2011). However, our discussion will be focused on the 
phenomenological discussion. See note 2 
4 The author uses the terms ‘self-awareness’ and ‘self-consciousness’ interchangeably (see: 
Zahavi 2005, 225) 
5  It is important to note that here ‘implicit’ means ‘pre-reflective’ 
6  Moro, Zampini & Aglioti 2004, 440 write about cases of alien hand syndrome: “Stimuli were 
detected in all trials even though the hand was still felt as belonging to another person. 
Specifically asked about how it was possible to perceive stimuli delivered to another’s hand, 
the patient reported that ‘many strange things can happen in life.’ “ 
7 The history of the term is full of disagreement and philosophical discussion. For a nice 
summary of this history (see: Mullins & Spence 2003)  
8  A similar case can be found in cases of inserted emotions in which patients refer to the way 
that certain emotional states are given to them not as their own states: I cry, tears roll down 
my cheeks and I look unhappy, but I have a cold anger because they’re using me in this way, 
and it’s not me who’s unhappy, but they’re projecting unhappiness onto my brain. They 
project upon me laughter, for no reason, and you have no idea how terrible it is to laugh 
and look happy and know it’s not you, but their emotions’. (Mellor 1970, 17) 
9  The sense of agency is defined as: “The pre-reflective experience that I am the one who is 
causing or generating a movement or action or thought process” (Gallagher 2012, 132). 
10 For a specific discussion about the definitions of this term, see: De Haan & Leon de Bruin 
(2009) 
11 For critical discussion of this approach, see: Bortolotti & Broome (2009) and Martin & 
Pacherie (2013) 
12 In his reply, Zahavi explicitly adopts Gallagher’s distinction (See: Zahavi 2005, 143-144) 
13 James (1980 I, 225) claims that: ‘Every thought is part of a personal consciousness […] the 
universal fact is not ‘feelings and thoughts exists’, but ‘I think’ and ‘I feel’, [yet] to give an 
accurate account of [this] is the most difficult of philosophical tasks’  
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Trying to understand schizophrenic patients is a challenge for clinical psychiatrists. How is 
it possible for a person to write something and be convinced that another person has written 
the text? Or have the conviction that his thinking is shared and commented on by everyone? 
Or believe that the secret movement of his internal organs is controlled and manipulated by 
other people? In addition of being a source of disturbance, these questions threaten our 
common sense about the self and its stability. The self is central to our cognitive activities 
and vision of the world, and several authors have been looking for this elusive concept. 
Analyzing what happens in schizophrenic patients may be a way of discovering how it is 
constructed. The common idea of the self may be more complex than the primitive and 
autobiographical selves that have been considered until now. We need perhaps to envisage 
the existence of an intentional self. 
1. The neurobiology of schizophrenia 
The predisposition to schizophrenia is now understood as difficulties in having 
problems with brain connectivity by way of long fibers, which link distant zones of 
the neo-telencephalon (Fornito et al 2011). These difficulties are due to several 
genetic variations and early environmental aggressions that disturb the 
development and organization of long fibers in the telencephalon. Some structural 
brain anomalies have also been reported, such as large brain ventricles, persistence 
of the cavum septi pellucidi, which is a sign of immaturity, the presence of ectopic 
gray matter, and partial agenesis of the corpus callosum (Degreef et al 1992; Sherton 
et al 1997; Andraesen 2001). Schizophrenic patients and their families also have 
more symmetrical activity while performing a simple task, where normal subjects 
have more asymmetrical activity (Spence et al. 2000). With all these difficulties, pre-
schizophrenics and schizophrenic patients can achieve the same results in complex 
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tasks as normal controls, but with more chaotic, disorganized and laborious brain 
activity (Kim et al 2003). In the same task, healthy subjects only resort to the dorso-
lateral pre-frontal cortex and the inferior parietal zone. 
In daily life we perform very complex tasks: for instance, when evaluating reality, 
we are constantly alternating between our own intentions and the intentions of 
other people. Pre-schizophrenic subjects may have some difficulties with these 
tasks, in spite of giving correct responses after laborious brain activity. However, in 
certain phases of life, the pressure to perform complex tasks may increase, and 
patients give up performing them. Something in their brain may change, and the 
result may be psychosis. 
2. Functions of the Telencephalon 
Before analyzing these events, we should examine the role of those brain structures 
which are disrupted in pre-schizophrenic and schizophrenic subjects. The 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic origin of the telencephalon is the hippocampus 
(Ariens-Kappers 1929). In humans, this small structure is hidden by the temporal 
lobe and large brain hemispheres, but it is dominant in primitive animals (fish and 
reptiles), where it is involved in recognition of territory, since it is linked to the 
olfactory pathways. Deprived of olfactory signals, primitive animals, such as 
salmon, are unable to find their territory (the source of the river where they were 
born) to spawn (Hassler & Larsen 1955). The hippocampus degenerates in human 
Alzheimer Disorder, in which patients lose memory and become disorientated in 
place and time. Place cells, which respond to specific places in the environment, 
were first discovered in the hippocampus. In Mammals, visual and auditive 
information, which was previously processed at lower brain levels (the 
mesencephalon) has risen to the telencephalon and also is at the service of territory 
recognition. But the hipocampus, which is at the base of memory organization, 
maintains its importance in recognition of places. 
However, there is a threefold increase in volume of the telencephalon from evolved 
primates to man. We can now ask why we need such a large telencephalon. My 
provisional response is that we need it 
(1) to handle signs – words, drawings and manufactured objects - which permits us 
to extend our territory, since signs are essential for all cognitive activities;  
(2) to recognize other people and ourselves, since human territory is composed of 
other people. Humans have spread all over the world in families and groups, and 
they are now settled in large communities where they need to reconcile their own 
expectations with the expectations of other people. Finally, we need it  
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(3) to evaluate reality while shifting between our intentions and the intentions of 
others. Schizophrenic patients have specific difficulties in every one of these three 
domains. 
3. Handling signs 
The problem of signs will firstly be discussed. Several mammals, and dogs above 
all, use their urine and droppings to mark territory. They leave signs on their 
territory, which they then recognize by smell. Perhaps humans also deal with 
olfactory signs. However, we have learned to deal with spoken and written words.  
Spoken and written signs presuppose the functional and anatomical asymmetry of 
the brain. This asymmetry arose with the asymmetrical activity of the limbs while 
Homo sapiens manufactured objects, made drawings and wrote. Representing the 
right arm, the left hemisphere processes words and signs in general. An injury in 
the left hemisphere produces aphasia: the patient can’t name objects or words. He 
can't relate objects with words, nor words with other words (Cutting 1997). He can’t 
relate signs with signs. However he recognizes the meaning: he may not name a 
pen, but he can use it properly or say that it is used for writing. On the contrary, if 
a patient has an injury in the right hemisphere, he can describe a pen, but may use 
it to brush his hair. He can’t recognize the meaning of signs.  
Thus, we can say that the left hemisphere processes the Saussurean signifier of the 
signs. Words, drawings or objects are signifiers which represent the world (Eco 
1990). In its turn, the right hemisphere processes the signified, or the meaning, if we 
accept, as Wittgenstein (1995) and others proposed, that the meaning is the way we 
use the signs. In fact, a chair can be very similar to a stool, but what defines the 
different concept and name of each is how each is used. While perceiving or looking 
for a chair, we know that a chair is something where we can sit and lean back on, 
whereas we can't lean back on a stool. Thus, its concept and name must be different. 
We can also say that when we perceive a chair, its meaning is the possibility of 
sitting down and leaning back, and when we look for a chair, we have the intention 
of finding something to sit on and lean back on.  
Timothy Crow (1998; 1999; 2004; Mitchell & Crow 2005), has developed arguments 
suggesting that meaning and intention have the same nature and are both processed 
in the right hemisphere. Difficulties in lateralization in schizophrenics disturb 
intentional activity and the ability to attribute meaning to signs. The most striking 
symptoms of schizophrenia, delusional mood (the sensation that all meaning in the 
world has changed) (Jaspers 1963) and delusional perception (attribution of an 
arbitrary and delusional meaning to a common perception), reveal difficulties in 
assigning meaning. The written and spoken narratives of schizophrenic patients are 
sometimes full of neologisms and idiosyncratic meanings. All these symptoms 
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reveal that schizophrenic patients have obvious difficulties while attributing 
meaning, i.e. difficulties in linking Saussurean signifiers and signified (Crow 2004). 
4. Recognition of self and others 
The recognition of self and others, which is another complex task, will now be 
examined. If a child is in front of a mirror, and has a visible but unexpected mark 
on her nose, she goes directly to her face to remove the mark. This shows that the 
child recognizes herself in the mirror. However, younger children (under two years 
of age) try to remove the mark from the image in the mirror (Gallup et al 2003), 
meaning that they do not recognize themselves. The mirror experiment has been 
tested with other animals. Some evolved primates also recognize themselves in the 
mirror, but only when they are adults.  This shows that self-recognition is a learned 
task. 
Children recognize themselves only after a long period of imitation activities and 
pretend play, during which they first recognize the permanence of objects and 
specifically significant other people. With these activities, children develop a folk 
physics and a folk psychology which is now called Theory of Mind or 
“Mentalization” (Wellman & Lagattuta 2000). Later, they can change roles with 
other people and continue to organize their theory of mind, including the 
development of inter-subjective views and moral decision. 
The universal hide-and-seek game, where a child tries to deceive playmates, is a 
way of learning that other people may have different mental states from herself, 
and that her own mental states belong only to herself. The sense of self-ownership 
may then emerge. Other components of the self may develop later. When 
adolescents play computer games, they develop the sense of self-agency. Having 
the intention of moving the ball, they can verify their success when the results (or 
meaning) match the intention. Sometimes they have to decide if they are the real 
agent, or if the movement of the ball is being directed by the intention of another 
playmate. This occurs when the results do not match their own intention and, in 
this case, they have to study and, so to speak, guess the player's intention in order 
to win the game. Schizophrenics have difficulties with the sense of self-agency (Hur 
et al 2013). 
5. Evaluating Reality 
The ability to shift between our own intention and the intention of others supports 
the daily exercise of evaluating reality, and this is where schizophrenics may have 
difficulties. Klaus Konrad (1959) describes two common situations to explain this 
exercise. 
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The first concerns being on a train at the station. When the train begins to move, we 
have the sensation that we are static, and it is the station and people on the platform 
that are moving. We correct this view by putting ourselves in the shoes of the people 
on the platform, then realizing that, in fact, we are the ones who are moving. 
The second situation is closer to the schizophrenic experience. If we are sitting at 
home, near a window, and hear someone whistling outside, we immediately 
assume it is intended to attract our attention, perhaps calling us as if we were a dog. 
This is the experience of self-reference common in schizophrenics. However, we can 
correct this idea if we look through the window and see that the man is behind a 
dog. Putting ourselves in the shoes of the man, we realize that his intention is to call 
the dog and not us. In fact, we don’t need to look through the window: we do this 
exercise in our imagination.  Schizophrenics have difficulty in alternating between 
intentions and finding alternative meanings. Thus, they feel that everything is 
related to them (self-reference) and they have difficulties in evaluating reality 
objectively (Raballo et al 2006). A common example of alternating between 
intentions is the presentation of ambiguous pictures. A drawing can represent 
simultaneously a duck and a rabbit, and we can see one or the other, depending on 
our intention. Ambiguous pictures are now used as tools to help schizophrenic 
patients to develop their cognition (Moritz & Woodward 2007). 
6. The psychotic breakdown 
Thus, the main problem of the schizophrenic patient is alternating between his and 
others' intentions, and assuming alternative meanings. All through life, there are 
situations where self-recognition and recognition of self-agency is decisive but 
laborious. These are the situations that might precipitate a schizophrenic episode. 
Epidemiological studies reveal that expressed emotions in the family can 
precipitate schizophrenic episodes (Butzlaff & Hooley 1998). These are situations 
where ones own and others' interests, feelings and expectations are evaluated and 
sometimes negotiated, leading to a great effort being made to understand other 
people and alternate between intentions of the self and others. 
The first episode generally occurs in young adults, when they search for new 
intimate relationships and break the boundaries of personal spaces, leading to 
personal fusion. Sometimes, a conflictual affair, where the mind must alternate 
between the self's and the other's expectations, leads directly to a psychotic episode. 
Schizophrenia is more prevalent in immigrant populations (Cantor-Graae & Selton 
2005), and moving to a new community is another factor, which can precipitate 
psychosis. Predisposed young men joining the army have a psychotic breakdown 
when they arrive and not during or at the end of the mission, notwithstanding war 
stress (Steinberg & Durell 1968). 
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As schizophrenics make an additional effort in these complex tasks, something 
occurs in their brains. Cortical zones which process complex tasks can show a 
comparatively greater activity at first, but this declines when the difficulty increases 
(Jansma et al 2004). Thus, instead of cortical processing, the brain may look for a 
more economical (authomatized) mode of processing information (Broome et al 
2005). It is not very clear what happens next, but the basal ganglia are involved in 
this change, leading to increased and deregulated dopamine activity with the 
creation of dopaminergic "aberrant saliences" (Kappur 2003). These events correlate 
with, and are used to explain, the beginning of the psychotic episode when the more 
visible symptoms of schizophrenia occur.  However, and this is the main point in 
schizophrenia, these visible symptoms reflect the breakdown of the self. They were 
called the first-rank symptoms by Kurt Schneider (1966). Thus, the patient is 
thinking, but is listening to his thoughts as if they were spoken from outside. He 
believes that his thoughts are withdrawn from his head and widely broadcast by an 
outside agency. Sometimes he believes that someone inserts thoughts into his head. 
Frequently, he hears voices of other people arguing about him or commenting on 
his activity in the third person. These hallucinations have the same properties as 
inner language, and are produced in the same brain zones. (Jardri et al 2011), but 
they are attributed to other people instead of himself. Thus, schizophrenics have 
lost the ownership of some of their thoughts. In the same way, the patient complains 
that some feelings and impulses and his will are produced outside of himself, and 
his organs, body and facial expressions can equally be moved from outside. As with 
the feeling of ownership, the feeling of self-agency is also disturbed (Hur et al 2013). 
7. The self in schizophrenia 
In psychopathology, we usually say that schizophrenic symptoms disrupt the unity 
of the self (Pio Abreu 2008), as opposed to identity, which is disturbed in 
dissociative pathologies and is concerned with the temporal continuity of the self 
(or the autobiographical self). There are different pathologies that disturb other 
properties of the self.  
Recently, the self has been studied in relation to the default network. The default 
network corresponds to the brain zones that become more active when the subject 
is not involved in external tasks. In this “stand-by” mode, some middle areas of the 
brain, such as the medial pre-frontal cortex, anterior cingulum, precuneus and 
posterior cingulum, become more active. Some lateral zones of the convexity, such 
as the parietal inferior zone, also belong to the default network.  
Activities related to the self and inner activities, such as thinking about 
autobiographical memory, envisioning the future, theory of mind (empathizing) 
and moral decision-making, also activate zones belonging to the default network 
(Buckner et al. 2008). Damasio (2010) considers this zone, and especially the 
 ASASE 
Schizophrenia is the Collapse of Self-Recognition. What Self? 
231 
posterior medial zone, as the substrate of the autobiographical self. However, the 
autobiographical self is a human development of the nuclear self, related to the 
midbrain, where Panksepp (2003) also localizes his primordial self. None of these 
selves are primarily affected by schizophrenia. Thus, we have to look for the self, 
which is disturbed in schizophrenia in upper areas of the brain.  
These areas may be organized by learning, since the recognition of the self is also a 
learned task. In fact, some areas of the default network, namely the convex zones 
and the inferior parietal zone, are not present in young children (Fair et al 2008). 
The inferior parietal zone, especially in the right hemisphere, seems important, 
because it is very active when the subject has to decide between self-agency or an 
outside agency (Farrer et al 2003). We have seen this when speaking about moving 
balls in computer games, but another interesting situation involving tickling can be 
told. 
People do not feel ticklish when they tickle themselves. Why not? It is now known 
that when I have the intention of doing something and I really do something that I 
am going to perceive, such as seeing a moving ball or feeling ticklish, an efferent 
copy of the command order runs through long fibers to inhibit the posterior 
sensitive zone. Thus, if I have the intention of tickling myself, I do not feel ticklish 
because the efferent copy inhibits my sensorial perception. There is an experiment 
where subjects can tickle themselves with a tool, which may then be manipulated 
by the researcher in order to tickle in a slightly different way to the intended 
movement (Blakemore & Frith 2003). In this case, normal people feel ticklish, but 
schizophrenic patients have some difficulty in feeling the difference, perhaps 
because they cannot organize the efferent copies through long fibers in the 
telencephalon very well. 
Frith et al (2000) have proposed a neurocognitive model, which can explain these 
events. Once an action is intended, an efferent copy is sent to the parietal inferior 
zone in order to compare the intention with the perceived result and decide on self-
agency. Furthermore, while the subject is concerned with the results, muscle or 
proprioceptive sensibilities and their re-afference copies also inform the parietal 
inferior zone automatically. If the results match the intention, everything proceeds 
with the sense of self-agency and ownership. However, if the comparator does not 
work, and it does not work in schizophrenia because long fibers are damaged, the 
inferior parietal zone signals an alarm demanding attribution to an outside agency.  
Thus, the patient becomes concerned with his own moving arm as if it was an object, 
and loses implicit knowledge. If the proprioceptive feedback is also difficult, he can 
lose the feeling of ownership too (Gallagher 2000). Losing ownership and self-
agency properties of the self, schizophrenics additionally lose the common concept 
of the self, namely its unity. 
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To conclude, if we look at our current concept of the self, which is challenged when 
schizophrenic symptoms are experienced, we have to consider an upper intentional 
self, constructed by learning, and processed in the more recent areas of the brain, 
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Abstract: The self is central in our experience and has often assumed to be necessary for 
any kind of consciousness in philosophy. Recent investigations in neuroscience demonstrate 
a particular set of regions like the cortical midline regions to be associated with the 
processing of stimuli specifically related to the self as distinguished from those remaining 
unrelated to the self. Furthermore, findings show close overlap between self-related activity 
and high levels of resting state activity in especially anterior midline regions. Interestingly, 
recent findings in psychiatric disorders like depression and schizophrenia show resting state 
abnormalities in exactly these regions that is, the cortical midline structures. Based on the 
psychopathology of the self and the recent neural findings of the resting state, I here develop 
specific neuropsychopathological hypotheses about the self in depression and schizophrenia 
that are amenable to future experimental testing. 
Introduction 
You read these lines. You find them boring and your experience is thus signified by 
boredom. Who experiences this boredom? You. You are the subject of the 
experience of boredom. Without you as subject of this experience, you could not 
experience anything at all, not even boredom. This subject of experience has been 
described as the ‘self’. It is your ‘self’ that makes it possible for you to experience 
things. The self is a necessary condition for the possible constitution of experience 
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and thus also consciousness. It is clear therefore that there is much at stake when it 
comes to the self. We thus need to discuss how to characterize and define the 
concept of self. Why is the self so important? Because we usually assume that 
somebody must have consciousness. Somebody speaks a language. And somebody 
acquires a second language when coming for instance to a new country. Without 
somebody we may remain unable to do all these things. Who though is this 
somebody? This is what is traditionally called self. Hence the self is of central 
relevance. Who though is this self and how is it altered in the psychopathology of 
psychiatric disorders like depression and schizophrenia?  
This is the topic of the present contribution. Rather than going into much conceptual 
detail about the self [1-3], I here start right away with recent neuroscientific findings 
that demonstrate neural overlap between resting state activity and self-specific 
activity in especially anterior cortical midline regions. This is the first part of this 
paper. That is followed by a second part where I will focus on the self in depression 
where, after describing psychopathological and neural findings, I will develop what 
I describe as neuropsychopathological hypotheses. The same will then be done for 
schizophrenia in the third part of this paper. The focus on depression and 
schizophrenia allows me to develop specific neuropsychopathological hypotheses 
that are open to future experimental testing. However, due to the reasons of space, 
this will prevent me from giving a more general overview about the 
psychopathology of the self in other psychiatric disorders like in addiction (see for 
instance [4, 5]) and personality disorders (see [6]).  
 
1. Self and Resting State Activity  
Neuronal Findings Ia: Anatomical Rings, Midline Regions and Self-Specificity 
Neuroscience in general and functional brain imaging in particular detected the self 
in the last decade. In the last 10 years several imaging studies on the brain’s 
recruitment of neural activity during personally or self-specific stimuli were 
detected. Subjects viewed and judged words (or other stimuli like pictures or 
sounds) that were closely related to themselves as, for instance, the term “piano” 
for concert pianists. These self-specific words were then compared to other words 
unrelated and thus non-self-specific to the person (see [7-11] for reviews) 
Interestingly, most of these studies observed strong activity in the anterior and 
posterior cortical midline regions like the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex 
(PACC), the supragenual anterior cingulate cortex (SACC), the ventro- and 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC, DMPFC), the posterior cingulate cortex 
(PCC), the precuneus, and the retrosplenium (see [9-12] for reviews and meta-
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analyses). These findings have led to the question of whether the cortical midline 
structures specifically process the stimuli’s degree of self-specificity and can thus 
be considered a network specific to the self. 
However, the assumption of self-specificity of these regions has been put into doubt 
because tasks and stimuli other than those focusing on the self also recruit these 
regions [7, 8, 12]. This includes various cognitive functions like mindreading and 
decision making, and social functions like empathy, reward, and emotional-
affective functions. 
Another observation is that self-specificity does not only recruit cortical midline 
structures. If self-specific stimuli are presented independent of any associated 
cognitive tasks (like judgment), they also elicit neural activity changes in subcortical 
midline regions like the dorsomedial thalamus, the ventral striatum, the tectum, the 
periaqueductal gray, and the colliculi (see [13-16]). 
Is there thus a subcortical-cortical midline system mediating the self? There is indeed 
some neuroanatomimcal ground justifying the assumption of such subcortical-
cortical midline system (see though the critical stance of [7, 8, 12], who consider the 
midline regions to be too unspecific while they presuppose a different more 
cognitive notion of the self as presupposed here). This is well documented in the 
threefold radial-concentric anatomical organization, with inner, middle, and outer 
rings, that spans from the subcortical to cortical regions (see [1, 2, 17] as well as [1, 
2]). 
On the subcortical level the three rings group around the third ventricle. Most 
adjacent to it is the inner ring, the median part that extends to the aforementioned 
regions on the cortical level. This is followed by the paramedian and lateral core as 
middle ring and finally by the most outer lateral part, with both finding their 
continuation onto the cortical level. The threefold anatomical organization thus 
suggests integrated subcortical-cortical systems. 
Simply put, the inner ring includes all cortical and subcortical regions directly 
adjacent to the ventricles like the anterior and posterior cingulate on the cortical 
level, while the outer ring contains all regions that are visible on the outer surface 
of the brain like the lateral prefrontal and parietal cortex and the sensory and motor 
cortices. The middle ring is sandwiched in between and contains on the cortical 






Neuronal Findings Ib: Anatomical Rings and Self-Specificity 
How is such threefold subcortical-cortical neuroanatomical distinction related to the self? 
Does it map self-specificity better and more congruently than the traditional 
dichotomous medial-lateral distinction? 
For answers to these questions, neurologist Todd Feinberg relies, much like 
traditional neurologists such as Charles Sherrington, on the careful study of 
neurological patients. These patients suffer from lesions in particular regions of the 
brain and often experience bizarre changes in their phenomenal consciousness, 
including their sense of self. Feinberg attempts to explain his patients’ unusual 
experience of the self with the concept of the threefold anatomical organization (see 
[18-20]). 
Feinberg [18, 20]now assumes that the inner ring reflects the bodily or “intero-self,” 
while the outer ring may be rather related to the environmental self or the “extero-
self.” The middle ring is more related to the integration between both and thus the 
self proper, the “integrative self,” than spans across intero- and exteroceptive stimuli 
and thus body and environment. 
Can we gain any empirical support in favor of the different rings’ association with 
self-specificity? Pengmin Qin from my group [10, 21]conducted a meta-analysis of 
all imaging studies on the self using self-specific, familiar, and nonfamiliar stimuli. 
The self-specific condition yielded activity changes in the inner ring regions like the 
PACC, the insula, and the PCC as well as in the middle ring, that is, VMPFC and 
DMPFC. 
The familiarity condition, in contrast, did not yield any signal changes in the inner 
ring and its anterior regions, that is, insula and PACC. The familiarity condition did 
induce signal changes in the middle ring, VMPFC and DMPFC, as well as in the 
posterior regions of the inner ring, the PCC. Finally, the posterior regions of the 
inner ring like the PCC were also recruited during the nonfamiliar condition. Unlike 
familiarity, the non-familiar condition did not recruit any other midline regions in 
the anterior parts but rather the temporo-parietal junction and the temporal pole.  
Taken together, these findings suggest an inner-to-outer gradient coupled with an 
anterior-to-posterior gradient in the brain with regard to self-specificity. The more 
inner and anterior regions like the PACC and insula allow for the neural processing 
of high degrees of self-specificity, while the converse holds for the more outer (like 
lateral regions) and posterior regions (like PCC and precuneus) that are more 
associated with low degrees of self-specificity. Simply put, the own self is associated 
with anterior and inner parts in the brain, while others’ selves are more related to 
posterior and outer parts. 
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We have to be careful, however. The aforementioned findings described concern 
mainly on the cortical level, while there are much less data about the subcortical 
regions. Hence, future investigation is needed to reveal whether, for instance, the 
inner-to-outer gradient also applies to the subcortical level. 
One step in this direction has been taken by Hans Lou from Denmark. Having 
investigated the self in a series of excellent studies (see [22-27]), he assumes a 
subcortical-cortical paralimbic network to be central in mediating self and 
consciousness. This includes the thalamus (pulvinar), the subgenual and pregenual 
anterior cingulate cortex, the medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC, DMPFC), the 
striatum, and the posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus. That network can be 
characterized as a self-reference network that as such may balance other networks 
associated with reward, emotion, and executive-cognitive functions. As such, Lou 
considers it central for consciousness (see also the later discussion of this network 
in further detail). 
Moreover, we have to distinguish between the self-specificity of internal and 
external contents and their recruitment of midline regions. Internal contents 
concern the own thoughts and the own body, whereas external contents are related 
to objects and events in the environment. Future studies are needed to show, as I 
assume, that both internal and external contents with high degrees of self-specificity 
are processed in the subcortical-cortical midline regions. 
Neuronal Findings IIa: Rest and Self-Specificity—Anterior Midline Regions 
The cortical midline structures are core regions of the default-mode network that 
shows particularly high neural activity in the resting state (see[28, 29]). Since the 
midline regions have been shown to be implicated in mediating self-specificity, 
neural activity during self-specificity may strongly overlap with the high resting-
state activity in the very same regions. This is indeed the case, as several studies 
could show. 
D’Argembeau [30] conducted an H20 positron emission tomography (PET) 
investigation. Subjects underwent four conditions, thinking/reflection about one’s 
own personality traits, thinking/reflection about another person’s personality traits, 
thinking/reflection on social issues, and a pure rest condition where subjects could 
relax. This allowed them to compare self- and non-self conditions as well as to 
investigate the relation between self-conditions and the resting state. 
What about their results? The VMPFC showed significant increases in regional 
cerebral blood flow (rCBF) during the self condition when compared to the other 
and the social condition. In addition, they compared all three task-related 
conditions, that is, thinking/reflection about the own personality traits, 
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thinking/reflection about another person’s personality traits, and 
thinking/reflection on social issues, against a rest condition. This yielded increased 
rCBF in the DMPFC and the temporal regions, while no differences were observed 
in the VMPFC. Conversely, the rest condition showed rCBF increases in a large 
medial fronto-parietal and posterior medial network with no differences in the 
VMPFC. 
The separate account of self and rest allowed the authors to directly compare both 
conditions with each other. This yielded strong overlap in the VMPFC between both 
conditions, rest and self-specificity that showed similar rCBF increases. In contrast, 
other and social conditions induced rCBF decreases in the same region. 
Postscanning subjective measures demonstrated that self-referential thoughts were 
most abundant in the self condition while being more diminished in the other three 
conditions. The authors therefore correlated the postscanning measures of self-
referential thinking with the rCBF changes. This yielded a positive relationship in 
the VMPFC. The higher the rCBF in the VMPFC, the higher the degree of self-
referentiality in the thoughts subjects reported themselves (across all four 
conditions as described earlier). 
This strong association, that is, regional overlap, between self and rest in especially 
the regions of the inner ring was further confirmed by recent meta-analyses by 
Pengmin Qin from my group [10, 31] as I will describe in the following. 
Pengmin Qin conducted a meta-analysis of human imaging studies on the self when 
compared to nonself. Most important, he also included studies on the resting state 
to compare their neural activity pattern to the one during self- and non-self-specific 
stimuli. This allowed him to, for instance, directly compare resting state in the 
default-mode network with the regions recruited during self- and non-self-specific 
stimuli. 
What are his results? They confirm the ones described earlier showing regional 
overlap between self and rest. More specifically, the regional activities during self-
specific stimuli and the ones during resting state overlapped especially in the PACC 
extending to the VMPFC, while no such regional overlap with the resting state was 
observed in the other conditions, that is, familiarity and nonfamiliarity, in either the 
PACC or any other region. 
Taken together, these results suggest neural overlap between self-specificity and 
resting-state activity in the anterior midline regions like the VMPFC. 
 
ASASE 
How is our Self altered in Psychiatric Disorders: Neuropsychopathological Hypotheses 
241 
Neuronal Findings IIb: Rest and Self-Specificity—Anterior and Posterior 
Midline Regions 
The strong overlap between resting state and regions recruited during self-
specificity was further confirmed in a recent study [31]. They conducted two 
experiments with different subject groups. Each group underwent a self-reference 
task, explicit judgment of trait adjectives as self- or non-self-related, and a control 
task with a valence judgment of the trait adjectives as either positive or negative, 
and a pure resting state (of about 10 s). This allowed them to compare all three 
conditions/tasks (self, valence, rest) with each other and to see, in particular, how 
much self and rest overlap with each other. 
As expected, they found in both experiments recruitment of stronger neural activity 
in anterior and posterior midline regions (VMPFC, DMPFC, PACC, PCC, 
precuneus) during the self-task when compared to the valence task. Moreover, the 
rest condition was associated with stronger activity than the valence task in the 
midline regions, while this was not the case for the self-task when compared to rest. 
Here the level of neural activity in the midline regions did not differ between the 
self-task and the resting-state condition. 
The authors also conducted analyses that allowed them to directly investigate 
overlapping and dissociating regions between self and rest. Overlapping regions 
(i.e., conjunction analysis) between self and rest concerned the PACC, the VMPFC, 
and the PCC, while dissociating regions included the DMPFC (stronger during self) 
and the precuneus (stronger during rest). These findings could be confirmed in the 
second experiment where the relevant regions, as yielded in the first experiment, 
showed the same pattern of neural activity during the three conditions, self, non-
self, and rest. 
These findings suggest a close relationship, that is, regional overlap, between the 
neural activities underlying rest and self in especially the regions of the inner ring, 
the PACC and the PCC, while in the middle ring (precuneus, DMPFC), neural 
activities during self and rest seem to dissociate from each other. 
The overlap between rest and self is further support by a recent 
magnetoenceophalographic (MG) study by Lou et al [22]. He investigated judgment 
of self-related words and focused on three main regions, precuneues, 
thalamus/pulvinar, and anterior midline regions (including VMPFC, DMPFC, and 
PACC). Using granger causality analysis (which allows testing of the direction of 
functional connectivity), he observed that the three regions were bidirectionally 




Most interestingly, the increase in functional connectivity occurred already 900 ms 
before stimulus onset, while it was further enhanced by the stimulus itself for the 
first 900 ms. Such functional connectivity was strongest in the gamma range 
between 30 and 45 Hz before and after stimulus onset and strongest in the self-
condition after stimulus onset. 
Taken together, these studies show strong overlap between high resting-state 
activity and stimulus-induced activity as elicited by high self-specific stimuli in 
anterior and posterior midline regions, including both cortical and subcortical 
(albeit with limited evidence) regions. Hence, the resting-state activity in the 
anterior regions of the inner ring seems to be closely related to self-specificity in as 
yet unclear ways. What does this overlap between resting state activity and self-
specificity imply for the kind of psychopathological symptoms we observe in 
schizophrenia and depression? This will be the focus in the subsequent sections.  
 
II. Self in Depression  
Psychopathological Symptoms: ‘Increased Self-Focus’ and ‘Decreased 
Environment-Focus’ in Depression 
Major depressive disorder (MDD) is a psychiatric disorder that is characterized by 
extremely negative emotions, suicidal thoughts, hopelessness, diffuse bodily 
symptoms, lack of pleasure, that is, anhedonia, ruminations, and enhanced stress 
sensitivity (see [32]and [3] as well as [17]for a recent overview and [33]). 
How do depressed patient experience their symptoms? This is dealt with in 
phenomenology that, loosely (and rather broadly) defined (see: Northoff 2004 for 
details), describes the subjective experience of the depressive symptoms from the 
First-Person. Such phenomenological approach has to be distinguished from the 
psychopathological approach that targets the depressive symptoms in the rather 
objective terms of observation in Third-Person Perspective. Since the three above 
described psychodynamic key features clearly point to an altered self in depression, 
the following phenomenological and psychopathological account focuses on the 
self. For that purpose, I want to start with a quote from a recent paper that nicely 
describes the alterations of the self in depression.     
 “She sat by the window, looking inward rather than looking out. Her thoughts were 
consumed with her sadness. She viewed here life as a broken one, and yet she could not place 
here finger on the exact moment it fell apart. ‘How did I get to feel this way?’ she repeatedly 
asked herself. By asking, she hoped to transcend her depressed state; through understanding, 
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she hoped to repair it. Instead, her questions led her deeper and deeper inside herself –further 
away from the path that would lead to her recovery.” [34].  
This description of a depressed patient shows three crucial characteristics 
concerning the self which shall be conceptualized as increased self-focus, 
association of the self with negative emotions, and increased cognitive processing 
of the own self (see [35]). 
Let me start with the increased self-focus. Similar to our patient, almost all 
depressed patients look rather inward than outward, they focus very much on 
themselves while no longer being able to shift their focus on others’ (see arrows 
towards the self in Figure 1). Social-psychological theory speaks of self-focused 
attention as focus on internal perceptual events, that is, information from those 
sensory perceptions that react to changes in bodily activity [36]. The Self-focus may 
also concern enhanced awareness of one’s present or past physical behaviour, that 
is, heightened cognizance of what one is doing or what one is like. In addition to 
such increased self-focus, the depressed patient’s focus is often also on the own 
body. Depressed patients show heightened awareness of their own body which 
phenomenologically results in the subjective perception of diffuse bodily symptoms 
(see [37]). The increased self-focus may consequently be accompanied by what I call 
‘increased body-focus’.   
The increased self- and body-focus imply that the depressed subject’s attention is 
no longer focused on its relation to the environment and environmental events, as 
in healthy subjects, but rather on itself as the prime focus with the environment 
shifting into the background. Hence the increased self-focus goes along with what 
one may call ‘decreased environment-focus’. The concept of the decreased 
environment-focus describes that patient’s subjective experience and perception is 
no longer directed towards the environment and its respective persons and events. 
Instead, the patient’s subjective perception and experience is rather directed the 
own body and the own cognition thus resulting in what I here describe as ‘increased 
self-focus’. This means that the balance between the environment-focus and the self-
focus is unilaterally shifted to the latter in depression at the expense of the former. 
Therefore, the decreased environment-focus entails the increased self-focus (and 
vice versa) (see Figure 1). 
This also supported by recent empirical data. Empirical research clearly indicates 
heightened self-focused attention in depression. A variety of studies assessing self-
focused attention with diverse measures and methodologies all converge on the 
finding of an increased and perhaps prolonged level of self-focused attention in 
depression [36]. What remains unclear though is whether this increased self-focus 
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is purely explicit and thus conscious or whether it is already present on an implicit 
The figure shows the relationship between the different directions of phenomenal 
consciousness (here denoted as awareness) in depression. Phenomenal consciousness 
can be directed either externally towards the environment or internally towards either 
the own self or the body. In depression, there is increased directedness towards the own 
self and the body (‘increased self- and body-focus’), while the directedness towards the 
environment is decreased ('decreased environment-focus'). The increased self- and 
body-focus are symbolized by larger circles and inward arrows; the decreased 
relationship of both self and body to the environment is illustrated by thinned arrows. 
The consequences of the increased self-focus for subsequent psychological functions are 
indicated on the very left leading to increased association with negative emotions and 
increased cognitions of the own self.   
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is purely explicit and thus conscious or whether it is already present on an implicit 
and thus unconscious level.  
Another characteristic is the attribution of negative emotions to the own self, the 
association of the own self with negative emotions. The own self is associated with 
abnormal sadness, guilt, mistakes, inabilities, death, illness, etc. which may 
ultimately result in paranoid delusions. A recent study investigating symptom 
clusters in the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) observed three BDI factors among 
them the self-blame factor [38]. Interestingly, depressed patients with previous 
suicide attempts showed significantly higher scores on the BDI self-blame factor 
than those without suicide attempts. Moreover, the self-blame factor significantly 
correlated with the total number of suicide attempts and with known risk factors 
for suicidal behaviour (See [35] for review). Such self-blame possibly results from 
the association of the self with predominantly negative emotions in depression 
while at the same time these patients remain apparently unable to attribute any kind 
of positive emotions to their self.  
Finally, there is also increased cognitive processing of the own self. Our patient 
described above typically suffers from increased cognitive processing, she thinks 
about herself and her mood and tries desperately to discover the reasons for her 
depression and thereby gets only deeper and deeper into the depressed mood (see 
arrows from negative cognitions to the self in Figure 1). This cognitive processing 
of the own self is described as rumination and is often considered a method of coping 
with negative mood that involves increased self-focused attention and self-
reflection [36].  
On the basis of a rumination scale, Treynor et al. [34] suggest a two factor model of 
rumination. They call the first factor reflection, which describes a purposeful 
turning inward to engage in cognitive problem solving to alleviate one’s depressive 
problems. The second factor is best described as brooding as passive comparison of 
one’s current situation with some unachieved standard oriented on others’ and thus 
on what psychodynamically can be called the ideal-self [39]. Corresponding to the 
first factor, reflection, Rimes and Watkins [40]  suggest an increase in what they call 
‘analytical self-focus’ in depression which they define as thinking analytically 
‘about’ oneself and one’s symptoms; such increased ‘analytical self-focus’ is related 
to the increased ratings of the self as worthless and incompetent and ratings of 
depressed mood.  
They distinguish the increased ‘analytical self-focus’ in depression from what they 
call ‘experiential self-focus’. The concept of the ‘experiential self-focus’ is supposed 
to describe the focus on the direct experience of one’s thoughts, feelings and 
sensations in the present moment. In contrast to the increased ‘analytical self-focus’, 
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the ‘experiential self-focus’ tends to be rather low and decreased in depression since 
these patients do no longer experience themselves and their self as such. There is 
thus an imbalance between ‘analytical and experiential self-focus’ in depression. 
Whether this imbalance between ‘analytical and experiential self-focus’ 
corresponds to the above postulated dysbalance between an ‘increased self-focus’ 
and ‘decreased environment-focus’ must remain open here requiring future 
conceptual and empirical investigation.   
Neuronal Findings Ia: Resting State and its Anatomical Organisation  
Let me first describe the findings of altered resting-state activity in MDD. Because 
of several excellent reviews about the structural and functional brain changes in 
MDD ([41-46] we here briefly highlight only the main findings and conclusions 
from these various reviews and then relate them to functional networks as 
delineated in normal-healthy brains (see [3, 32] for recent reviews). 
Alcaro et al (2010) conducted a meta-analysis of all imaging studies in human MDD 
that had focused on resting-state activity. This yielded hyperactive regions in the 
perigenual anterior cingulate cortext (PACC), the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC), thalamic regions like the dorsomedial thalamus and the pulvinar, 
pallidum/putamen and midbrain regions like the ventral tegmental area, substantia 
nigra, the tectum, and the periaqueductal gray (PAG). In contrast, resting-state 
activity was hypoactive and thus reduced in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC), the PCC, and adjacent precuneus/cuneus [41]. 
These results are well in accord with other meta-analyses (see [46-49] ) emphasized 
the role of the hippocampus, parahippocampus, and the amygdala where resting-
state hyperactivity was also evident in MDD. Interestingly, the very same regions 
and the PACC also show structural abnormalities with reduced gray matter volume 
in imaging studies and reduced cell count markers of cellular function in 
postmortem studies (see [46, 48, 49]). 
Involvement of these regions in MDD is further corroborated by the investigation 
of resting-state activity in animal models of MDD. Reviewing evidence for resting-
state hyperactivity in various animal models yielded diverse participating brain 
regions—the anterior cingulate cortex, the central and basolateral nuclei of the 
amygdala, the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis, the dorsal raphe, the habenula, 
the hippocampus, the hypothalamus, the nucleus accumbens, the PAG, the DMT, 
the nucleus of the solitary tract, and the piriform and prelimbic cortex [41]. In 
contrast, evidence of hypoactive resting-state activity in animal models remains 
sparse with no clear results [41]. 
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Taken together, these findings indicate abnormally high resting-state activity in 
extended subcortical and cortical medial regions of the brain. This has led authors 
like Phillips [50],  Mayberg [42-44], and Drevets (see [46, 48, 49]) to assume 
dysfunction in the limbic system in depression or more specifically in the “limbic-
cortico-striato-pallido-thalamic circuit” with reciprocal interactions between 
medial prefrontal and limbic regions being crucial [46]. 
Neuronal Findings Ib: Resting State Imbalance between Inner and Outer Ring  
How do these findings fit into the delineated anatomical characterization of the 
healthy brain as characterized by inner, middle, and outer rings? What was 
conceptualized as inner and middle rings at the cortical level, the paralimbic areas 
and the cortical midline structures, generally show hyperactivity during resting 
state in MDD.  
Another observation fits well with this anatomical model in the healthy brain. The 
outer ring covers the lateral regions on the cortical level like the DLPFC and the 
sensory and motor regions. Especially in the DLPFC and in part also in the motor 
cortex (see [41]), resting-state hypoactivity has been consistently observed, 
especially in MDD. 
Considering these findings together, resting-state activity in MDD may be 
characterized by a subcortical-cortical imbalance between inner/middle and lateral 
rings. More specifically, the inner and middle rings’ regions seem to be hyperactive 
in the resting state. In contrast, subcortical and especially cortical regions of the 
lateral-cognitive ring, like the lateral prefrontal cortex and the sensory-motor 
cortices, seem to show hypoactivity in the resting state (see also [17]). 
Neuropsychopathological Hypothesis I: Resting-State Hyperactivity and 
Increased Self-Focus in Depression 
The aforementioned findings indicate imbalance in the resting-state activity 
between inner/middle and outer rings. More specifically, they show that resting-
state activity in the anterior portions of the inner ring and also to some degree in 
the middle ring is abnormally elevated, while the outer ring’s resting-state activity 
is decreased. This means that there is a dysbalance in the resting-state activity in 
depression along the aforementioned inner-to-outer and anterior-to-posterior 
gradients. 
I now assume the balance between the three anatomical rings and their 
corresponding functional connectivity to be central in constituting the balance 
between self-specific and pre-intentional organization in the resting state. Why? We 
recall the neural balance between midline and lateral networks to be central in 
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designating contents as internal or external as well as in constituting the 
directedness toward contents. Since the neuronal balance between the three 
anatomical rings is altered in depression, one would expect a shift toward increased 
internal contents and decreased external contents. This indeed is the case and 
surfaces on the phenomenal level, as I describe in the following. 
Phenomenally, a core symptom in MDD is the extremely increased focus on the 
own self. All thoughts and feelings are circulating around the own self, the own 
person, which we described as increased self-focus (see Northoff [3, 35]; see also 
Lemogne [51] , who distinguishes such increased self-focus as associated with 
phasic VMPFC hyperactivity from its phasic DMPFC-mediated cognitive 
elaboration). Such increased self-focus goes along with detachment from the 
environment; that is, from the persons, objects, and events with the patients feeling 
disconnected. We described this as “decreased environment focus” (see [17]). The 
question is now how the shift in the focus from the environment to the self, that is, 
decreased environment focus and increased self-focus, are generated. For that, we 
turn to the resting-state activity in MDD. 
One would consequently expect elevated resting-state activity in the midline 
regions to lead to increased self-specificity and hence to abnormally increased 
personal concerns in patients with MDD during both resting-state and stimulus-
induced activity. While it remains to be demonstrated for the resting-state activity, 
it holds true indeed for stimulus-induced activity. Grimm ([52, 53]) from our group 
(and others like Lemogne [51, 54-56] who also distinguish between phasic and tonic 
activity) observed behaviorally significantly increased scores for self-specificity 
with regard to especially negative emotional pictures. Neuronally this went along 
with decreased signal changes during self-specific stimuli in anterior cortical 
midline regions. This supposedly reflects the abnormally high resting-state activity 
and its increased assignment of self-specificity to stimuli. 
The assumption of increased self-specificity on the phenomenal level is further 
supported by the observation of a correlation between the increased behavioral 
scores of self-specificity and the decreased stimulus-induced activity in especially 
the anterior midline structures. One may consequently hypothesize that the 
increased self-specificity as observed behaviorally stems from the abnormally 
increased resting-state activity in the midline regions and their apparently 
increased self-specific processing [52, 53]. 
What do these findings imply in neurophenomenal regard? We observed decreased 
stimulus-induced activity in the anterior midline regions, while at the same time 
the stimuli were assigned increased degrees of self-specificity. How is it possible 
that decreased stimulus-induced activity goes along with increased self-specificity? 
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I assume that this is due to the carryover and transfer of the increased resting-state 
activity and its abnormal self-specific organization onto subsequent stimulus-
induced activity. 
Let me be more specific. The increased resting-state activity makes it impossible for 
the stimulus to induce major activity changes, hence the decreased stimulus-
induced activity. And the associated carryover and transfer of the resting state’s 
abnormal self-specific organization is increased and consecutively leads to the 
assignment of abnormally high degrees of self-specificity to the stimuli, hence the 
conjunction of neuronal decreases in stimulus-induced activity and behavioral 
increases in self-specificity. 
Neuronal Findings II: Abnormal Exteroceptive Processing in Depression 
How about the resting state’s preintentional organization in depression? For that, 
we need to consider how interoceptive and especially exteroceptive stimuli are 
processed in MDD. 
Patients with MDD often suffer from generalized bodily symptoms like heart 
pounding, increased breathing (with yawning), and multiple-diffuse bodily aches. 
This seems to go along with abnormally increased awareness of their own bodily 
processes (body perception), including sensitivity to stress and autonomic-
vegetative changes as demonstrated in a recent work [37]. 
The same study also investigated the neuronal activity during exteroceptive and 
interoceptive awareness (tone and heartbeat counting) in relation to the brain’s 
resting-state activity. Interoceptive stimuli by themselves (e.g., the heartbeat) 
induced a “normal” degree of brain signal changes (activation) in the bilateral 
anterior insula in depressed patients when considered relative to the preceding 
resting-state activity levels. This suggests that there is no abnormality in 
interoceptive stimulus processing itself in depression. 
In contrast to stimulus-induced activity during interoceptive stimuli, we observed 
abnormally reduced activity during exteroceptive stimuli. More specifically, we 
observed that exteroceptive stimuli induced decreased stimulus-induced activity in 
the insula in depressed patients when compared to healthy subjects. This let us 
further question whether such reduced activity is related either to the exteroceptive 
stimulus itself or rather to abnormal resting-state activity levels. The latter was 
indeed the case, as we observed increased resting-state activity in the insula itself. 
This is well in line with the resting-state hyperactivity in the inner ring, the core-
paralimbic system to which the insula belongs. 
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To test for independent changes in exteroceptively related stimulus-induced 
activity, we then calculated the exteroceptively related stimulus-induced activity 
relative to the preceding resting-state activity level. Interestingly, the initially 
observed difference between healthy and depressed patients in “absolute,” for 
example, resting-state-independent, signal changes during exteroceptive stimuli 
when calculating them in such “relative” way, dependent on the preceding resting-
state activity level. Hence, when including the resting-state activity level, there was 
no difference anymore between healthy and depressed subjects in signal changes 
during exteroceptive processing. 
In contrast to the exteroceptive stimuli, no differences between healthy and 
depressed subjects were evident in interoceptive stimuli in both relative and 
absolute signal changes. This difference between interoceptive and exteroceptive 
stimuli with regard to relative and absolute signal changes suggests differential 
interaction of both kinds of stimuli with resting-state activity. Either rest–stimulus 
interaction is reduced during exteroceptive stimuli or rest–stimulus interaction is 
increased during interoceptive stimuli, which cannot be differentiated on the basis 
of our findings. 
What is clear is that there is imbalanced activity between intero- and exteroceptive 
stimulus processing, including their respective interaction with the resting-state 
activity level. Because of the paucity of work in this area, additional imaging studies 
need to investigate changes in interoceptive processing in depression. 
The study by Wiebking [37] also investigated psychological measures of body 
perception, employing the body perception questionnaire (BPQ). They found the 
BPQ scores to be significantly increased in depressed patients as being indicative of 
increased bodily awareness. Most interestingly, unlike in healthy subjects, the 
increased BPQ scores no longer correlated with the signal changes during the 
resting-state and the exteroceptive condition. 
This suggests that depressed patients no longer properly modulate their degree of 
neuronal activity. They remain apparently unable to properly down-modulate the 
perception and awareness of their own body and to shift attention from the body to 
the environment. This may explain the many somatic complaints that characterize 
MDD. Though tentative, such lack of correlations with abnormally increased 
neuronal activity has also been seen for other psychological measures in depression 
like excessive negative affect, self-specificity, and negativistic temporal projections 
to future possibilities [37, 51, 53, 56]. 
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Neuropsychopathological Hypothesis II: “Self-Perspectival–Intentional 
Imbalance” in Depression 
These findings are indicative of an imbalance in the neural processing between 
interoceptive and exteroceptive stimuli, with only the latter but not the former 
inducing decreased neural activity. This may consecutively lead to relatively 
increased neural processing of interoceptive processing and rest–intero interaction 
when compared to the apparently absolutely reduced exteroceptive processing and 
rest–extero interaction. As already noted, this abnormal shift toward interoceptive 
processing may psychopathologically promote increased bodily awareness and 
subsequent concerns with undesired bodily symptoms. 
Meanwhile, the decreased exteroceptive processing may be accompanied by 
reduced awareness of and concern with environmental changes, especially positive 
events that could beneficially impact depression (see Fig. 27-2b). This means that, 
phenomenally, one may want to speak not only of an increased self-focus but also 
of an increased bodily focus and a decreased environment focus (see also: Northoff 
[17]). 
Why though are rest–extero interaction and external awareness reduced when 
compared to rest–intero interaction and internal (i.e., bodily and self-) awareness? 
Recall that I assumed the increased self-focus and increased self-specificity during 
stimulus-induced activity to be traced back to the increased resting-state activity 
and the anterior regions of the inner ring, the midline network. At the same time, 
however, the resting state data also showed decreased resting-state activity in the 
lateral regions of the outer ring (see earlier). The question now is how such 
decreased resting-state activity in the outer ring is manifest pre-phenomenally as 
well as phenomenally in stimulus-induced activity. 
We already know that stimulus-induced activity is reduced during exteroceptive 
stimuli as supposedly mediated by decreased rest–extero interaction. That, in turn, 
may phenomenally go along with decreased external awareness, which 
phenomenally I described as decreased environment focus. Now the question arises 
how such decreased stimulus-induced activity in lateral regions and the decreased 
environment focus are related to the abnormally low resting-state activity in the 
very same regions. 
One can assume a preintentional organization of the resting state that we supposed 
to be associated with the neural balance between midline and lateral networks in 
the resting state. If now this neural balance is abnormally shifted toward the midline 
regions, as it seems to be the case in depression, the associated pre-phenomenal 
balance will also shift. More specifically, the resting state’s pre-phenomenal balance 
will shift toward its self-specific organization and away from its pre-intentional 
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organization. That means that any subsequent phenomenal consciousness is 
predisposed and biased toward increased self-specificity while at the same time 
going along with decreased external directedness of their intentionality. 
That is exactly what one observes in depression. The resting state’s abnormally 
strong self-specific organization is manifest in increased self-specificity and 
increased directedness toward internal contents at the expense of external contents. 
This is reflected in the description of an increased self-focus and a decreased 
environment focus (see earlier). That is possible only if the resting state’s pre-
intentional organization is dysbalanced toward internal contents, which I assume 
to correspond to the abnormal neural balance between midline and lateral 
networks; that is, between inner/middle and outer rings. 
 
III. Self in Schizophrenia  
Psychopathological Symptoms:  Abnormalities of the Self in Schizophrenia  
Early psychiatrists like E. Kraepelin and E. Bleuler at the beginning of the 20th 
century assumed abnormality of the self to be basic in schizophrenia. Unlike in our 
times, these early psychiatrists had to rely on nothing but clinical observation. 
Based on that, they assumed an abnormal change of the self to be fundamental in 
schizophrenia. 
More specifically, Kraepelin [57] characterized schizophrenia as “the peculiar 
destruction of the inner coherence of the personality” with a “disunity of 
consciousness” (“orchestra without conductor”). Bleuler [58] also pointed out that 
schizophrenia is a “disorder of the personality by splitting, dissociation” where the 
“I is never completely intact.” 
A contemporary of Bleuler and Kraepelin, Berze, even referred to schizophrenia as 
“basic alteration of self-consciousness.” Karl Jaspers [59] also noticed “incoherence, 
dissociation, fragmenting of consciousness, intra-psychic ataxia, weakness of 
apperception, insufficiency of psychic activity and disturbance of association, etc.” 
to be basic as unifying “central factors” in schizophrenia. 
The early descriptions of a disrupted self are complemented by current 
phenomenological accounts that focus predominantly on the experience of the own 
self in relation to the world. Josef Parnas [60, 61] describes what he calls “presence” 
as being altered in schizophrenia. The experience of the world and its objects is not 
accompanied by a pre-reflective self-awareness anymore. 
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Let me specify this point. The own self, the self that experiences the experience of 
the world, is no longer included in that very experience: 
“The prominent feature of altered presence in the pre-onset stages of schizophrenia 
is disturbed ipseity, a disturbance in which the sense of self no longer saturates the 
experience. For instance, the sense of mineness of experience may become subtly 
affected: one of our patients reported that this feeling of his experience as his own 
experience only “appeared a split-second delayed.” ” [60] 
The patients remain unable to refer to themselves in their experience of the world. 
It is as if the experience of the world is no longer their own experience of their own 
self. Instead, their experience may belong to and be experienced by someone else, 
but it is no longer their own self who makes and experiences those experiences. Due 
to the absence (as opposed to presence) of the own self in their experience of the 
world, patients with schizophrenia become detached, alienated, and estranged 
from their own experience. Such detachment of the experiences from their own self 
makes it impossible for them to experience their experiences as subjective and thus 
as belonging to their own self. 
The experiencing self is consequently no longer affected by its own experiences, 
which Sass (2003) describes as “disorder of self-affectivity”: the own self is no longer 
experienced as the own self and most important is no longer experienced as the vital 
centre and source of the own experiences, actions, perceptions, thoughts, and so on. 
This reflects what Sass [62] calls the “diminished self-affection,” meaning that the 
self is no longer affected by its own experiences. 
If, however, the self is not affected anymore by its own experience, the self stands 
apart from the objects and the events in the world that are experienced. A gulf, a 
phenomenological distance as Parnas [60] says, opens up between world and self. 
The objects and events of the world no longer make intuitive sense and are thus not 
meaningful anymore to the experiencing subject. The own self becomes thus almost 
objective and mechanical in its experience and perception of the world. 
Neuronal Findings Ia: Resting State in Schizophrenia 
Various studies investigated recently the default-mode network (DMN) in 
schizophrenia (see: Kuhn and Gallinat [33] for a recent review). Recent imaging 
studies in schizophrenia reported abnormal resting-state activity and functional 
connectivity in the anterior cortical midline structures (aCMS). One study [31] 
demonstrated that the aCMS (and posterior CMS like the posterior cingulated 
cortex [PCC]/precuneus) show decreased task-induced deactivation (TID) during a 
working memory task. This was observed in both schizophrenic patients and their 
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relatives when compared to healthy subjects. That is indicative of decreased task-
related suppression and possibly increased resting-state activity. 
Furthermore, the very same schizophrenic subjects also showed increased 
functional connectivity of the aCMS with other posterior regions of the CMS, such 
as the PCC. Both functional hyperconnectivity and decreased TID correlated 
negatively with each other. The more decreased task-related suppression, the more 
increased the degree of functional connectivity. Finally, both decreased TID and 
increased functional connectivity in aCMS correlated with psychopathology, that 
is, the predominantly positive symptoms as measured with the PANS scale. 
Decreased TID in aCMS was also observed in an earlier study that investigated 
working memory [63]. Similar to the study described earlier, they let subjects 
perform a working memory task and observed abnormally decreased TID in aCMS 
in schizophrenic patients when compared to healthy subjects. And similar to the 
other study, they also observed abnormal task-related activation in the right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in schizophrenic patients. Another study [64] also 
reported abnormal TID in aCMS as well as abnormal functional connectivity from 
aCMS and posterior CMS to the insula in schizophrenic patients (see also [65-68] .In 
addition to TID and functional connectivity, another abnormal measure of resting-
state activity is the temporal features, more specifically fluctuations or oscillations 
in certain temporal frequencies. For instance, Hoptman [69] demonstrated that low-
frequency fluctuations in the resting state were increased in the aCMS (and the 
parahippocampal gyrus) in schizophrenic patients, while they were decreased in 
other regions like the insula. Abnormally increased low-frequency oscillations 
(<0.06 Hz) in the aCMS (and posterior CMS regions and the auditory network) and 
their correlation with positive symptom severity were also observed in another 
study on schizophrenic patients [70]. 
Neuronal Findings Ib: Self-Specificity in Schizophrenia 
This concerns alterations in the resting-state activity. How about changes during 
stimulus-induced activity and their relation to self-specificity? 
A recent imaging study by Holt [71] showed that abnormal anterior-to-posterior 
midline connectivity is related to self-specificity. They investigated schizophrenic 
patients during a word task where subjects had to judge trait adjectives according 
to their degree of self-specificity (and also two other tasks: other-reflection, i.e., 
relation of that word to another person) and perception-reflection (i.e., word 
printed in uppercase or lowercase letters). 
How about their results? Schizophrenic patients showed significantly elevated 
activity in posterior midline regions like the mid- and posterior cingulate cortex 
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during self-reflection, while signal changes in the anterior midline regions like the 
medial prefrontal cortex were significantly reduced when compared to healthy 
subjects. Finally, functional connectivity was abnormally elevated from the 
posterior to the anterior midline regions in schizophrenic patients. Analogous 
results of altered midline activity with a dysbalance between anterior and posterior 
midline regions are also observed in other studies on self-specificity in 
schizophrenia (see [72]) 
Taken together, these results demonstrate abnormal resting-state activity in 
especially the anterior and posterior midline network in schizophrenia (see [33] for 
a recent meta-analysis). The very same network also shows alterations in the 
balance between anterior and posterior midline regions when probing for self-
specific stimuli. 
Unfortunately, studies testing the linkage between resting-state abnormalities and 
self-specific stimuli remain to be conducted in schizophrenia. This would be needed 
to support the argument of the carryover and transfer of the resting state’s self-
specific organization onto subsequent stimulus-induced activity and the associated 
phenomenal state of consciousness. 
While we currently do not have such neuronal evidence, there is plenty of 
phenomenal evidence of schizophrenic patients suffering from an abnormality in 
self-specificity in their experience. This makes it rather likely that abnormal self-
specific organization in the resting state may be carried over and transferred onto 
the subsequent stimulus-induced activity and its associated phenomenal states. 
Neuropsychopathological Hypothesis Ia: “Basic Disturbance of the Self” in 
Schizophrenia 
How do these findings relate to the psychopathological and phenomenological 
descriptions? I assume that what the early psychiatrists described as “the peculiar 
destruction of the inner coherence of the personality” or “basic alteration of self-
consciousness” may correspond to what here refer to the changes in the resting 
state’s self-specific organization. Let me spell this out in further detail. 
Following the early descriptions, the basic disturbance in the self is supposed to 
impact all other subsequent functions and domains of the personality. Analogously, 
I assume the resting state’s self-specific organization to also affect any subsequent 
stimulus-induced activity and consecutively all functions, including sensory, 
motor, affective, and cognitive functions (as it seems indeed to be the case in 
cognitive, affective, sensory, and motor functions). In the same way the basic 
disturbance of the self is present everywhere, the resting state, metaphorically 
speaking, “has its hands” in all kinds of neural processing. 
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How is such overall presence of the “basic disturbance of the self” possible? It must 
indeed be very basic. As basic as, for instance, the resting state is basic to any kind 
of subsequent stimulus-induced activity. And it must be carried over and 
transferred to the subsequent stimulus and its associated contents and functions. I 
thus assume that what the early psychiatrists described as “basic disturbance of the 
self” is carried over and transferred to every domain of the subject’s mental life. In 
the very same way the resting state’s abnormal self-specific organization is carried 
over and transferred to the subsequent stimulus-induced activity and its associated 
functions (see Figure 2). 
 
The figure shows different stages in the constitution of an altered sense of self in 
schizophrenia. I assume the encoding of stimuli and their natural statistics to be 
abnormal in schizophrenia during stimulus-rest interaction. That leads to 
abnormal resting state activity with abnormal pre-phenomenal structures. The 
abnormal resting state will then affect subsequent rest-rest interaction which 
leads to abnormal self-specific organisation in the resting state. Any encounter 
with stimuli during rest-stimulus interaction will be affected by that which 
results in the consecutive experience of an abnormal sense of self.  
I indicated three levels, neuronal (upper), phenomenal (middle low), and 
psychopathological (lower). I assume that the above described neuronal 
mechanisms correspond to the respective phenomenal and psychopathological 
features. 
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Where does this “basic disturbance of the self” and thus the resting state’s abnormal self-
specific organization come from?  
I assume the resting state’s abnormal self-specific organization to be ultimately 
traced back to an abnormal encoding of the environmental stimuli’s statistical 
frequency distribution by the resting state’s neural activity. This, in turn, leads to 
an abnormal “environment brain unity,” which in turn affects the resting state’s 
self-specific organization.  
Analogously, I assume the resting state and its abnormal self-specific organization 
to be carried over and transferred to subsequent stimulus-induced activity and thus 
any kind of neural processing. If so, one would assume the resting state’s abnormal 
self-specific organization to lead to abnormal experiences on the phenomenal level 
of consciousness. This will be the focus of the next section. 
Neuropsychopathological Hypothesis Ib: Abnormal Self-Specific Organization 
in Schizophrenia 
How do these phenomenal descriptions relate to the here postulated neuronal mechanisms? 
I assume that they reflect an abnormal self-specific organization in the resting state 
as it is carried over and transferred to subsequent stimulus-induced activity. This is 
in accordance with the earlier described neuronal results of an abnormal resting 
state and abnormal neural activity during self-specific stimuli. 
Let me be more specific. Due to the resting-state abnormalities, the stimulus cannot 
be properly integrated into the resting state’s pre-phenomenal self-specific 
organization. The lack of the stimulus’s integration into the resting state’s self-
specific organization leads then to a lack of self-specificity of the stimulus itself 
during stimulus-induced activity. This decreased or lacking assignment of self-
specificity to the stimulus is then phenomenally manifest in what is described as 
decreases in both self-affection and sense of mineness and belongingness. This 
amounts to exactly the way Parnas and others characterize experience in 
schizophrenia. 
How about phenomenal consciousness itself? Unlike patients in a vegetative state, 
schizophrenic patients still show phenomenal consciousness. I assume the 
occurrence of phenomenal consciousness in schizophrenia to be possible because of 
the transfer and carryover of their resting state’s self-specific and pre-intentional 
organization. The problem is that what is carried over and transferred is abnormal 
by itself. And these abnormalities are then imposed upon the subsequent stimulus-




The case of schizophrenia must thus be distinguished from vegetative patients who 
do not show any phenomenal consciousness. Here I assume the process of 
carryover and transfer by itself to be affected. Hence, we may need to distinguish 
between “what” is carried over and transferred and “how” this occurs. The “what” 
is altered in schizophrenia, while the “how” is disturbed in the vegetative state. As 
we can see, both lead to radically different consequences for phenomenal 
consciousness. 
This also pertains to the distinction between the form and state of consciousness [1, 
2]. The form or organization of consciousness concerns the “what” and thus the 
resting state and its pre-phenomenal structures. This is abnormal in schizophrenia 
and depression as neuropsychiatric disorders, while the “how” refers to the state of 
consciousness, the level of consciousness, that, as I assume, is related to the degree 
of carryover and transfer. This is deficient in the vegetative state and other disorders 
of consciousness (see for instance: [73, 74]).  
Conclusion  
I focused on the abnormalities of resting-state activity across different regions in 
MDD and schizophrenia. Thereby we put the current findings of resting-state 
hyper- and hypo-activity into a wider neuroanatomical context, which suggests 
multiple radial-concentric and vertical integrations between subcortical and cortical 
regions. The inner-middle ring of subcortical core-paracore and cortical paralimbic-
midline regions shows abnormal resting-state hyperactivity in MDD while the 
outer ring of the lateral subcortical and lateral cortical region is relatively 
hypoactive. Since the different subcortical-cortical systems, e.g., the different rings, 
include different functional systems as for affect, bodily perception, reward, 
cognition, etc., abnormal resting-state activity leads to abnormal rest-stimulus 
interaction and consecutively to the different kinds of symptoms in MDD. 
Schizophrenia too showed abnormal neural activity in anterior and posterior 
cortical midline structures as well as in the resting state, which seem to be related 
to the abnormal experience of the self.  
Both disorders point out the central role of the resting state in these disorders in 
general and its particular relationship to the abnormalities of the self. The exact 
neural mechanisms underlying the self in general and its abnormal changes in 
psychiatric disorders remain unclear, however. Future investigations are therefore 
necessary to reveal the neural mechanisms which, in turn, may then yield 
diagnostic and therapeutic markers that allow for the consecutive development of 
endophenotypes and biomarkers and thus for clinical utility.  
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Abstract: Persons with Autistic Spectrum Disorder show various difficulties in social 
skills, cognitive processing and other co-occurring behavioral and physical problems.  
Taking into account that people with autism demonstrate a lack of ability in dealing with 
others, the study of autism, with its specific constellation of behavioral and cognitive 
deficiencies may highlight the structure, development and nature of social cognition in 
general and learning by interaction, in particular. In this article, I will challenge the Theory 
of Mind view that characterizes social cognition as an individual achievement that happens 
within a particular person’s brain and treats social phenomena as external events that 
require interpretation, namely, mindreading. Alternatively, I will support Shawn 
Gallagher’s “Interaction Theory” which proposes that the ability to “read” others is 
primarily a form of body reading rather than mind reading.  
I will emphasize that in autism, a first-person perspective based on pre-reflexive, essentially 
non-conceptual bodily attunement (affective framing) often is replaced with the third-person 
perspective involving the application of algorithms, general principles and abstract rules of 
pure logic, and I will claim that learning by interaction is an impairment of Autism not due 
to an intellectual or cognitive impairment but rather ensue from an embodied cognitive 
impairment.  
 
1. Clinical Properties of Autistic Spectrum Disorder 
The word “Autism” derives from the Greek word "auto" meaning "I", "same", 
"directed from within". Kanner’s early work includes several references to the 
extreme self-focus exhibited by the children he examined. He writes that one child 
“behaved as if people as such did not matter or even exist”, and another gave “the 
impression of being self-absorbed”. Another child is described as following:  
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“he got happiest when left alone, almost never cried to go to his mother, did not 
seem to notice his father’s homecomings, and was indifferent to visiting relatives 
(…) he seems to be self-satisfied to get his attention almost requires one to break 
down a mental barrier between his inner consciousness and the outside world” 
(Kanner 1943).  
Frith and colleagues refer to this self-absorption as naïve egocentrism, and describe 
how it can be a source of difficulty in social interchange for individuals with autism 
(Frith & de Vignemont 2005). 
As pervasive developmental disorder, autism is characterized by deficits in more 
than one functional domain. According to Wing and Gould (1979) it has been 
common practice to base the diagnosis on a triad of impairments: (1) Socialization, 
(2) Imagination, (3) Communication.  
(1) Socialization includes indifference to others, disability in play with other 
children experiencing an interaction based on need (needs-only basis) and often 
nonverbal; inability to measure the thoughts and emotions of others (failure of a 
meeting of minds, Kanner's notion of "Autistic aloneliness"). (2) Imagination: 
evident disability during games activities. While autistic children do not quickly 
build some drama of its creation through the toys autistic children simply organize 
the toys, for example, online (straight lines), build them in towers. Outside of 
games, problems occur when imagination offer resistance to change and reluctance 
to routine activities vary. (3) Communication: is a severe disability of autism. The 
speech (spoken language) is virtually absent in 50% of cases (Yale Child Study 
Center). In general the development of language is considerably delayed and 
markedly deviant.1 
Persons with autism show severely diminished or abnormal social interaction and 
communication, as well as a restricted repertoire of activities and interests (DSM-
IV, 66). These symptoms can be mild, seen in a lack of certain nonverbal behaviors 
such as eye-to-eye gaze and gestures or any type of social interaction, or a more 
serious lack of all reciprocal social interaction and other large impairments in 
language development and language use. 
Autists seem to acquire only a portion of self and yet, many children with autism 
have some concept of self and self-reflection. In fact, their concepts of self and their 
magnitude of self-directed attitudes is limited due to their inability to few 
dissociative lines of development that contribute to the typical self-development. 
Nonetheless, children with autism demonstrate abilities to recognize intentions and 
actions directed to an objective; however, they have a relative lack of propensity to 
respond to the attitudes of the other. Indeed, they can copy actions with 
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intentionality directed (goal-directed actions), but do not tend to identify with the 
subject of the action. 
For Vygotsky, as in “The Genesis of Higher Mental Functions”, these "higher mental 
functions" of cognition such as thinking, planning, memory, are socially founded 
relations, and their relationships as mental functions reflect social processes. 
According to Bakhtin (1981), reasons, self and other are jointly involved in the 
determination of meaning: "consciousness is never self-sufficient; it always finds 
itself in the intense relationship with other consciousness". 
Recent evidence from neuroscience and more specifically from functional MRI 
Scanning Mirror Neurons or other insights of self-other correspondence in 
psychological connectedness and interaction, showed us how something like 
empathy and identification can operate at the neuronal (Decety and Chaminade 
2003, Gallese 2001) and physiological funcionnal level. Behavioral impairments in 
autism are theorized to result from abnormal neuronal organization in brain 
development generating 4 systemically related neurofunctional impairments: (a) 
canalesthesia, wherein abnormal hippocampal system function "canalizes" sensory 
records, disrupting integration of information; (b) impaired assignment of the 
affective significance of stimuli, wherein abnormal amygdaloid system function 
disrupts affect association; (c) asociality, wherein impaired oxytocin system 
function flattens social bonding and affiliativeness; and (d) extended selective 
attention, wherein abnormal organization of temporal and parietal polysensory 
regions yields aberrant overprocessing of primary representations. This model 
proposes that complex human behaviors may be guided by multiple overlapping 
neural mechanisms (Waterhouse et al 1996). 
The theory of cognitive development argues that the concepts of self are necessary 
as the child feels and expresses social emotions since these involve an elaborated 
cognitive process. It is not possible to consider an emotion as "social" without the 
individual experience of the other person’s awareness. At a minimum, this 
awareness has to be constituted by having an emotion of the kind that sets a 
personal relatedness, that is: the emotion can establish social cognition. 
The typical human development as a development of interpersonal relationships 
and social understanding depends on the structure of a self-other very early on in 
life. The self can be seen as an “atom” in the world of relational processes. Thus, 
there are selves that come together to form relationships, but it is rather a relational 





2. Learning by Interaction: an impairment in Autism Spectrum Disorder? 
One of the most widely discussed approached to explain the cognitive and 
behavioral aspects of Autism is Theory of Mind (ToM), it characterizes social 
cognition as an individual achievement that happens within a particular person’s 
brain and body and treats social phenomena as external events that require 
interpretation (Maiese 2013). Through this perspective, we first remark the other 
person’s behavior and expressions, and then we use mind reading to understand 
him. The theory theory (TT), a version of ToM, supports that the pervasive way in 
which we understand other persons depends on our implicit or explicit practice of 
mentalizing or mind-reading, in which we use a common sense or folk-
psychological theory about how mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions) inform 
the behaviors of others. 
Shaun Gallagher has challenged the Cartesian idea that other’s mental states are 
hidden away and inaccessible and rejects the notion that we ordinarily act as 
spectators of other’s behavior. According to him, TT fails to grasp the primary way 
in which we relate to and interact with others and, as an account of intersubjectivity 
or social cognition more generally, can be challenged at the level of its basic 
suppositions: 
“Supposition 1 (the mentalistic supposition): The problem of intersubjectivity is 
precisely the problem of other minds. That is, the problem is to explain how we 
can access the minds of others. This is a problem of access because other minds 
are hidden away, closed in, behind the overt behavior that we can see. This is a 
mentalistic and clearly Cartesian supposition about the very nature of what we 
call the mind. The mind is conceived as an inner realm, in contrast to behavior, 
which is external and observable, and which borrows its intentionality from the 
mental states that control it. Both theory theory and simulation theory set the 
problem as one of gaining access to other minds, and their explanations of social 
cognition are framed in precisely these terms. 
Supposition 2 (the supposition of universality): Our reliance on theory (or our 
reliance on simulation or some combination of theory and simulation) is close 
to universal. That is, this folk-psychological way of understanding and 
interacting with others is pervasive in our everyday life”. (Gallagher, 2004) 
Supposition 1 is to be found, explicitly or implicitly, in almost every description of 
intersubjective interaction that proponents of theory of mind propose. A typical 
example is Happé’s characterization:  
“to have a theory of mind is to be able to attribute independent mental states to self 
and others in order to explain and predict behavior.” Autism, then, is “an 
impairment of the fundamental human ability to ‘mind-read’”(Happé 1995, 38).  
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Supposition 2 is easily documented in the many strong claims made for universality 
by proponents of theory of mind. According with Gallagher (2004), “our normal 
procedure is to treat them [others] as bearers of mental states hidden behind their 
embodied, behavioral manifestations, and that our primary form of interacting with 
them is predicated on our attempts to explain or to predict their next move through 
a process of mentalizing”. 
Proponents of theory of mind do appeal to developmental psychology, and 
especially to false-belief tests, for support. In false-belief task, a subject is asked 
about the thoughts and actions of another person (or sometimes a puppet or 
character in a story) who lacks certain information that the subject has. Importantly, 
these are the same tests that many autistic subjects fail to pass, and it is primarily 
on this basis that the theory of mind account of autism is developed.  
In this context, we shall raise the question: does the false belief paradigm capture 
everything there is to say about children’s abilities to understand others, or does it 
even capture the most important things? According to Gallagher (2004), false-belief 
tasks are thus extremely limited in terms of trying to capture the nature of 
intersubjective understanding. One reason for this is that subjects are asked to 
predict the behavior of others with whom they are not interacting. The subject is 
installed in the role of third-person observer, and in this role the child is asked to 
predict what the other person will do. The fact that what is tested is ability for third-
person observation suggests that the results of these experiments may not be 
applicable to second-person (I–you) interaction, which is arguably the primary and 
ordinary way of encountering the other person. 
Alternatively, Gallagher proposes “Interaction Theory”, which emphasizes how 
our capability to comprehend other persons ultimately rests in a form of embodied 
practice that is emotional, sensory-motor, perceptual and non-conceptual. 
Whatever theory of mind we have, depend on these embodied practices that we 
carry out during interpersonal interaction, and these are the basic ways of 
understanding each other. 
Interaction Theory comprehends Primary Intersubjectivity and Secondary 
Intersubjectivity. Primary Intersubjectivity is the innate or early developing 
capacity to interact with others manifested at the level of perceptual experience— 
we see or more generally perceive in the other person’s bodily movements, facial 
gestures, eye direction, and so on, what they intend and what they feel. On this 
view, in second-person interactions, the mind of the other is not entirely hidden or 
private, but is given and manifest in the other person’s embodied behavior. 
Interaction theory contends that these embodied practices constitute our primary 
Inês Hipólito 
268 
access for understanding others, and continue to do so even after we attain theory 
of mind abilities.  
“What we might reflectively or abstractly call their belief or desire or mental 
state is expressed directly in their behavior” In brief, the developmental 
evidence for primary intersubjectivity suggests that pretheoretical 
(nonconceptual) sensory-motor capabilities for understanding others already 
exist in very young children. Infants already have a sense from their own 
proprioception and movement of what it means to be an experiencing subject-
agent. They can sense that certain kinds of entities (but not others) in the 
environment are indeed subject-agents like themselves; and that in some way 
these entities are similar to and in other ways different from themselves”. 
(Gallagher 2004) 
As contemporary research on mirror neurons (Rizzolatti & Craigheiro 2004; Gallese 
& Sinigaglia 2010; 2011) endorses, our perception of the other person induces a 
sensory motor process that reverberates kinetically and kinesthetically with their 
intentions2 (see: Gallagher 1986; Petit 1999). 
The perception of others’ intentional actions engages our motor and affective 
process in a way that TT fails to acknowledge. In neonate imitation, the newborn 
demonstrates proprioceptive awareness of her own body, the acknowledgment of 
a distinction between self and no self, and also the recognition that the other is, in 
fact the same kind of entity as herself.  
“This interaction depends not only on a distinction between self and non-self, and 
a proprioceptive sense of one’s own body, but on the recognition that the other is 
in fact of the same sort as oneself” (Bermúdez 1996, cit. in: Gallagher 2004 see as 
well: Gallagher and Meltzoff 1996).  
The newborn infant not only can pick out a human face from the crowd of objects 
in its surroundings, but also can imitate the gesture it sees on that face and use facial 
gesture to provoke response from others (Maiese 2013). This is an imitation that 
cannot be mediated by theorizing or even strictly cognitive simulation, rather 
occurs in a direct, unmediated and fully embodied manner. In fact, the infant is 
capable of perceiving other persons as intentional agents. This perceptual ability is, 
as Scholl and Tremoulet suggest, “fast, automatic, irresistible and highly stimulus-
driven” (2000, 299). By the innate body schema appeal, infants can map other’s 
facial expressions and bodily movements into their proprioceptive bodily 
experiences. 
Infants as young as 6 months perceive grasping as goal directed; at 9 months they 
follow the other person’s eyes and start to perceive various body movements as 
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goal-directed movements; and at 10 to 11 months they are able to construe some 
kinds of continuous action according to intentional boundaries. In other words, 
infants are capable of non-mentalistic, perceptually based understanding of the 
dispositions of other persons and they look to other’s bodies and expressive 
movements to make sense of their behavior. 
According to Gallagher, the ability to “read” others is primarily a form of body 
reading rather than mind reading. Indeed, the basic bodily capacities that make 
humans naturally attuned to the expressions of others are largely pre-reflective, 
emotional, sensory-motor, perceptual and not intellectual governed. All face-to-face 
interactions are based in embodied intersubjectivity. Social understanding should 
be, thus, understood as a product of the embodied social interactions of primary 
intersubjectivity, which are both enactive and essentially emotive.  
There are good reasons to believe that our appreciation of others as a person 
involves a disposition to affect them, and to be affected by them. It is during this 
process of mutual affection that joint meanings are generated and individuals’ 
distinct perspectives are intersubjectively merged and modified. Interpersonal 
engagement is enactive in the sense that individuals “do not passively receive 
information from their environments, which they are translate into internal 
representations whose significant value is to be added later”, but instead actively 
participate in the generation of meaning. 
Even in the early stages of interpersonal engagement, the infant’s body serves as 
sense-giving orientation through which all experience is structured, and 
surroundings take on meaning and significance on the basis of the infant’s basic 
needs and preferences. This is not only because the infant must depend on others 
to satisfy her basic needs, but also because the infant spontaneously cares about 
other persons. 
People use expressions, gestures and other body movements to invite the infant into 
some sort of communication. In early interactions between child and caregiver that 
require joint attention, the body plays a key role in allowing the infant to gain 
familiarity with her caregiver’s intentions and attune her behavior accordingly. This 
is a result of infant’s directly perception of other’s desiderative feelings in their 
actions, gestures and expressions, while, simultaneously, becomes directly aware 
of the mutual influence that exists between her and her caregiver. Very young 
children have some basic awareness of their own ability to modulate and impact 
the behavior of others. Moreover, the infant’s experiences inform her that others can 
elicit gestures, actions and expresions from her. She implicit sense that where adults 
point their fingers or direct eyes often shapes her own patters of attentions. As a 
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social agent, involved in a social interaction, the infant is “at once prodder and 
prodded” (Maiese 2013). 
Some of the bodily processes that help to give rise to this sense of relatedness and 
cooperation include the key elements of primary intersubjectivity identified by 
Gallagher (see: Maiese 2013):  
a) A perpetual “intentionality detector” 
b) An “eye direction detector”, and  
c) A “shared attention mechanism”  
This suggests that there is a link between the perception of others and the goal-
oriented potentialities of one’s own body, and that the direct perception of others 
as persons involves bodily responsiveness. In this regard, too, primary 
intersubjectivity is based on something that is cognitively closer to the perception 
of embodied comportment, rather than to a theoretical inference about emotional 
states. It is, of course, impossible to ask the infant to provide phenomenological 
descriptions of primary intersubjectivity. Yet phenomenologists have described 
something that seems to correspond to what is indicated by the behavioral 
measures of developmental psychology. 
Contemporary theorists have called attention to this sort of bodily responsiveness 
or “motor resonance”. Daniel Hutto observes that imitation and motor mimicry can 
be characterized as “instinctual responses to situations or other people, for which 
our innate systems naturally are calibrated”(Hutto 2004). This information is bound 
up with intentional directedness informed by our biological needs; perception of 
one’s social environment often is quick and reliable. To engage in acts of imitation 
and mimicy, infants or adults need not rely on psychological principles or make 
inferences about people’s beliefs and desires, since in many cases subjects simply 
read another person’s basic desires straight from her reactions and expressions. 
According to Hobson (2002)  
“(t)he defining feature of secondary intersubjectivity is that an object or event can 
become a focus between people. Objects and events can be communicated about 
(…) the infant’s interactions with another person begin to have reference to the 
things that surround them. The child, seeing an adult who tries to manipulate a toy 
in the right way and who appears frustrated about being unable to do so, quite 
readily picks up the toy and shows the adult how to do it” (see: Meltzoff 1995; 
Meltzoff and Brooks 2001).  
Quite obviously this understanding depends on shared attention and the pragmatic 
context, just as we understand our own actions on the highest pragmatic level 
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possible. So again, the evidence indicates that well before the development of a 
theory of mind mechanism, the child looks to the body and the expressive 
movement of the other to discern the intention of the person or to find the meaning 
of some object. In this kind of second-person interaction two-year-olds are even 
capable of recognizing pretend behavior, for example, the mother pretending the 
banana is a telephone (Leslie 1994). Our understanding of the others’ expressive 
movements depends on their involvement in meaningful instrumental/pragmatic 
contexts. Therefore, according to Gurwitsch, the meaningful encounter with others 
is not only embodied, but contextually embedded and pragmatic. “Prior to all 
specific cognition, and independent of it, we are concerned with other people in our 
‘natural living’ of daily life” (1978, 35)— in the pragmatic contexts of life. 
From the “Interaction Theory” perspective, social interaction, intersubjectivity, and 
the perception of others are not explainable in terms of socially contextualized 
behavior is irreducible to either pragmatically contextualized or abstractly 
noncontextualized behavior. 
The interaction theory of intersubjectivity, then, includes two important and 
related, but nonetheless distinct, elements: 
ƺ Primary intersubjectivity: embodied, sensory-motor (emotion-informed) 
capabilities that enable us to perceive the intentions of others (from birth 
onward); 
ƺ Secondary intersubjectivity: embodied, perceptual, and action capabilities 
that enable us to understand others in the pragmatically contextualized 
situations of everyday life (from twelve to eighteen months of age 
onward). 
According to Gallagher (2004), “on this view, the theory of mind is, at best, a set of 
specialized cognitive abilities that allow us to mentalize on rare Cartesian occasions 
(from four years onward)”. 
There are good reasons to believe that, in addition to their impaired ability to 
understand other people’s mental states, autistic subjects exhibit wide ranging 
sensory abnormalities that make bodily engagement with physical world 
dramatically different that of ordinary. Because autistics lack a clear sense of the 
meaning and significance of their own bodily feelings, they will find it difficult to 
engage in social referencing behaviors or shared attention. The sensory 
disturbances commonly associated with autism, which are symptomatic of a 
disruption is embodied emotion consciousness, lead directly to an inability to 
become attuned to other people. 
For this reasons, the distinction that Baron-Cohen (1999) sorts between 
understanding the physical world and understanding the mental world is 
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misguided because It fails to acknowledge the sense in which understanding other 
minds is largely a matter of becoming attuned to other’s living. As Baron-Cohen 
himself highlights, pointing gestures, gaze monitoring, showing gestures, and 
others aspects of joint attention often are absent in children with autism. 
Autistics are incapable to monitor or direct another person’s focus of attention, use 
gestures to engage in social communication, and coordinate their own behavior and 
attention to others. It seems unlikely that autism results essentially from a 
disturbance in meta-cognitive or higher-level mechanisms of mentalizing or 
theorizing. Social cognition rests largely on the capacity for body attunement rather 
than theorizing and it is disrupted or etiolated patterns of essentially embodied 
experience and bodily attunement that make it difficult for autistic subjects to 
connect with and understand others. 
Because autistic subjects cannot perceive the intentions or emotions of others in 
their bodily comportment or participate fully in reciprocal bodily modulation, high-
functioning autistics may employ theorizing strategies or mentalizing as a way to 
compensate. Nevertheless, it is indeed because of the lack of ordinary way of 
understanding others, and so must try to make algorithmic and explicit what for 
most of us is second in nature (Maiese 2013). In autism, a first-person perspective 
based on pre-reflexive, essentially nonconceptual bodily attunement (affective 
framing) often is replaced with the third-person perspective involving the 
application of algorithms, general principles and abstract rules of pure logic.. 
Uta Frith and Frederique de Vignemont (2005) depict social cognition among 
autistic subjects as relying primarily on “abstract allocentrism”. Autistic subjects 
take up the allocentric stance in direct social interaction. They rely heavily on rules 
and predict other people’s behavior on the basis of regularities between inputs and 
outputs. Therefore, while autistics are able to understand social structures and 
interpersonal relationships in a detached way, their sense of how the social world 
should work often is very logical, formal and far removed from the reality of most 
everyday social encounters. They are capable only of an abstract allocentric stance 
that is disconnected from embodied, face-to-face interactions, so they tend to rely 
on normative rules rather than the desiderative bodily feelings of affective framing 
when empathizing with others. One might say that people with autism operate in 
the way one might expect all humans to operate if TT were true, by appealing to a 
set of generalizations and approaching social cognition from a detached, third 
person perspective. However, it is important to keep in mind that this sort of rule 
following is not the way the ordinary subjects understand other people, but instead 
a way that high-functioning autistics attempt to compensate for their social 
cognition deficits. The application of rules helps to make sense of what autistic 
subjects appear to be sensitive to moral considerations in certain respects, and yet 
ASASE 
On Autism and Interaction Theories of the Self 
273 
lack moral competence in other. The data listed above, lead us to infirm that there 
is not an impairment on the intellectual o cognitive level, but rather, an impairment 
on the level of perception, this is, on embodied cognition which precludes learning 
by interaction, in other terms, it precludes we-experiences. 
Conclusions 
If the account of bodily attunement that I have presented is correct, then Autism 
should not be understood as “mindblindness” or impairment in the ability to 
theorize about what is going on in others’ minds, infer their mental stantes, and 
predict their behavior. The available evidence (Frith & Vignemont 2005) does not 
indicate that children with autism are impaired with respect to emotion recognition, 
rather they suffer from emotion processing abnormalities and find it more difficult 
to regulate and reflect on their emotions – this may indicate that although they have 
an autonomic affective response, they are unable to decipher fully the meaning of 
what they are feeling, and, as a result, their emotions do not come to the interaction 
scenario during information processing. In Autism the cognitive and the affective 
elements come apart, so that the desiderative bodily feelings or affective framing 
no longer effectively focus attention or guide the subject in making sense of others’ 
behavior (Maiese 2013). It doesn’t seem reliable that they are insensitive to others 
or that they simply do not care, rather than their caring is more detached from 
cognitive processing than it is from ordinary subjects. Maiese argues that this 
apparent detachment can be explained as a deficiency in bodily attunement and an 
impairment capacity for affective framing. Although autistics do exhibit a 
weakened sense of emotional connectedness, they still are able to participate in 
moral life to some extent and are capable of some mode of empathy. Athwart the 
development of moral rules and principles of conduct, they can fashion long-term 
stable values and concerns for themselves and care about the interests of others. 
While many of us are empathically engaged spontaneously and become 
immediately attuned to the concerns of others, autistics rely more on rules of 
conduct and general principles in order to navigate the social landscape. This might 
be described as a “cold” methodology that engages the interest to a great extent in 
order to bring about the sort of affective, bodily attunement that for ordinary 
subjects is already there and occurs spontaneously and pre-reflectively via affective 
framing. 
Since autistics’ mode of empathy is more rule-driven, their participation in social 
and moral scene differs from ordinary subjects. As autistics are unable to grasp 
human emotions intuitively and pre-reflectively through bodily attunement, they, 
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Autism diagnose is guided by checklists such as is found in DSM. Items are used to assess 
socialization and imagination, that include “pervasive lack of responsiveness to other 
people” and bizarre responses to various aspects of the environment. Regarding 
communication, there are items such as “gross deficits in language development”, “if preach 
is present, peculiar speech patterns, such as immediate and delayed echolalia and pronoun 
reversal” and “abnormalities of speech, such as question-like melody or monotone robotic-
like voice”.
 This insight was much developed by Merleau-Ponty who wrote that “between this 
phenomenal body of mine and that of another as I see it from the outside, there exists an 
internal relation which causes the other to appear as the completion of the system” (1962, 
315). Gallese has been developing the implications of the mirror neuron research for these 
kinds of questions, although he takes the simulationist position. 
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Abstract: There is controversy over the basis for young children’s experience of themselves 
and others as separate yet related individuals, each with a mental perspective on the world 
– and over the nature of corresponding deficits in autism1. On the dominant view, it has 
been argued that the human aptitude at inferring mental states is one of the crucial 
preconditions for the evolution of cooperative social structure in human societies. 
Consequently, limitations in psychological perspective-taking among autistic children have 
been regarded as signs of a “Mindblindness” deficit in having metarepresentational mental 
states (Baron-Cohen et al 1985; Leslie 1994). Lombardo and Baron-Cohen (2010) recently 
acknowledged that Mindreading researches have left a gap in terms of devices that may be 
responsible not only for atypical self-referential processes in autistic children but also in 
their integration into the bigger picture of how individuals navigate and interact with the 
social world. This paper defends the idea that the intersubjective relatedness of the self is 
foundational for the development of higher order mentalizing skills and not the other way 
around. Hence, autistic individuals might suffer from a specific Relational-Self Impairment 
which triggers metarepresentational deficits.  
Keywords: autism, enactivism, intersubjectivity, relational self 
Introduction  
Central to the study of the development of self/other connectedness are questions 
that concern our most basic understanding of other people. Primates, and 
particularly human beings, are social animals whose cognitive capacities develop 
upon interaction with other conspecifics. But how can we relate to what is going on 
in other people’s minds? Within the dominant cognitivist2 research paradigm, there 
has been a two-party debate between Theory Theory (TT) and Simulation Theory 
(ST). TT theorists (Baron-Cohen 1985; Leslie 2000) hold that we explain and predict 
others’ behavior by relying on (i) an innate modular or (ii) acquired 
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mechanism/theory of how people generally behave. ST theorists (Currie and 
Ravenscroft 2002; Davies and Stone 1995b; Goldman 2006) argue that we explain 
and predict others’ behavior by using an inner model designed to simulate the other 
person’s mental states. The basic idea is that we understand others by having some 
grasp of their mental states and by using this understanding to explain and predict 
their behavior on the basis of these mental states (Spaulding 2010). At the core of 
our intersubjective skills there are high-level cognitive mechanisms.  
Over the past two decades progress has been limited to articulating hybrid TT/ST 
accounts. However, a new party to the debate has recently emerged, stemming from 
(1) embodied/enactive cognition (Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Bermúdez 2003; Hutto 
2008; Gallagher 2005; Menary 2007; Chemero 2009; Hutto and Myin 2013); (2) 
phenomenology (Thompson 2001; Ratcliffe 2007; Overgaard 2007; Zahavi 2007); and 
(3) Wittgenstein’s late philosophical work (Hobson 2009). These theorists reject the 
idea that at the core of our intersubjective skills there are high-level cognitive 
mechanisms. The Embodied/Enactive Social Cognition approach is roughly the 
view that our normal everyday interactions consist in non-mentalistic embodied 
engagements. This relatively new research paradigm in cognitive science challenges 
the conceptual foundations of cognitivism, namely the idea that mentality is 
essentially content-involving and hence an exclusively heady affair (Chemero 2009; 
Hutto and Myin 2013) and claims instead that we have evolved from creatures 
whose neural resources were devoted primarily to perceptual and motoric 
processing, and whose cognitive activity consisted largely of immediate online 
interaction with the environment. Consequently, it has been suggested that perhaps 
“it is time we set the horse before the cart: personal relations are what provide the 
basis for cognitively elaborated concepts of mind in toddlerhood and beyond” 
(Hobson 2009, 246). If this line of reasoning is correct, then it has profound 
implications for our understanding of minds not as inferential or simulationist 
devices situated in individuals’ heads, but rather as constitutively dependent upon 
worldly and social interactions. The intersubjective relatedness of the self might be 
foundational for and not merely subsidiary to the development of mentalizing 
skills. In other words, the lack of mindreading abilities in autism may be the effect 
and not the cause of interpersonal relatedness impairments. 
This paper is structured as follows: in section 1 I briefly present and discuss current 
understandings of autism within the cognitivist Mindreading paradigm. Then I will 
interpret recent empirical findings as corroborating the idea that Mindreading 
theories overestimate the role of conceptual thinking and thereby fail to encapsulate 
the relational aspects of the self. Part 2 argues that the so-called “minimal self” 
(Zahavi 2005) is primarily a “relational self”, i.e. constitutively dependent upon 
social interactions. More specifically, I discuss empirical findings suggesting that 
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social cognition is not reducible to intracranial mechanisms but instead emerges 
from within the dynamics of the interactive process itself (Krueger 2010). Section 3 
defends the idea that autistic individuals might suffer from a specific Relational-
Self Impairment (RSI henceforth), and reviews behavioral and neural evidence 
supporting this hypothesis. I conclude that the enactive research paradigm, by 
stressing the role of social interactions in shaping the relatedness of the self, might 
provide us with better tools in understanding autistic disorders.   
1. A Lacking Device? The Mindblindness Hypothesis 
The discipline of developmental psychopathology represents a uniquely powerful 
tool in characterizing the underpinning of a person’s understanding of self vis-à-vis 
other people. The social disabilities found in autism have been emphasized as a, if 
not the, central defining feature of the disorder. Indeed, autistic children (AC 
henceforth) show a fundamental impairment in socialization from the first years, 
perhaps even the first days or weeks of life. Unlike typically developing infants, 
they display a lack of reciprocity in social contact, inappropriate gaze behavior, and 
paucity of joint play and communicative skills (Klin et al 1992). Later in life, 
symptoms of social impairment persist even in the case of the highest functioning 
individuals who have a pervasive difficulty in responding empathically to others 
(Cohen 1980).  
The social impairments in autistic children have been conceptualized by three 
explanatory theories. (1) The “Theory of Mind” (ToM) (Leslie 2000; Baron-Cohen 
1985) proponents explain these deficits in terms of very specific and primarily 
cognitive incapacity to attribute psychological states to others and to self. 
Underlying it is the assumption that what other people feel and think is internal 
and occluded from us, and the only clue we have is their observable behavior. AC 
are thought to have more trouble to “read” other people’s occluded minds and to 
conceive of other people’s subjectivity, hence the impairment in empathy display 
and social cognition in general. (2) The Weak Central Coherence (WCC) theory (Frith 
1989; Happé 1994) argues that AC focus on piecemeal information and have 
difficulty integrating what they perceive as well as perceiving things in context. (3) 
Finally, the Executive Function (EF) theory (Ozonoff et al 1991; Russell 1998) holds 
that AC lack control over their actions and attention, associated with activity in the 
frontal lobes. A full review of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper. What 
seems important at this stage of our discussion is the fact that all these theories are 
shaped within a cognitivist-representationalist framework. Indeed, according to a 
longstanding philosophical tradition, to know is to have a mind that possesses 
internal detailed and complete representations of the outside world. The concepts 
of “representation”3 and “metarepresentation”4 have played a very important role 
in research in autism. Indeed, one of the main premises behind the Mindblindness 
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theory is the idea that while typically developing children (TD) have an intact 
mechanism for representing or attributing mental states to both self and other, this 
mechanism (Carruthers 2009) or set of mechanisms (Baron-Cohen 1985; Leslie 1994) 
is profoundly impaired in autistic children (AC henceforth).  
Before setting the discussion about the Relational Self Impairment” hypothesis, we 
need to have a quick look at the evidence on which Mindreading statements are 
grounded. A popular distinction in the developmental literature is the distinction 
between automatized and controlled processes. Automatized processes refer to 
prewired or over-learned structures of behavioral organization in which information 
is represented implicitly, embedded in procedures, unavailable to other 
representational systems of the mind. In contrast, deliberative processes refer to 
voluntary and conscious operations that are flexible and modifiable and can be 
governed by higher-order cognitive goals. Now, the important question is: how an 
infant does develop awareness of and come to represent the sets of internal states 
cues? Are infants initially more sensitive to internal or to external stimuli? On the 
one hand, it has been hypothesized that infants make use of innate cross-modal 
capacity to map the adult’s visual movements onto the proprioceptive feelings of 
his or her own movements that the adult is imitating. For example, Meltzoff and 
Gopnik (1993) proposed that there are innate mechanisms that allow the infant to 
attribute emotions to other minds starting from birth. Experiments on neonatal 
imitation (Meltzoff and Moore 1977) and on the innate basis for primary emotions 
(Ekman et al 1972; Izard 1977) suggest that by imitating the caregiver's facial 
emotion expression, the infant activates through prewired connections the 
corresponding physiological emotion state in himself or herself. The imitation-
generated internal emotion state is then introspectively accessed, and the felt affect 
is attributed to the other's mind. The basic assumption behind this view is that the 
infant's initial state is characterized by direct introspective access to internal 
emotion states, and that they have conscious access to their internal basic emotion 
states from the beginning of life.  
Opposing these views, Gergely and Watson (1999) argued that at the beginning of 
life “the perceptual system is set with a bias to attend to and explore the external 
world and builds representations primarily on the basis of exteroceptive stimuli.” 
(1999, 110) In other words, infants are born with an innate Contingency Detection 
Module (CDM). More specifically, the CDM is supposed to identify the contingent 
relatedness between internal proprioceptive stimuli and external affect-mirroring 
display.  
These debates have been abundantly discussed in the literature and the details will 
not be pursued here. For the moment suffice it to say that current research attempt 
to appraise the infants’ preconceptual senses of the self and others and aims to 
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explain how these contribute to their increasingly sophisticated and linguistically 
elaborated understanding of persons with minds. The core assumption of the 
tradition representationalist view is that there are subpersonal contents and 
subpersonal operations that are truly cognitive in the sense that these operations 
can be properly explained only in terms of these contents.  
In autistic children, for reasons that are not yet understood, there are failures of both 
the basic set of metarepresentational skills and at the intersubjective connectedness 
level. Indeed, both clinical descriptions (Kanner 1943) and experimental studies 
(Hobson et al. 2006,) illustrate how AC appear to lack a grasp of self and other in 
social interactions. Numerous studies have revealed that AC show not only limited 
responsiveness to others in settings that elicit social referencing (Charman et al 
1997; Sigman et al 1992) but also impairment in the assimilations of the stance of the 
other (Hobson 1993) and reduced one-to-one intersubjective engagement and 
responsiveness along with impairment in joint attention and other forms of 
‘secondary intersubjectivity’ (Wimpory et al 2000). 
In short, AC have but partial and fragile capacities (a) to perceive expressions of 
emotion as expressive of subjective mental life, (b) to relate to other persons as 
persons with subjective states of their own and (c) to identify with other people’s 
attitudes, and co-ordinate experiences of self and other (Hobson 2009).  
Unsurprisingly, Mindblindness defenders explain these results by arguing that AC 
display a fundamentally cognitive impairment. But consider the opposite 
hypothesis, namely that the ability to socially interact and read others’ minds might 
have evolved first, with the turning inward of the metarepresentational spotlight 
upon our own inner states developing only later (Happé 2003). Indeed, as Hobson 
insightfully argued:  
“to suppose that children with autism lack cognitive equipment for mentalistic 
reasoning that is normally ‘triggered’ by perceptual input, or to conceptualize their 
difficulties in apprehending and responding to people’s feelings in terms of their limited 
ability to interpret socio-emotional ‘cues’, is to overintellectualize and over-
individualize the socially embedded nature of human psychology” (Hobson 2009, 255).  
In the next section, I argue that our concepts of psychological states are dependent 
upon our interaction and attitudes towards what people express through their 
bodies. Then I review experimental studies suggesting that the complexity of 
interpersonal coordination5 is already present in early infancy. More specifically, I 
argue that an impairment of the biologically-based tendencies for interpersonal 




2. Building the Self through Others: the Interaction Component  
Clearly, the story of the development of self-other relations begins in the earliest 
months of life, when infants adjust to the interactive style of their caregiver (Bigelow 
1998), apprehend and copy certain of the facial and manual actions of other people 
(Field et al 1982; Meltzoff and Moore 1977) and register if someone fails to maintain 
responsiveness towards them in face-to-face interactions (Cohn and Tronick 1983; 
Murray and Trevarthen 1985). The centrality of what has come to be termed as 
“primary intersubjectivity” characterizes the mental experience of infants during 
infant–caregiver interactions from the earliest phases of life (Braten 1988; Hobson 
1993; Stern, 1985; Trevarthen 1979; Trevarthen and Aitken 2001). Given this 
atunement between a baby’s subjective experience of her own as well as of the 
caregiver’s experience during the organized patterns of mother–infant interactions 
from birth (Rochat and Striano 1999), it has been hypothesized that there is a basic 
human-specific drive to share psychological states with others (Tomasello et al 
2005). Trevarthen (2005), for example, showed that the newborn baby is already 
interested in the attention of a nearby person. Indeed, the infant appears to be 
endowed with the tendency to make emotionally expressive movements with voice, 
face and hands which are ideally adapted for interpersonal emotional expression.  
Moreover, attention has been paid to the intricate organization of the early bi-
directional affective and imitative interaction sequences and their characteristic 
contingent ‘protoconversational’ turn-taking structure (Beebe et al 1997; Jaffe et al 
2001). Several studies showed innate attentiveness to and preference for the pattern 
of the human face, a prewired interest in eye contact and an innate propensity to 
follow gaze shift when this is subsequent to direct eye contact (Farroni et al 2002), 
the early sensitivity and motivation to explore and analyze the causal contingency 
structure of interactions (Gergely and Watson 1999) or the implicit understanding 
of others’ pretend actions at 15 months (Onishi and Baillargeon 2005). Later, 
towards the end of the first year, infants relate to others’ actions and attitudes with 
reference to a shared world, for example by showing things to others and making 
requests, imitating others’ actions on objects, and engaging in social referencing 
(Bretherton 1992). A further stage that occurs between the middle and the end of 
the second year is when children show conceptual understanding of self and other, 
for example in adjusting their actions to the needs and feelings of others, referring 
to themselves as ‘I’ and addressing others as ‘you’, and talking about their own and 
others’ mental states (Bretherton and Beeghly 1982). This latter stage has been 
typically taken to reflect a child’s ‘theory of mind’, but also the child’s increasingly 
sophisticated concept of ‘selves’, i.e., of individual persons who have distinctive 
psychological relations with the social and physical world. 
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Recently, evidence has been mounting to suggest that infants’ understanding of 
others is more robust within interactive contexts (Moll et al 2008; Kiraly 2009). In 
other words, the more engaged the interactions infants/agents are the more robust 
the infants’ understanding of others becomes. Consistent with a burgeoning 
literature suggesting a common basis for both the production and perception of 
action, it has been hypothesized that infants’ own actions inform their perceptions 
of goal-directed behavior (Falck-Yter et al 2006; Kanakogi and Itakura 2010) and 
thereby contribute to their ability to view others as goal-directed agents6. 
Furthermore, goal-relatedness is differently perceived by infants in social versus 
physical event configurations (Woodward et al 2001). They regard the direction of 
the others’ eye-gaze as being referentially significant and hence intentional. Studies 
using looking-time measures have revealed a difference between understanding 
passive visual (looker-object) versus active, manual (actor-object) relations in 
infants (Woodward 1998). Similarly, fMRI evidence is accumulating that infants’ 
brain organization in typically developing children may well adapted to be an 
“intersubjective system” (Aitken and Trevarthen 1997; Tzourio-Mazoyer et al 2002). 
Moreover, several developmental studies seem to suggest that higher level 
cognitive processes are strongly affected by the history of social interactions (Jaffe 
et al 2001; Threvarthen 2005, 2010).  
The idea behind these studies is that the environment is never for a living system a 
neutral world waiting to be internally represented and evaluated in order to become 
meaningful. In so many ways, the ongoing online processes are already meaningful, 
without the need of adding an explicit conceptual representation of it. These 
findings suggest that infants’ capacity to understand other minds is rooted in their 
capacity to actively engage in intersubjective scenarios. In other words, there is an 
irreducible embodied aspect to such interactions (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). 
The “interaction component” thesis stipulates that interaction constitutes (not just 
causally contributes to) intersubjective understanding.  
Indeed, by the end of first year of life, infants have a non-mentalizing perception-
based, embodied and pragmatic understanding of the emotions and intentions of 
other persons (Gallagher 2011). Moreover, typically developing newborns show 
rudimentary forms of social mimicry (Meltzoff and Moore 1977), which expands 
(develops) considerably across the first two years of life (Masur and Ritz 1984; 
Piaget 1962). The importance of imitation skills to early peer engagement has been 
established for typically developing toddlers (Nadel and Peze 1993). The imitative 
process begins with imitation of facial movements, available at birth, and develops 
to include affectively related body movements and mirroring of facial expressions, 
body postures, gestures and tone of voice. Importantly, imitation difficulties seem 
to be a core part of the primary symptom set associated with early autism. Several 
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studies demonstrated that social impairments in autism involve dyadic as well as 
triadic engagement (Dawson et al 1998; Hobson 1993). Crucially, unlike motor 
stereotypes and repetitive behaviour, the lack of social and emotional mirroring is 
unique to the disorder (Charman et al 1997; Stone et al. 1997). 
In the next section I introduce the Relational-Self Impairment (RSI) hypothesis and 
review a mix of behavioral and neural studies supporting the idea that the lack of 
mentalizing abilities may be the effect and not the cause of intersubjective 
connectedness impairments.   
3 The Relational-Self Impairment Hypothesis 
Recently, Lombardo and Baron-Cohen (2010) acknowledged that Mindreading 
researches have left a gap in terms of devices that may be responsible for atypical 
self-referential processes in autistic children and their integration into the bigger 
picture of how individuals navigate and interact with the social world. 
Consequently, they argue that what is needed is a more relational approach in order 
to reveal the deeper complexities involved in interpersonal relations. While I agree 
with Lombardo and Baron-Cohen on this final note, I disagree with their proposal 
to replace the search for individual mechanisms by a search of relations between 
mechanisms. In this section I argue that a good way to bridge the above mentioned 
gap is to examine whether the aspects of social-cognitive impairments that extend 
beyond the autistic children’s limitations to form representations are foundational 
in nature.  
More specifically, building upon Neisser’s (1991) distinction between the 
interpersonal self7and the ecological self8and starting with premise that the early 
manifestation of a sense of self in the physical and social domain is not a given but 
rather “develops via the active process of intermodal perception and exploration” 
(Rochat and Striano 2000, 515), the idea is to argue that failures in emotional 
engagement and perspective-taking may be primary in development and cause 
children’s representational limitations. Indeed, one could briefly define an 
impairment of the Relational-Self as a dissociation between autistic children’s self-
consciousness in being observed and their ability to be affected by and engaged with 
the attitudes of a particular embodied person. Against theories focusing upon 
cognitive aspects of autism, Peter Hobson (1989, 1993) has long championed a view, 
which insists on the idea of a profound disruption of patterned intersubjective 
engagement between the child and other is basic in autism. Furthermore, several 
theorists proposed that emotion deficits are primary to autism, producing other 
social and cognitive dysfunctions (Mundy and Sigman 1989; Rogers and 
Pennington 1991). In the remainder of this section, I present and discuss several 
findings that are in line with the RSI hypothesis.  
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At the behavioral level, Klin and colleagues (1992) found deficits in early social skills 
such as reaching in expectation of being picked up: these impairments in primitive 
social abilities are not easily explained as the result of impaired cognitive abilities. 
Furthermore, it seems that a deficit at the level of interpersonal connectedness could 
prevent AC from registering and assimilating the bodily-anchored psychological 
stance of another person as suggested by a recent study by Hobson and colleagues 
(2009) in which AC witnessed one adult tearing another (nonresponsive) adult’s 
drawing. In contrast to children without autism, who expressed dismay, questioned 
the perpetrator, and showed concern towards the victim, most children with autism 
showed very little indication of feeling for the person whose drawing was destroyed. 
The victim had shown no overt expression, yet the children without autism 
immediately orientated towards, and showed concern for, this person. Similar 
findings reveal that AC display limited propensity to register and assimilate the 
bodily-expressed attitudes of others in such a way as to apprehend and relate to the 
world through other people’s minds and emotions. Also they exhibit limitations in 
perceiving and/or adjusting to the perspectives of different figures within a story, 
and in shifting from one-person anchored perspective to another (Hobson and 
Meyer 2005).   
Moreover, several studies illustrated that facial imitation9 is tied to interpersonal 
social engagement, including communication and mirroring of emotional 
expressions and imitation of sounds. Evidence is accumulating that people mimic 
others’ emotional facial expressions (Bush et al 1989; Dimberg 1982). Importantly, 
numerous studies reveal that autistic children are significantly more impaired in 
overall imitation abilities than typically developing children. Stone et al (1997) 
found dissociation between imitation of actions and objects and imitation of 
body/facial actions in young children with autism. De Myer et al 1972 and Stone et 
al 1999 reported that imitations of functional actions on objects were less impaired 
than imitation of body-movements without objects. Also Hobson and Lee (1999) 
found significant impairments in imitating the emotional quality of the 
experimenter’s movement.  
Crucially, not all areas of emotional functioning are impaired. Indeed, autistic 
individuals can express a wide range of emotions and show attachment behaviors 
(Sigman et al 1992). But the interesting point is that autistic individuals reveal 
failures in automatic affective processes, such as those involved in creating 
emotional reciprocity (Hobson 1993, Kasari et al 1993, Rogers and Pennington 1991). 
Consequently, McIntosh and colleagues (2006) investigated automatic facial 
mimicry – a process involved in rapid emotional communication by using the 
psychophysiological method of facial electromyography (EMG)10 (Cacioppo and 
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Berntson 1992). The main hypothesis to be tested was that imitation in autism 
involves two different processes: 
(a) An “affective mechanism” available at birth and modulating social exchanges; 
(b) A more “executively constructed, cognitively mediated, intentional imitation system 
that allows one to learn from instrumental means-end relations from others” (Rogers et al 
2003, 777) 
Hence, they compared automatic11 and voluntary mimicry of emotional facial 
expressions in autistic individuals and a matched comparison sample of typical 
individuals and found that autistic participants did not automatically mimic facial 
expressions, but they were equally successful as typical participants on voluntary 
mimicry. This suggests that their absence of automatic mimicry was not due to 
deficits in perception, praxis, motivation or task understanding.  
Consequently, it has been argued that imitation performance on complex goal-
oriented tasks tells us little about automatic processes that might contribute to rapid 
sharing of affective, more basic states. Indeed, given that autistic individuals 
perform generally better in imitating actions on objects, it has been suggested that 
perhaps autistic individuals make use of the second mechanism (b), but without the 
benefit of the first (a). Hence, their imitation is more effortful and unaccompanied 
by the social / emotional markers of pleasure and intimacy that typically developing 
children demonstrate as they imitate another person’s movements. This model 
predicts a gradual development of imitation abilities in autism as the second 
imitative system, more cognitively effortful matures.  
In another study designed to test the children’s abilities to recognize emotions, 
Hobson and colleagues (1988) presented an array of four emotionally expressive 
photographs of different individuals’ faces. Then they gave the children a pile of 
full-face photographs to sort, with instructions either to sort by the people’s 
identities, or by their emotional expressions. The experimenters selected 
photographs so that the task was either to match emotions across different 
individuals, or to match photographs of the same individual when that person’s 
emotion differed. When they did this with the mouths and brows of the faces 
blanked-out, so that only the eyes were available as a basis for sorting, children 
without autism were much more able than those with autism to sort emotional 
expressions. When the experimenter used full faces- but with the array and the faces 
to be sorted upside-down- the task was beyond the participants without autism. Yet 
the performance of the children with autism substantially improved over sorting 
part-faces, and they scored significantly higher than the comparison children in 
sorting upside-down emotions.  
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At the neural level, Hall and colleagues (2003) investigated whether attenuation in 
neural activation to facial stimuli is present in individuals with autism (adolescents 
and adults) when the salience of emotional cues is increased and additional 
prosodic information is provided. They found that although participants with 
autism performed as well as the comparison group on the gender-recognition task; 
also they responded as quickly, but made significantly more errors than the 
comparison subjects during the emotion-recognition task. They found that high-
functioning adults with autism, when recognizing emotion, place less processing 
emphasis on the extraction of facial information. They also found that in emotion 
processing, adults with autism showed greater thalamic activation which is 
consistent with the suggestion that autistic individuals process facial stimuli trough 
a selective analysis of features rather that holistically. They used cross-modal 
emotional stimuli and suggested that autistic individuals may process these cross-
modal stimuli as competing rather than complementary sensory experiences. They 
draw the conclusion that autistic individuals show difficulties in recognizing and 
understanding emotions because they rely on prototypical representations of 
emotions and use categorical knowledge to solve novel problems of emotional 
experiences. In short, autistic individuals draw on categorical knowledge to 
interpret emotional signals. 
To summarize: individuals with autism are notably impaired in both (1) the 
recognition of emotional prosody and (2) the perception of facial emotion. In order 
to compensate, they use effortful cognitive strategies based on learned associations 
and prototypical references to label emotional expressions. Indeed, for many 
emotion tasks, autistic individuals, given sufficient time, might be able to use non-
affective compensatory strategies to accomplish the task. But these strategies are 
costly. Moreover, this could explain why AC manage eventually to acquire 
language skills while failing to show any propensity whatsoever in engaging in an 
emotional and psychological attunement with other people. Hence, lack of 
communication and participatory sense-making (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007) rather 
than lack of language or mindreading abilities seem to characterize autism. 
Conclusion 
I argued here that impairments of the relational self in autistic individuals might 
induce important mentalizing abilities deficits. In other words, modes of social 
relatedness may be primary over modes of cognitive abilities. I reviewed several 
empirical studies emphasizing both the constitutive role of interpersonal 
relatedness in self-awareness and the basic human-specific drive to share 
psychological states with others. Then I presented recent empirical work suggesting 
that the fundamental social process of automatic mimicry may be impaired in 
disorders such as autism. These findings, I claimed, support the Relational Self 
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Impairment hypothesis according to which the lack of metarepresentational 
abilities may be the effect and not the cause of socio-emotional and communication 
deficits. If this line of reasoning is correct, then the case of autism illuminates both 
the perceptual-relational underpinnings of human beings’ grasp of psychological 
states concepts, and the importance of a shared form of life for successful 
mentalizing functioning. Indeed, adopting this view has profound implications for 
our understanding of minds not as mechanisms situated in individuals’ heads, but 









1  Autism is a developmental disorder with a genetic basis and a prevalence of 0.1 to 0.6%. It 
is diagnosed on the basis of early emerging qualitative abnormalities in social interaction, 
communication and imagination. Given the limited space available here, I shall use the term 
“autism” as an umbrella term for “Autistic Spectrum Disorders”.  
2  Cognitivism is roughly the view that that our cognitive capacities should be understood in 
terms of computational procedures operating on symbolic, internal mental states, and thus, 
that cognitive science should be focused on studying these internal states and processes.  
3   I will use the term “representation” to mean mental representation as defined in Von Eckardt's 
MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences  entry. According to Von Eckardt, a (mental) 
representation has four important aspects: “(1) it is realized by a representation bearer; (2) 
it has content or represents one or more objects; (3) its representation relations are somehow 
‘grounded’; (4) it can be interpreted by (will serve as a representation for) some interpreter” 
(1999, 527). 
4  A metarepresentation is a “representation of a representation” or as it is sometimes labeled, 
a “higher-order representation”. 
5  Note that the notion of “coordination” and other dynamical systems conceptual tools are 
not mysterious. Not only the interaction dynamics can be mathematically expressed and 
empirically measured (Kelso 2009a) but also more importantly, it can be related to neural 
activity. Indeed, the field of second-person neuroscience is growing (Schilbach et al 2013). 
6  For example, Sommerville and colleagues (2005, 2008) demonstrated that 3-month olds focus 
on the relation between an agent and her goal if they reached for (and not merely looked at) 
a toy before observing another actor grasping it. Also 10-month olds who received active 
training in pulling a cane to retrieve a toy subsequently registered another person’s cane-
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pulling action as goal-directed behavior, while infants who underwent mere observational 
training were unable to do this.  
7 The interpersonal self grows out of the infant’s transactions with others, in particular the 
developing sense of shared experience and reciprocity. 
8  The ecological self is the sense infants develop of their own physical body as a differentiated 
and situated agent in the environment. 
9  Niedenthal et al (2001) illustrated that this mimicry plays a causal role in the processing of 
emotional expression. Participants watched one facial expression morph into another and 
had to detect when the expression changed. Some participants were free to mimic, whereas 
others were prevented from mimicking by holding a pencil laterally between their lips and 
teeth. Consistent with the embodiment hypothesis, participants free to mimic the 
expressions detected the change in emotional expression earlier (more efficiently) for any 
facial expression than did participants who were prevented from mimicking the 
expressions.  
10 EMG monitors electrical charges in muscle activity over the cheek and brow region.  
11 Automatic Mimicry occurs without external prompting and involves mere replication of a 
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